Indonesia
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
2001
March 4, 2002
Indonesia continued to make progress in some areas of its transition from a long-entrenched authoritarian regime to a more pluralistic, representative democracy. In July the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), which is the country's supreme governing institution, exercised its constitutional right to convene an "extraordinary session," and removed President Abdurrahman Wahid from office in connection with charges of corruption and misrule. Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri replaced Wahid, as stipulated by law, and the MPR elected United Development Party Chairman Hamzah Haz to replace Megawati as Vice President. Wahid was elected in 1999 in the country's first pluralistic elections, in a process judged free and fair by international monitors. The Government continued to face enormous challenges because institutions required for a democratic system either do not exist or are at an early stage of development. Existing institutions, including the government bureaucracy and security establishment, often were obstacles to democratic development. A constitutional amendment process underway since 1999 has provided for a clearer separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. The President and the appointed Cabinet are accountable to the MPR, the majority of whose members are elected. The 500-member Parliament (DPR), of which 462 members were chosen in the 1999 elections (but which also includes 38 unelected members of the military), remained a forum for vigorous debate of government policy and practice during the year. The Parliament frequently challenged the authority and policies of the executive branch, including the removal of Wahid in July. The MPR, which consists of the Parliament, 130 elected regional representatives, and 65 appointed functional group representatives, held its second annual session in November. Previously, the MPR had met only once every 5 years to elect the President and Vice President and to consider other matters reserved for the MPR. During its November session, the MPR amended the 1945 Constitution to provide, among other changes, for direct presidential and vice-presidential elections, a bicameral legislature with a regional representative's chamber, and a constitutional court with the power of judicial review of legislation. The amendments, if fully implemented, would increase elected officials' accountability to constituents by allowing people to elect the President and Vice President. The human rights protection amendment to the Constitution was incorporated in 2000 and was not further amended during the year. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, it remains subordinated to the executive and there is pervasive corruption.
The 275,000-member armed forces (TNI) are under the supervision of a civilian defense minister but retain broad nonmilitary powers and an internal security role, and are not fully accountable to civilian authority. The military and police jointly occupy 38 appointed seats in the DPR reserved for the security forces, as well as 10 percent of the seats in provincial and district parliaments. The security forces, whose members do not have the right to vote in elections, agreed to relinquish their appointed seats in the national and regional legislatures in 2004, but appear likely to retain some seats in the MPR until as late as 2009. In 2000 Wahid signed a decree abolishing the Agency for Coordination of Assistance for the Consolidation of National Security (BAKORSTANAS), which had given the security forces had wide discretion to detain and interrogate persons who were perceived as threats to national security. In 2000 Wahid also signed a decree removing the national police force of 175,000 members from the supervision of the Minister of Defense and providing for civilian oversight. This step, in addition to the formal separation of the police from the armed forces in 1999, was intended to give the police primary responsibility for internal security. The separation of the military and the police was reinforced through a 2000 constitutional amendment and a police law enacted during the year. There continues to be confusion in the armed forces regarding the respective responsibilities of each institution in some cases. The decree provides a caveat that permits the Army to provide security assistance to the State Police upon the latter's request. Notwithstanding these changes, the military continues to play a substantial internal security role in areas of conflict, such as Aceh, the Moluccas, and Papua (formerly known as Irian Jaya). Members of both the TNI and the police committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
The economy, which is market-based with a significant degree of government intervention, increased by approximately 3 percent during the year, following more than 4.8 percent growth in 2000. Industrial exports grew strongly, particularly in labor-intensive textiles, electronics, wood products, and other light manufacturing industries based in the densely populated islands of Java and Bali. Underemployment remained high at approximately 19 million persons. Over 40 percent of the adult working population is employed in agriculture, which in Java, Bali, and southern Sulawesi primarily involves rice and other food crops but elsewhere concentrates on cash crops such as oil palm, rubber, coffee, tea, coconut, and spices. Per capita gross domestic product among the population of 211 million was $738 in 2000, well below the levels achieved before the severe economic downturn that began in July 1997. The downturn affected most severely the urban poor, particularly in Java, partly as a result of a wholesale shift in employment from the higher-paying formal sector to the less secure informal sector. The negative impact of the economic and financial downturn was smaller in less populated, natural resource-rich Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Sumatra. Large disparities in the distribution of wealth and political power contributed to social tensions across the country and continued to create demands for greater regional autonomy. Two laws providing for greater political and economic decentralization and for revenue sharing among the country's provinces and districts came into effect in January. Parliament approved the Aceh Special Autonomy Law in July and the Papua Special Autonomy Bill in October. The two provinces of Aceh and Papua were granted special autonomy, which affords them greater political, cultural, and economic benefits, including the right to retain a larger percentage of their oil and gas revenues.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it continued to commit serious abuses. Security forces were responsible for numerous instances of, at times indiscriminate, shooting of civilians, torture, rape, beatings and other abuse, and arbitrary detention in Aceh, West Timor, Papua (formerly known as Irian Jaya), and elsewhere in the country. TNI personnel often responded with indiscriminate violence after physical attacks on soldiers. They also continued to conduct "sweeps" that led to killing of civilians and property destruction. The Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS) reported that during the period between June 2000 and June 2001, police killed 740 persons. Despite the May 2000 agreement between the Government and the leaders of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to limit armed hostilities, military, police, and GAM forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings. Security forces in Papua assaulted, tortured, and killed persons during search operations for members of militant groups. The security forces inconsistently enforced a no-tolerance policy against flying the Papuan flag, tearing down and destroying flags and flag poles, and killing eight persons, and beating others who tried to raise or protect the flag prior to the signing into law of the Papua Special Autonomy Law, which permits the flying of the flag as a cultural symbol. There continued to be credible reports of the disappearance of civilians, KONTRAS reported 55 cases of forced disappearance between January 1 and September. The killers of two Achenese NGO activists, Jafar Siddiq Hamzah and Tengku Hashiruddin Daud, who had been abducted in 2000 and later found dead with indication of torture, had not been identified by year's end. Papuan independence leader Theys Eluay was kidnaped and killed in November. Crossborder raids into East Timor by East Timorese prointegration militias resident in West Timor, armed and largely supported by the army, diminished during the year as the Indonesian military withdrew its backing. Three Timorese who admitted killing three U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) workers in West Timor were brought to trial in Indonesia and charged with manslaughter instead of murder.
Security forces tortured and otherwise abused persons. Rapes and sexual exploitation by security forces continued to be a problem. Prison conditions are harsh. Security forces employed arbitrary arrest and detention without trial in Aceh. Despite initial steps toward reform, the judiciary remains subordinate to the executive, is corrupt, and does not always ensure due process. Security forces infringe on citizens' privacy rights. Security forces continued to intimidate and assault journalists. The Government places some controls on freedom of assembly; however, it allowed most demonstrations to proceed without hindrance except in Aceh and Papua. Security forces also brutally dispersed demonstrations on several occasions. The Government places some controls on freedom of association. There are some restrictions on certain types of religious activity and on unrecognized religions. The Government continues to restrict freedom of movement to a limited extent. Thousands of Acehnese residents fled their villages during conflicts between the security forces and separatists. Intercommunal conflict forced the relocation of hundreds of thousands of persons in Maluku and North Maluku in 2000 and during the year. In West Timor, the Government's failure to disarm and disband the East Timorese prointegration militias impeded the repatriation or resettlement of thousands of East Timorese IDP's during the first half of the year. During the latter part of the year, obstacles to repatriation were uncertainty about conditions in East Timor and unresolved problems with government pensions.
Domestic human rights organizations continued to play a significant role in advocating for improvements in human rights; however, at times security force members killed, abused, and detained human rights activists and humanitarian workers, most frequently in areas with active insurgencies. On March 29, security forces reportedly killed three human rights workers and left their bodies in a village in South Aceh. In June in Jakarta, police detained and threatened Non Governmental Organization (NGO) members before releasing them. Violence and discrimination against women are widespread problems. Child abuse and child prostitution are problems, and female genital mutilation (FGM) persists in some areas. Discrimination against persons with disabilities, indigenous persons, and religious and ethnic minorities also are widespread problems. Interreligious violence, particularly in the Moluccas, has claimed over 6,000 lives since the onset of hostilities in January 1999, and thousands of Christians in Maluku have been forced to convert to Islam: http://souisapaul81.blogspot.com.au/2012/05/arab-ideology-that-has-influenced.html
Discrimination against ethnic minorities persisted. Attacks against houses of worship continued, and the lack of an effective government response to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks led to allegations of official complicity in some of the incidents.
The Government continued to allow new trade unions to form and operate; however, enforcement of labor standards remains inconsistent and weak in some areas. Millions of children work, often under poor conditions. Forced and bonded child labor remains a problem, although the Government continued to take steps during the year to remove children from fishing platforms, on which bonded child labor most commonly occurs. Trafficking of persons into and from the country for the purpose of prostitution and sometimes for forced labor is a problem.
The Government was ineffective in deterring social, interethnic, and interreligious violence that accounted for the majority of deaths by violence during the year. Enforcement of the law against criminal violence deteriorated, resulting in religious groups purporting to uphold public morality, and mobs dispensing "street justice" operating with impunity.
In Aceh, armed separatists killed dozens of civil society leaders, academics, politicians and other local residents, as well as civil servants, police and soldiers. They also abducted and otherwise harassed such persons. GAM also targeted non-ethnic Acehnese residents of Aceh. On March 23, presumed GAM militants reportedly kidnaped and killed seven Javanese transmigrants. In June attackers believed to be GAM members, killed scores of Javanese and ethnic Gayo in Central Aceh. Ethnic clashes between Dayaks and Madurese transmigrants in February and March claimed 500 lives in Central Kalimantan, according to official sources.
In response to past abuses, joint civilian-military courts and various other investigative bodies continued to pursue cases involving army and police officers. Four military personnel and four civilians were detained in February for the December 2000 killings of three humanitarian workers from the NGO Rehabilitation Action for Torture Victims in Aceh (RATA) in North Aceh. A court was convened to consider the case, but by the year's end, no hearings had been held. The four civilians suspects escaped from police custody; the four military suspects remained in detention. There were no other reports of military or police personnel being prosecuted for crimes in Aceh. The Government has prosecuted several persons in connection with 2 attacks on UN personnel in East and West Timor, but has not prosecuted others for the militia-related crimes in West or East Timor dating back to 1999, although the Attorney General in September and October 2000 named 23 persons as suspects in East Timor human rights cases (one of whom was killed in early September 2000). The Government's critical failure to pursue accountability for human rights violations reinforces the impression that there would be continued impunity for security force abuses.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
Historically, politically related extrajudicial killings have occurred most frequently in areas in which separatist movements were active, such as Aceh, Papua, and formerly East Timor, and security forces continued to employ harsh measures against separatist movements. In addition security forces killed unarmed demonstrators, and there also were numerous instances of reported extrajudicial killings by security forces in cases involving alleged common criminal activity. The Government rarely holds the military or police accountable for committing extrajudicial killings or using excessive force.
In Aceh army and police personnel committed many extrajudicial killings and used excessive force or directed force against noncombatants in an attempt to quell separatist movements; at times the police and army forces were responding to rebel attacks. By year's end, 1,477 persons had been killed in Aceh, including 1,028 civilians, 134 security force members, and 315 GAM members. It was unclear to what extent police investigated such killings, and they made no progress in identifying the persons who committed these killings by year's end. The steep increase in casualties resulted directly from "Operation to Restore Security," a military crackdown begun in May. Local newspapers reported that 11 bodies were found on February 28 around Aceh and another 10 bodies were found on February 27. According to the report, at least several of the bodies were of those persons seized by security forces the night before their bodies were discovered. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that on March 29, security forces killed three human rights workers and left their bodies in the village of Simpang Tiga Alue Pakuk in Sawang subdistrict, South Aceh. One of these victims, Tengku Al-Kamal, a Muslim boarding school director in South Aceh, was a member of the team monitoring the "peace through dialog" agreement between the Government and the GAM. The other two victims were Suprim Sulaiman, Kamal's attorney from the Human Rights Coalition of Aceh, and Kamal's driver, Amirduddin. According to HRW, police questioned the three men earlier in connection with accusations of rape that five women had made against the Mobil Brigade Police, also known as Brimob (see Section 1.c.). According to HRW, on April 11, Brimob forces shot and killed student Usman bin Adam in Aceh. The Government denied any involvement by the security forces; however, human rights workers who conducted an investigation at the site claimed that security forces most likely were responsible. According to press reports, on July 1, security forces shot and killed 24 Acehnese during a military operation near the town of Takengon in Central Aceh. Soldiers claim that the soldiers had attacked a group of rebels who were planning to attack a nearby town; however, rebel spokesman said only four of the persons killed were militants and the rest were villagers. According to press reports, on July 22 security forces shot and killed 22 Acehnese during a joint military-police operation at a village in East Aceh. A GAM spokesman claimed that only one of the victims had been a GAM member. In October during a raid on Krueng Seumideun village in Peukan Baro district in Pidie, TNI forces shot and killed a high-ranking GAM negotiator, Zulfani bin Abdul Rani. There were numerous instances of excessive force by the military, police, and GAM members that went unpunished during the year. In December Lt. Colonel Supartodi said that his troops shot and killed four rebels during an ambush and that government troops also killed eight insurgents in other clashes. However, some separatists claimed that military officers forced the persons to lead them to rebel bases, after which soldiers killed them.
During the year there were numerous killings in Aceh that could not be clearly attributed to either the security forces or to the armed separatist movement, the GAM. Initial reports on August 9 indicated that unknown assailants shot and killed 31 employees of PT Bumi Flora, a palm oil plantation in Idi Rayeuk in East Aceh. According to the Government, GAM members often tried to extort protection money and intimidate the workers into striking. When the workers refused, GAM members shot and killed them. The GAM denied responsibility and called for an independent team to investigate the killings and bring the perpetrators before an international tribunal. An internal government report compiling eyewitness testimony on August 10 indicated possible military involvement in the killings. Security forces and the GAM blamed each other for the September 6 killing of the Rector of Syiah Kuala University Dayan Dawood, who unidentified assailants shot and killed while he was in his car. Dawood previously had offered to mediate between the GAM and the Government. Dawood's killing followed the killing of Aceh provincial legislator Zaini Sulaiman on September 1 and prominent politician Teungku Johan in May. Aceh's Police Chief promised to investigate the killings; however, no action had been taken by year's end. There were numerous other instances of excessive force by the military and police during the year that went unpunished, including the killing of politician Nashiruddin Daud, an NGO activist. As in most cases, there were no results from alleged government investigations into the deaths of Sukardi, Sulaiman Ahmad or Tengku Safwan Idris, who were killed during 2000 (see Section 1.b.).
In Papua security forces allegedly killed proindependence leaders during the year. Local community groups suspect that security forces killed Willem Onde, the leader of the Papua Liberation Front Army (TPNP), and his friend, Johanes Tumeng. Bodies, believed to be theirs, bearing evidence of gunshot wounds, were found floating in the Kumundu River on September 12 with their hands bound and heads shaved. In addition, on November 11, Papuan proindependence leader Theys Hiyo Eluay was found dead in his car outside of the provincial capital Jayapura after his driver reported that he had been kidnaped. Police also continued to shoot and kill persons involved in largely peaceful Papuan independence flag-raisings or demonstrations (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and 5). Police shot and killed eight persons, and detained and beat six others after mobs rioted, blocked roads, burned cars, and damaged buildings in Papua. The mobs allegedly were reacting to reports that the security forces planned to remove the Papuan flag from the house of an indigenous community leader. Police detained 22 persons returning from a traditional ceremony in March and killed six of them in connection with the same incident. Such incidents were similar to a series of police reactions to flag-raisings over the past 3 years; however, after the Papua Special Autonomy law was signed in November, allowing the Papua flag to be displayed as a cultural symbol, security forces seemed to allow the flying of the flag.
Police also killed Papuans while attempting to search for suspects. For example, police killed one person while searching for the killers of three employees of a logging company in Wonggema village, in Papua. In June and July, police shot 13 persons while seeking the persons who killed 5 police officers and 1 local employee of a foreign-owned logging company.
East Timorese prointegration militias based in West Timor, who, according to credible reports, continued to be armed and supported by the army, committed numerous extrajudicial killings in past years. For example, in September 2000, a mob of East Timorese IDP's, led by militia members attacked UNHCR offices in Atambua, West Timor and killed three international UNHCR staff members, then mutilated and burned their bodies. Security forces that were assigned to protect the UNHCR office failed to prevent the militia forces from attacking and left the area before the militia's second attack on the building, when the three UNHCR workers were killed. Six individuals originally were sentenced in May to between 10-to-20 months on charges of mob violence in connection with the incident, after a lower court ruled that they had been provoked. On November 15, the Supreme Court handed down sentences of 5 to 7 years, the maximum for the charge of mob violence, to three of the defendants. The Court had not rendered its decision on the other three defendants by year's end. In November Jacobus Bere, a member of a group accused of the July 2000 killing of a New Zealand Peacekeeper, was retried for first- and second-degree murder, following a joint investigation of the incident by the Government and U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The trial was postponed from October until December because Bere was ill, and had not concluded by year's end. Government prosecutors also indicted three of the five other militia members involved in the incident. The other two militia members still were at large. Johannes Tino and Gabriel Hale Noni were charged with premeditated murder, a charge carrying the death penalty. Fabianus Ulu face up to 15 years in jail if convicted on the lesser charge of homicide. Killings by prointegration militias included those of West Timor resident Bornard Loddo in July 2000 and a Nepali U.N. peacekeeper in August 2000. There were no reports of progress into the investigation into these killings during the year.
