Lecture #1177
Abstract: The United Nations has largely failed to
maintain international peace and security, promote self-determination
and basic human rights, and protect fundamental freedoms. While the
conflicting interests of member states have led to many of these
failures, the U.N. system itself is partly to blame. The U.N. and its
affiliated organizations are plagued by outdated and redundant missions
and mandates, poor management, ineffectual oversight, and a general lack
of accountability. In recent years, the U.S. Congress itself has
neglected its responsibility to exercise proper oversight. Congress
should press for U.N. reform and withhold funding when necessary to
encourage reform.
The United Nations was created to maintain international peace and security, promote self-determination and basic human rights, and protect fundamental freedoms. Regrettably, the past 65 years have yielded more disappointment than success in realizing these high aspirations.
A great deal of the blame for this failure is due to divergent interests among the member states that have prevented the organization from taking decisive, timely action.
However, the U.N. system itself is partly to blame. The U.N. and many of its affiliated organizations are beset by outdated or duplicative missions and mandates, poor management practices, ineffectual oversight, and a general lack of accountability. As former U.N. Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown recently stated to The New York Times, “There’s a huge redundancy and lack of efficiency” in the U.N. system, and the budget is “utterly opaque, untransparent and completely in shadow.”[1]
These problems waste resources and undermine the U.N.’s ability to discharge its responsibilities effectively. The past six decades have seen dozens of initiatives from governments, think tanks, foundations, and panels of experts aimed at reforming the U.N. to make it more effective in meeting its responsibilities.[2] Although these reform efforts have seen rare success, for the most part they have failed due to opposition from the majority of the U.N. member states. Indeed, the U.S. almost always finds itself on the losing side in U.N. debates and votes when it proposes reforms to improve U.N. management, oversight, and accountability.
This happens because the bulk of the U.N. member states simply do not pay enough to the U.N. for inefficiency, waste, or corruption to trouble them. For instance, Sierra Leone is assessed 0.001 percent of the U.N.’s regular budget and 0.0001 percent of the peacekeeping budget. In contrast, the U.S. is assessed 22 percent and 27.1 percent, respectively. Therefore, while Sierra Leone and the dozens of other countries with the same assessments pay less than $35,000 per year to these budgets, the U.S. pays billions. With this in mind, is it surprising that the U.S. cares about how the U.N. is managed and how the funding is used, while most countries do not?
Yet these are the countries that control most of the votes. The combined assessment of the 128 least-assessed countries—two-thirds of the General Assembly—totals less than 1 percent of the U.N.’s regular budget and less than one-third of 1 percent of the peacekeeping budget, even though that group alone can, according to U.N. rules, pass the budget. These countries, combined with influential voting blocs in the U.N., can and do block U.S. attempts to implement reforms and curtail budgets.[3]
There is another problem. American administrations are often interested in pressing for reform, but frequently that long-term agenda is abandoned in favor of achieving more immediate political objectives. Pressing for reform ruffles feathers at the U.N. When the U.S. is lobbying for votes on a resolution, the last thing U.S. diplomats want to do is anger a mission by pressing for budgetary cuts or other reforms.
U.N. reform requires a longer perspective. The rare reform successes frequently share one thing in common: congressional involvement backed by the threat of financial withholding.
Regrettably, Congress has neglected its oversight role in recent years. U.N. reform legislation has not been seriously considered for years, and only a handful of U.N. oversight hearings have been held in recent years. Meanwhile, U.S. contributions to the U.N. are at an all-time high.
That is why I am very pleased that the committee decided to hold a briefing on U.N. reform. History indicates that the quickest and most effective way of convincing the U.N. to implement reforms is for Congress to be strongly involved in its oversight role and, when necessary, to drive the process forward through financial incentives.
U.S. Contributions to the U.N. at an All-Time High
The United States is facing a budgetary crisis. In the coming months and years, Congress and the Administration will grapple with tough decisions on where and how much to reduce spending. Although U.S. contributions to the U.N. system are not a large part of the budget, there is no reason to exclude those contributions from the overall effort to identify areas where taxpayer dollars could be better spent. Indeed, U.N. budgets have grown even faster than the U.S. budget over the past decade.
America’s recent contributions to the U.N. dwarf those from 10 years ago. According to the Office of Management and Budget, total U.S. contributions to the U.N. system exceeded $6.347 billion in FY 2009, compared to just $3.183 billion in FY 2001.[6] Increases have occurred throughout the U.N. system.
U.N. Regular Budget. The U.N. regular budget has more than doubled from $2.49 billion for the 2000–2001 biennium to $5.16 billion under the 2010–2011 budget approved by the General Assembly on December 23, 2009.[7] This level of growth is extraordinary. The U.N. regular budget has increased even faster than the U.S. budget over that period. Already, the U.N. Secretary-General is projecting an increase in the 2012–2013 biennial budget of more than $300 million. The U.S. is assessed 22 percent of the U.N. regular budget. The Administration’s budget for FY 2011 requested $516.3 million for the U.N. regular budget.
U.N. Peacekeeping Budget. The U.N. peacekeeping budget increased more than fourfold from $1.7 billion in 2000–2001[8] to $7.2 billion in 2010– 2011.[9] However, this does not include the possibility of new or expanded missions, such as the proposed expansion of the mission in Cote d’Ivoire or U.N. support of the African Union mission in Somalia. The U.S. is assessed more than 27 percent of the U.N. peacekeeping budget. In dollar terms, the State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities account was $2.12 billion for FY 2010.
Other U.N. Assessed Contributions. The State Department’s Contributions to International Organizations account includes contributions to the U.N. regular budget, the U.N. Capital Master Plan, the Rwandan and Yugoslavian tribunals, 11 other U.N. organizations, and a number of international organizations not affiliated with the U.N. [10] This account totaled $880.5 million in 2000 and $1.68 billion in 2010.[11] Excluding contributions to the U.N. regular budget, U.S. contributions to organizations that it categorized as part of the U.N. system were estimated at $375 million in FY 2000[12] and $645.5 million in FY 2010.[13]
Voluntary Contributions. The U.S. also provides voluntary contributions to a host of U.N. programs, funds, bodies, and other entities and supplementary support for activities also funded through the assessed budgets. It is difficult to obtain a definitive figure on these contributions because they fluctuate and can originate from parts of the U.S. government other than the State Department, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of Agriculture.[14] The State Department account for these contributions (International Organizations and Programs) was $394 million for FY 2010.[15] However, the Congressional Research Service estimated that the U.S. provided “$2.2 billion in voluntary contributions to U.N.-affiliated organizations and programs” in 2001.[16] Last fall, the President’s National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform noted that the U.S. gives the U.N. system “more than $3.5 billion in ‘voluntary’ funds each year.”[17]
When the U.S. and other governments are being forced to tighten their belts, it is reasonable to expect the U.N. and its affiliated organizations to similarly scrutinize their activities to determine how to trim their budgets to emphasize priorities. The rapid expansion of U.N. budgets over the past decade has been combined with minimal attempts at prioritization. Congress should not be shy in suggesting budgetary cuts.
Fighting for Budgetary Restraint in Turtle Bay
From the late 1980s through the 1990s, the U.S. insisted on a “zero growth” policy for the U.N. regular budget. An agreement reached in the 1980s (spurred by the Kassebaum–Solomon amendment) required the U.N. regular budget to be adopted through consensus. This gave the U.S. and other countries a “veto” over the budget. By insisting on the zero growth policy, the U.S. was, for the most part, able to hold the U.N. regular budget stable, excluding adjustments for currency fluctuations and, later, for inflation.
However, America’s desire to involve the U.N. in Iraq and Afghanistan and to fund them through the U.N. regular budget, rather than through the peacekeeping budget in which the U.S. assessment is higher, set the stage for undermining this constraint on the regular budget. These proposed U.N. missions were expensive, and the other member states insisted that they be funded through an increase in the overall U.N. regular budget rather than by forcing politically difficult fights over which programs should be cut to finance the new missions.
In the end, the U.S. acquiesced to an increased budget. Abandoning the zero growth budget policy opened the floodgates. The U.N. regular budget has more than doubled in the past 10 years. It is past time to rein in this budget.
The first step in this process is to reestablish the zero growth policy and identify the baseline for zero growth. Congress could use the dollar level of the first year of the 2010–2011 U.N. biennial budget or another amount. Once established, Congress should instruct the Administration to use its “voice and vote” to oppose any increase in the U.N. regular budget above the baseline. This freeze would, through inflation, gradually reduce the size of the budget.
However, it would also leave intact the current funding structure of the regular budget, which funds a number of activities that it should not fund. Specifically, the U.N. regular budget is broken down into 36 budget lines (or fascicles).[18] When examining the U.N. regular budget, it is quickly apparent that most fascicles fund activities that should be independently supported by the member states. For instance, the U.N. regular budget for 2010–2011 provides more than $500 million for the Economic Commission for Africa, the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. Each of these commissions claims to contribute to the economic development by promoting cooperation and integration. This may be a fine goal, but how is it unique and additive to the efforts of the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group, the regional development banks, the European Union, the African Union, ASEAN, and the other dozen or so U.N. organizations that also try to promote economic development and cooperation? This is an open question at best.
There may be a demand for the activities of the economic commissions, but it is hard to determine because they receive funding primarily through the assessed U.N. regular budget, which means that the U.S. pays 22 percent ($110 million in 2010–2011) of the economic commissions’ budgets. The U.S. should demand that the economic commissions be spun out of the regular budget and forced to support themselves through voluntary contributions as do other U.N. organizations. If they provide a valued service, they will attract support. If not, they will adapt or wither.
Some fascicles actually provide funding to largely autonomous U.N. organizations that receive independent funding. In many cases, the amount of funding that they receive from the U.N. regular budget is a small fraction of their overall budget. For instance:
These organizations may do good and valuable work, but funding them through the U.N. regular budget is unnecessary. Moreover, the amounts are minimal compared to their other sources of funding. The U.S. should try to focus the U.N. regular budget on supporting the direct activities of the main bodies of the U.N.—the Security Council, General Assembly, International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat—and have indirect activities, such as commissions, be funded independently. Such an effort could reduce the U.N. regular budget by 20 percent to 30 percent. The U.S. would then have the option of keeping its proportional share of these funds or providing them voluntarily to the same or other U.N. organizations.
Fascicles supporting activities directly related to the operation of the main U.N. bodies deserve to be included in the regular budget. However, even there, opportunities for saving millions of dollars remain unimplemented. For instance, the U.N. spends enormous amounts on translation, editing, printing, and publishing documents. Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed relocating or outsourcing these activities to lower-cost locales in 2006.[19] Little has been done to follow through on this recommendation. Similarly, the U.N. conference budget is enormous. Opportunities for telecommuting and other cost-cutting should be investigated.
Reinstate the Mandate Review and Insist on Sunsetting U.N. Mandates.
Moreover, there is a general unwillingness on the part of the member states to prioritize U.N. regular budget expenditures to accommodate new concerns. The General Assembly passed the 2005 Outcome Document, which instructed the Secretary-General to provide “analysis and recommendations, including on the opportunities for programmatic shifts that could be considered for early General Assembly consideration.”[20] The Secretary-General created a Mandate Registry[21] to provide, for the first time, a comprehensive list of the more than 9,000 individual mandates of the General Assembly, Security Council, and Economic and Social Council. However, he did not identify specific mandates for elimination or recommend programs or activities to be sunset or eliminated.
While halting and weak, this process was immensely revealing of the need for the review and illustrated the difficulties involved in trying to eliminate outdated or irrelevant mandates. For example:
Oversight and accountability at the U.N. have historically been weak. The U.N. did not have anything even resembling an inspector general until 1994, when the Office of Internal Oversight Services was created after U.S. demands for such an office. Earlier this decade, three major scandals—the corruption in the Iraqi Oil-for-Food program, sexual abuse committed by U.N. peacekeepers, and corruption and mismanagement in U.N. procurement—spurred calls for stronger oversight and accountability.[27] The scandals provoked a series of U.N. reports and resolutions identifying the problems and proposing solutions. Regrettably, these efforts largely have been weak or temporary.
The Ethics Office and Whistleblower Protections. The General Assembly instructed the Secretary-General in 2005 “to scrupulously apply the existing standards of conduct and develop a system-wide code of ethics for all United Nations personnel [and] submit details on an ethics office with independent status.”[28] The Secretary-General adopted a whistleblower protection policy in 2005, and the General Assembly approved resources for a new Ethics Office charged with enforcing that policy. Regrettably, the authority of the Ethics Office was quickly crippled in a dispute with the U.N. Development Programme. When the UNDP fired a whistleblower in March 2007, the Ethics Office investigated and concluded that the firing was retaliatory. The UNDP rejected the conclusions of the Ethics Office and rejected its authority over the UNDP. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon sided with the UNDP against his own Ethics Office and released a bulletin allowing each “separately administered organ or programme” to establish its own Ethics Office equivalent and its own ethics standards and procedures.[29] As the Government Accountability Project observed:
The weak nature of the financial disclosure policy is troubling. As the Secretary-General notes, disclosure “demonstrates that U.N. staff members understand the importance of the general public and U.N. Member States being assured that, in the discharge of their official duties and responsibilities, staff members will not be influenced by any consideration associated with his/her private interests.”[33] The unwillingness of the Secretary-General to require even a minimum level of public financial disclosure for high-level U.N. officials undermines accountability and, considering U.N. privileges and immunities, inhibits the ability of national authorities to investigate alleged crimes and wrongdoing.
Procurement Task Force (PTF). When the extent of U.N. fraud and mismanagement in the Iraqi Oil-for-Food program became clear, the U.S. was able to convince the U.N. to create the Procurement Task Force to investigate and pursue allegations of fraud and mismanagement. The PTF began work in January 2006 and over the next three years uncovered fraud, waste, and mismanagement in U.N. procurement and other activities involving contracts valued at more than $630 million. The evidence unearthed by the PTF led to misconduct findings against 17 U.N. officials and the conviction of a senior U.N. procurement official. Regrettably, the PTF did its job too well. As punishment for pursuing cases against Singaporean and Russian nationals, those countries led a successful effort to eliminate the PTF in December 2008.[34]
Across the board, U.N. oversight and auditing capabilities suffer from insufficient resources, political pressure, and a lack of institutional support. Indeed, a recent report by the U.N. Joint Inspection Unit concluded that U.N. auditors are underqualified, underresourced, and lack institutional support.[35] Although the U.N. has a few other oversight bodies (the Joint Inspection Unit, the Independent Audit Advisory Committee, and the Board of Auditors), the day-to-day tasks of oversight and investigations fall to the OIOS. As detailed in a leaked internal report to Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon from Under-Secretary-General Inga-Britt Ahlenius, who was in charge of the OIOS until last summer, the OIOS is subject to political pressure that undermines its independence. Among the harsh assessments relayed by Ahlenius:
The U.N. needs more transparency, accountability and independent oversight, and the U.S. should insist on them. To address these problems, Congress should:
One of the United Nations’ primary responsibilities is to help to maintain international peace and security. U.N. peacekeeping debacles in the 1990s led to a necessary reevaluation of U.N. peacekeeping. However, as troubling situations have arisen in recent years, many of them in Africa, the Security Council has found itself under pressure to respond and “do something” even though it may violate the central lesson learned in the 1990s that “the United Nations does not wage war.”
At the end of November 2010, U.N. peacekeeping had more than 123,000 personnel involved in U.N. peacekeeping, political, or peace-building operations, including international and local civilian personnel and U.N. volunteers. The U.N. is currently overseeing the deployment of more uniformed personnel than any single nation except the United States has deployed outside of its borders. As a result, U.N. peacekeeping is now being conducted with unprecedented pace, scope, and ambition. Increasing demands have revealed ongoing, serious flaws.
Substantial Mismanagement, Fraud, and Corruption in Procurement. Audits and investigations over the past few years have revealed substantial mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in procurement for U.N. peacekeeping. An OIOS audit of $1 billion in U.N. peacekeeping procurement contracts over a six-year period found that at least $265 million was subject to waste, fraud, or abuse.[39] According to a 2007 OIOS report, an examination of $1.4 billion of peacekeeping contracts turned up “significant” corruption schemes that tainted $619 million (over 40 percent) of the contracts.[40] An audit of the U.N. mission in Sudan revealed tens of millions of dollars lost to mismanagement and waste and exposed substantial indications of fraud and corruption.[41] Moreover, the OIOS revealed in 2008 that it was investigating approximately 250 instances of wrongdoing ranging from sexual abuse by peacekeepers to financial irregularities. According to Ahlenius, “We can say that we found mismanagement and fraud and corruption to an extent we didn’t really expect.”[42]
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. Incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers and civilian personnel are widespread and often go unpunished. There have been numerous reports of U.N. personnel committing serious crimes and sexual misconduct, from rape to the forced prostitution of women and young girls. U.N. personnel have also been accused of sexual exploitation and abuse in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.[43] The U.S. and other member states successfully pressured the U.N. to adopt stricter requirements for peacekeeping troops and their contributing countries. Contact and discipline teams are now present in most U.N. peacekeeping missions, and troops are now required to undergo briefing and training on behavior and conduct.[44] However, these crimes continue,[45] and the U.N. reported that allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. civilian and uniformed personnel totaled 106 in 2009 and 83 in 2010.[46]
The U.S. should support U.N. peacekeeping operations when they further America’s national interests. Legitimate questions must be asked as to whether the U.N. should be engaging in the current number of missions and whether these situations are best addressed through the U.N. or through regional, multilateral, or ad hoc efforts.
U.N. peacekeeping operations can be useful and successful if employed with an awareness of their limitations and weaknesses. This awareness is crucial because the demand for U.N. peacekeeping shows little indication of declining in the foreseeable future. This requires the U.S. to press for substantial changes to address serious problems with U.N. peacekeeping. Without fundamental reform, serious problems will likely continue and expand, undermining the U.N.’s credibility and ability to accomplish the key mission of helping to maintain international peace and security. To address this, Congress should:
The U.N. Human Rights Council
The U.N. Human Rights Council was created in 2006 to replace the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, which had failed to hold governments to account for violating basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. During negotiations to establish the council, many basic reforms and membership standards were proposed to ensure that the council would not simply repeat the commission’s failures, but few reforms received sufficient support in the General Assembly.[47] As a result, the Human Rights Council has performed no better—and in some ways worse—than the commission it replaced.
Anticipating this outcome, the Bush Administration decided not to seek a seat on the council in 2006. Based on the council’s subsequent disappointing record, the U.S. again declined to seek a seat in 2007 and 2008. The Bush Administration also withheld a portion of the U.S. contribution to the U.N. regular budget equivalent to the part that would be allocated to the council and distanced itself from the council’s proceedings except in instances of “deep national interest.”[48]
The Obama Administration disagreed with the Bush Administration policy. It sought and won a seat on the council in 2009. Although the U.S. has been able to usher some positive resolutions through the council, such as the establishment of a U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Association, and to support resolutions addressing some human rights situations, the more fundamental problems of the Human Rights Council remain:
The council’s performance is unlikely to improve without drastic reforms to improve its membership, such as barring states with grave human rights violations from membership and requiring competitive elections. The best opportunity to implement such reforms will be at the U.N. General Assembly’s mandatory five-year review of “the status of the Council,” which is required by the resolution that created the council. The review must be conducted in 2011. To provide backing to U.S. efforts to reform the Human Rights Council, Congress should:
The dozens of independent and semi-autonomous organizations and bodies in the U.N. system receive billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars each year. No organization is without problems, but few are without any positive elements. Too often, however, the U.S. fails to ensure that the benefits of these organizations meet their costs.