According to credible reports, security forces in the Maluku island chain, especially in the centrally located island of Ambon, were responsible for some of the shooting deaths that occurred during widespread riots and communal clashes throughout the year. The National Commission on Human Rights (KOMNAS-HAM) established a fact-finding team to investigate the June 12-14 killings of 20 persons during a crossfire shooting between the military and the Laskar Jihad (the Java based Muslim militia). The fact finding team concluded that the killings were outside KOMNAS jurisdiction, because the Commission's mandate allowed it to investigate only cases involving gross violations of human rights. Despite claims to the contrary, there was no credible evidence to suggest that the security forces as an institution supported one side or the other during the violence (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
The police on several occasions throughout the country used deadly force to disperse demonstrators. For example, in January Central Kalimantan police shot and killed at least 20 persons and wounded many others by shooting indiscriminately into rioting crowds. On February 27, police shot three rioters in Sampit and two in Palangka Raya, killing one. On March 8, police in Palangka Raya fired into a crowd of rioters killing five persons and injuring several others. On April 9, police in Sampit killed 1 and seriously injured 2 civilians, when they opened fire to disperse a crowd of 300 Dayaks protesting harsh measures police imposed on local Dayaks. On July 17, a police officer shot and killed a bystander while attempting to disperse a crowd in Jakarta. Many citizens also claimed that police were slow to respond forcefully to violent civil disorder. For example, police were slow to respond to the killings of Madurese migrants in Central Kalimantan in January and February.
In Pasuruan, East Java, police opened fire on demonstrators protesting the MPR's second censure of then President Wahid on June 20, killing one protester. Fact finding teams from the MPR and KOMNAS-HAM investigated the killing. MPR officials announced that the police followed correct procedures. However, KOMNAS-HAM investigators, in an October 22 letter to the East Java police, called for further investigation of the killing. KOMNAS-HAM also conducted an investigation into police use of excessive force on December 7, 2000 in Abepura, West Papua, when police pulled 23 students from their dormitory rooms and beat them. Two students died from the beatings, and dozens of others sustained serious injuries. The KOMNAS-HAM issued a report recommending that the case be tried by the new human rights court. No investigation into police killings of demonstrators during 2000 had occurred by year's end.
No disciplinary action was taken against the immigration personnel responsible for the disappearance and presumed death of a foreign citizen in March 2000, and there were no developments in the case by year's end.
At times the police and the military killed civilians in the crossfire of their attacks on each other. A Madurese IDP was killed during a February 27 dispute between police and security forces over extortion collections from Madurese IDP's evacuating from Central Kalimantan; 10 soldiers and police were wounded. Police and military exchanged fire on September 15, killing 3 civilians and injuring 15 others in Madiun, East Java. Observers said that the gunfight occurred over "turf battles" for protection of gambling dens and drug trade. Investigators named 112 military personnel and 13 police personnel as suspects in the killings, and announced that their cases would be tried. Twenty-three members of the military and police force were discharged.
The police often employed deadly force in apprehending suspects or dealing with alleged criminals, many of whom were unarmed. For example in September, police shot and killed 23 persons suspected of illegal weapons possession in an incident in Jakarta, claiming that they resisted arrest. During the year, police shot and killed at least 25 Africans suspected of trafficking in narcotics. Africans constitute a disproportionately large percentage of those killed while being arrested, suggesting that such killings are racially motivated. In response to criticism that the methods used were unjustifiably harsh and amounted to execution without trial, police generally claimed that the suspects were fleeing, resisting arrest, or threatening the police. Police did not release complete statistics regarding the number of these cases by year's end (see Section 5).
Four military officers and four civilians were detained in February for the December 2000 killings of three humanitarian workers in Aceh. The court found the officers not guilty of murder, but convicted them of inciting mob violence and sentenced them to prison terms varying from 10 to 20 months in prison.
In July 1999, the Government appointed an independent commission (KPP Aceh) to investigate human rights violations in Aceh. In November 1999, the Commission recommended that the Government investigate five cases of alleged human rights violations. In April 2000, the trial of 24 army personnel and a civilian, who all previously were convicted for the killing of 58 civilians in Beutong Ateuh in July 1999, began; however, none of the accused was above the rank of lieutenant colonel. During the trial, soldiers testified that they had killed civilians, but argued that they were not guilty of murder because they were following their commander's orders. The commander reportedly disappeared; however, NGO's reported a subsequent sighting of him in the company of other military officials. The trial ended in May 2000 when the 24 defendants received sentences of 8 to 10 years in prison. By year's end, no one had been charged in the other four cases, which include: The May 1999 massacre at Krueng Geukey, North Aceh; the February 1999 attack on demonstrators that resulted in seven persons killed in Idi Cut, East Aceh; a series of killings and abductions at a detention facility in Pidie from 1997-98; and the August 1996 rape of Sumiati, an Acehnese women, by a soldier.
The Commission for Investigation of Violations of Human Rights in East Timor (KPP-HAM) delivered its report of human rights violations in East Timor to the Attorney General's Office in January 2000. The Attorney General said that his office initially would prosecute five major cases arising from the April 6, 1999 massacre in Liquisa; the April 17, 1999 killings at the home of independence leader Manuel Carrascalao's house; the September 5, 1999 attack on the compound of the Catholic Diocese in Dili; the September 6, 1999 massacre of priests and displaced persons at a church in Suai; and the September 21, 1999 killing of Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes. The Attorney General's Office named 23 suspects in September and October 2000 (one of whom, an East Timorese militia commander, was killed by militia members in early September 2000). Those accused included several army and police generals, but did not include then-Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto, former Armed Forces intelligence chief Zacky Anwar Makarim, and other senior members of the military leadership who were named as responsible parties in the KPP-HAM report. Progress on these five cases was slow, and the number of suspects named was small in comparison to the number of persons believed responsible. Although Indonesian authorities were assisted greatly in their investigation by UNTAET, the Government did not cooperate fully in December 2000, when UNTAET requested similar support for its own investigations into the atrocities.
There were no new developments during the year in the shooting deaths of at least nine demonstrators at Jakarta's Semanggi interchange in November 1998. The trial of nine low-ranking police officers implicated in the May 1998 shooting deaths of four students at Trisakti University in Jakarta began on June 18. Prosecutors charged the officers with premeditated murder, which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, and assault leading to death, which carries a maximum penalty of 7 years in prison. The trial was ongoing at year's end.
In 2000 the police began conducting an investigation of the July 1996 attack on the headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), questioning the top army and police leadership at the time. A joint police/military team subsequently questioned witnesses and potential suspects, and by November 2000 had begun submitting cases to the Attorney General's Office for prosecution, although no further action was taken during the year (see Section 1.b.).
The East Java police in 2000 reopened an investigation into the 1993 killing of labor activist Marsinah, questioning again over a dozen witnesses and previous suspects, including civilians and army and police personnel. In December 2000, the East Java police chief said Australian laboratory tests confirmed that Marsinah's blood had been found in the home of the owner of the factory where Marsinah worked and in a van believed to have transported her to the place where she was found. However, by year's end, there was no further action on the police investigation.
In February 2000, the National Human Rights Commission formed a commission to investigate the September 1984 killing of an estimated 33 demonstrators by security forces at Tanjung Priok, Jakarta. The commission questioned senior army and police officials, exhumed mass graves where victims were buried, and reported the investigation results, including names of 23 persons considered to be responsible for the killings, to the Attorney General in October (see Sections 1.c. and 4). At year's end, a spokesman for the Attorney General confirmed that the investigation was completed; however, he declined to name any suspects and none were arrested.
Citizens' attacks on other citizens caused the majority of killings during the year.
Throughout the year in Aceh, armed separatist groups killed dozens of civil society leaders, academics, politicians, and other local residents, as well as civil servants, police, and soldiers. For example, on March 23, local newspapers reported that attackers, presumed to be GAM members, kidnaped and killed seven Javanese transmigrants that had been working on a plantation. The seven transmigrants were found shot with their hands tied behind their backs. In June attackers believed to be GAM members, killed scores of Javanese and ethnic groups in Central Aceh. On September 18, armed separatists abducted Muzakir, a Muslim community leader of a village in Batu Itam. Residents of Alur Naga in South Aceh found him dead on September 20 with bullet holes and burn wounds. Armed separatists shot and killed T. Sofyan, the village leader in Lan Tabeh, Aceh Besar, on November 16. Armed separatists, who had constructed roadblocks on the Medan-Aceh road, shot and killed a police captain who attempted to drive through the roadblock on December 18.
Separatist groups also killed numerous civilians and soldiers during the year. The Free Papua movement (OPM) killed five police officers and a security guard at a foreign-owned logging company in Wondiboi, Wasior District, and Papua on June 13. Police blamed the attacks on OPM; however, many local human rights groups believe a disagreement between the local community and the foreign company over compensation for logging on indigenous land may have instigated the attacks. An OPM group took two migrant settlers hostage after police shot and killed two Papuan separatists in a September 23 crossfire after an OPM raid on a military post in Bonggo, Papua. Unknown attackers killed four soldiers in a February 3 attack on a military post in Betaf, Papua.
Fighting in the Moluccan island group, which began in Ambon in January 1999, spread to most major islands in the Moluccas in 2000 and during the year. The fighting in all three provinces (North Maluku, Maluku, and Central Sulawesi) had political, economic, ethnic, and religious overtones (see Sections 2.c. and 5). While initial conflicts emerged over land tenure questions and the political and economic status of local residents versus that of migrants, in many cases the conflicts later evolved into highly charged religious clashes. One of the major factors contributing to the continuation of violence in these islands was the failure to bring the perpetrators to justice (see Sections 2.c. and 5); another factor was the failure of the authorities to prevent armed militants from traveling in large groups to the Moluccas from Java. Christian and Muslim groups increasingly used sophisticated weapons as the fighting continued, causing over 3,000 deaths and destroying many churches, mosques, and, in some cases, entire towns, mostly in 2000. The level of violence intensified in late 1999 and in the early part of 2000, after Christian gangs and militia (and to a lesser extent, Muslim gangs and militia) attacked isolated villages in Halmahera and other parts of North Maluku. During 2000 and following the December 1999 attacks by Christians, Muslim militias drove Christian populations away from many areas of North Maluku and Maluku provinces (see Section 2.d.). As IDP's fled to neighboring areas and islands, their resentment against those who had attacked them often sparked conflict in their new places of residence. In addition unverified reports of provocations and conspiracies fueled the continuous cycle of violence. The violence decreased in Ambon in late January 2000 and this year, after security forces began enforcing a curfew and disarming civilians. At the same time, mutually destructive fighting escalated in Halmahera and other parts of North Maluku. By April 2000, there were some signs of reconciliation in Ambon after the provincial government established reconstruction programs and markets in border areas between Muslim and Christian communities. However, in late April 2000, serious rioting broke out immediately following a visit by then Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri. There was a further upsurge in violence in May 2000, after boats filled with members of the Laskar Jihad, Muslim militants from Java, arrived in Ambon and other parts of the Moluccas (see Section 5). As many as 2,000 to 3,000 militants ultimately arrived via boat. Law and order continued to deteriorate steadily, and in June 2000, violent mobs stormed through Ambon city with little or no security force interference. There also were large-scale Muslim attacks against Christians in Halmahera in May and June 2000. The level of violence decreased, particularly in North Maluku, after then-President Wahid declared a state of civil emergency in both provinces in late June 2000 (see Section 2.d.); the state of emergency still was in effect at end of 2000. However, violent interreligious clashes continued to occur throughout the year, especially in Ambon.
According to HRW, on May 4, the Government arrested the head of Laskar Jihad, Jafar Uman Thalib, and charged him with murder. He was released on June 12. Violence subsequently flared in Ambon, where 18 Christians were killed (see Section 5). In response, on June 14, the army attacked a Laskar Jihad post, killing 22 Muslims.
Beginning in late May 2000, in Central Sulawesi, numerous villages experienced renewed religious riots and violence, resulting in numerous deaths and widespread destruction. A significant increase of killings occurred in November and December, apparently spurred by Laskar Jihad militants. Tens of thousands of Christians fled their homes as villages were attacked. On December 1 and 2, hundreds of Laskar Jihad attacked Christian forces in the villages of Sepe and Batugincu, south of Poso city. Three soldiers and three civilians were shot. A police officer shot and killed a rioter and wounded four on December 3, after a Muslim attacked a church in Poso city. By year's end, the army was able to quell the violence, and a tenuous peace agreement was negotiated. According to local press reports, the three leaders of the Christian Red Force who were convicted of leading rioters in mass killings and given the death penalty, are appealing their sentences to the Supreme Court.
In Kalimantan interethnic clashes resulted in hundreds of killings during February and March. Indigenous Dayak tribesmen killed approximately 600 Madurese migrant settlers and burned more than 1,000 houses and stores in Central Kalimantan (see Section 5). In response, over 105,000 Madurese evacuated back to East Java and Madura Island, where they settled in local communities. In Pontianak, West Kalimantan, the killing of a Malay boy, on June 25, allegedly by Madurese robbers, as well as local resentment of the continued presence of Madurese IDP's in local public sports facilities, led to interethnic clashes between Madurese refugees and ethnic Malay residents which resulted in 7 refugee deaths and destruction of temporary shelters for over 300 families (see Section 5). Three suspects were arrested for the robbery, no arrests in connection with the killings were made by year's end. Over 40,000 Madurese migrants remained in IDP camps located in public sports facilities in Pontianak or in outlying areas at year's end. There were reports from local NGO's, provincial officials, and local press of Dayaks killing an unknown number of Madurese attempting to return to Central Kalimantan.
A series of bombings occurred in Jakarta and other cities, including Depok, Bekasi, Yogyakarta, Banten, and Central Sulawesi from January through June targeting churches, overpasses, shopping malls, and residences. Several bombings between Christmas and New Year's primarily targeted churches. The NGO Coalition (ORNOP) reported that there were 110 bombing incidents, which claimed 26 lives and injured 201 persons during the year. A suspect in the October bombings at Atrium Mall was released on her own recognizance on October 4; however, she was required to report to the Jakarta Police twice a week. Police arrested 13 persons, including 3 Malaysians, in September following another bombing of the Atrium Mall. Police believed the 13 detainees also were responsible for some of the church bombings on Christmas Eve 2000 (see Section 5). The Christmas Eve bombings occurred in 9 cities and injured more than 100 persons, according to press accounts. On July 19, the Bandung District Court sentenced two defendants found guilty of involvement in one of the bombings that killed four persons to 9 years in prison. The court sentenced the owner of the house in which the two defendants allegedly made the bombs to 8 years in prison.
Two defendants suspected of involvement in the Jakarta Stock Exchange bombing, which killed 10 persons and injured dozens of others in September 2000, escaped from custody before they could be tried. One of the defendants, a corporal in the Army's Strategic Reserves Command, escaped while in the custody of four members of the military police. The other suspect, a civilian, escaped from prison in East Jakarta in February. The court sentenced the remaining three defendants, two military and one civilian, to 20 years in prison each (see Section 1.c.).
According to press reports, during 2000 145 persons accused of committing crimes (usually theft or responsibility for vehicular accidents) were killed by mobs of persons on the scene of the alleged crimes in the most populous urban areas of Jakarta, West Java, East Java, and North Sumatra. Countrywide statistics were not available at year's end.
There also were press reports of mobs attacking security forces and civilian guards. For example, on August 14, pedicab drivers beat to death a civilian guard and severely injured eight others attempting to evict the drivers from West Jakarta; by year's end, no one had been arrested in connection with the attack (see Section 1.c. and 6.a.). The city administration had banned pedicabs from operating in Jakarta since 1988.
During the year, there were a number of reports of killings of persons who practice traditional magic ("dukun santet") (see Section 5). For example, on September 2, approximately 40 villagers in Bentarkawung, Central Java killed Warsono, who the villagers believed caused another resident to become ill and die. On October 7, a resident in Tangerang, West Java, beat and killed a newly arrived resident who was believed to have caused the death of seven residents. No one had been charged in the incidents by year's end.
b. Disappearance
According to a report issued in 2000 by the Committee for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS), 843 persons remain missing as a result of military operations, land disputes, and political and religious activities over the past 20 years. In addition KONTRAS reported that 106 persons remained missing in Aceh during the year.
In Aceh there continued to be credible reports of the disappearance of many civilians. KONTRAS reported that 14 persons disappeared in September alone, including 5 Acehnese community leaders, who GAM abducted while returning from a meeting with President Megawati on September 8, but released them on September 10. Aristoteles Masoka, Theys Eluay's driver, has been missing since Eluay's murder; he last was known to be in Kopassus custody. Often, the bodies of missing persons later are discovered, frequently bearing marks of torture (see Section 1.c.). Three prominent Acehnese disappeared in Medan, North Sumatra during 2000; however, only Syahputra remained missing at year's end. The bodies of Member of Parliament and human rights activist Tengku Nashir and NGO activist Jafar Sidiq Hamzah later were found, bearing signs of torture. NGO's allege that TNI forces or police personnel are responsible for many cases of civilian disappearances.
There were no developments in the investigation into the causes of death or the identification of the remains of 32 bodies found floating around Biak, Papua in July 1998 after navy and police forces broke up a proindependence demonstration. Multiple reports claimed that many of the bodies were demonstrators who had been detained and then killed while in custody.
The Government has not taken any significant action deter forces that abduct persons. In most cases in Papua, Brimob or Kopassus forces often round up and detain persons after a violent incident. An atmosphere of impunity by such groups encourages others to continue abductions.
According to Amnesty International (AI) on June 25, armed men abducted Hubertus Wresman, a Sunday school teacher from Betaf. AI believes Wersman's abductors were army personnel. There were no developments in Wresman's case by year's end. Brimob officers kidnaped Daud Yomaki, Henok Marani, and Mais Imburi during search operations after five police were killed on June 13 in Wondiboi village (see Section 1.a.). The body of Felex Urbon, another person who allegedly was abducted by Brimob on June 20, was found on July 16.
There were no developments in the numerous disappearances of persons in East Timor in 1999 and in earlier years.
There was no progress in the case of four members of the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA), an NGO based in Bandung, West Java that advocates for dispossessed farmers, claimed that they were kidnaped at gunpoint by unknown persons on August 14 in 2000. Their alleged abduction came after police forcibly removed them from a demonstration and hunger strike that they were conducting inside the Parliament building in Jakarta. They claimed that after several days in solitary confinement they were driven to different locations and interrogated at length about their organization's activities, finances, and aims. They said that they were not tortured physically, but that their lives and those of their families and colleagues frequently were threatened. Their captors released them on August 27. The KPA then filed suit against the police alleging that the police had kidnaped four of its members. The Jakarta district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of evidence. The KPA filed an appeal; however, the court had not rendered a decision by year's end. Police opened an investigation into the kidnaping, but were unable to identify the perpetrators (see Sections 1.e. and 4).
There were no developments in the case of 12 persons who disappeared (and are presumed dead) in Java during a series of kidnapings of opponents of the Soeharto regime carried out by Army Special Forces (Kopassus) personnel in 1997 and 1998. However, in 2000 the police began conducting an investigation into the 1996 PDI incident in which 16 persons disappeared, and submitted cases to the Attorney General's Office (see Section 1.a.). No new information emerged on the fate of the 16 missing persons by year's end.
In Aceh armed separatists often abduct army members, police personnel, civil servants, and others, although they do not always acknowledge responsibility for these incidents. Militia groups are believed to have killed some civilians suspected of being collaborators or informants of the security forces. For example, the GAM abducted Ghazali Usman, a member of Aceh's provincial parliament in September. He was released on November 26.
On January 16, 12 employees of a Korean firm in Asiki district were kidnaped by the OPM. The OPM also detained a 4-man negotiating team before releasing all 16 persons on January 25. On March 23, two Korean employees of a logging company were kidnaped and released by March 30. Two Belgian filmmakers, who were abducted on June 6 by Papuan separatists and held in Puncak Jaya district, were released on August 16. Papuan separatists kidnaped two transmigrants on September 23 after a raid on a military post in Bonggo district. The six plantation employees who were abducted in July 1999 in Papua near Arso remained missing.
Kidnaping of children for ransom is a recent and reportedly growing phenomenon. In July a 2-year-old boy was kidnaped after his grandparent in Ciwidey failed to pay a debt. The kidnaper surrendered to police before the child's parents paid the ransom.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The Criminal Code makes it a crime punishable by up to 4 years in prison for any official to use violence or force to elicit a confession; however, in practice legal protections are both inadequate and widely ignored, and security forces continued to employ torture and other forms of mistreatment, particularly in regions where there were active security concerns, such as Aceh and Papua. Police often resort to physical abuse, even in minor incidents.
There were numerous credible reports that the army and police continued routinely to torture detainees in Aceh. A July report by KONTRAS stated that police and the TNI tortured 159 persons in Aceh. For example, a suspected GAM member told HRW that a joint security force of police, Brimob, and military arrested and blindfolded him on April 2. He said that his interrogators "used pliers to pull the nail off his left thumb, punctured his nose, and caused other scars on his forearm and nipple." Methods of torture documented in the past include beating, whipping, electric shock, and rape. AI reported that police at a military checkpoint in Southeast Aceh detained and tortured two human rights activists. The activists had been investigating reports that 100 persons in Central Aceh district had been killed in June by the TNI. AI reported that Brimob beat, shot, and killed three high school students detained at the Krueng Sabee police station in Caleng, West Aceh on June 18.
In Aceh army and police officials routinely use excessive force and violence when investigating attacks by armed separatists. Police and army personnel also routinely respond to attacks on soldiers by engaging in indiscriminate violence against bystanders. In March police and military burned hundreds of homes and stores in the East Aceh town of Idi Rayeuk after rebels briefly captured the town. Police and military killed three civilians and injured three others as they retook the town.
There were numerous credible reports that army, paramilitary groups, and police assaulted persons detained in Papua. Police arbitrarily detained, beat, and tortured persons in search operations after attacks on security facilities or private companies by unknown armed groups. According to the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy (ELSHAM), Brimob forces responded to the killing of five Brimob members by unidentified gangs by conducting operations against villagers in Ransiki, and arrested and tortured nine persons, including a 15-year-old boy, who they beat unconscious. The TNI also arbitrarily detained over 100 persons during the search operation. KONTRAS reported that during the operation, the TNI tortured 14 to 16 of the persons it detained in the village of Wondiboi.
During testimony before the U.N. Committee Against Torture, Felice Gaer stated that sexual violence in the country "appeared to be frequently employed" as a form of torture. Gaer added that she had received numerous reports of sexual abuses, including rape, in Aceh, Papua, North Maluku, and Maluku. KONTRAS reports that there were 15 documented cases of rape in Aceh since April. According to a local report in Papua, the TNI raped 94 women and girls in Paniai between 1969 and 1998.
On March 7, 2000 in an isolated area of North Aceh's Matangkuli subdistrict, a group of armed men in army fatigues raped 4 women and sexually molested 12 others; they also beat severely 6 men and robbed their families; no persons had been charged by year's end. The trial for the rape of Sumiati, an Acehnese woman allegedly raped by a TNI soldier in 1999, did not begin by year's end; Sumiati's rape case is one of five human rights trials that the special commission was scheduled to hear (see Section 1.a.). No charges were brought in the August 1999 rape of nine Acehnese women in Kecamatan Tangse Selatan, Pidie district, for which TNI soldiers allegedly were responsible.
There are allegations that prointegration East Timorese militias in West Timor are holding East Timorese women as "sex slaves" (see Section 5). Kristy Sword Gusmao, wife of East Timorese independence leader Xanana Gusmao reported in November 2000 that 33 pregnant East Timorese women returned to East Timor and claimed that the TNI had abducted them and forced them to serve as their sex slaves in West Timor. No one was held accountable for the numerous acts of rape and sexual abuse that TNI-supported militia groups perpetrated against displaced East Timorese women in 1999.
In January 2000, the Minister of State for Women's Empowerment said that the Government would follow up on the recommendations of the joint factfinding team (TGPF) that investigated the May 1998 civil unrest in Jakarta and other cities. The team's report, issued in November 1998, found evidence that some elements of the army may have been involved in provoking the violence, which included attacks against Sino-Indonesian women, and urged further investigation of the at least 85 instances of violence against women that the team verified. However, no further investigations had been undertaken by year's end (see Section 5).
There were instances in which security forces responded with brutality to peaceful demonstrations, although they usually allowed peaceful demonstrations to proceed without resorting to force. For example, the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) reported in June that 19 demonstrators from the Young Christian Worker movement (YCW), the Student League for National Democracy (LMND), and the People's Democratic Party (PRD), were detained and tortured in Bandung. The demonstrators were protesting against changes to the labor laws regarding severance pay and oil-price increases. According to the Legal Aid and Human Rights Association, 18 of the demonstrators were released after 3 months of detention without trial, and 1 was sentenced to one year in prison for spreading hatred of the Government. On June 8, individuals allegedly belonging to an Islamic organization ransacked the Asia Pacific Solidarity Conference on Neoliberalism in West Java and reportedly harming some of the participants. Police did not intervene to protect the participants but instead broke up the conference and detained 2 local and 32 foreign labor activists (see Section 6.f.). On June 13, a mob of approximately 150 persons connected to the Golkar Party disrupted a Solidarity Center (ACILS) workshop on grievance handling in East Kalimantan (see Section 6.f.). In numerous instances in Papua in 2000 and during the year, police attempted to break up peaceful demonstrations in which Papuans raised the Papuan independence flag, and when Papuans resisted, police responded with excessive force, killing and injuring demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 2.a., 2.b., and 5).
Police entered and caused property damage to the building housing the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) and Jakarta Legal Aid Society (LBH) on two occasions in which they pursued demonstrators who sought refuge in the LBH building. LBH reported that Brimob beat and ordered LBH personnel to strip to their undergarments and lie face down on the ground before putting them in a truck and taking them to police headquarters. In addition police broke windows and damaged cars with rocks, nightsticks, and bullets during the incidents.
Students and other civilians also engaged in violent and destructive behavior, resulting in nonlethal injuries and property damage. Ten thousand workers protesting the new severance pay decree in June threw stones, wood, and plastic bottles, injuring at least nine persons and damaging two hotels in Jakarta. Hundreds of pedicab drivers, using Molotov cocktails, machetes, steel bars, and stones, attacked 500 city public security officials, who were about to raid their illegal business in August. The drivers beat an official to death, two officials were injured, and the mob set fire to and stoned vehicles (see Section 1.a.). Muslim students in Makassar, South Sulawesi attacked non-Muslim students during two separate incidents on October 23 and 24, severely injuring six persons. The Muslims claimed to be retaliating against the burning of an effigy of Usama bin Laden in a predominantly Christian town. Hundreds of students from the Indonesian Muslim University (UMI) in Makassar destroyed property at the Japanese Consulate General and demanded the Consul lower the Japanese flag so it could be burned. The students were protesting U.S. military action in Afghanistan.
On August 22, 2000 East Timorese militias beat and severely wounded two UNHCR staff members at the Naen camp near Kefamenanu, West Timor. The UNHCR staff had been invited to the camp to distribute shelter supplies when a machete-wielding man attacked them and a mob stoned them. A series of bombings occurred in Jakarta and other cities, including Depok, Bekasi, Yogyakarta, Banten, and Central Sulawesi, from January through June at churches, overpasses, shopping malls, and residences (see Section 1.a.). An NGO Coalition (ORNOP) reports that there were 110 bombing incidents that claimed 26 lives and injured 201 persons during this year. Except for the case of the Stock Exchange bombing, no suspects were apprehended by year's end.
In the latter part of the year, several Islamic groups threatened Western persons and conducted "sweeping" operations at hotels and other public venues in an attempt to drive Westerners out of the city.
Prison conditions are harsh, and mistreatment and extortion of inmates by guards and violence among prisoners is common. The incidence of mistreatment drops sharply once a prisoner is transferred from police or military custody into the civilian prison system or into the custody of the Attorney General. Nine prisoners at the Kebon Waru Prison in Bandung died from untreated illnesses, according to press reports in July. Credible sources report that criminal prisoners in some facilities are beaten routinely and systematically as punishment for infractions of prison rules and to coerce information about other prisoners. During an August raid of Cipinang Prison in East Jakarta, police seized knives, swords, sickles, machetes, firearms, and hand grenades, which had been smuggled into the prison for the inmates, according to press accounts. Prison brawls frequently occur over drugs or ethnic divisions. Former inmates at Jakarta's Cipinang Prison told the press in November 2000 that drug use among prisoners is common, and that inmates can obtain drugs, better treatment, and better conditions by bribing guards. Government officials admitted publicly that prison guards were involved in prison "drug syndicates."
Women are housed separately from men in prisons, but in similar conditions. Juveniles are not housed separately from adults.
The Government generally does not permit routine prison visits by human rights monitors, although some visits occasionally are permitted; however, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was able to visit 12 convicted prisoners during the year (see Section 4).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Criminal Procedures Code contains provisions against arbitrary arrest and detention, but it lacks adequate enforcement mechanisms, and authorities routinely violate it. The code specifies that prisoners have the right to notify their families promptly and that warrants must be produced during an arrest except under specified conditions, such as when a suspect is caught in the act of committing a crime. The law authorizes investigators to issue warrants to assist in their investigations or if sufficient evidence exists that a crime has been committed. However, authorities at times made arrests without warrants.
The law presumes that defendants are innocent and permits bail. Defendants or their families also may challenge the legality of their arrest and detention in a pretrial hearing and may sue for compensation if wrongfully detained. However, it virtually is impossible for detainees to invoke this procedure or to receive compensation after being released without charge. In both military and civilian courts, appeals based on claims of improper arrest and detention rarely, if ever, are accepted. The Criminal Procedures Code also contains specific limits on periods of pretrial detention and specifies when the courts must approve extensions, usually after 60 days. The courts generally respect these limits.
The authorities routinely approve extensions of periods of detention. In areas in which active guerrilla movements exist, such as Aceh and Papua, there are many instances of persons being detained without warrants, charges, or court proceedings. Bail rarely is granted. The authorities frequently prevent access to defense counsel while suspects are being investigated and limit or prevent access to legal assistance from voluntary legal defense organizations. Special laws on corruption, economic crimes, and narcotics are under the Criminal Code.
Security forces frequently detained participants suspected of inciting demonstrations, although most were released after questioning (see Section 2.b.). Labor activist Ngadinah was arrested on April 23 and charged with "unpleasant behavior" and inciting other workers to strike in an athletic shoe factory. Police detained Ngadinah for 2 weeks. She remained under house arrest until August 30, when a court acquitted her of all charges. On June 8, individuals allegedly belonging to an Islamic Organization ransacked the Asia Pacific Solidarity Conference on Neoliberalism in West Java and reportedly threatened some participants. On June 17, two student activists in Jakarta were arrested and charged with inciting "chaos" following a violent demonstration in Jakarta against a fuel price increase. The two students were sentenced to 5 months in jail in September and remained in detention at year's end (see Section 6.b.).
There is no reliable data on the number of arbitrary arrests or detentions without trial, particularly in Aceh and Papua, but there is ample evidence that arbitrary arrests and detention without trial are employed systematically in Aceh. On November 20, the head of the Aceh NGO (SIRA), Muhammad Nazar, was arrested on charges of "spreading hatred" by hanging banners in favor of a referendum and against the military during a campus rally in August 2000. He was convicted in March, sentenced to 10 months in prison, and released in December. On July 20, in Banda Aceh, police detained six GAM representatives to the "Peace Through Dialog" negotiations sponsored by the Switzerland-based Henri Dunant Center (HDC). Police claimed the individuals were rebels and not negotiators and arrested them on suspicion of subversion. Five of the six negotiators reportedly were released on August 29; the sixth remained in detention at year's end, accused of possession of false passports. In August Acehnese student leader Fasial Saifuddin was detained in Jakarta on similar charges. His trial was ongoing at year's end. Acehnese student leader Kautsar Mohammed Yus was detained in Banda Aceh in July on the charge that he spread hatred of the Government during a demonstration against ExxonMobil operations in Aceh. He remained in detention by year's end. In June and July, the TNI arbitrarily detained over 100 persons during a military operation in search of OPM members (see Section 1.c.).
Police detained numerous persons in Papua after violent clashes in Jayapura in December 2000, Merauke in November 2000, and in Wamena in October 2000 (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5). On December 15, police detained the director of the Institute of Human Rights Study and Advocacy in Papua for 22 hours (see Section 4). Four Papuan students were convicted on August 7 of defaming the Government for a December 2000 proindependence demonstration in front of a foreign embassy. The district court sentenced the students to 3 months in prison, including time served. Prior to the August trial, the students already had been detained for 3 months and released in March pending their trial. In March 2000 the regional police command for Papua investigated criminal charges against 16 leading members of the Papuan Presidium Council for crimes against the security of the state and public order, based on claims that they had organized a gathering of Papuan community leaders in February 2000 and a peaceful Papuan independence flag-raising on December 1, 1999. The investigation against some of the 16 persons later was dropped; however, in November 2000, police arrested the chairman, secretary general, and three other Papuan Presidium Council members on similar charges (see Sections 2.a. and 5). In mid-December 2000, 17 Papuan activists went on trial in Wamena on charges of endangering state security by promoting separatism during an October 6, 2000, flag-raising incident in which police killed 13 Papuans, then later killed 2 dozen migrants. The courts found all guilty of rebellion, attempting to secede from the State of Indonesia, and other lesser offenses, and sentenced them to terms of imprisonment ranging from 1 to 4 years. On June 12, they filed an appeal against their sentences to the Supreme Court. An earlier appeal to the Papua High Court was rejected.
Security forces detained a number of foreign members of both foreign and domestic NGO's during the year (see Section 4).
In past years, several foreign tourists have been subject to arbitrary arrest and detention while traveling in Papua.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for the independence of the judiciary; however, there are a few signs of judicial independence, and in practice, the judiciary is subordinate to the executive and the military. Pursuant to a 1999 law, a gradual transfer of administrative and financial control over the judiciary from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court is to take place by 2004. However, judges are civil servants employed by the executive branch, which controls their assignments, pay, and promotion. Low salaries encourage widespread corruption, and judges are subject to considerable pressure from governmental authorities, who often exert influence over the outcome of cases.