Congress should assess the merits of each organization and the extent to which it supports U.S. interests. This process should inform every authorization and appropriations decision. Congress may decide that some of them provide vital services that serve U.S. interests and those of other nations. Some of the more technical U.N. organizations perform low-key, but useful tasks. Other U.N. organizations provide little benefit to justify U.S. contributions. For instance, few, if any, U.S. interests were harmed by the U.S. absence from UNESCO for two decades. Few, if any, core U.S. interests have been significantly advanced since the U.S. returned to UNESCO in 2003. The dubious merits of UNESCO membership cost U.S. taxpayers $81 million in 2010.
Congress should also keep in mind that voluntarily funded organizations are generally more responsive to the concerns of the member states because they know that a member state could choose to reduce or suspend funding if it ignores the concerns raised by that country. Organizations funded through assessed budgets are generally less responsive and, with the U.S. State Department concurring, insist that the U.S. is under a legal obligation to pay them regardless of U.S. concerns. Although Congress has ignored this argument repeatedly in the past, it carries weight. Shifting activities funded currently through assessed budgets to voluntary funding would make it easier for Congress to support the programs that it wishes and withhold funding for those it does not. Having U.N. organizations compete for funding would also contribute to efficiency and effectiveness and improve responsiveness to member state requests. With this in mind, Congress should:
Reams of reports on U.N. reform over the past decade[59] have resulted in too little action to streamline the U.N. bureaucracy, reduce expenditures, or improve oversight, transparency, and accountability. U.N. reforms endorsed by the General Assembly in the 2005 Outcome Document have lain moribund or been poorly designed, implemented, or enforced. In some cases, reforms have been reversed. Specifically, oversight and accountability have been undermined. Transparency and ethics reforms have been adopted, but fecklessly and with little enforcement. Efforts to streamline U.N. mandates have been abandoned. The Human Rights Council is no better than the commission it replaced. Peacekeeping remains troubled by misconduct and mismanagement.
The failure to reform the U.N. has resulted in a system that remains bureaucratic, costly, cumbersome, lacking in oversight, and often incapable of fulfilling the responsibilities placed upon it. These failings sully the reputation of the U.N. and call into question proposals to give the U.N. more authority or a more central role in addressing international problems. Without fundamental reform, the problems hindering the U.N. will likely continue and expand, undermining the U.N.’s ability to support and advance U.S. interests.
Involvement by Congress in pressing for U.N. reform is entirely appropriate. The power of the purse places clear responsibility on Congress to ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars are used prudently. History shows that paying U.S. assessments and providing voluntary funds without demanding specific changes removes a powerful leverage point for encouraging reform.
The reality is that few countries are interested in making sure that the U.N. has adequate oversight and accountability, uses its resources efficiently, and prunes activities that are outdated, duplicative, or irrelevant. Most pay the U.N. a pittance and, therefore, have nothing at stake. If the U.S. does not press this issue, no other nation is likely to step forward.
—Brett D. Schaefer is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation and editor of ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations and the Search for Alternatives (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009). He delivered these remarks in testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs on January 25, 2011.
The United Nations was created to maintain international peace and security, promote self-determination and basic human rights, and protect fundamental freedoms. Regrettably, the past 65 years have yielded more disappointment than success in realizing these high aspirations.
A great deal of the blame for this failure is due to divergent interests among the member states that have prevented the organization from taking decisive, timely action.
However, the U.N. system itself is partly to blame. The U.N. and many of its affiliated organizations are beset by outdated or duplicative missions and mandates, poor management practices, ineffectual oversight, and a general lack of accountability. As former U.N. Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown recently stated to The New York Times, “There’s a huge redundancy and lack of efficiency” in the U.N. system, and the budget is “utterly opaque, untransparent and completely in shadow.”[1]
These problems waste resources and undermine the U.N.’s ability to discharge its responsibilities effectively. The past six decades have seen dozens of initiatives from governments, think tanks, foundations, and panels of experts aimed at reforming the U.N. to make it more effective in meeting its responsibilities.[2] Although these reform efforts have seen rare success, for the most part they have failed due to opposition from the majority of the U.N. member states. Indeed, the U.S. almost always finds itself on the losing side in U.N. debates and votes when it proposes reforms to improve U.N. management, oversight, and accountability.
This happens because the bulk of the U.N. member states simply do not pay enough to the U.N. for inefficiency, waste, or corruption to trouble them. For instance, Sierra Leone is assessed 0.001 percent of the U.N.’s regular budget and 0.0001 percent of the peacekeeping budget. In contrast, the U.S. is assessed 22 percent and 27.1 percent, respectively. Therefore, while Sierra Leone and the dozens of other countries with the same assessments pay less than $35,000 per year to these budgets, the U.S. pays billions. With this in mind, is it surprising that the U.S. cares about how the U.N. is managed and how the funding is used, while most countries do not?
Yet these are the countries that control most of the votes. The combined assessment of the 128 least-assessed countries—two-thirds of the General Assembly—totals less than 1 percent of the U.N.’s regular budget and less than one-third of 1 percent of the peacekeeping budget, even though that group alone can, according to U.N. rules, pass the budget. These countries, combined with influential voting blocs in the U.N., can and do block U.S. attempts to implement reforms and curtail budgets.[3]
There is another problem. American administrations are often interested in pressing for reform, but frequently that long-term agenda is abandoned in favor of achieving more immediate political objectives. Pressing for reform ruffles feathers at the U.N. When the U.S. is lobbying for votes on a resolution, the last thing U.S. diplomats want to do is anger a mission by pressing for budgetary cuts or other reforms.
U.N. reform requires a longer perspective. The rare reform successes frequently share one thing in common: congressional involvement backed by the threat of financial withholding.
- After failing to arrest rapid growth in the U.N. budget in the early 1980s, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick testified, “The countries which contribute more than 85 percent of the U.N. budget regularly vote against that budget, but are unable to prevent its increases because the countries who pay less than 10 percent of the budget have the votes.”[4] This led Congress to pass the 1985 Kassebaum– Solomon amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal year (FY) 1986 and FY 1987, which withheld 20 percent of U.S. assessed contributions to the U.N. regular budget and specialized agencies until weighted voting on budgetary matters was adopted. Weighted voting was not adopted, but the U.N. did agree in 1986 to the consensus-based budgeting process as an informal rule. In effect, this gave each country an informal veto over the budget, which helped greatly to constrain budget growth. Although this arrangement broke down in the mid-2000s, it provides a key insight into U.N. budgetary reform.[5]
- After former U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, who served as U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management in 1992 and 1993, informed Congress of his failed attempts to persuade Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to clamp down on mismanagement and waste, Congress decided to withhold U.N. funds until the General Assembly created an inspector general to monitor, audit, and inspect U.N. operations. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) was created in 1994 as the U.N.’s primary investigative and auditing unit. Although it lacks true independence and is understaffed, the OIOS has contributed to savings and has exposed instances of mismanagement.
- As a condition for payment of accumulated arrears to the U.N., Congress specified a series of reform benchmarks in the Helms–Biden United Nations Reform Act of 1999. Among other conditions, the legislation required the U.N. to reduce the U.S. assessments for the regular budget and the U.S. peacekeeping budget. The U.N. reduced the U.S. regular budget assessment to 22 percent and reduced America’s peacekeeping assessment, albeit not to the 25 percent sought by the U.S.
Regrettably, Congress has neglected its oversight role in recent years. U.N. reform legislation has not been seriously considered for years, and only a handful of U.N. oversight hearings have been held in recent years. Meanwhile, U.S. contributions to the U.N. are at an all-time high.
That is why I am very pleased that the committee decided to hold a briefing on U.N. reform. History indicates that the quickest and most effective way of convincing the U.N. to implement reforms is for Congress to be strongly involved in its oversight role and, when necessary, to drive the process forward through financial incentives.
U.S. Contributions to the U.N. at an All-Time High
The United States is facing a budgetary crisis. In the coming months and years, Congress and the Administration will grapple with tough decisions on where and how much to reduce spending. Although U.S. contributions to the U.N. system are not a large part of the budget, there is no reason to exclude those contributions from the overall effort to identify areas where taxpayer dollars could be better spent. Indeed, U.N. budgets have grown even faster than the U.S. budget over the past decade.
America’s recent contributions to the U.N. dwarf those from 10 years ago. According to the Office of Management and Budget, total U.S. contributions to the U.N. system exceeded $6.347 billion in FY 2009, compared to just $3.183 billion in FY 2001.[6] Increases have occurred throughout the U.N. system.
U.N. Regular Budget. The U.N. regular budget has more than doubled from $2.49 billion for the 2000–2001 biennium to $5.16 billion under the 2010–2011 budget approved by the General Assembly on December 23, 2009.[7] This level of growth is extraordinary. The U.N. regular budget has increased even faster than the U.S. budget over that period. Already, the U.N. Secretary-General is projecting an increase in the 2012–2013 biennial budget of more than $300 million. The U.S. is assessed 22 percent of the U.N. regular budget. The Administration’s budget for FY 2011 requested $516.3 million for the U.N. regular budget.
U.N. Peacekeeping Budget. The U.N. peacekeeping budget increased more than fourfold from $1.7 billion in 2000–2001[8] to $7.2 billion in 2010– 2011.[9] However, this does not include the possibility of new or expanded missions, such as the proposed expansion of the mission in Cote d’Ivoire or U.N. support of the African Union mission in Somalia. The U.S. is assessed more than 27 percent of the U.N. peacekeeping budget. In dollar terms, the State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities account was $2.12 billion for FY 2010.
Other U.N. Assessed Contributions. The State Department’s Contributions to International Organizations account includes contributions to the U.N. regular budget, the U.N. Capital Master Plan, the Rwandan and Yugoslavian tribunals, 11 other U.N. organizations, and a number of international organizations not affiliated with the U.N. [10] This account totaled $880.5 million in 2000 and $1.68 billion in 2010.[11] Excluding contributions to the U.N. regular budget, U.S. contributions to organizations that it categorized as part of the U.N. system were estimated at $375 million in FY 2000[12] and $645.5 million in FY 2010.[13]
Voluntary Contributions. The U.S. also provides voluntary contributions to a host of U.N. programs, funds, bodies, and other entities and supplementary support for activities also funded through the assessed budgets. It is difficult to obtain a definitive figure on these contributions because they fluctuate and can originate from parts of the U.S. government other than the State Department, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of Agriculture.[14] The State Department account for these contributions (International Organizations and Programs) was $394 million for FY 2010.[15] However, the Congressional Research Service estimated that the U.S. provided “$2.2 billion in voluntary contributions to U.N.-affiliated organizations and programs” in 2001.[16] Last fall, the President’s National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform noted that the U.S. gives the U.N. system “more than $3.5 billion in ‘voluntary’ funds each year.”[17]
When the U.S. and other governments are being forced to tighten their belts, it is reasonable to expect the U.N. and its affiliated organizations to similarly scrutinize their activities to determine how to trim their budgets to emphasize priorities. The rapid expansion of U.N. budgets over the past decade has been combined with minimal attempts at prioritization. Congress should not be shy in suggesting budgetary cuts.
Fighting for Budgetary Restraint in Turtle Bay
From the late 1980s through the 1990s, the U.S. insisted on a “zero growth” policy for the U.N. regular budget. An agreement reached in the 1980s (spurred by the Kassebaum–Solomon amendment) required the U.N. regular budget to be adopted through consensus. This gave the U.S. and other countries a “veto” over the budget. By insisting on the zero growth policy, the U.S. was, for the most part, able to hold the U.N. regular budget stable, excluding adjustments for currency fluctuations and, later, for inflation.
However, America’s desire to involve the U.N. in Iraq and Afghanistan and to fund them through the U.N. regular budget, rather than through the peacekeeping budget in which the U.S. assessment is higher, set the stage for undermining this constraint on the regular budget. These proposed U.N. missions were expensive, and the other member states insisted that they be funded through an increase in the overall U.N. regular budget rather than by forcing politically difficult fights over which programs should be cut to finance the new missions.
In the end, the U.S. acquiesced to an increased budget. Abandoning the zero growth budget policy opened the floodgates. The U.N. regular budget has more than doubled in the past 10 years. It is past time to rein in this budget.
The first step in this process is to reestablish the zero growth policy and identify the baseline for zero growth. Congress could use the dollar level of the first year of the 2010–2011 U.N. biennial budget or another amount. Once established, Congress should instruct the Administration to use its “voice and vote” to oppose any increase in the U.N. regular budget above the baseline. This freeze would, through inflation, gradually reduce the size of the budget.
However, it would also leave intact the current funding structure of the regular budget, which funds a number of activities that it should not fund. Specifically, the U.N. regular budget is broken down into 36 budget lines (or fascicles).[18] When examining the U.N. regular budget, it is quickly apparent that most fascicles fund activities that should be independently supported by the member states. For instance, the U.N. regular budget for 2010–2011 provides more than $500 million for the Economic Commission for Africa, the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. Each of these commissions claims to contribute to the economic development by promoting cooperation and integration. This may be a fine goal, but how is it unique and additive to the efforts of the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group, the regional development banks, the European Union, the African Union, ASEAN, and the other dozen or so U.N. organizations that also try to promote economic development and cooperation? This is an open question at best.
There may be a demand for the activities of the economic commissions, but it is hard to determine because they receive funding primarily through the assessed U.N. regular budget, which means that the U.S. pays 22 percent ($110 million in 2010–2011) of the economic commissions’ budgets. The U.S. should demand that the economic commissions be spun out of the regular budget and forced to support themselves through voluntary contributions as do other U.N. organizations. If they provide a valued service, they will attract support. If not, they will adapt or wither.
Some fascicles actually provide funding to largely autonomous U.N. organizations that receive independent funding. In many cases, the amount of funding that they receive from the U.N. regular budget is a small fraction of their overall budget. For instance:
- The U.N. Environment Program (UNEP) received $14.3 million from the 2010–2011 U.N. regular budget, but is projected to receive more than $420 million in voluntary extrabudgetary funding.
- The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in the Near East was provided $48.6 million from the 2010–2011 U.N. regular budget, but was projected to receive more than $2 billion in voluntary extrabudgetary funding.
These organizations may do good and valuable work, but funding them through the U.N. regular budget is unnecessary. Moreover, the amounts are minimal compared to their other sources of funding. The U.S. should try to focus the U.N. regular budget on supporting the direct activities of the main bodies of the U.N.—the Security Council, General Assembly, International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat—and have indirect activities, such as commissions, be funded independently. Such an effort could reduce the U.N. regular budget by 20 percent to 30 percent. The U.S. would then have the option of keeping its proportional share of these funds or providing them voluntarily to the same or other U.N. organizations.
Fascicles supporting activities directly related to the operation of the main U.N. bodies deserve to be included in the regular budget. However, even there, opportunities for saving millions of dollars remain unimplemented. For instance, the U.N. spends enormous amounts on translation, editing, printing, and publishing documents. Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed relocating or outsourcing these activities to lower-cost locales in 2006.[19] Little has been done to follow through on this recommendation. Similarly, the U.N. conference budget is enormous. Opportunities for telecommuting and other cost-cutting should be investigated.
Reinstate the Mandate Review and Insist on Sunsetting U.N. Mandates.
Moreover, there is a general unwillingness on the part of the member states to prioritize U.N. regular budget expenditures to accommodate new concerns. The General Assembly passed the 2005 Outcome Document, which instructed the Secretary-General to provide “analysis and recommendations, including on the opportunities for programmatic shifts that could be considered for early General Assembly consideration.”[20] The Secretary-General created a Mandate Registry[21] to provide, for the first time, a comprehensive list of the more than 9,000 individual mandates of the General Assembly, Security Council, and Economic and Social Council. However, he did not identify specific mandates for elimination or recommend programs or activities to be sunset or eliminated.
While halting and weak, this process was immensely revealing of the need for the review and illustrated the difficulties involved in trying to eliminate outdated or irrelevant mandates. For example:
- Mandates dating back decades remain active. For instance, according to the registry, there is an active, recurrent mandate adopted in 1946 regarding “the possible transfer of certain functions, activities and assets of the League of Nations.” A 1956 resolution, renewed within the past five years, calls on the U.N. to assist a committee examining the “effects of atomic radiation.”[22] This mandate became largely redundant in 1957 with the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but it remains in effect.
- Lack of implementation. Opposition by a number of member states has stalled the mandate review, and the mandate registry has not been updated since 2006. Only a very small number of mandates have been eliminated.[23] The most recent report from the co-chairmen of the mandate review was issued in August 2008. It concluded that only 155 (56 percent) of the 279 mandates in the Humanitarian cluster were “current and relevant” and that only 18 (35 percent) of the 52 mandates in the African Development cluster were current and relevant.[24] There is no evidence that the outdated or irrelevant mandates have been terminated or altered to improve their relevance. In a sad twist, the General Assembly and the Secretariat have instead quietly killed the mandate review process because it provided a basis and methodology for eliminating mandates.
- Restore the U.S. policy of zero growth for the U.N. regular budget. The U.S. zero growth policy for the U.N. budget helped to constrain growth in the late 1980s and 1990s. Congress should endorse a zero nominal growth policy and establish a baseline for the U.N. regular budget as the dollar cap on which the U.S. will pay its assessed contributions to the U.N. regular budget for future years. Congress should instruct the Administration to use its “voice and vote” to oppose any increase in overall resources and staff for the U.N. regular budget.
- Hold hearings on the U.N. regular budget and insist that the Administration seek to end the practice of funding non-core activities through that budget. Focusing the U.N. regular budget on supporting the activities of the main U.N. bodies could reduce the U.N. regular budget by 20 percent to 30 percent. Seeking cost savings through outsourcing, telecommuting, and other measures proposed in previous U.N. reports should also be explored.
- Establish a stronger relationship between U.N. budget decisions and financial contributions. The divorce between obligations and decision making is perhaps the greatest cause of the decades-long intransigence on U.N. reform. If the U.N. is to be a more effective, efficient, and accountable body, budgetary decision making must be linked to financial responsibilities. One way is for the U.N. to adopt a system of voting on budgetary matters that gives major donors a greater say in budgetary decisions.[25] If that is not possible, at least the financial burden should be spread across the U.N. membership more evenly by adjusting the scale of assessments.
- Insist that the U.N. revitalize the mandate review. A robust review of U.N. mandates accompanied by U.S. demands that outdated, irrelevant, or duplicative mandates be eliminated could save tens, even hundreds, of millions of dollars. To support this, Congress should seek to have the U.N. adopt sunset clauses for all mandates so that they that would automatically terminate after the biennium unless they have been certified as relevant by the review.
- Keep the U.S. account current. The U.N. has retained funds owed to American taxpayers from the Tax Equalization Fund and possibly from other accounts.[26] These funds involve hundreds of millions of dollars. Congress should pass legislation instructing the Administration to seek reimbursement of all the amounts appropriated by Congress for various purposes to the U.N. or its affiliated agencies that were not expended at the end of each calendar or fiscal year as appropriate or that are otherwise owed to the U.S.
Oversight and accountability at the U.N. have historically been weak. The U.N. did not have anything even resembling an inspector general until 1994, when the Office of Internal Oversight Services was created after U.S. demands for such an office. Earlier this decade, three major scandals—the corruption in the Iraqi Oil-for-Food program, sexual abuse committed by U.N. peacekeepers, and corruption and mismanagement in U.N. procurement—spurred calls for stronger oversight and accountability.[27] The scandals provoked a series of U.N. reports and resolutions identifying the problems and proposing solutions. Regrettably, these efforts largely have been weak or temporary.