A quadripartite judiciary of general, religious, military, and administrative courts exists below the Supreme Court. The right of appeal from a district court to a high court to the Supreme Court exists in all four systems. The Supreme Court does not consider factual aspects of a case, only the lower courts' application of the law. The Supreme Court theoretically is an equal branch in relation to the executive and legislative branches, and in November the MPR granted the Supreme Court the right of judicial review over laws passed by Parliament (see Section 3).
A panel of judges conducts trials at the district court level, which consists of posing questions, hearing evidence, deciding guilt or innocence, and assessing punishment. Initial judgments rarely are reversed in the appeals process, although sentences can be increased or reduced. Both the defense and the prosecution may appeal cases.
Defendants have the right to confront witnesses and to produce witnesses in their defense. An exception is allowed in cases in which distance or expense is deemed excessive for transporting witnesses to court; in such cases, sworn affidavits may be introduced. State prosecutors are reluctant to use existing legal powers to plea bargain with defendants or witnesses, or to grant witnesses immunity from prosecution. As a result, witnesses generally are unwilling to testify against the authorities. The courts commonly allow forced confessions and limit the presentation of defense evidence. Defendants do not have the right to remain silent and may be compelled to testify against themselves.
The Criminal Procedures Code gives defendants the right to an attorney from the time of arrest, but not during the prearrest investigative period, which may involve prolonged detention. Persons summoned to appear as witnesses in investigations do not have the right to legal assistance, even if information developed during testimony subsequently becomes the basis of an investigation of the witness. The law requires counsel to be appointed in capital punishment cases and those involving a prison sentence of 15 years or more. In cases involving potential sentences of 5 years or more, an attorney must be appointed if the defendant is indigent and requests counsel. In theory indigent defendants may obtain private legal assistance, such as that provided by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation. However, in practice defendants often are persuaded not to hire an attorney, or access to an attorney of their choice is impeded.
In many cases, procedural protections, including those against confessions coerced by the security forces or police, are inadequate to ensure a fair trial. Corruption is a common feature of the legal system, and the payment of bribes can influence prosecution, conviction, and sentencing in civil and criminal cases.
In October the review panel of the Supreme Court overturned the Court's own guilty verdict against former President Soeharto's son, Hutomo "Tommy" Mandala Putra, shortly after the killing of one of its justices. Police accused Tommy Soeharto of ordering the killing of the justice to influence the outcome of the trial. Legislators, the Attorney General, and legal reformers have expressed their disagreement with the review panel's decision in the case. However, in the absence of any law providing for the appeal of a review panel's decision, the decision to overturn the Court's guilty verdict likely would stand.
Despite the beginning of the transfer of administrative and financial control over the judiciary from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court, there were few signs of judicial independence. The Courts continued to be used to take action against, or deny legal remedy to, political activists and government critics.
In November 2000, the DPR enacted a law establishing a permanent human rights court. The law creates four new district courts to adjudicate gross violations of human rights. The law requires that each of the five-member human rights courts include three human rights judges appointed to 5-year terms by the President upon nomination by the Supreme Court. Although cases are appealed to the standing High Court and Supreme Court, the law requires that those courts include three human rights judges on an ad hoc basis on the five-member panel when hearing human rights cases. The law provides for internationally recognized definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and command responsibility as core elements of gross human rights violations. However, it does not include war crimes as a gross violation. The law strengthens the powers of the Attorney General, who is the sole investigating and prosecuting authority in cases of gross human rights violations, and who is empowered to appoint ad hoc investigators and prosecutors. The law also empowers the Attorney General (as well as the courts) to detain suspects or defendants for multiple fixed periods in cases of gross human rights violations. However, the law requires the extension of any detention of alleged violations to be approved by the human rights court. For gross human rights violations that occurred before the enactment of the law, the law allows the President, with the recommendation of the DPR, to create an ad hoc bench within one of the new human rights courts to hear cases associated with a particular offense.
During 2000 victims of human rights violations sought for the first time to use the courts to obtain redress. In July 2000, the People's Democratic Party sued former President Soeharto and 13 other former senior officials for damages associated with the imprisonment of party leaders, the banning of the party, and the destruction of its property. The suit still was being heard at year's end. In addition in 2000, four members of the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA) sued the police in Jakarta for forcibly removing them from a peaceful demonstration and hunger strike that they were conducting inside the Parliament building in Jakarta. After being forcibly removed, they later were kidnaped and threatened by unknown persons (see Sections 1.b. and 4). A district court dismissed the suit, but an appeal to the High Court still was pending at year's end.
President Wahid released all remaining political prisoners from the Soeharto and Habibie eras in December 1999. A number of prisoners since have been convicted and are serving sentences on criminal charges such as subversion, defaming the Government and rebellion (see Section 1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence
Judicial warrants for searches are required except for cases involving suspected subversion, economic crimes, and corruption; however, security agencies regularly made forced or surreptitious entries into homes and offices. Security forces also commonly engaged in surveillance of persons and residences and selective monitoring of local and international telephone calls without legal restraint.
The Government and the DPR discussed implementing the Law on Overcoming Dangerous situations, which the DPR approved in September 1999, but which the President never signed. The law would allow the military to conduct search and seizure operations for weapons during a declared state of emergency without a warrant but would require such searches be reported to the courts within 24 hours. In November 2000, the Cabinet decided to further postpone implementation of the law to permit additional discussion and possible amendments. In January the Government asked the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Justice and Human Rights to revise the bill; however, the law had not been implemented by year's end.
Government security officials monitor the movements and activities of former members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its front organizations, especially persons whom the Government believes were involved in the abortive 1965 coup. However, according to the Action Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners (KAP T/N), these persons and their relatives no longer are subjected to surveillance, required check-ins, periodic indoctrination, and restrictions on travel outside their city of residence. Former PKI members also no longer are required to have official permission to change their place of residence. The requirement that "E.T." ("Ex-Tapol" or political prisoner) be stamped on the identification cards of these prisoners was ended officially in 1995, although in practice it continued to be used in many cases. At least some individuals who had E.T. stamped on their identity cards were able to have the stamp removed. This stamp has been used by the Government to monitor the activities of these persons, allowing the Government and prospective employers to identify alleged former PKI members, thereby subjecting them to official and unofficial discrimination.
Under the government-sponsored transmigration program, large numbers of persons were moved voluntarily from overpopulated areas to more isolated and less developed areas (this program began during the Dutch colonial period and has been carried out more or less continuously since then). It also was used to resettle local populations within East Timor and Papua. However, the Government reduced its support after the economic downturn that began in mid-1997, and in December 2000, Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Alhilal Hamdi announced that the Government had stopped sending transmigrants between islands as of August 2000. He said that henceforth the Government only would support transmigration within the same province. Conditions at some relocation sites are life-threatening, with inadequate measures to protect the transmigrant population against diseases endemic to the sites. In June 2000, 68 transmigrant families left their camp in Bonggo subdistrict, Papua, because of poor living and agricultural conditions, disease, and inadequate support from the Government. They told the Legal Aid Society in Jayapura, where they took refuge, that 39 families at the site were suffering from severe malnutrition, and that lack of health care facilities contributed to a high disease and mortality rate. Transmigrants and migrants outside of the Government's transmigration program received direct and indirect government support in the form of developmental assistance programs and contracts with the TNI or local government officials. This practice, particularly in Papua and parts of Kalimantan, led to resentment among indigenous populations, whose members believed that their rights were infringed upon. Indigenous inhabitants also believed that they were being discriminated against with the disbursement of development funds to other newly arrived groups that they perceived to be their economic rivals (see Section 5). Allegedly this was a contributing factor in the June 25 and 26 attack on the Pontianak IDP camps (see Section 1.a).
The Government used its authority, and at times intimidation, to appropriate land for development projects, particularly in areas claimed by indigenous people, and often without fair compensation (see Section 5).
The Government restricts the import of Chinese-language publications (see Sections 2.a. and 5).
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, journalists continued to suffer intimidation and assaults in areas of unrest. The Constitution contains a general provision for freedom of expression that was strengthened by the MPR's amendment of the Constitution in August 2000, and the 1999 law on human rights provides for substantive protection of press freedom (see Section 1.d.); however, journalists continued to be intimidated and abused during the year. President Megawati revived the Ministry of Information, the institution that controlled media reporting through censorship during former President Soeharto's era. According to the Government, the reinstated Ministry's primary goal is to disseminate information to the public. There were no reports that the Ministry was responsible for restricting freedom of the press by year's end.
The Alliance of Indonesian Journalists (AJI) revealed that police had assaulted journalists 47 times during the first 4 months of the year. AJI stated that the threat of violence from police or even police summons for journalists to be witnesses, as well as threats from members of the public, compel journalists to practice self-censorship.
The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported on the May 24 attack on six journalists in Central Java by the organization Laskar Diponegoro, which was composed of supporters of then-President Wahid. According to local and international sources, the perpetrators verbally and physically abused the journalists, who were reporting on a rally. One reporter, from the Jakarta-based daily newspaper Republika, suffered a concussion and was in the hospital for 5 days.
On August 28, the Maluku governor banned two newspapers, one Christian and one Muslim, accusing both of biased reporting and claiming that they threatened national security (see Section 2.b.). In North Maluku, the provincial government threatened to shut down operations of several local print media outlets for implicating the governor in corrupt practices and for biased reporting on ethno-religious conflicts. By year's end, the local police had taken no action.
During the year, the media often reported on corruption, political protests, national unrest, and the public debate between then-President Wahid and the DPR leading to Wahid's impeachment. Most major media are not hesitant to publish critical and balanced stories on sensitive problems or to criticize public figures. All print media are private. The press has been highly critical of both the GAM and the military in Aceh, reporting both sides of the conflict.
Since the Department of Information was abolished in 1999, most editors have believed that the Government no longer required a license to publish a newspaper or magazine because there no longer was a controlling body to receive reports. President Megawati revived the Ministry of Information, the institution that controlled media reporting through censorship during former President Soeharto's era. According to the Government, the reinstated Ministry's primary goal is to disseminate information to the public. There were no reports that the Ministry was responsible for restricting freedom of the press by year's end.
The Government operates a nationwide television network with 12 regional stations. Private commercial television networks, most with ownership by, or with management ties to, former President Soeharto's family, continued to flourish. All are required to broadcast government-produced news, but they also broadcast news and public affairs programming independently. Television networks increased their news coverage during the year, including extensive coverage of the DPR and MPR sessions.
In September 2000, the Film Censor Board (LSF) issued a circular to television stations stating that recorded talk shows that discuss social and political topics must be reviewed by the Board before they are broadcast. Media figures and legal experts claim that the circular had no legal standing because it conflicted with the 1999 Press Law, which forbids censorship of the press. Some observers called for the abolition of the LSF, which censors films for sex and violence, although there was no attempt at enforcement by the LSF.
As of October, 779 private radio broadcasting companies exist in addition to the Government's radio network. The Government radio station, Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), produces the program "National News." Private radio stations and 53 regional government network affiliates relay the news programming throughout the country.
Regulations issued by the Government in 1998 reduced the number of compulsory government RRI programming broadcasts from 14 to 4 per day. While private radio stations in the provinces generally adhered to the Government's requirement, many private radio stations in larger urban areas broadcast the RRI program only once per day. The regulations allowed stations to produce their own news programs, and many have done so. Candid live coverage of demonstrations and other breaking stories increased markedly during the year. Moreover, "talk radio" call-in programs regularly address timely political and socioeconomic problems.
Foreign television and radio broadcasts are readily accessible. Satellite dishes and cable television networks have proliferated throughout the country, and there is unrestricted access to the Internet. The Government made no effort to restrict access to satellite programming and has proclaimed an "open skies" policy. Foreign periodicals circulate widely without censorship.
The Government restricts the import of Chinese-language publications and music (see Sections 1.f. and 5). There are seven locally published Chinese language newspapers. In November 2000, a new independent television station, Metro TV, began broadcasting 2 hours of news in Mandarin per day. The program was the first Chinese-language television broadcast in the country since 1965.
The Government regulates access to the country by visiting foreign correspondents, particularly to areas of unrest. It occasionally reminds resident foreign correspondents of its authority to deny requests for visa extensions. Special permission is necessary for foreign journalists to travel to Aceh and Papua; however, there are no reports that the Government enforced this regulation during the year.
The Government requires a permit for the import of foreign publications and videotapes, which must be reviewed by government censors. Customs forms require entrants into the country to declare possession of Chinese publications, although significant amounts of material bypass customs and censorship procedures.
Most books by the prominent novelist and former political prisoner Pramoedya Ananta Toer remain banned, although some are in circulation. The Government banned no additional books during the year; however, protests from Islamic groups prompted three publishers to remove books from bookstores. In May the Islamic Youth Movement (GPI), an Islamist organization, burned books on Karl Marx and threatened bookstores with the forcible removal of books dealing with communism. Media and human rights NGO's criticized the calls to withdraw the books from circulation as a violation of freedom of expression.
The 1999 law on crimes against the State (see Section 1.d.) prohibits persons from disseminating or developing the teachings of communism, or from seeking to eliminate or replace the state ideology of Pancasila in a way that causes harm to persons or property.
The security forces inconsistently enforced a no-tolerance policy against flying the Papuan or Acehnese flags until the Papua Autonomy Law, which allows the flying of the Papua flag as a cultural symbol, was signed into law in November. Security forces tore down and destroyed flags and flag poles, and in some cases beat or killed those attempting to raise or protect separatist flags. The Government pressed criminal charges of treason against Alex Manuputty, Secretary General of the FKM, after he refused to abide by a ban on FKM activities and hoisted the separatist South Maluku Republic (RMS) flag on April 24 in Ambon. Manuputty faces maximum penalties of 7 years for hostile intentions and 4 years for treason.
The GAM intimidated journalists in Aceh. Aceh's leading daily newspaper, Serambi Indonesia, closed for a month beginning on August 11 after harassment from the GAM. The GAM also kidnaped three television crew members for 3 weeks, claiming that their media coverage was biased (see Section 1.b.).
Editors of several Jakarta newspapers and major television stations said that they had received letters and telephone calls from extreme religious groups threatening physical violence for articles or editorials the group considered against their beliefs. The editors acknowledged that these threats from citizen groups have a chilling effect on how they report the news.
The law provides for academic freedom, and there are no significant constraints in practice on the activities of scholars. Political activity, open discussions, and blunt criticism of the Government at universities continued to flourish during the year.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government places significant controls on the exercise of this right in certain areas. There are no permit requirements for public social, cultural, religious, or scientific meetings, of five or more persons. However, organizers of political, union, and public policy meetings must notify the police (see Section 6.a.). In practice some public meetings were dispersed forcibly. On July 6, four alleged police intelligence officers interrupted an international NGO workshop in Manado, North Sulawesi. The officers demanded that facilitators provide proof of prior notification about the conference, a written explanation of course activities, and a list of the participants before allowing the workshop to continue.
The law on freedom of expression requires that demonstrators notify the police 3 days in advance and appoint someone accountable for every 100 demonstrators. The law restricts demonstrations near specific sites. Nevertheless, frequent demonstrations are held in Jakarta and around the country with or without official permission. The Government previously had invoked the law to detain and try demonstrators in Jakarta and elsewhere; however, no such trials occurred during the year. Participants in several demonstrations were killed and suffered injuries when security forces seeking to disperse crowds shot, beat, and kicked demonstrators (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Ten thousand workers protesting the new severance pay decree in June threw stones, wood, and plastic bottles, injuring at least nine persons and damaging two hotels in Jakarta. Hundreds of pedicab drivers, using Molotov cocktails, machetes, steel bars, and stones, attacked 500 city public security officials, who were about to raid their illegal business in August. The drivers beat an official to death, two officials were injured, and the mob set fire to and stoned vehicles (see Section 1.a.). Muslim students in Makassar, South Sulawesi attacked non-Muslim students during two separate incidents on October 23 and 24, severely injuring six persons. The Muslims claimed to be retaliating against the burning of an effigy of Usama bin Laden in a predominantly Christian town. Hundreds of students from the Indonesian Muslim University (UMI) in Makassar destroyed property at the Japanese Consulate General and demanded the Consul lower the Japanese flag so it could be burned. The students were protesting U.S. military action in Afghanistan. Police broke up several peaceful demonstrations in Papua. In some instances, police broke up peaceful demonstrations in which Papuans raised the Papuan independence flag and, after demonstrators resisted, killed and injured many demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.a., and 5).
The vast majority of public gatherings and demonstrations, which have proliferated rapidly since President Soeharto's resignation, occurred without any official interference. A number of labor strikes throughout the year and demonstrations during the MPR Special Session to impeach Wahid took place without police or TNI intervention (see Sections 3 and 6.a.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the Government places some controls on the exercise of this right. The Social Organizations Law (ORMAS) requires the adherence of all organizations, including recognized religions and associations, to the official ideology of Pancasila. This provision, limits political activity and prohibits groups from seeking to engage in democratic political competition, to make Indonesia an Islamic state, to revive communism, or to reintroduce partisan ideological division into the country.
The 1999 Law on Crimes Against the State (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.) prohibits the formation of organizations that "are known to or are properly suspected" of embracing the teachings of Communism/Marxism/Leninism "in all its forms and manifestations." It empowers the Government to disband any organization that it believes to be acting against Pancasila, and it requires prior government approval before any organization may accept funds from foreign donors. The Communist party is banned; however, the requirement for prior government approval is ignored so widely as to be meaningless.
The Government announced late in 1995 its intention to relax a regulation requiring police approval for all meetings of five or more persons of all organizations outside offices or normal work sites. However, in practice this regulation continues to apply to union meetings (see Section 6.a.).
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for religious freedom for members of officially recognized religions, and the Government generally respects this provisions in practice; however, there are some restrictions on certain types of religious activity and on unrecognized religions. The Constitution also requires the belief in one supreme God.
The law officially "embraces" five religions--Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, and Hinduism; however, on June 1, the Government lifted its remaining ban on Jehovah's Witnesses, and in January 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid lifted the ban on the practice of Confucianism that had existed since 1967. While only these religions are recognized officially, the law also states that other religions are not forbidden. The Government permits the practice of the mystical, traditional beliefs of "Aliran Kepercayaan." Some religious minorities, including the Baha'i and Rosicrucians, were given the freedom to organize in May 2000. The MPR adopted a Human Rights Charter that provides citizens the freedom to practice their religion without specifying any particular religion.
Jehovah's Witnesses had been banned from practicing their faith since 1976; however, the ban was lifted in June by presidential decree. The Government requires Jehovah's Witnesses to register with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, under the Directorate General of Protestantism. Unlike in previous years, members of Jehovah's Witnesses have not reported any incidents of harassment or any difficulties in conducting civil matters, and some local governments have issued permits to build places of worship.
A presidential decree promulgated in January 2000 repealed the ban on the practice of Chinese religion, its beliefs, and its customs. Confucianists are permitted to celebrate publicly the Chinese New Year. A Ministry of Interior circular issued in late March 2000 permits Confucianism to be listed as a religion on marriage license applications, allowing Confucian marriages to be recognized and registered officially in the country. However, not all communities have implemented the new guidelines.
Members of the Baha'i Faith generally did not report problems during the year. However, in May a crowd of Muslims reportedly expelled two Baha'i families living in a predominantly Muslim village in the Donggala District of Central Sulawesi.
The Government in some provinces has banned the messianic Islamic sect Darul Arqam; the Government also bans the Al-Ma'Unah school in some provinces. The Government attempts to monitor Islamic groups considered to be deviating from orthodox tenets, and in the past has dissolved some groups. Historically, the Government has attempted to control Muslim groups whose practices deviate from mainstream Islamic beliefs because of pressure by nongovernmental leaders of mainstream or conservative and traditional Muslim groups as well as the Government's concern for national unity. A proposal to implement Islamic law failed to gain MPR approval in August 2000.
The legal requirement to adhere to Pancasila extends to all religious and secular organizations. The first tenet of Pancasila is belief in one supreme God; however, individuals are not compelled to practice any particular faith. All citizens must be classified as members of one of the officially recognized religions and atheism is forbidden. As this choice must be noted on official documents, such as the identification card, failure to identify a religion can make it impossible to obtain such documents. The Government actively supports allowing Islamic law in Aceh, although it had not been implemented by year's end, and has dropped previous public opposition to groups who support it elsewhere. The Vice President in fact has publicly expressed support for Islamic law for Muslims in the whole country.
Religious violence and the lack of an effective government response to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks led to allegations that officials were complicit in some of the incidents or, at a minimum, allowed them to occur with impunity. There were numerous instances of attacks on churches, mosques, temples, and other religious facilities during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 5). The most widespread interreligious violence occurred in Maluku province. Governor Latuconsina estimated that 164 houses of worship were damaged or destroyed between June 2000 and July 2001, and that thousands of persons were killed as a result of violence between Christians and Muslims. For example, in June, 20 civilians were killed in a firefight between security forces and Laskar Jihad members (see Section 1.a.). A bomb planted on a passenger ship exploded in the Bay of Ambon on December 11, killing 3 passengers and injuring 39 others. Soon after, several hundred Christian youths and Muslims fought as security forces stood by. On Seram Island in Maluku, hundreds of Christians converted to Islam in July to save their lives (see Section 5). The Government continued to be reluctant to intervene in mob attacks on houses of worship and proved ineffective in controlling the violence in Maluku province; however, governmental efforts to respond to communal violence in the provinces of North Maluku and Sulawesi generally were more effective (see Section 5).
In Maluku Christian sources alleged that elements of the security forces were biased against them. However, there was no evidence to suggest that the security forces, as an institution, supported either side. Some individuals and some units occasionally sided with their coreligionists, but their actions appeared to be random and contrary to orders. Some military troops were detained and interrogated for allegedly openly siding with militia in at least one episode on Haruku; however, there were no reports that such perpetrators ever were punished. Several hundred police officers have themselves been attacked and some killed because of their religion; hundreds of police members and their families, and numerous other government officials, are among the country's IDP's.
According to many Christian officials, the anti-Christian sentiment behind the violence in the Moluccas, Sulawesi, and elsewhere is not new, but the impunity associated with such acts has increased since the resignation of Soeharto in May 1998. In April local courts sentenced to death three Christian suspects who were found guilty of killing hundreds of Muslims and inciting religious hatred in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in May and June 2000. The Government did not investigate fully most cases of attacks on religious facilities that occurred during riots, and in other cases, did not investigate such incidents at all; however, the Government formed a special interagency team to investigate the December 24 bombings on Christian churches, and an NGO has formed a joint fact-finding team with the Government to investigate the Christmas Eve church bombings (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5).
A regulation provides that before a house of worship may be built, consent must be obtained from local residents living near the site, and a license must be obtained from the regional office of the Department of Religion. Some Christians claim that this regulation is used to prevent them from building churches and rebuilding damaged religious facilities. Nonetheless, Christians continued to build churches during the year.
The law allows conversion between faiths, and such conversions do occur. Independent observers note that it is difficult to obtain official recognition for interfaith marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims. Persons who are not members of one of the five accepted religions also have difficulty in obtaining official recognition of their marriages.
The Government views proselytizing by recognized religions in areas heavily dominated by another recognized religion as potentially disruptive, and discourages it. Foreign missionary activities are relatively unimpeded, although in North Maluku, the provincial government requires missionaries to engage in strictly humanitarian work. In the first half of the year, the Government deported Australian missionaries who did not inform the regional government of their activities. In addition visas allowing the official entrance of new foreign clergy are difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, many foreign clergy come to the country. Laws and decrees from the 1970's limit the number of years that foreign missionaries may spend in the country, although some extensions were granted in remote areas like Papua. Foreign missionary work is subject to the funding stipulations of the Social Organizations Law (see Section 2.b.).
The Government does not target or use violence against converts to or from a particular religion; however, witnesses testified to human rights groups of multiple incidents in which active duty and retired military personnel stood by during the torture of Moluccan Christians who refused to convert.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution permits the Government to bar persons from either entering or departing the country, and the Government restricts freedom of movement to some extent. A September 20 press report indicated that 201 suspects were prevented from leaving the country by the Attorney General's office, and that 29 suspects similarly were barred from leaving by the Finance Ministry. A decree issued in July permits the Government to confiscate and revoke the passports of persons banned from travel outside of the country. The Government exercised this authority in September when it banned the travel of two businessmen suspected of involvement in a graft case. In 1999 according to Department of Justice information quoted in the press, the Government maintained a list of 3,665 foreigners who are barred from entering the country, and 417 citizens who are prohibited from leaving the country. Five prominent Papuan leaders who were barred from leaving the country in August 1999 (see Section 5) subsequently were allowed to travel abroad; however, some of them only were able to travel after foreign governments made high-level representations on their behalf.
The Government also restricts movement by citizens and foreigners into and within parts of the country. The 1999 Law on Overcoming Dangerous Situations (see Section 1.f.) allows the military to limit land, air, or sea traffic, to prohibit migration into and out of areas, to order relocation of persons outside areas, and to order house arrest in a declared state of emergency. Following demonstrations against the law, the Parliament sent the law to the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defense for revisions. The law was passed during the year; however, it has yet not been implemented.
The State Intelligence Agency screens the proposed foreign staff members of non-Indonesian institutions that implement technical cooperation programs, including NGO's, before the State Secretariat approves the staffs' entry into the country (see Section 4). Foreign consultants and foreign assistance staff, particularly those working in sensitive parts of the country such as Aceh, Papua, and the Moluccas, must be cleared by the Intelligence Coordination Agency (BAKIN) before their assignments can be approved by the State Secretariat.
On June 23, 2000, then-President Wahid announced a ban on all travel to Maluku and North Maluku provinces; however, the ban was not enforced effectively. On June 26, 2000, the President declared a state of civil emergency for both provinces. The emergency decree, originally in place for 90 days, was extended indefinitely (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.c., and 5).
The Government requires that individuals obtain permits to work in certain areas, primarily to limit further population movement to crowded cities; however, this requirement is universally ignored.
According to the Government, foreigners residing in the country for more than 3 months were required to register with the Immigration Office between August 10 and October 10 for census purposes. This reinforced the Foreigner Registration Law, under which violators may be subject to a maximum of 1 year in prison and a 500 fine (5 million rupiahs).
Although former political prisoners associated with the abortive 1965 coup no longer are officially required to carry the stamp "E.T." on their identity cards, in many cases, the stamps have not been eliminated in practice (see Section 1.f.).
Following the August 30, 1999 consultation vote in East Timor, there was credible evidence that, in a planned and orchestrated operation, the security forces and militia forcibly removed or compelled to flee a substantial percentage of the 250,000 East Timorese who departed the territory at that time. Over 190,000 of these IDP's have returned to East Timor, but during the first half of the year intimidation by East Timorese prointegration militia forces in the camps in West Timor continued to prevent many others from returning (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
All international assistance to the IDP's in West Timor was suspended following the September 6, 2000, attack on UNHCR personnel in Atambua, in which three UNHCR workers were killed, and did not resume during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 4). The Government's failure to disarm and disband the militias created security conditions unfavorable to the resumption of international assistance. There is evidence that TNI elements have supported the militias with supplies and training, although such support apparently declined in 2000. In 2000 and during the year, the Government began to take steps to promote the voluntary and safe return of IDP's, for example, by agreeing to settle pension claims for some IDP's who requested repatriation, or resettlement in Indonesia. There is no evidence that the Government is returning forcibly or resettling East Timorese IDP's. The Government planned to end support to East Timorese IDP's in West Timor, and closed the refugee camps; however, this had not occurred by year's end.
According to a U.N. World Food Program report released in November, there were over 1,321,136 IDP's in Indonesia, up from slightly over a million in 2000. The largest number of IDP's were from the sectarian conflict in Maluku and North Maluku, although some Moluccan IDP's returned to their homes during the year. In Maluku province, there were 338,440 IDP's and 166,318 in North Maluku. There were 46,103 IDP's in North Sulawesi, almost entirely Christians from Maluku and North Maluku; 35,611 in Central Sulawesi (most displaced by sectarian fighting in the Poso area); and 246,904 in South and Northeast Sulawesi. Other IDP's from Maluku are located in Papua, which has a total of 16,870 IDP's. There were 48,585 IDP's in North Sumata and another 14,351 displaced within Aceh. There were 194,596 IDP's on the island of Java. In Kalimantan, there were 60,777 displaced Madurese. Other islands, including Bali, hosted smaller numbers of displaced persons.
The Government generally has encouraged and assisted foreign and domestic humanitarian aid to the Moluccas and Sulawesi (see Section 4). However, on occasion both Muslim and Christian groups have accused some foreign donors of partiality. The Government had not been particularly effective or helpful in promoting the voluntary and safe return or resettlement of the IDP's in these areas by year's end.
In East Java, there were no reports during the year of police forcibly evicting to other areas persons rumored to be practitioners of magic (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
During the year, indigenous Dayaks forced over 105,000 Madurese migrants to flee their homes in Central Kalimantan (see Sections 1.a. and 5). An estimated 40,000 Madurese who fled their homes during interethnic violence in 1999 remained in IDP camps in West Kalimantan and Madura (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
Throughout the year, thousands of rural Acehnese temporarily fled their villages and became IDP's. In some cases, IDP's were fleeing security forces that were patrolling the area or otherwise intimidating them (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In other cases, armed separatists terrorized or coerced villagers into becoming IDP's, in part to create international attention and sympathy. In other cases, rural nonethnic Acehnese residents were targeted by armed separatist GAM members. In June the GAM conducted a series of attacks in Central Aceh against Javanese and Gayo residents, displacing thousands of persons.
Unrest in Papua caused numerous persons to leave their homes in Wasior district and other areas. Hundreds of persons fled security force search operations connected to the killing of five Brimob officers (see Section 1.a.). Approximately 300 Papuan refugees remain in camps in Papua New Guinea, afraid to return for fear of being targeted by security forces as militants. Forty-six families fled a Bonggo transmigration site during an exchange of fire between security forces and militant groups.
The law does not provide for the granting of asylum and/or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the UNHCR, which maintains a regional office in Jakarta. As of December 31, the UNHCR had registered 2,835 asylum seekers and refugees. Of this number, 1,459 were Iraqis, 1,035 were Afghans, 174 were Iranians, and 167 other nationalities. The Government has not formulated a policy regarding asylum; however, there were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government
In 1999 citizens for the first time successfully changed their government through an open, transparent democratic process, following decades of authoritarian rule. The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) meets every 5 years in a "General Session" to elect the President and Vice President in separate secret ballots and to establish the "Broad Guidelines of State Policy" (GBHN), which is intended to serve as a policy plan for the Government.
In July the MPR met to convene an "Extraordinary Session" to require then-President Wahid to account for his performance in office. Claiming the charges politically were motivated, Wahid refused to appear, instead issuing a directive to "freeze" the MPR, the House of Representatives, DPR, and the Golkar party, and to hold new elections, exceeding his authority under the Constitution. The military and police refused to implement the directive, and on July 23, the MPR cancelled Wahid's mandate and Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri replaced Wahid as President provided by law.
The 695-member MPR consists of the 500 Members of the DPR, 130 regional representatives, who are elected by provincial legislatures, and 65 appointed representatives from functional and societal groups. The June 7, 1999 general election, in which 48 political parties participated, was monitored by domestic and international observers and was widely considered open, fair, and free. In October 1999, the newly installed MPR chose Abdurrahman Wahid as President and Megawati Soekarnoputri as Vice President in a transparent process, which was broadcast live on national television. The next round of general and presidential/vice presidential elections is scheduled for 2004.
Reportedly, the military's significant historical and sociopolitical role, is being phased out gradually. Although the police and military are separated, the 2 institutions continue jointly to hold 38 unelected seats in the DPR and 10 percent of the seats in provincial and district parliaments, in partial compensation for not being permitted to vote. In addition to these appointed legislative positions, active-duty military and police officers also may run for election to government office but, in a significant departure from past practice, are expected to retire (except those appointed to legislative bodies) after they are elected; however, retired officers often retain strong ties to their former institutions, and occupy important positions at all levels of government. The military and police have agreed to relinquish their appointed seats in the DPR and regional legislatures by 2004, but an MPR decree passed in August 2000 allows them to retain seats in the MPR until "not later than" 2009. In an apparent effort to decrease demands for an immediate end to their legislative positions, military and police legislators generally have sought to limit their involvement in matters deemed not to affect their core interests.
The legislative branch, which had no independence during the Soeharto era, has moved forcefully to establish its independence from the executive branch. A number of constitutional changes, MPR decrees, and legal changes have enhanced legislative branch authorities, raising some concerns that the balance of power may have shifted too far from the executive branch. However, during its November session, the MPR amended the constitution to provide for direct presidential and vice presidential elections, a bicameral legislation with a regional representative's chamber, and a constitutional court with the power of review of the legislation. The MPR was to decide its precise future role and transitional arrangements through further constitutional changes to be considered in 2002. The legislative branch has demonstrated its independence through the DPR's aggressive pursuit of its government oversight function, as well as the MPR's success in first forcing President Wahid to cede more authority over daily government management to Vice President Megawati because of perceived inefficiency and inconsistency in the Wahid Administration's implementation of policy. Through the first half of the year, the DPR's legislative record reflected its almost exclusive focus on removing Wahid from office; however, it was restricted by cumbersome procedures and a lack of staff expertise. Nonetheless, it exercised considerable influence over the final content of bills introduced by the Government. Legislative reforms passed in October established a legislative code of ethics and streamlined the legislative process.
The MPR is empowered to amend the Constitution and issue decrees, functions that it undertook in the first of its newly instituted "Annual Sessions" held in August 2000. A key demand of the reform movement was an overhaul of the 1945 Constitution, which was perceived to have fostered the development of past authoritarian regimes. In the first amendment of the Constitution, the 1999 MPR passed curbs on executive power, including a limit of two 5-year terms for the President and Vice President. At the same time, the MPR empowered an ad hoc working committee to consider further amendments and to draft MPR decrees. This effort resulted in the passage of the second amendment to the Constitution during the "Annual Session" in August 2000. The second amendment did include many important changes, including provisions for protections of human rights modeled closely on the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, regional autonomy, and further separation of powers. During its November session, the MPR amended the 1945 Constitution to provide, among other changes, for direct presidential and vice-presidential elections, a bicameral legislature with a regional representative's chamber, and a constitutional court with the power of judicial review of legislation. The amendments, if fully implemented, would increase elected officials accountability to constituents by allowing persons to directly elect the President and Vice President.