The Ethics Office and Whistleblower Protections. The General Assembly instructed the Secretary-General in 2005 “to scrupulously apply the existing standards of conduct and develop a system-wide code of ethics for all United Nations personnel [and] submit details on an ethics office with independent status.”[28] The Secretary-General adopted a whistleblower protection policy in 2005, and the General Assembly approved resources for a new Ethics Office charged with enforcing that policy. Regrettably, the authority of the Ethics Office was quickly crippled in a dispute with the U.N. Development Programme. When the UNDP fired a whistleblower in March 2007, the Ethics Office investigated and concluded that the firing was retaliatory. The UNDP rejected the conclusions of the Ethics Office and rejected its authority over the UNDP. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon sided with the UNDP against his own Ethics Office and released a bulletin allowing each “separately administered organ or programme” to establish its own Ethics Office equivalent and its own ethics standards and procedures.[29] As the Government Accountability Project observed:
[W]histleblower policies at the U.N. Secretariat, UNDP, WFP, U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA), [are] inconsistent, weakened by arbitrary loopholes and, on the whole, less comprehensive than the original U.N. policy established in 2005. These policies should be rewritten to, at a minimum, meet the standards set out in the original U.N. policy.[30]Financial Disclosure. U.N. financial disclosure requirements on U.N. staff above a certain level were adopted in 2006.[31] Most U.N. employees subject to disclosure requirements submit their forms, and summaries are posted online.[32] However, public disclosure of financial interests is entirely voluntary. In most cases, covered U.N. employees submit the following statement: “In accordance with General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/238, I have chosen to maintain the confidentiality of the information disclosed by me in order to comply with the Financial Disclosure Programme.” Even those choosing to disclose some information typically provide only the broadest details, such as stating that they own a home or have a checking account.
The weak nature of the financial disclosure policy is troubling. As the Secretary-General notes, disclosure “demonstrates that U.N. staff members understand the importance of the general public and U.N. Member States being assured that, in the discharge of their official duties and responsibilities, staff members will not be influenced by any consideration associated with his/her private interests.”[33] The unwillingness of the Secretary-General to require even a minimum level of public financial disclosure for high-level U.N. officials undermines accountability and, considering U.N. privileges and immunities, inhibits the ability of national authorities to investigate alleged crimes and wrongdoing.
Procurement Task Force (PTF). When the extent of U.N. fraud and mismanagement in the Iraqi Oil-for-Food program became clear, the U.S. was able to convince the U.N. to create the Procurement Task Force to investigate and pursue allegations of fraud and mismanagement. The PTF began work in January 2006 and over the next three years uncovered fraud, waste, and mismanagement in U.N. procurement and other activities involving contracts valued at more than $630 million. The evidence unearthed by the PTF led to misconduct findings against 17 U.N. officials and the conviction of a senior U.N. procurement official. Regrettably, the PTF did its job too well. As punishment for pursuing cases against Singaporean and Russian nationals, those countries led a successful effort to eliminate the PTF in December 2008.[34]
Across the board, U.N. oversight and auditing capabilities suffer from insufficient resources, political pressure, and a lack of institutional support. Indeed, a recent report by the U.N. Joint Inspection Unit concluded that U.N. auditors are underqualified, underresourced, and lack institutional support.[35] Although the U.N. has a few other oversight bodies (the Joint Inspection Unit, the Independent Audit Advisory Committee, and the Board of Auditors), the day-to-day tasks of oversight and investigations fall to the OIOS. As detailed in a leaked internal report to Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon from Under-Secretary-General Inga-Britt Ahlenius, who was in charge of the OIOS until last summer, the OIOS is subject to political pressure that undermines its independence. Among the harsh assessments relayed by Ahlenius:
There is no transparency, there is lack of accountability. Rather than supporting the internal oversight which is the sign of strong leadership and good governance, you have strived to control it which is to undermine its position. I do not see any signs of reform in the Organization.The absence of a truly independent U.N. inspector general is a serious problem as is the ad hoc and weak nature of U.N. transparency and accountability. It underscores the U.N.’s irresponsibility in refusing to extend the mandate of the independent Procurement Task Force, which was taking great strides in uncovering mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in U.N. procurement. Since the PTF’s demise, its investigations have fallen to the OIOS to pursue, but those investigations into mismanagement, fraud, and corruption have not been actively pursued.[37]
I regret to say that the [U.N.] Secretariat now is in a process of decay. It is not only falling apart into silos—the secretariat is drifting, to use the words of one of my senior colleagues. It is drifting into irrelevance….
Your actions are not only deplorable, but seriously reprehensible. No U.N. Secretary-General before you has questioned the authority delegated to the [undersecretary-general of OIOS] to appoint the staff in OIOS. Your action is without precedent and in my opinion seriously embarrassing for yourself.[36]
The U.N. needs more transparency, accountability and independent oversight, and the U.S. should insist on them. To address these problems, Congress should:
- Demand that the U.N. adopt a rule mandating that U.N. officials publicly disclose in some detail their financial disclosure reports and permitting law enforcement authorities access to the full financial disclosure information upon formal request. The policy was adopted to increase transparency and accountability, but the implementation has only served to continue past opacity.
- Enhance U.N. ethics standards and whistleblower protections. Congress and the Administration should solicit advice from experts on whistleblower and ethics standards on how to improve U.N. rules, regulations, and practices and apply them across the U.N. system.
- Demand independent funding for the OIOS and clear authority for the Under-Secretary-General to hire and fire staff. The Ahlenius report revealed that she felt that the independence and integrity of the OIOS were under assault by the Secretariat. The duties of an inspector general require independence, and the OIOS needs to be insulated from political interference in the conduct of its duties. As observed by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, “U.N. funding arrangements constrain OIOS’s ability to operate independently as mandated by the General Assembly and required by international auditing standards that OIOS has adopted.”[38] This continues to be a problem that Congress should seek to address. As a standard procedure, OIOS reports should also be made publicly available on its Web site.
One of the United Nations’ primary responsibilities is to help to maintain international peace and security. U.N. peacekeeping debacles in the 1990s led to a necessary reevaluation of U.N. peacekeeping. However, as troubling situations have arisen in recent years, many of them in Africa, the Security Council has found itself under pressure to respond and “do something” even though it may violate the central lesson learned in the 1990s that “the United Nations does not wage war.”
At the end of November 2010, U.N. peacekeeping had more than 123,000 personnel involved in U.N. peacekeeping, political, or peace-building operations, including international and local civilian personnel and U.N. volunteers. The U.N. is currently overseeing the deployment of more uniformed personnel than any single nation except the United States has deployed outside of its borders. As a result, U.N. peacekeeping is now being conducted with unprecedented pace, scope, and ambition. Increasing demands have revealed ongoing, serious flaws.
Substantial Mismanagement, Fraud, and Corruption in Procurement. Audits and investigations over the past few years have revealed substantial mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in procurement for U.N. peacekeeping. An OIOS audit of $1 billion in U.N. peacekeeping procurement contracts over a six-year period found that at least $265 million was subject to waste, fraud, or abuse.[39] According to a 2007 OIOS report, an examination of $1.4 billion of peacekeeping contracts turned up “significant” corruption schemes that tainted $619 million (over 40 percent) of the contracts.[40] An audit of the U.N. mission in Sudan revealed tens of millions of dollars lost to mismanagement and waste and exposed substantial indications of fraud and corruption.[41] Moreover, the OIOS revealed in 2008 that it was investigating approximately 250 instances of wrongdoing ranging from sexual abuse by peacekeepers to financial irregularities. According to Ahlenius, “We can say that we found mismanagement and fraud and corruption to an extent we didn’t really expect.”[42]
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. Incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers and civilian personnel are widespread and often go unpunished. There have been numerous reports of U.N. personnel committing serious crimes and sexual misconduct, from rape to the forced prostitution of women and young girls. U.N. personnel have also been accused of sexual exploitation and abuse in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.[43] The U.S. and other member states successfully pressured the U.N. to adopt stricter requirements for peacekeeping troops and their contributing countries. Contact and discipline teams are now present in most U.N. peacekeeping missions, and troops are now required to undergo briefing and training on behavior and conduct.[44] However, these crimes continue,[45] and the U.N. reported that allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. civilian and uniformed personnel totaled 106 in 2009 and 83 in 2010.[46]
The U.S. should support U.N. peacekeeping operations when they further America’s national interests. Legitimate questions must be asked as to whether the U.N. should be engaging in the current number of missions and whether these situations are best addressed through the U.N. or through regional, multilateral, or ad hoc efforts.
U.N. peacekeeping operations can be useful and successful if employed with an awareness of their limitations and weaknesses. This awareness is crucial because the demand for U.N. peacekeeping shows little indication of declining in the foreseeable future. This requires the U.S. to press for substantial changes to address serious problems with U.N. peacekeeping. Without fundamental reform, serious problems will likely continue and expand, undermining the U.N.’s credibility and ability to accomplish the key mission of helping to maintain international peace and security. To address this, Congress should:
- Evaluate long-running U.N. peacekeeping missions. The U.S. should re-evaluate all U.N. operations that date back to the early 1990s or earlier—some date back to the 1940s—to determine whether each U.N. mission is contributing to resolving the situation or retarding that process. If an operation is not demonstrably facilitating resolution of the situation, the U.N. should emulate the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) model in which Greece and Cyprus pay for over 40 percent of the mission’s cost. Stakeholders wishing to continue U.N. peacekeeping operations that have not resolved the conflicts despite being in place for decades should be asked to assume the financial burden of the continued operation. These missions are generally small and among the least costly, but such a re-evaluation would help to reduce the enormous peacekeeping budget and send a welcome message of accountability and assessment that too often has been lacking in the rubber-stamp process of reauthorizing peacekeeping operations. Together, five of the older U.N. missions (MINURSO, UNFICYP, UNDOF, UNMOGIP, and UNTSO) cost nearly $243 million. If the U.S. could shift these missions to voluntary funding, the U.S. could save more than $54 million per year and perhaps focus the most affected parties on resolving these outstanding disputes.
- Build up peacekeeping capabilities around the world, particularly in Africa. The U.N. has no standing armed forces and is entirely dependent on member states to donate troops and other personnel to fulfill peace operation mandates. This is appropriate. Nations should maintain control of their armed forces and refuse to support the establishment of armed forces outside of direct national oversight and responsibility. However, the current arrangement results in an ad hoc system plagued by delays and other shortfalls. Congress should support increasing peacekeeping resources under its Global Peace Operations Initiative, which has significantly bolstered the capacity and capabilities of regional troops, particularly in Africa, to serve as peacekeepers for the U.N., the African Union, or other coalitions.
- Enforce standards of conduct for civilian and military personnel participating in U.N. peace operations. If the U.N. is to end sexual exploitation, abuse, and other misconduct by peacekeepers, it must do more than adopt a U.N. code of conduct, issue manuals, and send abusers home. The abusers and their governments must face real consequences to create incentives for effective enforcement. Member states must commit to investigate, try, and punish their personnel in cases of misconduct. U.N. investigatory units need to be independent, quick to deploy, and possess ample capabilities and authority to investigate situations, including full cooperation by mission personnel and access to witnesses, records, and sites where crimes occurred so that trials can have sufficient evidence to proceed. Equally important, the U.N. needs to be stricter in holding member countries to these standards. States that fail to fulfill their commitments to discipline their troops should be barred from providing troops for peace operations.
The U.N. Human Rights Council
The U.N. Human Rights Council was created in 2006 to replace the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, which had failed to hold governments to account for violating basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. During negotiations to establish the council, many basic reforms and membership standards were proposed to ensure that the council would not simply repeat the commission’s failures, but few reforms received sufficient support in the General Assembly.[47] As a result, the Human Rights Council has performed no better—and in some ways worse—than the commission it replaced.
Anticipating this outcome, the Bush Administration decided not to seek a seat on the council in 2006. Based on the council’s subsequent disappointing record, the U.S. again declined to seek a seat in 2007 and 2008. The Bush Administration also withheld a portion of the U.S. contribution to the U.N. regular budget equivalent to the part that would be allocated to the council and distanced itself from the council’s proceedings except in instances of “deep national interest.”[48]
The Obama Administration disagreed with the Bush Administration policy. It sought and won a seat on the council in 2009. Although the U.S. has been able to usher some positive resolutions through the council, such as the establishment of a U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Association, and to support resolutions addressing some human rights situations, the more fundamental problems of the Human Rights Council remain:
- Bias against Israel. Since 2006, the council has adopted 67 country-specific resolutions, of which 32 focused on Israel.[49] U.S. membership on the council has not stopped this bias. In 2010, over U.S. objections, the council adopted eight resolutions condemning Israel or its actions.[50] In addition, the council has held 12 special sessions since 2006 that focused on country situations with half of the sessions focused on condemning Israel. The most recent of these special sessions was held in 2009—after the U.S. became a member—to discuss the U.N. Human Rights Council Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (the Goldstone Report), which the Obama Administration has criticized as “deeply flawed” and biased against Israel.[51]
- Unwillingness to confront numerous serious human rights violations. Since the U.S. was elected to a seat, the council has passed resolutions addressing human rights situations in Cambodia, Honduras, Somalia, and Sudan. However, these actions are either low-hanging fruit or ground already traveled by the council in previous resolutions. Despite U.S. membership, the council continues to ignore human rights violations by many serious perpetrators, including Algeria, China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. In fact, in the 2010 election, seven countries with dubious human rights records (Libya, Angola, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, Mauritania, and Qatar) were elected to the council even though they have been criticized by human rights groups for violating the rights of their citizens.[52] All of these countries received overwhelming support from the U.N. membership in the May 13 election. Even Libya received support from 155 of 192 U.N. member states.
- Support for efforts that undermine human rights and fundamental freedoms. For instance, the Human Rights Council has repeatedly adopted resolutions recognizing and promoting bans on the “defamation of religions.”[53] The proponents of these resolutions seek to ban all criticism of religion, regardless of context or setting, and the text of the resolutions endorses restrictions on the fundamental rights to freedom of religion and expression.
The council’s performance is unlikely to improve without drastic reforms to improve its membership, such as barring states with grave human rights violations from membership and requiring competitive elections. The best opportunity to implement such reforms will be at the U.N. General Assembly’s mandatory five-year review of “the status of the Council,” which is required by the resolution that created the council. The review must be conducted in 2011. To provide backing to U.S. efforts to reform the Human Rights Council, Congress should:
- Withhold U.S. funding to the Human Rights Council until serious membership criteria are adopted.[54] Without serious and strict membership standards, the council will continue to disappoint.[55]
- Withhold a portion of U.S. funding to the U.N. regular budget until the General Assembly ends the practice of funding the council and other U.N. human rights activities through the U.N. regular budget. Many of these activities are worthy of support, but this practice shields bodies such as the Human Rights Council from congressional action. Discrete U.N. bodies should have independent funding to enable member states to express their support or dissatisfaction directly.
The dozens of independent and semi-autonomous organizations and bodies in the U.N. system receive billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars each year. No organization is without problems, but few are without any positive elements. Too often, however, the U.S. fails to ensure that the benefits of these organizations meet their costs.
Congress should assess the merits of each organization and the extent to which it supports U.S. interests. This process should inform every authorization and appropriations decision. Congress may decide that some of them provide vital services that serve U.S. interests and those of other nations. Some of the more technical U.N. organizations perform low-key, but useful tasks. Other U.N. organizations provide little benefit to justify U.S. contributions. For instance, few, if any, U.S. interests were harmed by the U.S. absence from UNESCO for two decades. Few, if any, core U.S. interests have been significantly advanced since the U.S. returned to UNESCO in 2003. The dubious merits of UNESCO membership cost U.S. taxpayers $81 million in 2010.
Congress should also keep in mind that voluntarily funded organizations are generally more responsive to the concerns of the member states because they know that a member state could choose to reduce or suspend funding if it ignores the concerns raised by that country. Organizations funded through assessed budgets are generally less responsive and, with the U.S. State Department concurring, insist that the U.S. is under a legal obligation to pay them regardless of U.S. concerns. Although Congress has ignored this argument repeatedly in the past, it carries weight. Shifting activities funded currently through assessed budgets to voluntary funding would make it easier for Congress to support the programs that it wishes and withhold funding for those it does not. Having U.N. organizations compete for funding would also contribute to efficiency and effectiveness and improve responsiveness to member state requests. With this in mind, Congress should:
- Seek to shift funding for U.N. activities and organizations from assessed budgets to voluntary contributions. History has shown that reforming U.N. organizations and reducing budgets is extremely difficult through diplomatic efforts alone. Financial leverage through legislative withholding can provide the stick necessary for progress in some instances. However, this is a blunt instrument, and Congress cannot legislate every change necessary for every U.N. organization or body. Withholding can also create difficulty for the U.S. in meeting other objectives. As Ambassador John Bolton has argued, moving more U.N. organizations and activities toward voluntary funding would resolve a number of problems and enhance America’s ability to fund those U.N. organizations or activities it deems worthwhile and to defund those it does not.[56]
- Insist that all U.N. organizations permit the U.S. unfettered access to all audits, internal documents, and other relevant information. There is a troubling lack of transparency in many U.N.-affiliated organizations that impedes U.S. oversight. For instance, even though the U.S. is a major and often the largest financier of these organizations and generally sits on their executive boards, organizations such as UNDP and the World Food Program refuse to allow the U.S. full access to their internal documents.[57] This opacity impedes proper governance and oversight of the organization.
- Reduce U.S. voluntary funding to the U.N. system. The co-chairs of the President’s National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform suggested reducing U.S. voluntary contributions to the U.N. system by 10 percent (about $350 million) per year.[58] Congress should heed this recommendation. The amount the U.S. provides in voluntary contributions is entirely at the discretion of the U.S. However, since these funds are voluntary, why not cut them by 25 percent or 50 percent? However, Congress should cut discriminately, rather than across the board. Organizations with management or policy problems should have their funds cut. Effective, transparent, and cooperative organizations should be rewarded.
Reams of reports on U.N. reform over the past decade[59] have resulted in too little action to streamline the U.N. bureaucracy, reduce expenditures, or improve oversight, transparency, and accountability. U.N. reforms endorsed by the General Assembly in the 2005 Outcome Document have lain moribund or been poorly designed, implemented, or enforced. In some cases, reforms have been reversed. Specifically, oversight and accountability have been undermined. Transparency and ethics reforms have been adopted, but fecklessly and with little enforcement. Efforts to streamline U.N. mandates have been abandoned. The Human Rights Council is no better than the commission it replaced. Peacekeeping remains troubled by misconduct and mismanagement.
The failure to reform the U.N. has resulted in a system that remains bureaucratic, costly, cumbersome, lacking in oversight, and often incapable of fulfilling the responsibilities placed upon it. These failings sully the reputation of the U.N. and call into question proposals to give the U.N. more authority or a more central role in addressing international problems. Without fundamental reform, the problems hindering the U.N. will likely continue and expand, undermining the U.N.’s ability to support and advance U.S. interests.
Involvement by Congress in pressing for U.N. reform is entirely appropriate. The power of the purse places clear responsibility on Congress to ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars are used prudently. History shows that paying U.S. assessments and providing voluntary funds without demanding specific changes removes a powerful leverage point for encouraging reform.