The remaining 92 percent of national and 90 percent of regional parliamentary seats that are not occupied by members of the military and police are filled through elections held every 5 years. All adult citizens, except active-duty members of the armed forces, persons in prison convicted of crimes punishable by over 5 years' incarceration, persons suffering from mental disorders, and persons deprived of voting rights by an irrevocable verdict of a court of justice, are eligible to vote. Members of the banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) may not run for office.
International and domestic monitoring groups and the major political parties accepted the June 1999 parliamentary election as generally free and fair, notwithstanding many technical problems and irregularities, particularly in remote areas. The numerous technical problems, due to inadequate preparations and ambiguities in the regulations, included inadequate supplies of ballots and reporting forms, poor training of poll workers, confusion over procedures, and insufficient funds to pay poll workers. There were numerous, and in some cases credible, allegations of vote buying and scattered allegations of voter intimidation, particularly in rural areas. In some cases, alleged violations were referred to judicial authorities for legal action; however, in most cases, political parties reached informal solutions among themselves.
The actions of some small party representatives on the General Election Commission (KPU) contributed to a significant delay in validating election results and led to a considerable loss of public faith in the impartiality and integrity of the KPU. In June 2000, the DPR amended the 1999 election laws to establish a new and more independent KPU, which was being formed through a transparent process that encourages public involvement. Some observers are concerned that the new KPU secretariat would remain administratively dependent upon the Ministry of Home Affairs.
While there are no legal restrictions on the role of women in politics, the percentage of women in government and politics does not correspond to their percentage of the population. The President, Megawati Soekarnoputri, is a woman, as are two members of her Cabinet. However, there are fewer women in the DPR and in the MPR than during the Soeharto era. Women represent less than 9 percent of DPR members, a decrease from 13 percent during Soeharto's last term. Nonetheless, many women activists argue that the quality of female politicians has improved. Female Members of Parliament announced in mid-October 2000 the formation of a non partisan women's caucus. Surveys have shown that while more than one-third of civil servants are women, less than 6 percent are in positions of authority (see Section 5). The Papua Special Autonomy Law reserves one-third of the seats on a Papuan Peoples' Assembly for women.
While there are no legal restrictions on the role of minorities in politics, the percentage of minorities in government and politics does not correspond to their percentage of the population. In the Cabinet, there are 15 Javanese, 4 Sundanese, 1 Bugese, 1 Papuan, 1 Sumbawa, 1 Flores, 1 Kalimantan, 1 Bali, 1 Chinese, 2 Acehnese, 2 Minang, and 1 Batak.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
Domestic human rights organization are subject to monitoring, interference, and abuse from the Government; nonetheless, domestic human rights organizations were extremely active in advocating improvements to the Government's human rights performance. They pressured the Government to investigate human rights abuses, acted as defense counsel in political trials, sought to offer assistance--and in some cases protection--to victims and witnesses of human rights abuses, and urged improvements in government policies and legislation.
There are many local NGO human rights organizations, including the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, the Indonesia Legal Aid and Human Rights Association and the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence. The Government meets with these NGO's regularly.
At times security force members killed, abused, and detained human rights activists and humanitarian workers, most frequently in areas with active insurgencies. For example, according to HRW, between November 2000 and October 2001, seven human rights defenders were killed in Aceh. Muhamad Efendi Malikon, secretary of the East Aceh Care Forum for Human Rights was killed on February 28, in Peukan Langsa village. His body was found shortly after he was stopped at a checkpoint by the paramilitary police. By year's end, there were no progress on the investigations of past killings of NGO workers.
In 2000 police summoned the director of Papua's best-known human rights organization, the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy in Papua (ELS-HAM), for questioning; police released him on December 16, 2000, after nearly 22 hours of questioning. The director was ordered to the station after ELS-HAM held a press conference in which it accused the police of the extrajudicial killing of three persons on December 7 (see Section 1.a.).
Four members of an NGO based in Bandung, West Java, that advocates on behalf of dispossessed farmers, claim that they were kidnaped on August 14, 2000, (see Sections 1.e. and 4). The office of the Committee for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS), based in Jakarta, was attacked during a series of bombings in various areas of the country in 2000 (see Section 1.c.).
Intimidation, threats, and violence toward NGO's escalated in West Timor in 2000, greatly hindering humanitarian operations. Intimidation by militias and outright attacks forced all international humanitarian aid organizations to withdraw from West Timor in September 2000; they had not returned by year's end (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
The Government must approve the assignment of staff members of foreign institutions that implement technical cooperation programs, including NGO's, before they are allowed to enter the country (see Sections 2.c. and 2.d.); however, some NGO's allege that the Government has used this requirement to restrict their activities, especially in sensitive areas.
The Government generally considered outside investigations or foreign-based criticism of alleged human rights violations to be interference in the country's internal affairs. In addition security forces and intelligence agencies tended to view foreign NGO's and international organizations with suspicion and distrust, particularly those operating in conflict areas. For example, on June 8, police detained overnight 34 foreigners representing NGO's, as well as the Indonesian organizers of an Asia Pacific Solidarity Conference on Neoliberalism in Depok, West Java (see Section 6.b.). On August 18, police detained overnight six German students, according to press accounts, for activities deemed incompatible with their visitor visas. The students were conducting demographic research in Jakarta with the help of the Urban Poor Consortium, a local NGO. Immigration officials initially said that the students would be deported, but later admitted that they did not have sufficient funds, and the students were permitted to depart at their own expense.
The Government generally encouraged and assisted foreign and domestic humanitarian aid. However, on occasion both Muslim and Christian groups accused some foreign donors of partiality (see Section 2.d.).
The ICRC generally was allowed access to identified detainees by civilian and military officials at the central government level. In Aceh the ICRC maintained an office in Lhokseumawe and was allowed to visit known prisoners and others detained by security forces. The ICRC conducted humanitarian operations in Aceh, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku, and East and West Timor; however, the Government at times hindered the ICRC's access to these areas and was slow in accrediting additional staff members.
The government-appointed National Human Rights Commission (KOMNASHAM), in its 8th year of operation, continued to examine reported human rights violations and to demonstrate independence from the Government. The 1999 Human Rights Law gave KOMNASHAM statutory authority and increased its membership to 35 members. KOMNASHAM lacks enforcement powers, but attempts to work within the system, sending teams to inquire into alleged human rights problems. It employs persuasion, publicity, and moral authority to highlight abuses, to recommend legal and regulatory changes, and to encourage corrective action. The Government appointed KOMNASHAM's original chairman, who then appointed the other 24 initial Commission members. Future members are required to serve 5-year terms and to be nominated by KOMNASHAM, confirmed by the Parliament, and approved by the President.
During the year, the number of commissioners dropped to 18 due to resignations and retirements, and KOMNASHAM began deliberating on nominees to fill the vacancies. The DPR had not selected the new commissioners by year's end. Disputes within KOMNAS-HAM prompted the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS), Legal Advocacy (ELSHAM), and Legal Aid Foundation (LBH) to criticize KOMNASHAM as an ineffective institution.
The law provides KOMNASHAM with subpoena powers and provides that disputes settled by written agreement through the Commission's mediation are enforceable in court. However, the law does not give KOMNASHAM the power to enforce its recommendations or to recommend government action.
In 1999 KOMNASHAM supported the work of the KPP-HAM and forwarded its findings to the Attorney General in late January 2000. In February 2000, KOMNASHAM formed a commission to investigate the 1984 killing of Muslim demonstrators at Tanjung Priok, Jakarta (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In August 2000, KOMNASHAM opened an office in Ambon, Maluku province. Commission members conducted an investigation into human rights violations in Papua in October 2000, following an outbreak of violence in Wamena (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
In response to the U.N. Security Council's (UNSC's) adoption of Resolution 1319 after the September 6, 2000, killing of three UNHCR workers in West Timor (see Section 1.a.), the Government and various political leaders initially indicated that they would oppose the actions that the UNSC mission called for in the resolution. However, the Government later invited the UNSC mission to observe the situation in West Timor and to assess the Government's compliance with the resolution. The UNSC mission, consisting of permanent representatives from five member countries, visited West Timor and Jakarta in November 2000.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status
The Constitution does not forbid explicitly discrimination based on gender, race, disability, language, or social status; however, it stipulates equal rights and obligations for all citizens, both native and naturalized. An amendment to the Constitution adopted during 2000 introduced the possibility of affirmative action to achieve fair and equal treatment; however, some activists believe that because the amendment does not mention men or women specifically, it would not adequately protect women.
The Guidelines of State Policy (legal statutes adopted by the MPR) explicitly state that women have the same rights, obligations, and opportunities as men. However, guidelines adopted in the past 20 years also state that women's participation in the development process must not conflict with their role in improving family welfare and the education of the younger generation. Marriage law designates the man as the head of the family. The Constitution grants citizens the right to practice their individual religions and beliefs; however, the Government only recognizes six religions and imposes some restrictions on other religious activity, although some of these restrictions were lifted during the year (see Section 2.c.).
Women
Violence against women remains poorly documented. The Government does not collect data on domestic violence. Women's rights NGO's estimate that only 15 percent of domestic violence incidents are reported. According to a legal aid organization involved in domestic violence issues, approximately 11 percent of rural women suffer some form of domestic violence. Experts on the subject agree that the number of incidents has risen since the onset of the country's economic downturn starting in mid-1997, which has been aggravated by social changes associated with rapid urbanization. The domestic violence victim advocacy group, Kalyana Mitra, counseled 96 cases in West Java between January and October, 75 domestic violence cases, 17 rape cases, and 4 sexual harassment cases. The Government has acknowledged the problem of domestic violence in society; however, violence against women, especially when it occurs within the home, is perceived by the public to be a private matter and not within the purview of the Government.
The Government, in consultation with women's NGO's, operates a National Commission on Violence against Women. The Commission's mandate is to improve and coordinate government and NGO efforts to combat violence against women and to provide assistance to victims. During the year, the Commission reported that violence against women resulting from the economic crisis continued to rise, and issued a national action plan report.
In November 1999, a group of government officials and NGO representatives signed a declaration calling for the development of a joint strategy to end violence against women. The group drafted a 2001-04 national action plan, which incorporates a "zero tolerance" strategy on violence against women, creates safety mechanisms to protect women against violence, and establishes new legislation to penalize perpetrators of such
violence. However, national legislation and implementing regulations to support the action plan have not yet been enacted. The Government provided technical support, but not funding, to establish and administer a women's crisis center in a leading public hospital in Jakarta. Foreign governments have funded some of these crisis center projects.
The Government provides some counseling for abused women, and several private organizations assist women. Many of these organizations focus on reuniting the family rather than on providing protection to women. Many women rely on the extended family system for assistance in cases of domestic violence. Both public and private initiatives to assist female victims of violence were undertaken during the year. There are a small but growing number of women's crisis centers, including a drop-in center founded in Jakarta by the government-sponsored National Women's Organization (KOWANI) and a crisis center for women in Yogyakarta that is administered by an NGO. Women's Partner (Mitra Perempuan), a crisis center for women that opened in 1997, runs a 24-hour hotline and a temporary shelter for abused women. The hotline receives several calls each day from battered women. The National Commission reports a general increase in the number of female victims of violence seeking assistance from crisis centers, and attributes the increase both to a growing awareness of services and to an increase in the incidence of violence against women. Some public hospitals in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya have integrated crisis centers that assist and protect abused women and children. These centers are cosponsored by the Government and the Women's Crisis Center (Pusat Krisis Perempuan). One of these centers, located in a Jakarta hospital, reported 30 cases of rape, 31 cases of domestic violence, and 37 cases of child abuse during a 4-month period during 2000. Jakarta, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta police have opened "women's desks" in their precincts to assist rape and domestic violence victims and to investigate their cases.
Rape is a punishable offense, and perpetrators have been arrested and sentenced for rape and attempted rape, but reliable statistics are unavailable. Women's rights activists believe that rape is seriously underreported due to the social stigma attached to victims. Some legal experts report that unless a woman immediately seeks an examination at a hospital that produces physical evidence of rape, she would be unable to bring charges successfully. A witness also is required in order to prosecute for rape, and only in rare cases can a witness be produced, according to legal experts. Some women reportedly fail to report rape to police because the police do not take their allegations seriously. The maximum prison sentence for rape is 12 years, but observers claim that sentences usually are much shorter. Mob violence against accused rapists frequently is reported. An August 1999 conference of forensic experts recommended that standard procedures be adopted for examining and taking statements from rape victims, in an effort to improve the successfulness of rape prosecutions. However, by year's end, no rape investigation standards were in place, nor were uniform procedures followed.
Rape by a husband of a wife is not considered a crime under the law. Cultural norms dictate that problems between a husband and wife are private matters, and violence against women in the home rarely is reported. While police could bring assault charges against a husband for beating his wife, they are unlikely to do so.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely criticized by international health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health, is practiced in some parts of the country. No national legislation exists on FGM. Customary ("adat") law has allowed for symbolic female circumcision and small-cut (mild) incisions of the clitoris, which would fall under the World Health Organization's (WHO's) type IV classification of FGM (this category includes pricking, piercing or incising of the clitoris). According to reports, FGM practices appear to be increasingly symbolic in nature (for example, a pinprick or the cutting of a ceremonial root). More invasive FGM practices--removal of the clitoral prepuce, partial removal of the sensitive tip of the clitoris, and even total removal--reportedly occur in Madura, South Sulawesi, and parts of East Java. However, there are no epidemiological reports on the frequency of these practices. Since FGM is not regulated, and religious leaders have taken no formal position, the method used often is left to the discretion of the local traditional practitioner. FGM usually occurs within the first year after birth, often on the 40th day, although it is performed in some areas up to age 10. It is performed either at a hospital or, especially in rural areas, by the local traditional practitioner. Both government officials and NGO leaders familiar with FGM problems believe invasive FGM practices are declining. The Government included FGM as a gender issue in its National Action Plan to End Violence against Women, published in late November. FGM heads the Action Plan's list of religious teachings requiring investigation and modification. The Government and NGO's are targeting awareness campaigns at Muslim religious leaders and those directly involved in performing female circumcisions (such as traditional birth attendants), and towards society at large, to bring about an end to these practices.
There were reports of the forced conversion of hundreds of Christians in Maluku in November and December 2000. Both male and female converts later were forced to undergo circumcision.
The country is a significant source, transit point, and destination for trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced prostitution and in some cases for forced labor (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). It is widely alleged that TNI-backed militias raped numerous women during the 1999 violence in East Timor and kept many as sex slaves (see Section 1.c.). Kirsty Sword-Gusmao, the wife of East Timorese independence leader Xanana Gusmao, reported to the international press in November 2000 that 33 pregnant East Timorese women returned to East Timor and claimed they had been abducted and forced to serve as sex slaves for the TNI in West Timor.
Female domestic servants also are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. In some cases, unscrupulous recruitment agencies have promised women employment as domestic servants overseas and then held them against their would for extended periods until jobs are found for them. Women working abroad as domestic servants often risk various forms of abuse, exploitation, and other cruel treatment. The Government has taken some steps to assist its citizens working abroad, but advocates charge that much more needs to be done (see Section 6.f.).
Harassment is not a crime under the law, only "indecent behavior." However, sexual harassment charges may damage a civil service career. The law reportedly only covers physical abuse, and requires two witnesses. Female job applicants and workers have complained of being victimized sexually by supervisors. Many groups criticized the Manpower Law for failing to address sexual harassment and violence against women in the workplace and for providing inadequate protection in areas of employment in which women regularly suffer abuse, such as overseas employment and household service. However, the Manpower Development and Protection Bill contains provisions requiring employers to ensure that female workers who work at night are safe and free from sexual abuse or harassment. A separate article in the bill also states that all workers have the right to receive protection against immorality and sexual harassment or abuse.
Women disproportionately suffer from illiteracy, poor health, and inadequate nutrition. The illiteracy rate among women is 17 percent, compared to 10 percent among men; the national illiteracy rate average for citizens over 15 years old is 12 percent, according to a UNICEF report. The high maternal mortality rate is approximately 18,000 deaths per year. In Papua the maternal mortality rate is 1,025 deaths per 100,000 and in Maluku 796 deaths per 100,000 live births.
During the year, hundreds of thousands of women and children were displaced by violent conflicts in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku provinces, West and Central Kalimantan, Papua, and Aceh (see Section 2.d.). In addition to those directly victimized by violence, a substantial number of those displaced suffered from nutritional deficiencies and other health problems.
Under the Constitution, women are equal to and have the same rights, obligations, and opportunities as men. However, in practice, women face some legal discrimination. Marriage law defines the man as the head of the family. Marriage law for Muslims, based on Shari'a (Islamic law), allows men to have up to four wives if the husband is able to provide equally for each of them. Court permission and consent of the first wife is required, but reportedly most women cannot refuse. Cabinet officials and military personnel customarily have been forbidden from taking second wives, although reportedly a few ministers have had second wives. A government regulation stipulates that a male civil servant must receive the permission of his superior to take a second wife. The regulation has come under considerable attack and renewed scrutiny. Some women's groups urged the Government to ban polygyny altogether.
Women often bear a heavier evidentiary burden than men in obtaining a divorce, especially in the Islamic-based family court system. Divorced women rarely receive alimony. There is no enforcement mechanism for alimony payment, and according to Shari'a, a divorced wife is entitled to only 3 months of alimony, and even alimony for this brief period is not always granted.
The Citizenship Law states that children's citizenship is derived solely from the citizenship of the father. Children of citizen mothers and foreign fathers are considered foreigners and require visas to remain in the country until the age of 18, at which time they may apply for citizenship. They are prohibited from attending public schools and must attend private, international schools, which usually are more expensive.
Foreign women married to citizens also face difficulties. Their children are citizens and thus are not allowed to attend international schools unless they receive special permission from the Ministry of Education. Such women usually are taxed as foreign heads of households, but they do not have property, business, or inheritance rights. NGO's and the Government appear to agree that the law needed revision; however, by year's end, the Government had not taken any action to remedy these problems.
Although some women (such as President Megawati Soekarnoputri) have a high degree of economic and social freedom and occupy important positions in both the public and private sectors, most women do not have such status and they constitute a disproportionately high percentage of the lower end of the socioeconomic and political scale (see Section 3). The latest survey showed that while more than one-third of civil servants are women, less than 6 percent are in positions of authority.
Female workers in manufacturing generally receive lower wages than men. Many female factory workers are hired as day laborers instead of as full-time permanent employees, and companies are not required to provide benefits, such as maternity leave, to day laborers. Women's rights activists report that there is a growing trend in manufacturing to hire women to do work in their homes for less than the minimum wage (see Section 6.e.).
Unemployment rates for women are approximately 50 percent higher than those for men. Women often are not provided the extra benefits and salary that men are given when they are the heads of households, and in many cases do not receive employment benefits for their family members, such as medical insurance and income tax deductions. Nevertheless, female university graduates receive an average salary that is 25 percent less than their male counterparts. Some women's activists believe that a growing number of professional women are advancing in a variety of fields, especially in the legal profession. However, no statistics are available to support this assertion. According to a study conducted during the year, only 20 percent of top managers and affluent consumers in Jakarta are female.
The law requires the Government to formulate national policies to forbid and eliminate discrimination (including by gender) in the workplace. However, there were no implementing regulations in effect and discrimination continued in practice.
Despite laws that provide women with a 3-month maternity leave, the Government acknowledged that pregnant women often are dismissed or replaced while on leave from their jobs. Some companies require women to sign statements that they do not intend to become pregnant. Labor laws mandate 2 days of menstrual leave per month for women, although this leave is not allowed in all cases. The Manpower Development and Protection Bill includes specific protections for female workers. For example, employers may not require pregnant women or unmarried women under 18 to work at night.
Women's advocacy groups remained active throughout the year. Numerous NGO-organized conferences and rallies dealing with women's issues were held, as well as some that were organized by academic institutions and government ministries.
Children
The Government has stated its a commitment to children's rights, education, and welfare, but lacks the resources to implement such a commitment. The Ministry of Women's Empowerment is responsible for children's issues. In its budget for 2002, the Government allocated 1.0 percent of the GDP to education, or 0.74 percent of the country's GDP. A 1979 law on children's welfare defines the responsibility of the State and parents to nurture and protect children; however, implementing regulations have never been promulgated and, despite DPR deliberations during the year, the law's provisions on protection of children had not gone into effect by year's end.
The Government estimates that the country has 40 million school-age children or about 19 percent of the country's population. During the year, the Ministry of Education began a national program to keep children in school through alternative programs as a means to combat child labor. According to International Labor Organization (ILO) and UNICEF statistics, about 6.1 to 6.4 million children between the ages of 7 and 15 have dropped out of school since the economic downturn that began in 1997. An academic source estimated in November 2000 that the number of students not enrolled in school for that age group was even higher, approximately 6.8 million. According to Ministry of Education data, 11.7 million children through the age of 18 were not attending school in 1999, while the ILO estimated that 11.9 million school-aged children did not attend school between 2000 and 2001.
A 1994 law increased mandatory education requirements from 6 to 9 years (6 years of elementary education and 3 years of junior high school education). However, the law has not been implemented fully, due to a lack of government enforcement, inadequate school facilities, and inability of families to pay children's school fees. Official and unofficial fees for public education, including payments for registration, books, meals, transport, and uniforms have become prohibitively high for many families. Boys and girls have mostly equal access to basic education according to 1998 Indonesian government statistics.
The Government allocates only 8 percent of its human resources development budget to health care. Low-cost medical care is available, although access and availability sometimes are sporadic, especially in rural areas. The results of a Ministry of Health study conducted in 2000 on public health services concluded that over 40 percent of the country's public health centers had no attending physicians. According to a UNICEF report issued during 2000, the percentage of women and children without access to health care ranged from 20 to 50 percent, with the most limited access occurring in rural areas and poorer provinces. Moreover, government spending on health care also has dropped in real terms due to the economic downturn. In some cases, women and children unable to pay medical bills have been detained by hospitals that maintained their own "debtors' prisons." There also were reports of hospitals refusing treatment to children suffering from malnutrition, due to insufficient resources.
According to a credible report from a local NGO, infant mortality rates nearly have doubled as a result of the economic downturn, increasing from 55 per 1,000 deaths in 1995 to 100 per 1,000 in 1998. According to UNICEF'S report, 7 percent of the country's children die before they are 5 years old and 5 percent die before their first birthdays. Almost 50 percent of children grow up in unhealthy or unsafe environments. The overall use of health care facilities by children has dropped significantly since the economic downturn began in mid-1997.
Throughout the year, UNICEF continued to warn of a "lost generation" of youth as a result of the economic crisis. In 2000 UNICEF estimated that 8 million preschool-age children were undernourished, which threatens the development of brain function. According to U.N. data, as many as 30 to 50 percent of the country's children under the age of 5 may be suffering from some form of malnutrition, an increase from 9.8 percent in 1995. One university source in 2000 estimated that 20 million children were malnourished, an increase from 8 million in 1997. Specifically, researchers have begun to document an increase in children suffering from deficiencies of Vitamin A, iron, and protein. According to the same UNICEF study many of the country's children suffer from "hidden hunger" or malnourishment.
In previous years, the media frequently reported on instances of children dying from malnutrition or lack of treatment for the condition. Such reports were most frequent in Java, but also originated from Sumatra and other regions.
Schooling for children in areas of conflict was disrupted severely during the year. Hundreds of thousands of children in Maluku and North Maluku provinces and in Central Sulawesi fled their homes to escape violence (see Section 2.d.), interrupting their education and exposing them to malnutrition, disease, and other hazards. NGO's and religious groups in Maluku province estimate that thousands of Muslim and Christian children between the ages of 12 and 17 have become child soldiers (see Sections 6.d.). Younger children between the ages of 7 and 12 provide support services to the militias. Some of the children involved in fighting reportedly are from outside the province. In one incident in 2000, a 16-year-old from Java, who had joined the Laskar Jihad militia, was killed while fighting on Saparua Island, Maluku province.
According to the Department of Manpower, the number of working children increased from approximately 2 million before the economic downturn began in 1997 to an estimated 2.5 million in mid-1999. Children's advocates and labor analysts agree that the number of working children has increased significantly due to the downturn, but contend that the number of working children was higher than the Government's estimate even before the downturn, and has increased significantly since 1997 (see Section 6.d.). The ILO estimated that between 6 and 8 million children worked during 2000, and World Vision, an international NGO, estimated that there were 6.5 million children working in the country. It is estimated that millions of girls work as live-in domestic servants (see Section 6.d.).
According to a study, there are about 170,000 street children in 12 urban areas. Of these, about 20 percent are girls. At least 60 percent of the street children polled were not enrolled in school. There were about 10,000 street children in Jakarta. Medan, Bandung, Surabaya, Makassar (Ujung Pandang), and Yogyakarta are other cities with substantial populations of street children. Of the 1,600 street children living in Yogyakarta, about 25 percent are girls. Many of them are victims of sexual abuse or are engaged in prostitution. Another NGO survey suggests that there are at least 100,000 street children and 6 million abandoned children in the country.
Street children sell newspapers, shine shoes, help to park or watch cars, and otherwise attempt to earn money. Many street children work under hazardous conditions as scavengers, garbage pickers, and on fishing platforms and fishing boats. According to credible sources, there are hundreds, perhaps over 1,000 children working in hazardous conditions on fishing platforms off the east coast of North Sumatra (see Section 6.c.). Many thousands of children work in factories and fields (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
A number of local and international NGO's work with street children. NGO's have criticized the Government's inadequate efforts to help street children and working children. The Government works in cooperation with the U.N. Development Program, UNICEF, the ILO, and with NGO's to create programs for street children and child laborers. One project includes the establishment of "open houses" in targeted areas to provide vocational training and basic education to street children. Open houses for street children have been established in several provinces. The Indonesian Children's Welfare Foundation reports that 100 open houses have been established.
Another approach to the problem of street children is the National Program for Discipline and Clean Cities Decree. Under this program, street children are removed physically from cities by bus. Usually, they are taken outside the city and left there. Sometimes they are taken to "holding houses" where they first are interrogated and later released. NGO's criticize this practice as ineffective and inhumane.
Child abuse is not prohibited specifically by law. According to Unicef's 2000 report, close family members frequently discipline children; however, there are no reliable sources for violence within families. Governmental efforts to combat child abuse have been slow and ineffective due to cultural sensitivities, lack of monitoring mechanisms and verification procedures regarding child abuse.
In September 2000, a network of illegal baby adoptions was uncovered by the authorities. Four persons were arrested and three babies were rescued and used as evidence. The babies allegedly were bought from low-income families and were sold to wealthy infertile couples.
Child prostitution (see Section 6.f.) and other sexual abuses occur, but firm data are lacking. Police continue to uncover syndicates involved in trafficking girls to work in brothels on various islands or in other countries (see Section 6.f.). According to a 1998 NGO study, there were 406 cases of child abuse that year, 900 to 1,200 cases of child rape, and 40,000 to 70,000 cases of other sexual abuse against children.
There is no separate criminal justice system for juveniles. Ordinary courts handle juvenile crime, and juveniles often are imprisoned with adult offenders. A Juvenile Justice Law was passed by Parliament in 1996 and was signed by then-President Soeharto in 1997. It defines juveniles as children between the ages of 8 and 18 and establishes a special court system and criminal code to handle juvenile cases; however, it has not been implemented. An estimated 400,000 children are brought to court annually, according to UNICEF statistics. Sixty percent of the children are involved in petty crimes such as theft. Areas with the highest reported incidences of juvenile crime are Java, including Jakarta (7,281), South Sumatra (1,336 cases), and North Sumatra (994).
Persons with Disabilities
There is some discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, and in the provision of other state services. The law mandates access to buildings for persons with disabilities; however, the Government generally does not enforce these provisions in practice. Precise statistics on the number of persons with disabilities in the country are not available. In 1999 the U.N. estimated that about 5.43 percent of the population (about 10 million persons) were persons with disabilities, while the Government estimated that 3 percent of the population (6 million persons) were persons with disabilities. Families often hide family members with disabilities to avoid social stigma or embarrassment. Several provinces have established rehabilitation centers for persons with disabilities. Authorities reportedly take persons with disabilities off the streets and bring them to these centers for job training. Nevertheless, many citizens with disabilities citizens beg for a living.
The Constitution requires that the Government provide care for orphans and persons with disabilities; however, it does not specify the definition of the term "care", and the provision of education to all children with mental and physical disabilities never has been inferred from the requirement. Regulations require the Government to establish and regulate a national curriculum for special education by stipulating that the community should provide special education services to its children.
According to a 2000 UNICEF report in 2000, there are approximately 2 million children with disabilities between the ages of 10 and 14. Law No. 4/1997 on Disability and Government Regulation No. 72 on Special Education stipulate that every child with disabilities has the right to access to all levels and types of education and rehabilitative treatment as necessary. However, this does not occur in practice. NGO's are the primary providers of education for children with disabilities. There are 1,084 schools for persons with disabilities; 680 are private and 404 are government-operated. Of the government schools, 165 are "integrated," serving both regular and special education students. In Jakarta there are 98 schools for persons with disabilities, 2 of which are government-operated and 96 of which are private. The Government also runs three national schools for the visually and hearing impaired, and persons with mental disabilities. These schools accept children from throughout the country.
The Disability Law was designed to provide access to education, employment, and assistance for persons with disabilities. It requires companies employing over 100 persons to give 1 percent of their positions to persons with disabilities. However, persons with disabilities face considerable discrimination in employment, although some factories have made special efforts to hire workers with disabilities. The law mandates accessibility to public facilities for persons with disabilities; however, virtually no buildings or public transportation provide such accessibility.
Indigenous People
The Government considers the term "indigenous people" to be a misnomer, because it considers all citizens except ethnic Chinese to be indigenous. Nonetheless, it publicly recognizes the existence of several "isolated communities," and their right to participate fully in political and social life. The Government estimates that the number of persons in isolated communities is 1.5 million. This includes, but is not limited to, groups such as the Dayak population in Kalimantan, some of whom live in remote forest areas, indigenous communities located throughout Papua, and economically disadvantaged families living as sea nomads on boats near Riau in eastern Sumatra and near Makassar (Ujung Pandang) in southern Sulawesi. In October the Government passed the Papua Special Autonomy Law, which had not come into effect by year's end. The law provides indigenous tribes the right to protect and maintain their customs and laws, and significant participation by tribes in the government and economy of Papua. Human rights monitors criticize the Government's transmigration program for violating the rights of indigenous people (see Section 1.f.) and for encouraging exploitation of natural resources upon which indigenous people depend for their livelihood.
Sixty percent of the country's population of over 200 million lives in Java, which represents only 7 percent of the country's territory. The government-sponsored transmigration program seeks to resettle persons from densely populated areas to sparsely populated areas outside Java (see Section 1.f). The majority of migrants are spontaneous migrants who are not part of the official program.
Critics of transmigration claim that it often threatens indigenous cultures and causes social resentment. Some critics claim that transmigration has been used as a political tool to increase the number of nonindigenous persons in certain areas in part to preclude secessionist movements by indigenous people. In some areas, such as in certain parts of Sulawesi, the Moluccas, Kalimantan, Aceh, and Papua, relations between transmigrants and indigenous people are hostile. NGO's also report tensions between transmigrated Javanese and indigenous populations in the Mentawai Islands off the west coast of Sumatra. Indigenous groups often claim that they receive less government support and funding than transmigrants, and transmigrants claim that in some cases they are moved to areas with undesirable land and inadequate infrastructure. Transmigrants sometimes are settled on land who ownership is disputed.
Acute tensions continued in West and Central Kalimantan between the indigenous Dayak and Madurese migrants over land disputes, economic competition, and cultural differences (see Section 1.a.). The Madurese community in Kalimantan developed around an earlier group of transmigrants, although the majority of Madurese in the area are spontaneous immigrants. An estimated 40,000 Madurese remain in camps in West Kalimantan and over 105,000 Madurese were forced to evacuate to East Java and Madura Island after over 600 died in ethnic violence in February and March.
Land disputes are a major source of tension throughout the country, particularly in many sparsely populated resource-rich areas traditionally inhabited by indigenous people. The tension often is expressed along racial and ethnic lines because developers frequently are ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Land disputes represent the largest category of complaints submitted to the National Human Rights Commission and a significant portion of the cases brought to legal aid foundations and other assistance organizations. According to a law derived from colonial era practices, all subsurface mineral resources belong to the Government. The Basic Agrarian Law states that land rights cannot be "in conflict with national and state interests," which provides the Government with a broad legal basis for land seizures. When disputes cannot be settled, the Government has the authority to define fair compensation for land.
However, in practice compensation for the land often is minimal or even nonexistent. Decisions regarding development projects, resource-use concessions, and other economic activities generally are carried out without the participation or informed consent of the affected communities. When indigenous people clash with those promoting private sector development projects, the developers almost always prevail. There are numerous instances of the use of intimidation, sometimes by the military, and often by hired "thugs," to acquire land for development projects, particularly in areas claimed by indigenous people. Such intimidation has been used in Jakarta, other parts of Java, North Sumatra, Aceh, and other areas. According to credible sources in West Sumatra, large tracts of land in the province have been confiscated over the past several years by commercial plantation developers who bribed the local governor. In some cases, NGO's report that farmers were evicted from the land without compensation to allow for new palm oil plantations staffed by Javanese transmigrants. Competition for land and resources remains acute in Sumatra. Some NGO's that seek to aid these communities are subjected to verbal attacks, raids, and other forms of intimidation by government security forces. Since 1999 NGO's have been more vocal and effective in lobbying for indigenous people's rights.
NGO's assert that violations of the rights of indigenous people are frequent in the mining and logging areas, and that violations stem from the Government's denial of ownership by indigenous people of ancestral land, erosion of indigenous groups' traditional social structure, and forced takeover of land. These problems are most prevalent in Papua, where disputes over compensation for logging resources led to several violent incidents between locals and logging companies (see Section 1.a.).
In Southeast Sulawesi, the Moronene people have been struggling for more than 40 years to secure government recognition of their claim to ancestral lands in what is now Rawa Aopa Watumohai National Park. The Government insists, on the basis of the 1999 Forestry Law, that the Moronene people must resettle on land outside the park. In September 2000, they reached agreement with the local government that they would be allowed to remain on their lands until a court decided the merits of their claim. However, from November 23 to 25, 2000, approximately 70 security personnel sought to evict the Moronene from the park. The security team, which consisted of local police, Brimob members, and forest police and officials, reportedly destroyed 23 homes in the 3 villages of Hukaea-Laeya, Lampopola, and Lanowulu. At year's end, the Moronene still were living in Hukaea-Laeya village, but they feared further destruction of their settlements since the Government has not changed its position that they must leave.