The reality is that few countries are interested in making sure that the U.N. has adequate oversight and accountability, uses its resources efficiently, and prunes activities that are outdated, duplicative, or irrelevant. Most pay the U.N. a pittance and, therefore, have nothing at stake. If the U.S. does not press this issue, no other nation is likely to step forward.
—Brett D. Schaefer is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation and editor of ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations and the Search for Alternatives (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009). He delivered these remarks in testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs on January 25, 2011.
[1]Matthew Saltmarsh, “A Bloated U.N. Bureaucracy Causes Bewilderment,” TheNew York Times, January 5, 2011, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/06/world/europe/06iht-nations06.html (January 27, 2011).
[2]See Brett D. Schaefer, “A Progress Report on U.N. Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1937, May 19, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/bg1937.cfm.
[3]See Brett D. Schaefer, “Who Leads the United Nations?” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 1054, December 4, 2007, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/12/who-leads-the-united-nations.
[4]Edward
C. Luck, “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in
Progress,” Academic Council on the United Nations System Occasional Paper No. 1, 2003, at http://www.reformwatch.net/fitxers/58.pdf (January 27, 2011).
[5]The
U.N. began violating this policy in 2006, culminating in passage of the
U.N.’s 2008–2009 biennial regular budget over the “no” vote of the U.S.
Brett D. Schaefer, “Congress Should Withhold Funding for Spendthrift
U.N.,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 1786, January 29, 2008, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/11/a-short-united-nations-to-do-list-for-the-new-congress.
[6]Brett D. Schaefer, “A Short United Nations To-Do List for the New Congress,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 3064, November 18, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/11/a-short-united-nations-to-do-list-for-the-new-congress.
[7]Brett D. Schaefer, “Time to Rein in the U.N.’s Budget,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2368, February 3, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/02/time-to-rein-in-the-uns-budget.
[8]
Ibid.
[9]U.N.
Department of Public Information, “General Assembly Adopts Peacekeeping
Budget of $7.2 Billion for Financial Year 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011,”
June 24, 2010, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10955.doc.htm (January 27, 2011).
[10]The
U.S. assessment for these organizations differs. For instance, in 2010,
the U.S. assessment is 3.18 percent of the International Maritime
Organization budget, 5.92 percent of the Universal Postal Union budget,
and 7.34 percent of the International Telecommunication Union budget.
However, most of the organizations base their assessments on the U.N.
assessment and charge the U.S. between 20 percent and 25 percent of
their assessed budgets. See Marjorie Ann Browne and Kennon H. Nakamura,
“United Nations System Funding: Congressional Issues,” Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, March 8, 2010, at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33611_20100308.pdf (January 27, 2011).
[11]U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification Fiscal Year 2009, p. 12, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100326.pdf (January 27, 2011), and Congressional Budget Justification Fiscal Year 2011, Vol. 1, Department of State Operations, pp. 14 and 542, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/136355.pdf (January 27, 2011).
[12]U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2000: Appendix, Department of State (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), p. 710, at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy00/pdf/sta.pdf (January 27, 2011).
[13]U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification Fiscal Year 2011, p. 542.
[14]Brett D. Schaefer, “U.S. Funding of the United Nations Reaches All-Time High,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 2981, August 13, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/08/us-funding-of-the-united-nations-reaches-all-time-high.
[15]U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification Fiscal Year 2011, Vol. 2, Foreign Operations, p. 131, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137936.pdf (January 27, 2011).
[16]Vita Bite, “UN System Funding: Congressional Issues,” Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress, updated September 10, 2003, at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/24669.pdf (January 27, 2011).
[17]National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, “Co-Chairs’ Proposal,” November 10, 2010, at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/Illustrative_List_11.10.2010.pdf (January 27, 2011).
[18]U.N.
General Assembly, Fifth Committee, “Proposed Programme Budget for the
Biennium 2010–2011 of the Secretary-General,” A/64/6, §§ 1–36, at http://www.un.org/en/ga/fifth/64/ppb1011sg.shtml (January 27, 2011).
[19]U.N. Secretary-General, “Investing in the United Nations: For a Stronger Organization Worldwide,” A/60/692, March 7, 2006, at http://www.un.org/reform/investinginun/investing-in-un.shtml (January 27, 2011).
[20]U.N. General Assembly, “2005 World Summit Outcome,” A/RES/60/1, para. 163(b), October 24, 2005, at http://www.un.org/ga/president/62/issues/resolutions/a-60-692.pdfga/president/62/issues/resolutions/a-60-692.pdf (January 27, 2011).
[21]As
the U.N. noted, “Mandates are not easily defined or quantifiable; a
concrete legal definition of a mandate does not exist. Guided by the
Summit Outcome Document and subsequent discussions, and in order to
facilitate the current mandate review exercise, we have, however,
identified an agreed upon...working definition: a mandate is a request
or a direction for action by the UN Secretariat or other implementing
entity, that derives from a resolution of the General Assembly or one of
the other relevant organs.” United Nations, Mandate Registry,
“Frequently Asked Questions,” at http://webapps01.un.org/mandatereview/displayFAQ.do;jsessionid=2064543609EFB82F18FD1B010743695F (January 27, 2011).
[22]United Nations, Mandate Registry, at http://webapps01.un.org/mandatereview/searchStart.do (February 1, 2011).
[23]The
latest progress in actually eliminating mandates is from 2006: “To
date, out of the 399 non-renewed mandates older than five years to be
examined, only 69 have been agreed by all Member States to be completed
and put aside.” Irene Martinetti, “Sluggish Progress on UN Mandate
Review,” Center for UN Reform Education UN Reform Watch No. 18, August 16, 2006, at http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/62 (January 27, 2011).
[24]U.N. General Assembly, “Mandate Review: Co-Chairs’ Report,” August 8, 2008, p. 3, at http://www.un.org/ga/president/62/letters/cochairsmandatereview080808.pdf (January 27, 2011).
[25]For more details, see Brett D. Schaefer, “The U.S. Should Push for Adjustment in UN Dues,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 2735, December 15, 2009, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/the-us-should-push-for-adjustment-in-un-dues.
[26]Brett D. Schaefer, “The U.N. Should Pay What It Owes the U.S. from Its Tax Equalization Fund,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 3052, November 8, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/11/the-un-should-pay-what-its-owes-the-us-from-its-tax-equalization-fund.
[27]For information on these issues, see Independent Inquiry Committee, “Documents,” Web site, at http://www.iic-offp.org/documents.htm (January 27, 2011); U.S. Government Accountability Office, United Nations: Lessons Learned from Oil for Food Program Indicate the Need to Strengthen UN Internal Controls and Oversight Activities, GAO–06–330, April 2006, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06330.pdf (January 27, 2011); U.S. Government Accountability Office, United Nations: Procurement Internal Controls Are Weak, GAO–06–577, April 2006, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06577.pdf (January 27, 2011); and hearing, United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Case for Peacekeeping Reform,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International
Operations, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of
Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., March 1, 2005, at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa99590.000/hfa99590_0f.htm (January 27, 2011).
[28]U.N. General Assembly, “2005 World Summit Outcome,” A/RES/60/1, para. 161(d).
[29]U.N.
Secretariat, “United Nations System-Wide Application of Ethics:
Separately Administered Organs and Programmes,” ST/SGB/2007/11, November
30, 2007, at http://www.unops.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/Ethics%20documents/SGB-2007-11%20EN.pdf (January 27, 2011).
[30]Government Accountability Project, “United Nations,” at http://www.whistleblower.org/program-areas/international-reform/united-nations (January 27, 2011).
[31]U.N. Secretariat, “Financial Disclosure and Declaration of Interest Statements,” ST/SGB/2006/6, April 10, 2006, at http://www.usun-ny.us/untai/resolution/SYG%20bulletin%20ST-SGB-2006-6%20-%20Financial%20Disclosure.pdf (January 27, 2011).
[32]U.N. Secretary-General, “Voluntary Public Disclosure of Financial Disclosure and Declaration of Interest Statements,” 2009, at http://www.un.org/sg/PublicDisclosure_2009.shtml (January 27, 2011).
[33]
Ibid.
[34]Brett D. Schaefer, “The Demise of the U.N. Procurement Task Force Threatens Oversight at the U.N.,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 2272, February 5, 2009, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/02/The-Demise-of-the-UN-Procurement-Task-Force-Threatens-Oversight-at-the-UN.
[35]See U.N. Joint Inspection Unit, “The Audit Function in the United Nations System,” JIU/REP/2010/5, 2010, at http://www.unjiu.org/data/reports/2010/JIU_REP_2010_05%20Final.pdf
(January 27, 2011). See also George Russell, “UN Auditors Are
Under-Qualified, Overstretched, Say Inspectors,” Fox News, January 14,
2011, at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/01/14/auditors-qualified-stretched-say-inspectors/ (January 27, 2011).
[36]Colum Lynch, “Blistering Insider Memo Describes UN Chief’s Actions as ‘Seriously Reprehensible,’” Foreign Policy, July 19, 2010, at http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/19/blistering_insider_memo_describes_un_chief_s_actions_as_seriously_reprehensible (January 28, 2011).
[37]“The
acting chief of the U.N. division that investigates wrongdoing in the
world body is currently under investigation himself for allegedly
retaliating against two whistle-blowers.” Associated Press, “U.N.
Investigations Chief Under Investigation,” USA Today, January 19, 2011, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-01-19-united-nations-probe_N.htm (January 28, 2011).
[38]Government Accountability Office, United Nations: Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of Internal Auditors, GAO–06–575, April 2006, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06575.pdf (January 28, 2011).
[39]Press
release, “Peacekeeping Procurement Audit Found Mismanagement, Risk of
Financial Loss, Security Council Told in Briefing by Chief of Staff,”
U.N. Security Council, February 22, 2006, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8645.doc.htm (January 28, 2011).
[40]The
task force looked at only seven of the 18 U.N. peacekeeping missions
that were operational during the investigation. U.N. Office of Internal
Oversight Services, “Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services
on the Activities of the Procurement Task Force for the 18-Month Period
Ended 30 June 2007,” A/62/272, October 5, 2007, at http://www.eyeontheun.org/assets/attachments/documents/5522_report_OIOS_activities_procurement_task_force_30_june_2007.doc
(January 28, 2011), and George Russell, “Report Details Progress in
Battle Against Corruption at UN Office,” Fox News, October 11, 2007, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,301255,00.html (January 28, 2011).
[41]Colum Lynch, “Audit of UN’s Sudan Mission Finds Tens of Millions in Waste,” The Washington Post, February 10, 2008, p. A16, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/09/AR2008020902427.html (January 28, 2011).
[42]Louis Charbonneau, “UN Probes Allegations of Corruption, Fraud,” Reuters, January 10, 2008.
[43]See Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, “UN Staff Accused of Raping Children in Sudan,” The Telegraph, January 4, 2007, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/01/03/wsudan03.xml (January 28, 2011); Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, “Sex and the UN: When Peacemakers Become Predators,” The Independent, January 11, 2005, at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sex-and-the-un-when-peacemakers-become-predators-486170.html (January 28, 2011); and Colum Lynch, “UN Faces More Accusations of Sexual Misconduct,” The Washington Post, March 13, 2005, p. A22, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30286-2005Mar12.html (January 28, 2011).
[44]U.N. Contact and Discipline Unit, “About CDU: Conduct and Discipline Teams,” at http://cdu.unlb.org/AboutCDU/ConductandDisciplineTeams.aspx (January 28, 2011).
[45]Corinna
Csáky, “No One to Turn to: The Under-Reporting of Child Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse by Aid Workers and Peacekeepers,” Save the
Children, 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/27_05_08_savethechildren.pdf (January 28, 2011).See also BBC News, “Peacekeepers ‘Abusing Children,’” May 27, 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/ 7420798.stm
(January 28, 2011), and UN News Center, “UN Team Looking into Alleged
Sexual Misconduct by Blue Helmets in DR Congo,” July 24, 2009, at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31574 (January 28, 2011).
[46]U.N.
Contact and Discipline Unit, “Statistics Allegations for All Categories
of Personnel per Year (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse),” updated January
14, 2011, at http://cdu.unlb.org/Statistics/AllegationsbyCategoryofPersonnelSexualExploitationandAbuse/AllegationsforAllCategoriesofPersonnelPerYearSexualExploitationandAbuse.aspx (January 28, 2011).
[47]For
a more detailed account, see Brett D. Schaefer, “The United Nations
Human Rights Council: Repeating Past Mistakes,” Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 964, September 19, 2006, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/The-United-Nations-Human-Rights-Council-Repeating-Past-Mistakes (January 28, 2011).
[48]Sean McCormack, “Daily Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, June 6, 2008, at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/jun/105716.htm
(January 28, 2011), and Zalmay Khalilzad, statement on the Durban II
Conference and the Human Rights Council to the Conference of Presidents
of Major Jewish Organizations, April 8, 2008, at http://www.eyeontheun.org/assets/attachments/documents/6581.doc
(January 28, 2011). For a summary of Bush Administration policy
regarding the council, see Luisa Blanchfield, “The United Nations Human
Rights Council: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, June 1, 2009, pp. 11–12, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33608.pdf (January 28, 2011).
[49]Eye on the UN, Human Rights Actions, at http://www.eyeontheun.org/browse.asp (January 28, 2011).
[50]U.N.
Human Rights Council, Resolutions A/HRC/RES/13/5, A/HRC/RES/13/6,
A/HRC/RES/13/7, A/HRC/RES/13/8, A/HRC/RES/13/9, A/HRC/RES/14/1,
A/HRC/RES/15/1, and A/HRC/RES/15/6.
[51]“We
continue to believe that the Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on
the Gaza Conflict, widely known as the Goldstone Report, is deeply
flawed. We have previously noted shortcomings that include its
unbalanced focus on Israel, the negative inferences it draws about
Israel’s intentions and actions, its failure to deal adequately with the
asymmetrical nature of the Gaza conflict, and its failure to assign
appropriate responsibility to Hamas for deliberately targeting civilians
and basing itself and its operations in heavily civilian-populated
urban areas.” Alejandro Wolff, statement on a U.N. General Assembly
resolution on the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, U.S.
Mission to the United Nations, February 26, 2010, at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/137331.htm (January 28, 2011).
[52]See
Antoine Blua, “Rights Groups Dismayed over Libya’s Election to UN Human
Rights Council,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 13, 2010, at http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/2041110.html (January 28, 2011), and Edith M. Lederer, “UN Elects Rights Violators to Human Rights Council,” ABC News, May 13, 2010, at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=10637202
(January 28, 2011). For detailed accounts of the human rights records
of these individual countries, see U.S. Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, March 11, 2010, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/index.htm (January 28, 2011).
[53]Steven Groves, “Why the U.S. Should Oppose ‘Defamation of Religions’ Resolutions at the United Nations,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2206, November 10, 2008, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/11/why-the-us-should-oppose-defamation-of-religions-resolutions-at-the-united-nations.
[54]The
legislation is largely symbolic because the U.S. cannot directly
withhold money from the Human Rights Council, only an equivalent amount
from its contribution to the U.N. regular budget. Yet its passage
signals to other countries that Congress, not just the Administration,
is displeased with the “defunded” activities.
[55]For
suggestions on membership criteria, see Brett D. Schaefer, “Elections
for U.N. Human Rights Council Underscore the Need for Reform,” Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 2417, June 2, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/elections-for-un-human-rights-council-underscore-the-need-for-reform.
[56]John R. Bolton, “The Key to Changing the United Nations System,” American Enterprise Institute Outlook No. 2, October 2010, at http://www.aei.org/outlook/101000 (January 28, 2011).
[57]See
Brett D. Schaefer and Steven Groves, “Congress Should Withhold Funds
from the U.N. Development Program,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 1783, January 26, 2008, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/01/Congress-Should-Withhold-Funds-from-the-UN-Development-Program,
and and George Russell, “World Food Program’s ‘Sunshine Policy’ Falls
Short, UN Oversight Panel Says,” Fox News, November 11, 2010, at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/11/11/world-food-programs-sunshine-policy-falls-short-oversight-panel-says/ (January 28, 2011).
[58]National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, “Co-Chairs’ Proposal.”
[59]Brett D. Schaefer, “Enough Reports: More Action Needed on U.N. Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1988, December 8, 2006, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/12/enough-reports-more-action-needed-on-un-reformRelated News:
In the UN body should
undertake a massive cleanup in accordance with the formation of the
United Nations on October 24, 1945 in San Francisco.
http://souisapaul81.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/in-un-body-should-undertake-massive.htmlWe expect from the Government of Mexico to not follow the sweet seduction of illegal Indonesian government, which is still a lot of the problems humanity has been violated by the Indonesian Government.
http://souisapaul81.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/we-expect-from-government-of-mexico-to.html
We need the action of the American government and international humanitarian organizations firmly to lead the bandit government in Jakarta to go to the international court, and recognizes the validity of the status of Maluku, West Papua, Kalimantan (Borneo), Aceh, and others, is apart from the authority of the Republic of Indonesia, where it is in accordance with the true history and applicable law.
http://souisapaul81.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/we-need-action-of-american-government.html
Coaxing from illegal Indonesian Government through conferences or meetings that have been held for fraud and dirty business.
http://souisapaul81.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/coaxing-from-illegal-indonesian.html
Exiled FKM founder Alex Manuputty, speaking to 3rd Degree from his Californian hideout, said he is seeking a political asylum on the run from Koppassus.
http://souisapaul81.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/exiled-fkm-founder-alex-manuputty.html
See more: Republic of South Maluku (Moluccas)
_________________________________________________________________________
Indonesian:
Kuliah # 1177 pada Demokrasi dan Hak Asasi Manusia
3 Februari 2011
PBB: Masalah Mendesak Itu Perlu Kongres Aksi
Oleh Brett D. Schaefer
Abstrak: PBB umumnya telah gagal untuk memelihara perdamaian dan keamanan internasional, mempromosikan penentuan nasib sendiri dan hak asasi manusia, dan melindungi kebebasan dasar. Sementara konflik kepentingan negara-negara anggota telah menyebabkan banyak kegagalan, sistem PBB sendiri sebagian menyalahkan. PBB dan organisasi-organisasi afiliasinya terganggu oleh misi usang dan berlebihan dan mandat, manajemen yang buruk, pengawasan efektif, dan kurangnya akuntabilitas. Dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, Kongres AS sendiri telah mengabaikan tanggung jawabnya untuk melaksanakan pengawasan yang tepat. Kongres harus menekan untuk reformasi PBB dan menahan pendanaan bila diperlukan untuk mendorong reformasi.
PBB diciptakan untuk memelihara perdamaian dan keamanan internasional, memajukan hak asasi manusia penentuan nasib sendiri dan dasar, dan melindungi kebebasan dasar. Sayangnya, 65 tahun terakhir telah menghasilkan kekecewaan lebih dari keberhasilan dalam merealisasikan aspirasi tinggi.
Sejumlah besar menyalahkan kegagalan ini adalah karena kepentingan berbeda antara negara-negara anggota yang telah menghalangi organisasi dari mengambil menentukan, tindakan tepat waktu.
Namun, sistem PBB sendiri sebagian harus disalahkan. PBB dan banyak organisasi afiliasinya yang dilanda misi usang atau duplikasi dan mandat, praktek manajemen yang buruk, pengawasan efektif, dan kurangnya akuntabilitas. Sebagai mantan PBB Wakil Sekretaris Jenderal Mark Malloch Brown baru-baru ini menyatakan kepada The New York Times, "Ada redundansi besar dan kurangnya efisiensi" dalam sistem PBB, dan anggaran adalah "benar-benar buram, tidak transparan dan benar-benar dalam bayangan." [1 ]
Masalah-masalah ini membuang-buang sumber daya dan merusak kemampuan PBB untuk melaksanakan tanggung jawabnya secara efektif. Enam dekade terakhir telah melihat lusinan inisiatif dari pemerintah, think tank, yayasan, dan panel ahli bertujuan mereformasi PBB agar lebih efektif dalam memenuhi tanggung jawabnya. [2] Meskipun upaya reformasi telah melihat keberhasilan yang langka, untuk sebagian besar mereka telah gagal karena oposisi dari mayoritas negara anggota PBB. Memang, AS hampir selalu menemukan dirinya di pihak yang kalah dalam perdebatan PBB dan penilaian ketika mengusulkan reformasi untuk meningkatkan pengelolaan PBB, pengawasan, dan akuntabilitas.
Hal ini terjadi karena sebagian besar negara anggota PBB hanya tidak membayar cukup untuk PBB untuk inefisiensi, pemborosan, atau korupsi untuk masalah mereka. Misalnya, Sierra Leone dinilai 0,001 persen dari anggaran rutin PBB dan 0,0001 persen dari anggaran perdamaian. Sebaliknya, AS dinilai 22 persen dan 27,1 persen, masing-masing. Oleh karena itu, sementara Sierra Leone dan puluhan negara-negara lain dengan penilaian yang sama membayar kurang dari $ 35,000 per tahun untuk anggaran ini, AS membayar miliaran. Dengan pemikiran ini, tidak mengherankan bahwa AS peduli tentang bagaimana PBB dikelola dan bagaimana dana tersebut digunakan, sementara sebagian besar negara tidak?
Namun ini adalah negara-negara yang mengendalikan sebagian besar suara. Penilaian gabungan dari 128 paling-dinilai negara-dua-pertiga dari Majelis Umum-total kurang dari 1 persen dari anggaran rutin PBB dan kurang dari sepertiga dari 1 persen dari anggaran pemeliharaan perdamaian, meskipun kelompok itu saja bisa, menurut aturan PBB, melewati anggaran. Negara-negara ini, dikombinasikan dengan blok-blok suara berpengaruh di PBB, bisa dan melakukan blok upaya AS untuk melaksanakan reformasi dan mengurangi anggaran. [3]
Ada masalah lain. Administrasi Amerika sering tertarik dalam menekan untuk reformasi, tapi sering bahwa agenda jangka panjang ditinggalkan demi mencapai tujuan politik yang lebih langsung. Menekan reformasi ruffles bulu di PBB Ketika AS melobi suara pada resolusi, hal terakhir diplomat AS ingin lakukan adalah kemarahan misi dengan menekan untuk pemotongan anggaran atau reformasi lainnya.
Reformasi PBB memerlukan perspektif jangka. Keberhasilan reformasi langka sering berbagi satu kesamaan: keterlibatan kongres didukung oleh ancaman pemotongan keuangan.
- Setelah gagal untuk menangkap pertumbuhan yang cepat dalam anggaran PBB pada awal tahun 1980, mantan Duta Besar AS untuk PBB Jeane Kirkpatrick bersaksi, "Negara-negara yang memberikan kontribusi lebih dari 85 persen dari anggaran PBB teratur suara terhadap anggaran itu, tapi tidak mampu mencegah nya meningkat karena negara-negara yang membayar kurang dari 10 persen dari anggaran memiliki suara. " [4] Kongres ini dipimpin untuk lulus 1985 Kassebaum-Solomon amandemen Hubungan Luar Negeri Authorization Act untuk tahun anggaran (TA) 1986 dan TA 1987, yang dipotong 20 persen dari US menilai kontribusi untuk anggaran rutin PBB dan badan-badan khusus sampai voting tertimbang pada hal-hal anggaran diadopsi. Suara tertimbang tidak diadopsi, tapi PBB tidak setuju pada tahun 1986 dengan proses penganggaran berbasis konsensus sebagai aturan informal. Akibatnya, hal ini memberi masing-masing negara hak veto informal atas anggaran, yang membantu sangat untuk menghambat pertumbuhan anggaran. Meskipun pengaturan ini mogok di pertengahan 2000-an, ia menyediakan wawasan kunci ke dalam reformasi anggaran PBB. [5]
- Setelah mantan Jaksa Agung AS Richard Thornburgh, yang menjabat sebagai Wakil Sekretaris-Jenderal Administrasi dan Manajemen pada tahun 1992 dan 1993, memberitahu Kongres upayanya gagal membujuk Sekretaris Jenderal Boutros Boutros Ghali-untuk menekan salah urus dan limbah, Kongres memutuskan untuk menahan dana PBB sampai Majelis Umum menciptakan inspektur umum untuk memonitor, audit, dan memeriksa operasi PBB. Kantor Pengawasan Internal Jasa (OIOS) diciptakan pada tahun 1994 sebagai sebuah unit investigasi dan audit utama PBB. Meskipun tidak memiliki kemerdekaan sejati dan kekurangan, OIOS telah memberikan kontribusi terhadap tabungan dan telah terkena kasus salah urus.
- Sebagai syarat untuk pembayaran tunggakan akumulasi untuk PBB, Kongres ditentukan serangkaian tolok ukur reformasi di Helms-Biden PBB Undang-Undang Reformasi 1999. Antara lain, undang-undang yang diperlukan PBB untuk mengurangi penilaian AS untuk anggaran rutin dan anggaran penjaga perdamaian AS. PBB mengurangi penilaian anggaran rutin AS untuk 22 persen dan mengurangi penilaian penjaga perdamaian Amerika, meskipun tidak dengan 25 persen dicari oleh AS
Sayangnya, Kongres telah mengabaikan peran pengawasan dalam beberapa tahun terakhir. Undang-undang reformasi PBB belum dipertimbangkan secara serius selama bertahun-tahun, dan hanya segelintir pengawasan sidang PBB telah diselenggarakan dalam beberapa tahun terakhir. Sementara itu, kontribusi AS untuk PBB berada pada semua waktu tinggi.
Itulah mengapa saya sangat senang bahwa panitia memutuskan untuk mengadakan briefing pada reformasi PBB. Sejarah menunjukkan bahwa cara tercepat dan paling efektif untuk meyakinkan PBB untuk melaksanakan reformasi adalah untuk Kongres akan sangat terlibat dalam peran pengawasan dan, bila perlu, untuk mendorong proses maju melalui insentif keuangan.
AS Kontribusi untuk PBB pada Tinggi All-Waktu
Amerika Serikat sedang menghadapi krisis anggaran. Dalam bulan-bulan dan tahun-tahun mendatang, Kongres dan Administrasi akan bergulat dengan keputusan sulit di mana dan berapa banyak untuk mengurangi pengeluaran. Meskipun kontribusi AS untuk sistem PBB bukan merupakan bagian besar dari anggaran, tidak ada alasan untuk mengecualikan kontribusi tersebut dari upaya menyeluruh untuk mengidentifikasi daerah-daerah di mana dolar pembayar pajak bisa menghabiskan lebih baik. Memang, anggaran PBB telah tumbuh lebih cepat daripada anggaran AS selama dekade terakhir.
Amerika kontribusi terakhir ke kurcaci PBB yang berasal dari 10 tahun yang lalu. Menurut Kantor Manajemen dan Anggaran, jumlah kontribusi AS untuk sistem PBB melebihi $ 6347000000 pada tahun fiskal 2009, dibandingkan dengan hanya $ 3183000000 pada tahun fiskal 2001. [6] Meningkatkan telah terjadi di seluruh sistem PBB.
Anggaran Reguler PBB. Anggaran rutin PBB memiliki lebih dari dua kali lipat dari $ 2490000000 untuk dua tahunan 2000-2001 untuk $ 5160000000 bawah anggaran 2010-2011 disetujui oleh Majelis Umum pada tanggal 23 Desember 2009. [7] Tingkat pertumbuhan luar biasa . Anggaran rutin PBB telah meningkat lebih cepat daripada anggaran AS selama periode tersebut. Sudah, Sekretaris Jenderal PBB memproyeksikan peningkatan anggaran 2012-2013 dua tahunan lebih dari $ 300 juta. AS dinilai 22 persen dari anggaran rutin PBB. Anggaran Administrasi untuk TA 2011 meminta $ 516.300.000 untuk anggaran rutin PBB.
. Penjaga Perdamaian PBB Anggaran Anggaran penjaga perdamaian PBB meningkat lebih dari empat kali lipat dari US $ 1,7 miliar pada 2000-2001 [8] menjadi $ 7,2 miliar pada 2010 -. 2011 [9] Namun, ini tidak termasuk kemungkinan misi baru atau diperluas, seperti mengusulkan perluasan misi di Cote d'Ivoire atau dukungan PBB misi Uni Afrika di Somalia. AS dinilai lebih dari 27 persen dari anggaran penjaga perdamaian PBB. Dalam dolar, Kontribusi Departemen Luar Negeri untuk Perdamaian Internasional Kegiatan akun adalah $ 2120000000 untuk TA 2010.
Lainnya Dinilai Kontribusi PBB. Kontribusi Departemen Luar Negeri ke rekening Organisasi Internasional meliputi kontribusi untuk anggaran rutin PBB, Rencana Induk Modal PBB, Rwanda dan Yugoslavia pengadilan, 11 organisasi PBB lainnya, dan sejumlah organisasi internasional tidak berafiliasi dengan PBB [ 10] Akun ini mencapai $ 880.500.000 pada tahun 2000 dan $ 1680000000 pada tahun 2010. [11] Tidak termasuk kontribusi untuk anggaran rutin PBB, kontribusi AS untuk organisasi yang dikategorikan sebagai bagian dari sistem PBB diperkirakan mencapai $ 375.000.000 pada TA 2000 [12] dan $ 645.500.000 pada tahun fiskal 2010. [13]
Kontribusi Sukarela. AS juga memberikan kontribusi sukarela untuk sejumlah program PBB, dana, badan, dan entitas lain dan dukungan tambahan untuk kegiatan juga didanai melalui anggaran dinilai. Sulit untuk mendapatkan angka definitif tentang kontribusi tersebut karena mereka berfluktuasi dan dapat berasal dari bagian pemerintah AS selain Departemen Luar Negeri, seperti Badan Pembangunan Internasional AS dan Departemen Pertanian. [14] Kisah Departemen Luar Negeri untuk kontribusi tersebut (Organisasi Internasional dan Program) adalah $ 394.000.000 untuk tahun buku 2010. [15] Namun, Congressional Research Service memperkirakan bahwa AS menyediakan "$ 2,2 miliar kontribusi sukarela untuk organisasi dan program PBB yang berafiliasi" pada tahun 2001. [16] Musim gugur yang lalu, Komisi Nasional Presiden tentang Tanggung Jawab Fiskal dan Reformasi mencatat bahwa AS memberikan sistem PBB "lebih dari $ 3,5 miliar dana 'sukarela' setiap tahun." [17]
Ketika AS dan pemerintah lainnya dipaksa untuk mengencangkan ikat pinggang mereka, adalah wajar untuk mengharapkan PBB dan organisasi-organisasi afiliasinya untuk sama meneliti kegiatan mereka untuk menentukan bagaimana untuk memangkas anggaran mereka untuk menekankan prioritas. Ekspansi yang cepat dari anggaran PBB selama dekade terakhir telah digabungkan dengan upaya minimal pada prioritas. Kongres harus malu-malu dalam menunjukkan pemotongan anggaran.
Berjuang untuk Pengendalian Anggaran di Turtle Bay
Dari akhir 1980-an hingga 1990, AS bersikeras pada "pertumbuhan nol" kebijakan anggaran rutin PBB. Kesepakatan yang dicapai pada tahun 1980 (didorong oleh Kassebaum-Solomon amandemen) diperlukan anggaran rutin PBB untuk diadopsi melalui konsensus. Hal ini memberikan negara-negara AS dan lainnya yang "veto" atas anggaran. Dengan menekankan pada kebijakan zero growth, AS adalah, untuk sebagian besar, mampu menahan stabil PBB anggaran rutin, termasuk penyesuaian untuk fluktuasi mata uang dan, kemudian, untuk inflasi.
Namun, keinginan Amerika untuk melibatkan PBB di Irak dan Afghanistan dan untuk mendanai mereka melalui anggaran rutin PBB, daripada melalui anggaran penjaga perdamaian di mana penilaian AS yang lebih tinggi, menetapkan panggung untuk merusak kendala ini pada anggaran rutin. Ini misi yang diusulkan PBB yang mahal, dan negara-negara anggota lainnya bersikeras bahwa mereka akan didanai melalui peningkatan anggaran rutin PBB secara keseluruhan daripada dengan memaksa perkelahian politik yang sulit di mana program harus dipotong untuk membiayai misi baru.
Pada akhirnya, AS terpaksa setuju untuk anggaran meningkat. Meninggalkan kebijakan anggaran zero growth membuka pintu air. Anggaran rutin PBB telah lebih dari dua kali lipat dalam 10 tahun terakhir. Ini adalah masa lalu untuk mengendalikan anggaran ini.
Langkah pertama dalam proses ini adalah untuk membangun kembali kebijakan zero growth dan mengidentifikasi dasar untuk pertumbuhan nol. Kongres bisa menggunakan tingkat dolar dari tahun pertama 2010-2011 anggaran dua tahunan PBB atau jumlah lain. Setelah didirikan, Kongres harus menginstruksikan Administrasi untuk menggunakan "suara dan suara" untuk menentang setiap kenaikan anggaran rutin PBB atas baseline. Beku ini akan, melalui inflasi, secara bertahap mengurangi ukuran anggaran.
Namun, hal itu juga akan meninggalkan utuh struktur pendanaan saat ini anggaran rutin, yang mendanai sejumlah kegiatan yang seharusnya tidak mendanai. Secara khusus, anggaran rutin PBB dipecah menjadi 36 garis anggaran (atau fasikula). [18] Ketika memeriksa anggaran rutin PBB, itu cepat jelas bahwa sebagian besar kegiatan dana fasikula yang harus independen didukung oleh negara-negara anggota. Misalnya, anggaran rutin PBB untuk 2010-2011 memberikan lebih dari $ 500 juta untuk Komisi Ekonomi untuk Afrika, Komisi Ekonomi dan Sosial untuk Asia dan Pasifik, Komisi Ekonomi untuk Eropa, Komisi Ekonomi untuk Amerika Latin dan Karibia, dan Komisi Ekonomi dan Sosial untuk Asia Barat. Masing-masing komisi tersebut mengklaim untuk berkontribusi pada pembangunan ekonomi dengan mempromosikan kerjasama dan integrasi. Ini mungkin sebuah tujuan baik, tapi bagaimana itu unik dan aditif untuk upaya Organisasi Perdagangan Dunia, Dana Moneter Internasional, Kelompok Bank Dunia, bank-bank pembangunan regional, Uni Eropa, Uni Afrika, ASEAN, dan selusin atau organisasi lain sehingga PBB yang juga mencoba untuk mempromosikan pembangunan ekonomi dan kerjasama? Ini merupakan pertanyaan terbuka yang terbaik.
Mungkin ada permintaan untuk kegiatan komisi ekonomi, tetapi sulit untuk menentukan karena mereka menerima dana terutama melalui anggaran rutin PBB menilai, yang berarti bahwa AS membayar 22 persen ($ 110 juta pada 2010-2011) dari ekonomi anggaran komisi '. AS harus menuntut bahwa komisi ekonomi yang berputar keluar dari anggaran rutin dan dipaksa untuk mendukung diri mereka sendiri melalui kontribusi sukarela seperti halnya organisasi PBB lainnya. Jika mereka memberikan layanan dihargai, mereka akan menarik dukungan. Jika tidak, mereka akan beradaptasi atau layu.
Beberapa fasikula benar-benar memberikan dana kepada organisasi PBB yang sebagian besar otonom yang menerima dana independen. Dalam banyak kasus, jumlah dana yang mereka terima dari anggaran rutin PBB adalah sebagian kecil dari anggaran mereka secara keseluruhan. Sebagai contoh:
- PBB Program Lingkungan (UNEP) menerima $ 14.300.000 dari anggaran rutin PBB 2010-2011, namun diproyeksikan untuk menerima lebih dari $ 420,000,000 dalam pendanaan luar anggaran sukarela.
- Relief PBB dan Pekerjaan Badan Pengungsi Palestina (UNRWA) di Timur Dekat diberikan $ 48.600.000 dari anggaran rutin PBB 2010-2011, tetapi diproyeksikan untuk menerima lebih dari $ 2 miliar di luar anggaran dana sukarela.
Organisasi-organisasi ini dapat melakukan pekerjaan yang baik dan berharga, namun pendanaan mereka melalui anggaran rutin PBB tidak perlu. Selain itu, jumlah yang minimal dibandingkan dengan sumber-sumber lain dari segi pendanaan. AS harus mencoba untuk fokus anggaran rutin PBB untuk mendukung kegiatan langsung dari badan utama PBB-Dewan Keamanan, Majelis Umum, Mahkamah Internasional, dan Sekretariat-dan memiliki kegiatan tidak langsung, seperti komisi, akan didanai independen. Seperti upaya yang dapat mengurangi anggaran rutin PBB sebesar 20 persen menjadi 30 persen. AS kemudian akan memiliki pilihan untuk menjaga proporsional atas dana tersebut atau memberikan mereka secara sukarela kepada organisasi PBB yang sama atau lainnya.
Fasikula kegiatan yang terkait langsung dengan operasi badan utama PBB mendukung layak untuk dimasukkan dalam anggaran rutin. Namun, bahkan di sana, peluang untuk menghemat jutaan dolar tetap diimplementasikan. Misalnya, PBB menghabiskan jumlah besar pada penerjemahan, editing, percetakan, dan penerbitan dokumen. Sekjen PBB Kofi Annan mengusulkan relokasi atau melakukan outsourcing kegiatan ini untuk locales-biaya yang lebih rendah pada tahun 2006. [19] sedikit yang telah dilakukan untuk menindaklanjuti rekomendasi ini. Demikian pula, anggaran konferensi PBB sangat besar. Peluang untuk telecommuting dan pemotongan biaya lainnya harus diselidiki.
Mengembalikan Ulasan Mandat dan Bersikeras Sunsetting Mandat PBB.
Selain itu, ada keengganan umum pada bagian dari negara-negara anggota untuk memprioritaskan pengeluaran anggaran rutin PBB untuk mengakomodasi kekhawatiran baru. Majelis Umum melewati Dokumen Hasil 2005, yang menginstruksikan Sekretaris Jenderal untuk memberikan "analisis dan rekomendasi, termasuk pada peluang untuk perubahan program yang dapat dipertimbangkan untuk awal pertimbangan Majelis Umum." [20] Sekretaris Jenderal menciptakan sebuah Mandat Registry [21] untuk memberikan, untuk pertama kalinya, daftar komprehensif dari lebih dari 9.000 mandat individu Majelis Umum, Dewan Keamanan, dan Dewan Ekonomi dan Sosial. Namun, ia tidak mengidentifikasi mandat khusus untuk penghapusan atau merekomendasikan program atau kegiatan yang akan sunset atau dihilangkan.
Meski penghentian dan lemah, proses ini sangat mengungkapkan tentang perlunya review dan menggambarkan kesulitan yang terlibat dalam mencoba untuk menghilangkan mandat usang atau tidak relevan. Sebagai contoh:
- Mandat dating kembali beberapa dekade tetap aktif. Misalnya, menurut registri, ada yang aktif, mandat berulang diadopsi pada tahun 1946 mengenai "kemungkinan transfer fungsi tertentu, kegiatan dan aset Liga Bangsa-Bangsa." Sebuah resolusi tahun 1956, diperpanjang dalam lima tahun terakhir, menyerukan kepada PBB untuk membantu komite memeriksa "efek radiasi atom." [22] Mandat ini menjadi sebagian besar berlebihan pada tahun 1957 dengan penciptaan Badan Energi Atom Internasional (IAEA), tetapi tetap berlaku .
- Kurangnya implementasi. Oposisi oleh sejumlah negara anggota telah terhenti review mandat, dan registry mandat belum diperbarui sejak tahun 2006. Hanya jumlah yang sangat kecil dari mandat telah dieliminasi. [23] Laporan terbaru dari co-ketua dari tinjauan mandat dikeluarkan pada bulan Agustus 2008. Ini menyimpulkan bahwa hanya 155 (56 persen) dari 279 mandat di cluster Kemanusiaan adalah "saat ini dan relevan" dan bahwa hanya 18 (35 persen) dari 52 mandat di cluster Pembangunan Afrika yang saat ini dan relevan. [24] Ada ada bukti bahwa mandat usang atau tidak relevan telah dihentikan atau diubah untuk meningkatkan relevansi mereka. Dalam twist sedih, Majelis Umum dan Sekretariat telah diam-diam malah membunuh proses peninjauan mandat karena memberikan dasar dan metodologi untuk menghilangkan mandat.
- Mengembalikan kebijakan AS pertumbuhan nol untuk anggaran rutin PBB. AS kebijakan zero growth untuk anggaran PBB membantu menghambat pertumbuhan pada 1980-an dan 1990-an. Kongres harus mendukung kebijakan pertumbuhan nominal nol dan menetapkan data dasar untuk anggaran rutin PBB sebagai cap dolar di mana AS akan membayar iuran yang dinilai untuk anggaran rutin PBB untuk tahun-tahun mendatang. Kongres harus menginstruksikan Administrasi untuk menggunakan "suara dan suara" untuk menentang setiap peningkatan sumber daya keseluruhan dan staf untuk anggaran rutin PBB.
- Mengadakan dengar pendapat tentang anggaran rutin PBB dan bersikeras bahwa Administrasi berusaha untuk mengakhiri praktek pendanaan kegiatan non-inti melalui anggaran itu. Fokus anggaran rutin PBB untuk mendukung kegiatan badan-badan PBB utama bisa mengurangi anggaran rutin PBB sebesar 20 persen hingga 30 persen. Mencari penghematan biaya melalui outsourcing, telecommuting, dan langkah-langkah lain yang diusulkan dalam laporan PBB sebelumnya juga harus dieksplorasi.
- Membangun hubungan yang lebih kuat antara keputusan anggaran PBB dan kontribusi keuangan. Perceraian antara kewajiban dan pengambilan keputusan mungkin merupakan penyebab terbesar dari kerasnya dekade-panjang pada reformasi PBB. Jika PBB adalah untuk menjadi badan lebih efektif, efisien, dan akuntabel, pengambilan keputusan anggaran harus dikaitkan dengan tanggung jawab keuangan. Salah satu cara adalah bagi PBB untuk mengadopsi sistem hak suara sesuai anggaran yang memberikan donor utama yang lebih besar dalam keputusan anggaran. [25] Jika itu tidak mungkin, setidaknya beban keuangan harus tersebar di seluruh keanggotaan PBB lebih merata oleh menyesuaikan skala penilaian.
- Bersikeras bahwa PBB merevitalisasi review mandat. Sebuah tinjauan yang kuat mandat PBB disertai dengan tuntutan AS yang sudah ketinggalan zaman, tidak relevan, atau duplikasi mandat dihilangkan bisa menyelamatkan puluhan, bahkan ratusan, juta dolar. Untuk mendukung hal ini, Kongres harus berusaha untuk memiliki PBB mengadopsi klausul matahari terbenam untuk semua mandat sehingga mereka yang secara otomatis akan mengakhiri setelah dua tahunan kecuali mereka telah disertifikasi sebagai relevan oleh review.
- Menjaga arus akun AS. PBB telah ditahan dana berutang kepada pembayar pajak Amerika dari Dana Perimbangan Pajak dan mungkin dari account lain. [26] Dana ini melibatkan ratusan juta dolar. Kongres harus meloloskan peraturan menginstruksikan Administrasi untuk mencari penggantian seluruh jumlah dialokasikan oleh Kongres untuk berbagai keperluan kepada PBB atau lembaga afiliasinya yang tidak dikeluarkan di akhir setiap kalender atau tahun fiskal yang sesuai atau yang lain berutang ke AS
Pengawasan dan akuntabilitas di PBB sudah lemah. PBB tidak memiliki apa-apa bahkan menyerupai inspektur jenderal sampai tahun 1994, ketika Kantor Pengawasan Internal Jasa diciptakan setelah tuntutan AS untuk kantor tersebut. Awal dekade ini, tiga skandal-utama korupsi dalam program Minyak untuk Pangan Irak, pelecehan seksual yang dilakukan oleh pasukan penjaga perdamaian PBB, dan korupsi dan salah urus dalam panggilan pengadaan mendorong PBB untuk pengawasan yang lebih kuat dan akuntabilitas. [27] Skandal memicu serangkaian laporan PBB dan resolusi mengidentifikasi masalah dan mengusulkan solusi. Sayangnya, upaya ini sebagian besar telah lemah atau sementara.
Kantor Etika dan Perlindungan Whistleblower. Majelis Umum menginstruksikan Sekretaris Jenderal pada tahun 2005 "untuk cermat menerapkan standar yang ada perilaku dan mengembangkan sistem kode-macam etika bagi semua personel Amerika Bangsa [dan] menyampaikan rincian tentang kantor etika dengan berdiri sendiri. " [28] Sekretaris Jenderal mengadopsi kebijakan perlindungan whistleblower pada tahun 2005, dan Majelis Umum menyetujui sumber daya untuk Kantor Etika baru bertugas dalam menegakkan kebijakan tersebut. Sayangnya, wewenang Kantor Etika segera lumpuh dalam perselisihan dengan Program Pembangunan PBB. Ketika UNDP dipecat whistleblower pada bulan Maret 2007, Kantor Etika diselidiki dan menyimpulkan bahwa penembakan itu pembalasan. UNDP menolak kesimpulan dari Kantor Etika dan menolak kewenangannya atas UNDP. Sekretaris-Jenderal Ban Ki-moon berpihak pada UNDP terhadap Kantor Etika sendiri dan merilis sebuah buletin yang memungkinkan setiap "organ diberikan secara terpisah atau program" untuk membangun Etika sendiri setara Office dan standar etika dan prosedurnya sendiri. [29] Sebagai Pemerintah Accountability Project diamati:
[W] kebijakan histleblower di Sekretariat PBB, UNDP, Dana WFP, Anak PBB (UNICEF) dan Dana Kependudukan PBB (UNFPA), [yang] konsisten, dilemahkan oleh celah sewenang-wenang dan, secara keseluruhan, kurang komprehensif daripada kebijakan UN asli didirikan pada tahun 2005. Kebijakan ini harus ditulis ulang untuk, minimal, memenuhi standar yang ditetapkan dalam kebijakan UN aslinya. [30]Keterbukaan Informasi Keuangan. Persyaratan pengungkapan keuangan PBB pada staf PBB di atas tingkat tertentu yang diadopsi pada tahun 2006. [31] Sebagian besar karyawan PBB tunduk pada persyaratan pengungkapan mengirimkan formulir mereka, dan ringkasan yang diposting online. [32] Namun, pengungkapan publik kepentingan keuangan sepenuhnya sukarela. Dalam kebanyakan kasus, karyawan PBB tertutup menyerahkan pernyataan berikut: "Sesuai dengan Resolusi Majelis Umum A/RES/60/238, saya telah memilih untuk menjaga kerahasiaan informasi yang diungkapkan oleh saya untuk mematuhi Program Pengungkapan Keuangan. "Bahkan mereka memilih untuk mengungkapkan beberapa informasi biasanya hanya memberikan rincian luas, seperti menyatakan bahwa mereka memiliki rumah atau memiliki rekening giro.
Lemahnya sifat kebijakan pengungkapan keuangan yang mengganggu. Sebagai catatan Sekretaris Jenderal, pengungkapan "menunjukkan bahwa anggota staf PBB memahami pentingnya masyarakat dan Anggota PBB umum Serikat menjadi yakin bahwa, dalam melaksanakan tugas resmi mereka dan tanggung jawab, anggota staf tidak akan dipengaruhi oleh pertimbangan terkait dengan / nya kepentingan pribadinya. " [33] Keengganan Sekretaris Jenderal untuk meminta bahkan tingkat minimum pengungkapan keuangan publik bagi para pejabat PBB tingkat tinggi memperlemah akuntabilitas dan, mengingat hak istimewa dan kekebalan PBB, menghambat kemampuan otoritas nasional untuk menyelidiki dugaan kejahatan dan kesalahan.
Pengadaan Task Force (PTF). Ketika tingkat penipuan PBB dan salah urus dalam program minyak-untuk-Pangan Irak menjadi jelas, AS mampu meyakinkan PBB untuk menciptakan Satuan Tugas Pengadaan untuk menyelidiki dan mengejar dugaan penipuan dan kesalahan manajemen . The PTF mulai bekerja pada Januari 2006 dan selama tiga tahun ke depan ditemukan penipuan, pemborosan, dan salah urus dalam pengadaan PBB dan kegiatan lain yang melibatkan kontrak senilai lebih dari $ 630.000.000. Bukti digali oleh PTF menyebabkan temuan pelanggaran terhadap 17 pejabat PBB dan keyakinan dari seorang pejabat senior PBB pengadaan. Sayangnya, PTF melakukan tugasnya terlalu baik. Sebagai hukuman untuk mengejar kasus terhadap warga negara Singapura dan Rusia, negara-negara memimpin upaya yang berhasil untuk menghilangkan PTF pada Desember 2008. [34]
Di seluruh papan, pengawasan dan audit kemampuan PBB menderita sumber daya yang memadai, tekanan politik, dan kurangnya dukungan kelembagaan. Memang, laporan terbaru oleh Unit Inspeksi Bersama PBB menyimpulkan bahwa auditor PBB underqualified, underresourced, dan kurangnya dukungan kelembagaan. [35] Meskipun PBB memiliki beberapa badan pengawas lainnya (Unit Inspeksi Bersama, Komite Penasehat Audit Independen, dan Dewan Audit), tugas sehari-hari pengawasan dan investigasi jatuh ke OIOS. Sebagaimana tercantum dalam sebuah laporan internal yang bocor ke Sekretaris Jenderal PBB Ban Ki-Moon dari Under-Sekretaris Jenderal Inga-Britt Ahlenius, yang bertanggung jawab dari OIOS sampai musim panas lalu, OIOS tunduk pada tekanan politik yang merongrong kemerdekaan. Di antara penilaian yang keras disampaikan oleh Ahlenius:
Tidak ada transparansi, ada kurangnya akuntabilitas. Daripada mendukung pengawasan intern yang merupakan tanda kepemimpinan yang kuat dan pemerintahan yang baik, Anda harus berusaha untuk mengendalikan itu yang melemahkan posisinya. Saya tidak melihat tanda-tanda reformasi dalam Organisasi.Tidak adanya benar-benar independen PBB inspektur jenderal adalah masalah serius seperti yang bersifat ad hoc dan lemahnya transparansi dan akuntabilitas PBB. Ini menggarisbawahi tidak bertanggung jawab PBB dalam menolak untuk memperpanjang mandat Pengadaan Satgas independen, yang mengambil langkah besar dalam mengungkap salah urus, penipuan, dan korupsi dalam pengadaan PBB. Sejak kematian PTF itu, penyelidikan telah jatuh ke OIOS untuk mengejar, tetapi mereka penyelidikan urus, penipuan, dan korupsi belum aktif mengejar. [37]
Aku menyesal untuk mengatakan bahwa [PBB] Sekretariat sekarang berada dalam proses pembusukan. Hal ini tidak hanya berantakan dalam silo-sekretariat melayang, menggunakan kata-kata dari salah satu rekan senior saya. Hal ini hanyut ke ketidakrelevanan ....
Tindakan Anda tidak hanya menyedihkan, tapi serius tercela. Tidak Sekretaris Jenderal PBB sebelum Anda telah mempertanyakan kewenangan didelegasikan kepada [wakil jenderal OIOS] untuk menunjuk staf di OIOS. Tindakan Anda adalah tanpa preseden dan menurut pendapat saya serius memalukan untuk diri sendiri. [36]
PBB membutuhkan transparansi, akuntabilitas dan pengawasan independen, dan AS harus bersikeras pada mereka. Untuk mengatasi masalah ini, Kongres harus:
- Menuntut PBB mengadopsi aturan yang mewajibkan bahwa pejabat PBB secara terbuka mengungkapkan secara rinci laporan pengungkapan keuangan mereka dan memungkinkan aparat penegak hukum akses ke informasi pengungkapan keuangan penuh atas permintaan resmi. Kebijakan ini diadopsi untuk meningkatkan transparansi dan akuntabilitas, namun dalam implementasinya memiliki hanya melayani untuk melanjutkan opacity masa lalu.
- Meningkatkan standar etika PBB dan perlindungan whistleblower. Kongres dan Administrasi harus meminta saran dari ahli whistleblower dan standar etika tentang bagaimana meningkatkan aturan PBB, peraturan, dan praktek-praktek dan menerapkannya di seluruh sistem PBB.
- Permintaan dana independen untuk OIOS dan wewenang yang jelas untuk Wakil Sekretaris Jenderal untuk mempekerjakan dan memecat staf. Laporan Ahlenius mengungkapkan bahwa dia merasa bahwa independensi dan integritas OIOS berada di bawah serangan oleh Sekretariat. Tugas-tugas seorang inspektur jenderal memerlukan independensi, dan OIOS tersebut perlu terlindungi dari campur tangan politik dalam melakukan tugasnya. Seperti yang diamati oleh Kantor Akuntabilitas Pemerintah AS, "pengaturan pendanaan PBB membatasi kemampuan OIOS untuk beroperasi secara independen sebagaimana diamanatkan oleh Majelis Umum dan dibutuhkan oleh standar audit internasional yang OIOS telah mengadopsi." [38] Hal ini terus menjadi masalah bahwa Kongres harus mencari untuk mengatasi. Sebagai prosedur standar, laporan OIOS juga harus tersedia untuk umum pada situs Web-nya.
Salah satu tanggung jawab utama PBB adalah untuk membantu menjaga perdamaian dan keamanan internasional. Debacles penjaga perdamaian PBB di tahun 1990-an menyebabkan reevaluasi diperlukan penjaga perdamaian PBB. Namun, karena situasi mengganggu telah muncul dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, banyak dari mereka di Afrika, Dewan Keamanan telah menemukan dirinya di bawah tekanan untuk merespon dan "melakukan sesuatu" meskipun mungkin melanggar Hikmah belajar pada 1990-an bahwa "PBB tidak tidak berperang. "
Pada akhir November 2010, penjaga perdamaian PBB memiliki lebih dari 123.000 personel yang terlibat dalam pemeliharaan perdamaian PBB, operasi politik, atau perdamaian, termasuk personil sipil internasional dan lokal dan sukarelawan PBB. PBB saat ini mengawasi penyebaran personel berseragam lebih daripada satu bangsa kecuali Amerika Serikat telah dikerahkan di luar perbatasannya. Akibatnya, penjaga perdamaian PBB kini sedang dilakukan dengan kecepatan yang belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya, ruang lingkup, dan ambisi. Peningkatan permintaan telah mengungkapkan berlangsung, kelemahan serius.
Salah urus substansial, Penipuan, dan Korupsi dalam Pengadaan. Audit dan investigasi selama beberapa tahun terakhir telah mengungkapkan salah urus besar, penipuan, dan korupsi dalam pengadaan penjaga perdamaian PBB. Audit OIOS dari $ 1 miliar dalam kontrak pengadaan perdamaian PBB selama enam tahun menemukan bahwa setidaknya $ 265.000.000 tunduk pada limbah, penipuan, atau pelecehan. [39] Menurut sebuah laporan tahun 2007 OIOS, pemeriksaan sebesar $ 1,4 miliar penjaga perdamaian kontrak muncul skema korupsi "signifikan" yang tercemar $ 619.000.000 (lebih dari 40 persen) dari kontrak. [40] Suatu audit dari misi PBB di Sudan mengungkapkan puluhan juta dolar yang hilang salah urus dan limbah dan terkena indikasi besar penipuan dan korupsi. [41] Selain itu, OIOS mengungkapkan pada 2008 bahwa pihaknya sedang menyelidiki sekitar 250 kasus kesalahan mulai dari pelecehan seksual oleh pasukan penjaga perdamaian ke penyimpangan keuangan. Menurut Ahlenius, "Kita dapat mengatakan bahwa kita menemukan salah urus dan penipuan dan korupsi ke tingkat yang kita tidak benar-benar mengharapkan." [42]
Eksploitasi Seksual dan Pelecehan. Insiden eksploitasi dan penganiayaan seksual oleh pasukan penjaga perdamaian PBB dan personil sipil yang luas dan sering dibiarkan begitu saja. Ada banyak laporan personil PBB melakukan kejahatan serius dan pelecehan seksual, dari perkosaan ke prostitusi paksa perempuan dan gadis-gadis muda. Personil PBB juga telah dituduh eksploitasi dan penganiayaan seksual di Bosnia, Burundi, Kamboja, Kongo, Republik Demokratik Kongo, Guinea, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, dan Sudan. [43] Amerika Serikat dan anggota lainnya menyatakan berhasil menekan PBB untuk mengadopsi persyaratan ketat untuk pasukan perdamaian dan negara mereka berkontribusi. Kontak dan disiplin tim kini hadir dalam misi penjaga perdamaian PBB yang paling, dan pasukan kini diwajibkan untuk menjalani pembekalan dan pelatihan pada perilaku dan perilaku. [44] Namun, kejahatan ini terus, [45] dan PBB melaporkan bahwa tuduhan eksploitasi seksual dan pelecehan oleh personil sipil dan berseragam PBB berjumlah 106 pada tahun 2009 dan 83 pada tahun 2010. [46]
AS harus mendukung operasi penjaga perdamaian PBB ketika mereka memajukan kepentingan nasional Amerika. Pertanyaan yang sah harus ditanyakan, apakah PBB harus terlibat dalam jumlah saat misi dan apakah situasi ini yang terbaik ditujukan melalui PBB atau melalui upaya-upaya regional, multilateral, atau ad hoc.
Operasi penjaga perdamaian PBB dapat berguna dan berhasil jika bekerja dengan kesadaran keterbatasan dan kelemahan mereka. Kesadaran ini sangat penting karena permintaan penjaga perdamaian PBB menunjukkan sedikit indikasi menurun di masa mendatang. Ini membutuhkan AS untuk menekan perubahan substansial untuk mengatasi masalah serius dengan penjaga perdamaian PBB. Tanpa reformasi mendasar, masalah serius kemungkinan akan melanjutkan dan memperluas, merusak kredibilitas dan kemampuan untuk mencapai misi utama membantu memelihara perdamaian dan keamanan internasional PBB. Untuk mengatasi ini, Kongres harus:
- Evaluasi berjalan lama misi penjaga perdamaian PBB. AS harus mengevaluasi ulang semua operasi PBB yang tanggal kembali ke awal 1990-an atau sebelumnya-beberapa tanggal kembali ke 1940-untuk menentukan apakah setiap misi PBB memberikan kontribusi untuk menyelesaikan situasi atau memperlambat proses yang . Jika operasi tidak terbukti memfasilitasi resolusi situasi, PBB harus meniru Pasukan Pemelihara Perdamaian PBB di Siprus (UNFICYP) model di mana Yunani dan Siprus membayar lebih dari 40 persen dari biaya misi. Stakeholder yang ingin melanjutkan operasi penjaga perdamaian PBB yang belum diselesaikan konflik meskipun berada di tempat selama beberapa dekade harus diminta untuk memikul beban keuangan dari operasi lanjutan. Misi ini umumnya kecil dan di antara yang paling mahal, tapi evaluasi ulang tersebut akan membantu untuk mengurangi anggaran pemeliharaan perdamaian besar dan mengirim pesan selamat datang akuntabilitas dan penilaian yang terlalu sering telah kurang dalam proses karet-cap reauthorizing operasi penjaga perdamaian . Bersama-sama, lima dari misi PBB yang lebih tua (MINURSO, UNFICYP, UNDOF, UNMOGIP, dan UNTSO) biaya hampir $ 243.000.000. Jika AS bisa menggeser misi ini untuk pendanaan sukarela, AS bisa menghemat lebih dari $ 54.000.000 per tahun dan mungkin fokus pihak yang paling terkena dampak pada penyelesaian sengketa ini beredar.
- Membangun perdamaian kemampuan seluruh dunia, khususnya di Afrika. PBB tidak memiliki angkatan bersenjata berdiri dan sepenuhnya tergantung pada negara-negara anggota untuk menyumbangkan pasukan dan personel lain untuk memenuhi mandat operasi perdamaian. Ini adalah tepat. Negara harus mempertahankan kontrol angkatan bersenjata mereka dan menolak untuk mendukung pembentukan angkatan bersenjata di luar pengawasan langsung dan tanggung jawab nasional. Namun, hasil pengaturan saat ini dalam sistem ad hoc terganggu oleh keterlambatan dan kekurangan lainnya. Kongres harus mendukung peningkatan sumber daya penjaga perdamaian di bawah Initiative Operasi Perdamaian Global, yang telah secara signifikan didukung kapasitas dan kemampuan pasukan regional, khususnya di Afrika, untuk melayani sebagai pasukan penjaga perdamaian untuk PBB, Uni Afrika, atau koalisi lainnya.
- Menegakkan standar etik bagi personil sipil dan militer yang berpartisipasi dalam operasi perdamaian PBB. Jika PBB adalah untuk mengakhiri eksploitasi seksual, pelecehan, dan kejahatan lainnya oleh pasukan penjaga perdamaian, ia harus melakukan lebih dari mengadopsi code of conduct PBB, masalah manual, dan mengirim penyalahguna rumah. Para pelaku dan pemerintah mereka harus menghadapi konsekuensi nyata untuk menciptakan insentif bagi penegakan hukum yang efektif. Negara-negara anggota harus berkomitmen untuk menyelidiki, mencoba, dan menghukum personil mereka dalam kasus pelanggaran. Unit investigasi PBB harus independen, cepat untuk menyebarkan, dan memiliki kemampuan yang cukup dan otoritas untuk menyelidiki situasi, termasuk kerja sama penuh oleh personel misi dan akses ke saksi, catatan, dan situs di mana kejahatan terjadi sehingga percobaan dapat memiliki bukti yang cukup untuk melanjutkan. Sama pentingnya, PBB harus ketat dalam memegang negara anggota untuk standar ini. Negara yang gagal untuk memenuhi komitmen mereka untuk mendisiplinkan pasukan mereka harus dilarang menyediakan pasukan untuk operasi perdamaian.
Dewan HAM PBB
Dewan HAM PBB dibentuk pada tahun 2006 untuk menggantikan Komisi HAM PBB, yang telah gagal untuk menahan pemerintah untuk pertanggungjawaban atas pelanggaran hak asasi manusia dan kebebasan fundamental. Selama negosiasi untuk mendirikan dewan, banyak reformasi dasar dan standar keanggotaan yang diusulkan untuk memastikan bahwa dewan tidak hanya akan mengulangi kegagalan komisi, tetapi hanya sedikit reformasi mendapat dukungan yang cukup di Majelis Umum. [47] Akibatnya, Dewan Hak Asasi Manusia telah melakukan tidak lebih baik-dan dalam beberapa hal lebih buruk dari komisi diganti.
Mengantisipasi hasil ini, pemerintahan Bush memutuskan untuk tidak mencari tempat duduk di dewan pada tahun 2006. Berdasarkan catatan mengecewakan berikutnya dewan, AS lagi menolak untuk mencari kursi di tahun 2007 dan 2008. Pemerintahan Bush juga dipotong sebagian dari kontribusi AS untuk anggaran rutin PBB setara dengan bagian yang akan dialokasikan untuk dewan dan menjauhkan diri dari persidangan dewan kecuali dalam kasus "kepentingan nasional dalam." [48]
Pemerintahan Obama tidak setuju dengan kebijakan pemerintahan Bush. Ini dicari dan memenangkan kursi di dewan itu pada 2009. Meskipun AS telah mampu mengantar beberapa resolusi positif melalui dewan, seperti pembentukan Pelapor Khusus PBB untuk Kebebasan Majelis dan Asosiasi, dan untuk mendukung resolusi menangani beberapa situasi hak asasi manusia, masalah yang lebih mendasar dari Dewan Hak Asasi Manusia tetap:
- Bias terhadap Israel. Sejak tahun 2006, dewan telah mengadopsi 67 resolusi spesifik negara, dimana 32 terfokus pada Israel. [49] US keanggotaan di dewan belum berhenti bias ini. Pada tahun 2010, atas keberatan AS, dewan mengadopsi delapan resolusi mengutuk Israel atau tindakannya. [50] Selain itu, dewan telah mengadakan 12 sesi khusus sejak tahun 2006 yang berfokus pada situasi negara dengan setengah dari sesi terfokus pada mengutuk Israel. Yang paling terakhir ini sesi khusus diadakan pada tahun 2009-setelah AS menjadi anggota-untuk membahas Manusia PBB Dewan Hak Fakta Menemukan Misi tentang Konflik Gaza (Goldstone Report), yang telah Pemerintahan Obama dikritik sebagai "sangat cacat" dan bias terhadap Israel. [51]
- Keengganan untuk menghadapi berbagai pelanggaran HAM yang serius. Sejak AS terpilih untuk kursi, dewan telah menyampaikan resolusinya menangani situasi hak asasi manusia di Kamboja, Honduras, Somalia, dan Sudan. Namun, tindakan ini baik buah tergantung rendah atau tanah yang sudah dilalui oleh dewan dalam resolusi sebelumnya. Meskipun keanggotaan AS, dewan terus mengabaikan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia oleh banyak pelaku yang serius, termasuk Aljazair, Cina, Kuba, Mesir, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Arab Saudi, Venezuela, dan Zimbabwe. Padahal, pada pemilu 2010, tujuh negara dengan catatan hak asasi manusia meragukan (Libya, Angola, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, Mauritania, dan Qatar) terpilih untuk dewan meskipun mereka telah dikritik oleh kelompok hak asasi manusia karena melanggar hak-hak warga negara mereka. [52] Semua ini negara mendapat dukungan luar biasa dari keanggotaan PBB pada 13 Mei pemilu. Bahkan Libya mendapat dukungan dari 155 dari 192 negara anggota PBB.
- Dukungan untuk upaya yang melemahkan hak asasi manusia dan kebebasan fundamental. Misalnya, Dewan HAM telah berulang kali mengadopsi resolusi mengakui dan mempromosikan larangan pada "pencemaran nama baik agama." [53] Para pendukung resolusi ini berusaha untuk melarang semua kritik agama, terlepas dari konteks atau pengaturan, dan teks resolusi dukung pembatasan hak-hak dasar untuk kebebasan beragama dan berekspresi.
Kinerja dewan tidak mungkin untuk meningkatkan tanpa reformasi drastis untuk meningkatkan keanggotaannya, seperti pembatasan negara dengan pelanggaran HAM berat dari keanggotaan dan membutuhkan pemilihan kompetitif. Kesempatan terbaik untuk melaksanakan reformasi tersebut akan di Majelis Umum PBB lima tahun ulasan wajib "status Dewan," yang dibutuhkan oleh resolusi yang dibuat dewan. Tinjauan ini harus dilakukan pada tahun 2011. Untuk memberikan dukungan kepada upaya AS untuk mereformasi Dewan HAM, Kongres harus:
- Menahan dana AS untuk Dewan Hak Asasi Manusia sampai kriteria keanggotaan serius diadopsi. [54] Tanpa standar keanggotaan serius dan ketat, dewan akan terus mengecewakan. [55]
- Menahan sebagian dana AS untuk anggaran rutin PBB sampai Majelis Umum mengakhiri praktek pendanaan dewan dan kegiatan hak asasi manusia PBB lainnya melalui anggaran rutin PBB. Banyak dari kegiatan ini layak didukung, tetapi praktik ini perisai badan-badan seperti Dewan Hak Asasi Manusia dari tindakan kongres. Badan-badan PBB diskrit harus memiliki dana independen untuk memungkinkan negara-negara anggota untuk mengekspresikan dukungan mereka atau ketidakpuasan secara langsung.
Puluhan organisasi independen dan semi-otonom dan badan dalam sistem PBB menerima miliaran dolar pembayar pajak AS setiap tahun. Tidak ada organisasi tanpa masalah, tetapi hanya sedikit yang tanpa elemen positif. Terlalu sering, bagaimanapun, AS gagal untuk memastikan bahwa manfaat dari organisasi-organisasi ini memenuhi biaya mereka.
Kongres harus menilai manfaat masing-masing organisasi dan sejauh mana mendukung kepentingan AS. Proses ini harus menginformasikan setiap otorisasi dan keputusan alokasi. Kongres dapat memutuskan bahwa beberapa dari mereka menyediakan layanan penting yang melayani kepentingan AS dan orang-orang bangsa lain. Beberapa organisasi PBB lebih teknis melakukan tugas-tugas rendah, tapi berguna. Organisasi PBB lainnya memberikan sedikit manfaat untuk membenarkan kontribusi AS. Misalnya, sedikit, jika ada, kepentingan AS yang dirugikan oleh tidak adanya AS dari UNESCO selama dua dekade. Sedikit, jika ada, kepentingan inti AS telah secara signifikan maju sejak AS kembali ke UNESCO pada tahun 2003. Manfaat meragukan keanggotaan UNESCO biaya pembayar pajak AS $ 81.000.000 pada tahun 2010.
Kongres juga harus diingat bahwa organisasi yang didanai secara sukarela umumnya lebih responsif terhadap keprihatinan negara-negara anggota karena mereka tahu bahwa negara anggota bisa memilih untuk mengurangi atau menangguhkan dana jika mengabaikan keprihatinan yang diajukan oleh negara itu. Organisasi didanai melalui anggaran dinilai umumnya kurang responsif dan, dengan Departemen Luar Negeri AS concurring, bersikeras bahwa AS berada di bawah kewajiban hukum untuk membayar mereka terlepas dari kekhawatiran AS. Meskipun Kongres telah mengabaikan argumen ini berulang kali di masa lalu, ia membawa berat badan. Pergeseran kegiatan yang didanai melalui anggaran saat ini dinilai untuk pendanaan sukarela akan membuat lebih mudah bagi Kongres untuk mendukung program-program yang ia berharap dan menahan dana bagi mereka tidak. Memiliki organisasi PBB bersaing untuk pendanaan juga akan berkontribusi terhadap efisiensi dan efektivitas dan meningkatkan respon permintaan negara anggota. Dengan pikiran dalam, Kongres harus:
- Berusahalah untuk menggeser dana untuk kegiatan dan organisasi PBB dari anggaran dinilai untuk sumbangan sukarela. Sejarah telah menunjukkan bahwa reformasi organisasi PBB dan mengurangi anggaran sangat sulit melalui upaya diplomatik saja. Leverage keuangan melalui pemotongan legislatif dapat memberikan tongkat yang diperlukan untuk kemajuan dalam beberapa kasus. Namun, ini adalah instrumen tumpul, dan Kongres tidak bisa mengatur setiap perubahan yang diperlukan untuk setiap organisasi atau badan PBB. Pemotongan juga dapat membuat kesulitan bagi AS dalam memenuhi tujuan lain. Sebagai Duta Besar John Bolton berpendapat, bergerak organisasi dan kegiatan yang lebih PBB terhadap pendanaan sukarela akan menyelesaikan sejumlah masalah dan meningkatkan kemampuan Amerika untuk mendanai organisasi-organisasi atau kegiatan PBB yang dianggap berharga dan untuk menggembosi mereka tidak. [56]
- Bersikeras bahwa semua organisasi PBB mengizinkan dibukanya akses AS untuk semua audit, dokumen internal, dan informasi lain yang relevan. Ada kurangnya mengganggu transparansi dalam banyak organisasi PBB yang berafiliasi yang menghambat pengawasan AS. Misalnya, meskipun AS merupakan organisasi besar dan sering pemodal terbesar organisasi-organisasi ini dan umumnya duduk di dewan eksekutif mereka, seperti UNDP dan World Food Program menolak untuk mengizinkan akses penuh AS untuk dokumen internal mereka. [57] opacity ini menghambat tata kelola yang baik dan pengawasan organisasi.
- Mengurangi pendanaan sukarela AS untuk sistem PBB. Co-chair dari Komisi Nasional Presiden tentang Tanggung Jawab dan Reformasi Fiskal disarankan mengurangi kontribusi sukarela AS untuk sistem PBB sebesar 10 persen (US $ 350 juta) per tahun. [58] Kongres harus memperhatikan ini rekomendasi. Jumlah AS menyediakan dalam kontribusi sukarela sepenuhnya pada kebijaksanaan AS Namun, karena dana ini bersifat sukarela, mengapa tidak memotong mereka sebesar 25 persen atau 50 persen? Namun, Kongres harus dipotong discriminately, daripada seluruh papan. Organisasi dengan masalah manajemen atau kebijakan harus memiliki dana memotong mereka. Organisasi yang efektif, transparan, dan koperasi harus dihargai.
Rim laporan tentang reformasi PBB selama dekade terakhir [59] telah mengakibatkan tindakan terlalu sedikit untuk merampingkan birokrasi PBB, mengurangi pengeluaran, atau meningkatkan pengawasan, transparansi, dan akuntabilitas. Reformasi PBB disahkan oleh Majelis Umum dalam Dokumen Hasil 2005 telah berbaring sekarat atau sudah buruk dirancang, dilaksanakan, atau ditegakkan. Dalam beberapa kasus, reformasi telah terbalik. Secara khusus, pengawasan dan akuntabilitas telah dirusak. Transparansi dan etika reformasi telah diadopsi, tapi fecklessly dan dengan sedikit penegakan hukum. Upaya untuk merampingkan mandat PBB telah ditinggalkan. Dewan Hak Asasi Manusia tidak lebih baik dari komisi diganti. Perdamaian tetap terganggu oleh kesalahan dan salah urus.
Kegagalan untuk mereformasi PBB telah menghasilkan sebuah sistem yang tetap birokrasi, mahal, rumit, kurang pengawasan, dan sering tidak mampu memenuhi tanggung jawab yang diletakkan di atasnya. Ini kegagalan menodai reputasi PBB dan mendorong untuk proposal pertanyaan untuk memberikan kewenangan yang lebih PBB atau peran yang lebih sentral dalam menangani masalah-masalah internasional. Tanpa reformasi fundamental, masalah yang menghambat PBB kemungkinan akan melanjutkan dan memperluas, merusak kemampuan PBB untuk mendukung dan memajukan kepentingan AS.
Keterlibatan oleh Kongres dalam menekan untuk reformasi PBB sepenuhnya tepat. Kekuatan dompet menempatkan tanggung jawab yang jelas pada Kongres untuk memastikan bahwa dolar AS pembayar pajak digunakan secara hati-hati. Sejarah menunjukkan bahwa membayar penilaian AS dan menyediakan dana sukarela tanpa menuntut perubahan spesifik menghilangkan titik leverage yang kuat untuk mendorong reformasi.
Kenyataannya adalah bahwa beberapa negara tertarik dalam memastikan bahwa PBB memiliki pengawasan dan akuntabilitas yang memadai, menggunakan sumber daya secara efisien, dan kegiatan plum yang usang, duplikasi, atau tidak relevan. Sebagian membayar PBB harga murah dan, karenanya, tidak ada yang dipertaruhkan. Jika AS tidak menekan masalah ini, tidak ada bangsa lain kemungkinan untuk melangkah maju.
- Brett D. Schaefer adalah Jay Kingham Fellow di Regulatory Affairs Internasional di Margaret Thatcher Pusat untuk Kebebasan, sebuah divisi dari Kathryn dan Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, di The Heritage Foundation dan editor teka-teki: Keterbatasan PBB dan Pencarian Alternatif (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009). Ia menyampaikan pernyataan ini dalam kesaksian kepada Komite DPR AS Urusan Luar Negeri pada tanggal 25 Januari 2011.
[1] Matius Saltmarsh, "A Birokrasi PBB Kembung Penyebab Kebingungan," The New York Times, 5 Januari 2011, pukul http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/06/world/europe/06iht-nations06.html?_r=0 (27 Januari 2011).
[2] Lihat Brett D. Schaefer, "Sebuah Laporan Perkembangan Reformasi PBB," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No 1937, 19 Mei 2006, di http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/a-progress-report-on-un-reform.
[3] See Brett D. Schaefer, "Siapa Memimpin PBB?" Heritage Foundation WebMemo No 1054, tanggal 4 Desember 2007, di http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/12/who-leads-the-united-nations.
[4] Edward C. Keberuntungan, "Reformasi PBB: Pelajaran dari Sejarah in Progress," Dewan Akademik pada Sistem PBB Occasional Paper No 1, 2003, http://www.reformwatch.net/fitxers/58.pdf (27 Januari 2011).
[5]
PBB mulai melanggar kebijakan ini pada tahun 2006, yang berpuncak pada
bagian 2008-2009 anggaran rutin dua tahunan PBB atas suara "tidak" dari
US Brett D. Schaefer, "Kongres Harus Menahan Pendanaan untuk boros PBB,"
Heritage Foundation WebMemo No 1786, 29 Januari 2008, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/11/a-short-united-nations-to-do-list-for-the-new-congress
[6] Brett D. Schaefer, "A Short PBB To-Do List untuk Kongres Baru," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No 3064 18 Nopember 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/11/a-short-united-nations-to-do-list-for-the-new-congress
[7] Brett D. Schaefer, "Waktu untuk Rein dalam Anggaran PBB," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No 2368, 3 Februari 2010, di http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/02/time-to-rein-in-the-uns-budget.
[8] Ibid.
[9]
PBB Departemen Informasi Publik, "Mengadopsi Majelis Umum Penjaga
Perdamaian Anggaran sebesar $ 7,2 Miliar untuk Tahun Buku 1 Juli 2010
sampai dengan 30 Juni 2011," 24 Juni 2010, di http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10955.doc.htm (27 Januari 2011).
[10] Penilaian AS untuk organisasi-organisasi ini berbeda.
Misalnya, pada tahun 2010, penilaian AS adalah 3,18 persen dari
anggaran Maritim Organisasi Internasional, 5.92 persen dari anggaran Uni
Pos Universal, dan 7,34 persen dari anggaran Uni Telekomunikasi
Internasional.
Namun, kebanyakan organisasi mendasarkan penilaian mereka pada
penilaian PBB dan muatan AS antara 20 persen dan 25 persen dari anggaran
mereka dinilai. Lihat Marjorie Ann Browne dan Kennon H. Nakamura, "Bangsa Sistem Pendanaan Amerika: Isu Kongres," Kongres Research Service Laporan Kongres, 8 Maret 2010, di http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33611_20100308.pdf (Januari 27, 2011).
[11] Departemen Luar Negeri AS, Anggaran Kongres Tahun Anggaran Justifikasi 2009, hal. 12, di http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100326.pdf (27 Januari 2011), dan Anggaran Tahun Anggaran Kongres Justifikasi 2011, Vol. 1, Departemen Operasi Luar Negeri, hlm 14 dan 542, di http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/136355.pdf (27 Januari 2011).
[12] US Kantor Manajemen dan Anggaran, Anggaran Pemerintah Amerika Serikat, Tahun Anggaran 2000: Lampiran, Departemen Luar Negeri (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), hlm. 710, di http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy00/pdf/sta.pdf (27 Januari 2011).
[13] Departemen Luar Negeri AS, Anggaran Kongres Tahun Anggaran Justifikasi 2011, p. 542.
[14] Brett D. Schaefer, "AS Pendanaan PBB Capai All-Time tinggi," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No 2981, 13 Agustus 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/08/us-funding-of-the-united-nations-reaches-all-time-high
[15] Departemen Luar Negeri AS, Anggaran Kongres Tahun Anggaran Justifikasi 2011, Vol. 2, Operasi Luar Negeri, p. 131, di http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137936.pdf (27 Januari 2011).
[16] Vita Bite, "UN Sistem Pendanaan: Isu Kongres," Kongres Research Service Laporan Singkat untuk Kongres, diperbarui September 10, 2003, di http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/24669.pdf (27 Januari , 2011).
[17] Komisi Nasional Tanggung Jawab Fiskal dan Reformasi, "Co-Chairs 'Proposal," November 10, 2010, http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/Illustrative_List_11.10.2010.pdf (27, 2011).
[18] Majelis Umum PBB, Komite Kelima, "RAPBN Program untuk dua tahunan 2010-2011 dari Sekretaris Jenderal," A/64/6, § § 1-36, pada http://www.un.org/ en/ga/fifth/64/ppb1011sg.shtml (27 Januari 2011).
[19] Sekretaris Jenderal PBB, "Investasi di PBB: Untuk Stronger Seluruh Dunia Organisasi," A/60/692, 7 Maret 2006, di http://www.un.org/reform/investinginun/investing- di-un.shtml (27 Januari 2011).
[20] Majelis Umum PBB, "2005 World Summit Outcome," A/RES/60/1, para. 163 (b), 24 Oktober 2005, http://www.un.org/ga/president/62/issues/resolutions/a-60-692.pdf ga/president/62/issues/resolutions/a-60-692.pdf (27 Januari 2011).
[21] Sebagai PBB mencatat, "Mandat tidak mudah didefinisikan atau diukur, definisi hukum konkret mandat tidak ada.
Dipandu oleh Dokumen Hasil KTT dan diskusi berikutnya, dan untuk
memfasilitasi review latihan mandat saat ini, kami telah, bagaimanapun,
mengidentifikasi disepakati ... definisi kerja: mandat adalah permintaan
atau arah bagi tindakan oleh Sekretariat PBB atau badan lain yang
melaksanakan, yang berasal dari resolusi Majelis Umum atau salah satu
organ lain yang relevan. "PBB, Mandat Registry," Sering Diajukan, " http://webapps01.un.org/mandatereview/displayFAQ.do;jsessionid=2064543609EFB82F18FD1B010743695F (Januari 27, 2011).
[22] PBB, Mandat Registry, di http://webapps01.un.org/mandatereview/searchStart.do (1 Februari 2011).
[23]
Kemajuan terbaru dalam benar-benar menghilangkan mandat adalah dari
2006: "Sampai saat ini, dari 399 mandat non-diperbarui lebih dari lima
tahun untuk diperiksa, hanya 69 telah disetujui oleh semua negara
anggota akan selesai dan sisihkan. "Irene Martinetti," Kemajuan lamban
pada PBB Mandat Review, "Pusat PBB Reformasi Pendidikan Reformasi PBB Tonton No 18, 16 Agustus 2006, di http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/62 (27 Januari 2011).
[24] Majelis Umum PBB, "Mandat Ulasan: Laporan Co-Chairs '," 8 Agustus 2008, hal. 3, di http://www.un.org/ga/president/62/letters/cochairsmandatereview080808.pdf (27 Januari 2011).
[25] Untuk lebih jelasnya, lihat Brett D. Schaefer, "AS Harus Dorong untuk Penyesuaian dalam UN Iuran," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No 2735, 15 Desember 2009, di http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/the-us-should-push-for-adjustment-in-un-dues .
[26] Brett D. Schaefer, "PBB Harus Bayar Apa Itu Berhutang AS dari Dana Perimbangan Pajak Its," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No 3052 8 November 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/11/the-un-should-pay-what-its-owes-the-us-from-its-tax-equalization-fund
[27] Untuk informasi tentang masalah ini, lihat Komite Penyelidikan Independen, "Dokumen," situs Web, di http://www.iic-offp.org/documents.htm (27 Januari 2011), Kantor Akuntabilitas Pemerintah AS, Inggris Bangsa: Pelajaran dari Minyak untuk Program Pangan Menunjukkan Kebutuhan untuk Memperkuat Pengawasan Internal PBB dan Kegiatan Pengawasan, GAO-06-330, April 2006, di http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06330.pdf (Januari 27, 2011); Kantor Akuntabilitas Pemerintah AS, PBB: Pengadaan Pengendalian Internal Apakah Lemah, GAO-06-577, April 2006, di http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06577.pdf (Januari 27, 2011), dan pendengaran, PBB Organisasi Misi di Republik Demokratik Kongo: Kasus untuk Penjaga Perdamaian Reformasi,
Sub-komite Afrika, global Hak Asasi Manusia dan Operasi Internasional,
Komite Hubungan Internasional, DPR AS, 109 Cong, 1st Sesi. ., 1 Maret
2005, di http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa99590.000/hfa99590_0f.htm (27 Januari 2011).
[28] Majelis Umum PBB, "2005 World Summit Outcome," A/RES/60/1, para. 161 (d).
[29]
Sekretariat PBB, "United Nations System-lebar Penerapan Etika: Organ
terpisah Diperintah dan Program," ST/SGB/2007/11, 30 November 2007, di http://www.unops.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/Ethics % 20documents/SGB-2007-11% 20EN.pdf (27 Januari 2011).
[30] Proyek Pemerintah Akuntabilitas, "PBB," di http://www.whistleblower.org/program-areas/international-reform/united-nations (27 Januari 2011).
[31] Sekretariat PBB, "Pengungkapan Keuangan dan Deklarasi Laporan Bunga," ST/SGB/2006/6, 10 April 2006, http://www.usun-ny.us/untai/resolution/SYG%20bulletin%20ST-SGB-2006-6%20-%20Financial%20Disclosure.pdf (Januari 27, 2011).
[32] Sekretaris Jenderal PBB, "Pengungkapan Sukarela Publik Pengungkapan Keuangan dan Deklarasi Laporan bunga," 2009, di http://www.un.org/sg/PublicDisclosure_2009.shtml (27 Januari 2011).
[33] Ibid.
[34] Brett D. Schaefer, "The Demise dari Gugus Tugas Pengadaan PBB Ancam Pengawasan di PBB," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No 2272, 5 Februari 2009, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/02/The-Demise-of-the-UN-Procurement-Task-Force-Threatens-Oversight-at-the-UN
[35] Lihat PBB Satuan Gabungan Inspeksi, "Fungsi Audit dalam Sistem PBB," JIU/REP/2010/5, 2010, di http://www.unjiu.org/data/reports/2010/JIU_REP_2010_05% 20Final pdf. (27 Januari 2011). Lihat juga George Russell, "Auditor PBB Are U-Berkualitas, kewalahan, Inspektur Katakanlah," Fox News, 14 Januari 2011, di http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/01/14/auditors-qualified- membentang-katakanlah-inspektur / (27 Januari 2011).
[36] Colum Lynch, "Blistering Insider Memo Menjelaskan Tindakan Chief PBB sebagai 'Serius Tercela,'" Kebijakan Luar Negeri, 19 Juli 2010, http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/19/blistering_insider_memo_describes_un_chief_s_actions_as_seriously_reprehensible (Januari 28, 2011).
[37]
"Kepala bertindak dari divisi PBB yang menyelidiki kesalahan dalam
badan dunia saat ini sedang diselidiki atas tuduhan dirinya membalas
dendam terhadap dua whistle blower." Associated Press, "Investigasi PBB
Kepala Investigasi bawah," USA Today, 19 Januari, 2011, di http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-01-19-united-nations-probe_N.htm (28 Januari 2011).
[38] Kantor Akuntabilitas Pemerintah, PBB: Pengaturan Pendanaan Menghambat Kemerdekaan Auditor Internal, GAO-06-575, April 2006, di http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06575.pdf (28 Januari 2011 ).
[39]
Siaran Pers, "Penjaga Perdamaian Pengadaan Audit Ditemukan
Mismanagement, Risiko Kerugian Keuangan, Dewan Keamanan Diceritakan
dalam Briefing oleh Kepala Staf," Dewan Keamanan PBB, 22 Februari 2006,
di http://www.un.org/News / Press/docs/2006/sc8645.doc.htm (28 Januari 2011).
[40] Gugus tugas memandang hanya tujuh dari 18 misi penjaga perdamaian PBB yang operasional selama penyelidikan.
Kantor PBB Pengawasan Internal Jasa, "Laporan dari Kantor Pengawasan
Internal Jasa pada Kegiatan Satuan Tugas Pengadaan untuk Periode 18
Bulan yang Berakhir 30 Juni 2007," A/62/272, 5 Oktober 2007,
28, 2011), dan George Russell, "Laporan Rincian Kemajuan dalam
Pertempuran Melawan Korupsi di Kantor PBB," Fox News, 11 Oktober 2007,
di http://www.foxnews.com/story/0, 2933,301255,00 html. (28 Januari 2011).
[41] Colum Lynch, "Audit PBB Sudan Misi Menemukan Puluhan Jutaan di Sampah," The Washington Post, 10 Februari 2008, hal. A16, di http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/09/AR2008020902427.html (28 Januari 2011).
[42] Louis Charbonneau, "Probe PBB Dugaan Korupsi, Penipuan," Reuters, 10 Januari 2008.
[43] Lihat Kate Holt dan Sarah Hughes, "Staf PBB Dituduh memperkosa anak di Sudan," The Telegraph, 4 Januari 2007, di http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml = / news/2007/01/03/wsudan03.xml (28 Januari 2011), Kate Holt dan Sarah Hughes, "Seks dan PBB: Ketika Pembawa damai Menjadi Predator," The Independent, 11 Januari 2005 28, 2011), dan Colum Lynch, "Wajah PBB Tuduhan Lebih Misconduct seksual," The Washington Post, 13 Maret, 2005, hal. A22, di http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30286-2005Mar12.html (28 Januari 2011).
[44] PBB Kontak dan Unit Disiplin, "Tentang CDU: Perilaku dan Tim Disiplin," di http://cdu.unlb.org/AboutCDU/ConductandDisciplineTeams.aspx (28 Januari 2011).
[45]
Corinna Csáky, "No One Turn to: The U-Pelaporan Eksploitasi Seksual
Anak dan Penyalahgunaan oleh Pekerja Bantuan dan pemelihara perdamaian,"
Save the Children, 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2 / shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/27_05_08_savethechildren.pdf (28 Januari 2011). Lihat juga BBC News, "'Menyalahgunakan Anak,' Pasukan penjaga perdamaian" 27 Mei 2008, di http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/ 7420798.stm
(28 Januari 2011), dan PBB News Pusat, "Tim PBB Melihat ke Misconduct
Seksual Dugaan oleh Helm Biru di Kongo," 24 Juli 2009, di http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31574 (28 Januari 2011 ).
[46]
PBB Kontak dan Unit Disiplin, "Statistik Tuduhan untuk Semua Kategori
Personil per Tahun (Eksploitasi Seksual dan Kekerasan)," diperbarui 14
Januari 2011, http://cdu.unlb.org/Statistics/AllegationsbyCategoryofPersonnelSexualExploitationandAbuse/AllegationsforAllCategoriesofPersonnelPerYearSexualExploitationandAbuse.aspx (28 Januari 2011).
[47] Untuk lebih detail, lihat Brett D. Schaefer, "The Dewan Hak Asasi Manusia PBB: Mengulangi Kesalahan Past," Heritage Foundation Kuliah Nomor 964, 19 September 2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/The-United-Nations-Human-Rights-Council-Repeating-Past-Mistakes (Januari 28, 2011).
[48] Sean McCormack, "Daily Press Briefing," Departemen Luar Negeri AS, 6 Juni 2008, di http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/jun/105716.htm
(28 Januari 2011), dan Zalmay Khalilzad, pernyataan pada Konferensi
Durban II dan Dewan Hak Asasi Manusia pada Konferensi Presiden
Organisasi Yahudi Mayor, 8 April 2008, di http://www.eyeontheun.org/assets/ attachments/documents/6581.doc (28 Januari 2011).
Untuk ringkasan kebijakan pemerintahan Bush mengenai dewan, lihat Luisa
Blanchfield, "Manusia PBB Dewan Hak Asasi: Isu untuk Kongres," Kongres
Research Service Laporan Kongres, 1 Juni 2009, hlm 11-12, di http:/ / www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33608.pdf (28 Januari 2011).
[49] Eye on PBB, Tindakan Hak Asasi Manusia, di http://www.eyeontheun.org/browse.asp (28 Januari 2011).
[50]
Dewan Hak Asasi Manusia PBB, Resolusi A/HRC/RES/13/5, A/HRC/RES/13/6,
A/HRC/RES/13/7, A/HRC/RES/13/8, A / HRC/RES/13/9, A/HRC/RES/14/1,
A/HRC/RES/15/1, dan A/HRC/RES/15/6.
[51] "Kami tetap percaya bahwa Laporan PBB Misi Pencari Fakta tentang Konflik Gaza, dikenal sebagai Laporan Goldstone, sangat cacat.
Kami sebelumnya telah mencatat kekurangan yang mencakup fokus tidak
seimbang pada Israel, kesimpulan negatif menarik tentang niat dan
tindakan Israel, gagal untuk menangani secara memadai dengan sifat
asimetris konflik Gaza, dan kegagalan untuk menetapkan tanggung jawab
sesuai dengan Hamas untuk sengaja menargetkan warga sipil dan
mendasarkan diri dan operasi di banyak daerah perkotaan sipil penduduk.
"Alejandro Wolff, pernyataan pada resolusi Majelis Umum PBB pada PBB
Misi Pencari Fakta tentang Konflik Gaza, Misi AS untuk PBB, 26 Februari
2010, di http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/137331.htm (28 Januari 2011).
[52]
Lihat Antoine Blua, "Hak Grup Kecewa atas Pemilu Libya untuk Dewan HAM
PBB," Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 13 Mei 2010, di http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/2041110.html
( 28 Januari 2011), dan Edith M. Lederer, "PBB memilih Hak Pelanggar
kepada Dewan Hak Asasi Manusia," ABC News, 13 Mei 2010, pukul http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=10637202 ( January 28, 2011). Untuk rekening rinci catatan hak asasi manusia negara-negara masing-masing, lihat US Department of State, 2009 Negara Laporan Praktek Hak Asasi Manusia, 11 Maret 2010, di http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt / 2009/index.htm (28 Januari 2011).
[53] Steven Groves, "Mengapa AS Harus Menentang 'Fitnah Agama-agama' Resolusi di PBB," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No 2206, 10 November 2008, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/11/why-the-us-should-oppose-defamation-of-religions-resolutions-at-the-united-nations
[54]
Undang-undang ini simbolis karena AS tidak dapat langsung menahan uang
dari Dewan Hak Asasi Manusia, hanya jumlah yang setara dari
kontribusinya terhadap anggaran rutin PBB.
Namun bagian yang sinyal ke negara-negara lain bahwa Kongres, bukan
hanya Administrasi, tidak senang dengan kegiatan "defunded".
[55]
Untuk saran tentang kriteria keanggotaan, lihat Brett D. Schaefer,
"Pemilihan untuk Dewan HAM PBB Menggarisbawahi Kebutuhan Reformasi,"
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No 2417, tanggal 2 Juni 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/elections-for-un-human-rights-council-underscore-the-need-for-reform
[56] John R. Bolton, "Kunci Mengubah Sistem PBB," American Enterprise Institute Outlook No 2, Oktober 2010, di http://www.aei.org/outlook/101000 (28 Januari 2011).
[57] Lihat Brett D. Schaefer dan Steven Groves, "Kongres Harus Menahan Dana dari Program Pembangunan PBB," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No 1783, 26 Januari 2008 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/01/Congress-Should-Withhold-Funds-from-the-UN-Development-Program ,
dan dan George Russell, "Program Pangan Dunia 'Kebijakan Sinar
Matahari' Jatuh pendek, Panel Pengawasan PBB Says," Fox News, 11
Nopember 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/11/11/world-food-programs-sunshine-policy-falls-short-oversight-panel-says/ (Januari 28, 2011).
[58] "Proposal Co-Chairs '." Komisi Nasional Tanggung Jawab Fiskal dan Reformasi,
[59] Brett D. Schaefer, "Laporan Cukup: Aksi Lebih Dibutuhkan Reformasi PBB," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No 1988, 8 Desember 2006, di http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/12/enough-reports-more-action-needed-on-un-reformRelasi Berita:
Dalam tubuh PBB harus melakukan pembersihan besar-besaran sesuai dengan pembentukan Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa pada tanggal 24 Oktober 1945 di San Francisco.
http://souisapaul81.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/in-un-body-should-undertake-massive.html
Kami berharap dari Pemerintah Meksiko untuk tidak mengikuti rayuan manis pemerintah Indonesia ilegal, yang masih banyak masalah kemanusiaan telah dilanggar oleh Pemerintah Indonesia.
http://souisapaul81.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/we-expect-from-government-of-mexico-to.html
Kita perlu tindakan dari pemerintah Amerika dan organisasi kemanusiaan internasional tegas untuk memimpin pemerintahan penjahat di Jakarta untuk pergi ke pengadilan internasional, dan mengakui keabsahan status Maluku, Papua Barat, Kalimantan (Borneo), Aceh dan lain-lain, adalah terpisah dari otoritas Republik Indonesia, di mana hal ini sesuai dengan sejarah yang benar dan hukum yang berlaku.
http://souisapaul81.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/we-need-action-of-american-government.html
Membujuk dari Pemerintah Indonesia ilegal melalui konferensi atau pertemuan yang telah digelar untuk penipuan dan bisnis kotor.
http://souisapaul81.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/coaxing-from-illegal-indonesian.html
Exiled FKM pendiri Alex Manuputty, berbicara kepada 3rd Degree dari California persembunyiannya, mengatakan dia mencari suaka politik di jalankan dari Koppassus.
http://souisapaul81.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/exiled-fkm-founder-alex-manuputty.html
Lihat lebih: Republic of South Maluku (Moluccas)
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