Bonded labor has become a problem for some Dayaks in East Kalimantan (see Section 6.c.). According to the ILO in 2000, on at least one project, a logging company established a company store in a remote area, in which workers had to purchase necessities at inflated prices. Since the workers could not afford the prices, they bought the goods using vouchers representing future wages, thereby, according to the ILO, "turning once independent and relatively well-off farmers into impoverished bonded laborers trapped in an ever-mounting cycle of debt."
Tensions with indigenous people in Papua continued. Papuans complain of racism, religious bias, paternalism, and condescension as constant impediments to better relations with non-Papuans, including members of the Government, the military, and the non-Papuan business community. A large percentage of the population of Papua consists of migrants, who are economically and politically dominant. Most civil servants in local governments in Papua and other isolated areas continue to come primarily from other parts of the country, rather than from the local indigenous population. Tensions between Papuans and migrants continued during the year, particularly after Papuans killed 24 migrants in Wamena on October 6 and 7, 2000, after security forces opened fire on Papuans who resisted efforts to take down Papuan independence flags (see Sections 1.a. and 2.a.). The attack caused an exodus of several thousand migrants from the Wamena area and from Papua (see Section 2.d.). In 2000 Papuans and migrants clashed again in Merauke in early November and December 2000 and at the Abepura market area in Jayapura from November 11 to 13, 2000 resulting in injuries on both sides and the burning or looting of migrant shops. Unknown attackers killed two police and a security guard in Abepura, Papua, on December 7, 2000 and two timber workers near the Papua-Papua New Guinea border on December 9, 2000. Police blamed both attacks on the Free Papua Organization (OPM) (see Section 1.a.).
Since 1999 Papuans have asserted themselves politically to a greater extent than in the past. Beginning in late 1999, Papuan political figures and traditional tribal organizations began forming Papuan "task forces" (Satgas Papua). In February 2000, Papuan community and tribal leaders organized a "great consultation" of Papuan leaders to set an agenda for self-government and designate a Papuan Presidium Council to speak on behalf of Papuans. The consultation's closing statement called for the holding of a congress comprised of the entire Papuan community. The congress was held from May 29 through June 4 2000 in Jayapura, and involved more than 2,000 delegates from each of Papua's districts, other parts of the country, and the Papuan community overseas. Delegates approved a resolution rejecting the 1969 "Act of Free Choice," which confirmed Papua's incorporation into Indonesia; called on the central Government, along with the U.N. and the U.S. and Dutch governments, to review the process by which the territory became a part of Indonesia and to recognize Papua's sovereignty since 1961; and mandated the Papuan Presidium Council to strive for international recognition and to report back to the congress on December 1 2000, regarding progress toward these goals. On December 1, 2000, Presidium leaders led a peaceful commemoration of the 1961 declaration of independence by Papuan community leaders, then under Dutch rule. Presidium vice chairman Tom Beanal recounted the Presidium's efforts since the Papuan Congress to start a dialog with Jakarta, and appealed for calm. The day was observed peacefully in most parts of Papua. In 2000 Presidium Council leaders traveled throughout the province to publicize the results of the congress, regularly met with government officials in Jakarta, and journeyed to other countries to advance the Papuan cause.
The Government initially responded to Papuan initiatives by welcoming the call for dialog and offering special autonomy within the context of a united Indonesia. Then-President Wahid met several times with Papuan leaders and visited Papua on December 31, 1999 and January 1, 2000, when he announced that the name of the province would be changed to Papua. Then-Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri visited the province in May and September 2000, and then-President Wahid provided $110,000 (Rp. 1 billion) for the holding of the Papuan congress. After the congress, he met with Presidium Council leaders and reemphasized the Government's firm stance against Papuan independence, but said it was permissible to fly Papuan independence flags as long as they were smaller and flown below the Indonesian flag. However, during the August 2000 MPR session, legislators attacked Wahid's stance toward Papuans and demanded a tougher approach that rejected the flying of the independence flag, the use of the name Papua, and other perceived manifestations of proindependence sentiment. In late September 2000, new National Police Chief Suryo Bimantoro ordered all Papuan independence flags to be taken down. Police attempts to remove forcibly flags in Wamena on October 6, 2000, Merauke on November 4, 2000 and December 2, 2000, and Fak Fank on December 1, 2000 sparked violent clashes with Satgas Papua members, resulting in many deaths and heightened tensions between Papuans and non-Papuan migrants (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). After Papuans attacked a police station in Jayapura on December 7, 2000, police shot and killed a student at a nearby dormitory and detained and beat more than 100 others, 2 of whom died as a result of the beatings. Police revived criminal charges against five leading members of the Papuan Presidium Council for crimes against the security of the State and public order in November 2000 (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.). Police encouragement of the formation of migrant "solidarity" organizations, and the arming of some of those organizations by security forces, also sharpened divisions between the two communities. Moreover, the creation of an armed "Red and White Task Force" (Satgas Merah Putih) in Papua, reportedly at the instigation of the army, has raised concerns that certain elements of the national security forces may be seeking to create an armed Papuan paramilitary force, modeled on East Timorese militias, to oppose Papuan independence efforts, and to oppose specifically, the Satgas Papua groups, the vast majority of which were considered proindependence, and which were disbanded in late 2000.
The Papua Special Autonomy Law was signed into law in November, but by year's end had not come into effect. A March conference debated whether to pursue independence or special autonomy, resulting in numerous meetings with local communities to explain autonomy and solicit input. A special team was established in Jakarta to lobby Parliament and the administration and explain the intent and background of the Papuan Special Autonomy Law. This effort was effective in convincing the Parliamentary Special Committee to use the Papuan draft as the basis for the final law. Most of the provisions in the Papuan version survived largely intact in the final text, including permission to rename the province Papua and permission for a Papuan flag and anthem. The laws provisions include: acknowledgement of the Government's shortcomings in governing Papua; acknowledgement of the special cultural identity of Papuans and recognition of indigenous rights; establishment of a Human Rights Commission to clarify the history of Papua; redirection a large percentage of local revenues from the central government to the province; and a stipulation that the provincial government has authority in all fields, except foreign policy, defense, monetary and fiscal policy, religion, and justice.
Security forces did not obstruct political activities related to the Papuan Special Autonomy Law; however, they did sporadically enforce a no-tolerance policy on flying the Papuan flag, until the Special Autonomy Bill passed Parliament, after which time security forces allowed the flying of the flag. Security forces targeted separatist groups in attacks in Ilaga and Kali Kopi (see Section 1.a.).
Religious Minorities
Despite constitutional and legal provisions regarding freedom of religion, there are some restrictions on certain types of religious activity and on unrecognized religions. Closures and attacks on churches, temples, and other religious facilities, ranging from minor vandalism to arson, continued during the year, according to the Indonesian Christian Communications Forum (ICCF). The ICCF recorded 235 religiously motivated attacks on Christian churches or other Christian facilities from October 1999 through September 2001. The Ministry of Religion estimates that 181 mosques were damaged or destroyed during the year. The largest number of attacks on persons and places of worship occurred in 2000 in Maluku and Central Sulawesi provinces in the eastern part of the country, causing more than 3,000 deaths, the displacement of nearly 500,000 persons, and damage to at least 81 churches and dozens of mosques (see Sections 1.a., 2.c., and 2.d.).
Attacks on places of worship reflect religious tensions, but other contributing factors include underlying socioeconomic and political tensions between poor Muslims and more affluent Sino-Indonesian Christians. Similarly, in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi, economic tensions between native Christians and Muslims who migrated to these areas in recent decades were a significant factor in incidents of interreligious violence. Christian and Muslim communities in these provinces blamed each other for initiating and perpetuating the violence.
The Government failed to suppress or respond to most cases of violence, and did not resolve fully the many cases of attacks on religious facilities and churches that occurred during riots; in other cases, the Government did not investigate such incidents at all (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
Anti-Christian sermons and publications also increased, leading to concerns that societal support for religious tolerance was eroding. Muslim University students in Makassar, South Sulawesi severely beat four non-Muslims in October, after hearing that residents of a prodomendity Christian town, Tondano, had burned an effigy of Usama bin Ladin. The following day, Muslim students in Makassar severely beat two other non-Muslims. In 2000 a movement known as the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) emerged on university campuses in Java. There were sporadic reports from some neighborhoods of Jakarta that student followers of the NII movement set up roadblocks, checked identification cards, and harassed passing non-Muslims, in some cases forcing them to recite passages from the Koran. Similar incidents occurred in Makassar, South Sulawesi. Many of the country's religious minorities expressed growing concern over what they perceived to be increasing demands by certain Muslim groups to impose Shari'a law in the country. A proposal to implement Islamic law in 2000 failed (see Section 2.c.); however, Islamic law sometimes is implemented in communities, especially in Aceh. The regional autonomy plan in Aceh recognizes Islamic law as the local law there.
The Laskar Jihad ("holy war troops," a Muslim group that was formed in 2000) engaged in paramilitary training, and leaders of the group announced that they intended to wage war on Christians in the Moluccas and other parts of the country. An upswelling of killings occurred in Central Sulawesi in November and December, apparently spurred by Laskar Jihad militants. Tens of thousands of Christians fled their homes, as villages were attacked and in some cases burned to the ground. However, the Government moved in troops, who were able to quell the violence. By year's end, a peace agreement had been negotiated under government auspices; however, Laskar Jihad had not been removed from the area (see Section 1.a.).
Between June 2000 and July, thousands of persons were killed in violence between Muslims and Christians (see Section 2.c.). Local sources estimate that over 3,000 Laskar Jihad militia participated in attacks on Christians in Maluku Province and Central Sulawesi during the year. Police arrested Laskar Jihad leader Jafar Umar Thalib on May 4 on charges of inciting religious violence and ordering the killing by stoning of a follower, Abdullah. Police released Thalib on June 12, but placed him under house arrest pending further investigation.
In late December 2000, then-President Wahid conceded that hundreds of Christians on Keswui and Teor Islands in Maluku had converted to Islam in November and December 2000 to save their lives. By year's end, only an estimated 165 converts had been able to leave the 2 islands. There also were credible reports of forced conversions occurring in other parts of Maluku and North Maluku. Estimates range from over 3,500 to 8,000 cases. While most documented cases involve Christians who converted to Islam, there have been reports of Muslims who were forced to convert to Christianity in Halmahera, North Maluku.
Christian IDP's from Keswui and Teor who had undergone conversion said in media interviews that Muslim militants told Christians to convert to Islam or face probable death at the hands of Muslim militias. According to these sources, Christians were herded into mosques and converted to Islam en masse. Both male and female converts later were forced to undergo circumcision to prove that they were genuine Muslims, despite the fact that Muslim women in Maluku were not customarily circumcised.
A number of bombings and bombing attempts primarily targeted against Christian facilities occurred throughout the year, including at the Santa Anna Catholic Church in Jakarta on July 22. The bombing injured at least 70 persons, including a 7-month old infant and a 4-year old girl. Police accused 13 persons whom police arrested in September in connection with a mall bombing. On December 31, simultaneous bomb explosions damaged three churches near Palu; however, no persons were injured. A number of other bombings also occurred during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
Muslims are a religious minority in the easternmost province of Papua. Local sentiment against the efforts of Muslim missionaries to win converts in the predominantly Christian province, as well as resentment of the arrival in the province of mainly Muslim migrants from other parts of the country, has in the past led to attacks on mosques in Papua. However, there were no reports of attacks on mosques in Papua during the year.
In May a crowd of Muslims reportedly expelled two Baha'i families living in predominately Muslim villages in Central Sulawesi (see Section 2.c.).
During the year there were occasional reports of killings of persons who practice traditional magic ("dukun santets") (see Section 1.a.) in East, Central, and West Java. The number of such killings is believed to have declined since 1998, when nearly 200 such persons were killed in East Java, and since 1999, when more than 30 persons, believed to be dukun santet were killed in West Java.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The Government officially promotes racial and ethnic tolerance. Ethnic Chinese, who represent approximately 3 percent of the population--by far the largest nonindigenous minority group--historically have played a major role in the economy. In 1998 anti-Chinese sentiment led to serious and widespread attacks on Chinese-owned businesses. Despite the Wahid Government's commitment to reopen the investigation into these attacks, the Megawati government has failed to pursue the 1999 recommendations of the joint fact-finding team (TGPF) that was commissioned to investigate the 1998 attacks (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 4).
Racially motivated attacks against Sino-Indonesians have dropped sharply since mid-1998, although Sino-Indonesians continued to report instances of discrimination and harassment.
An undetermined number of Sino-Indonesians remain abroad or away from their normal places of residence in the country. While many reside in Singapore, there also are sizeable Sino-Indonesian populations in Australia and the U.S. Prominent Sino-Indonesians estimate that approximately half of the Sino-Indonesian men living abroad occasionally return to their homes for short visits to protect their remaining business interests, but most keep their families and the bulk of their capital offshore or in other parts of the country.
With the revocation of Presidential Decree 14/1967 in January 2000, Confucianism may be practiced in public and the law no longer forbids the celebration of the Chinese New Year in temples or public places (see Section 2.c.). Chinese New Year decorations are displayed prominently and sold in public shopping areas in several major cities. The Chinese language may be taught, spoken, and printed, and private instruction in Chinese no longer is prohibited. Some universities, including the University of Indonesia, offer Chinese-language instruction. A number of private institutions openly offer courses as well. Chinese-language publications in the country no longer are banned; however, customs regulations still prohibit the import of Chinese language publications and music (see Section 2.a.). State universities still have informal quotas that limit the enrollment of ethnic Chinese students.
Authorities no longer are required to note a special code on the national identification card for citizens of Chinese extraction. However, some Sino-Indonesians have claimed that this practice continues.
Noncitizen ethnic Chinese may not operate businesses in rural areas; however, the Government does not restrict this right for Sino-Indonesians.
Indigenous residents of Papua and various human rights groups charge that Papuans are underrepresented in the civil service in that province. The Government has made some efforts to recruit more civil servants in Papua, and there has been some increase in the number of civil servant trainees in this province, despite a "no growth" policy in the civil service as a whole.
In Kalimantan indigenous Dayaks claim that they are not considered in civil service jobs, and that they are marginalized in many other economic sectors by transmigrants. This led to recurrences of interethnic conflict in Central and West Kalimantan in which hundreds of indigenous Dayaks were killed (see Section 1.a.). In addition, Africans form a disproportionately large percentage of those killed while being arrested, suggesting that such killings are racially motivated.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The law provides that 10 or more workers have the right to form a union. Union membership must be open to all regardless of political affiliation, religion, ethnicity, or gender. Private sector workers are by law free to form worker organizations without prior authorization, and unions may draw up their own constitutions and rules and elect their representatives. In addition the law provides that union dues must finance union activities, but does not indicate how dues should be collected or whether management has a role in collecting dues.
Employers criticize the act's provision permitting any 10 workers to form a union. Employers claim that this provision encourages the creation of too many unions, which they say complicates collective bargaining and increases the possibility of strikes.
Under the law and registration regulations, more than 20 new or previously unrecognized union federations have notified the Department of Manpower of their existence since 1998, and thousands of workplace-level units have registered with the Department of Manpower, although some unions have complained of difficulty in registering their workplace units.
The Federation of All-Indonesian Trade Unions (SPSI), which was formed by the merger (under the Government's direction) of labor organizations in 1973, is the oldest trade union organization. The head of the SPSI and many members of the executive council also are members of the Golkar political organization and its constituent functional groups. The Department of Manpower, whose minister is the leader of the SPSI, does not intervene in organizational disputes within trade unions nor provides guidance to any unions.
The law allows the Government to petition the courts to dissolve a union if its basis conflicts with Pancasila or the 1945 constitution, or if a union's leaders or members, in the name of the union, commit crimes against the security of the State and are sentenced to at least 5 years in prison. Once a union is dissolved, its leaders and members may not form another union for at least 3 years after the original union's dissolution.
The law does not address the adjudication of jurisdictional disputes among multiple unions in a workplace, and existing laws and regulations do not provide clear guidance on how jurisdictional disputes should be handled. Such ambiguity occasionally has led to clashes between unions in a workplace.
Since 1999 civil servants have not been required to belong to KORPRI, a nonunion association. Employees of several government departments announced that they would form their own employee associations, and union organizations began to seek members among civil servants. Unions also are seeking to organize state-owned enterprise (SOE) employees, defined to include those working in enterprises in which the State has at least 5-percent ownership, although they have encountered some resistance from enterprise management, and the legal basis for registering unions in SOE's remains unclear. Teachers must belong to the Teachers' Association (PGRI). While technically classified as a union, the PGRI continues to function more as a welfare organization and does not appear to have engaged in trade union activities such as collective bargaining. Some groups of teachers have formed unofficial unions outside the PGRI. Other teachers have gone on strike for better wages and allowances, a rare and technically illegal action for teachers. For instance, in September public school teachers in Atambua, Lampung, Bandung, Banjarmasin, Gorontalo, went on strike over back pay owed to them. The central Government claimed that it had allocated funds for back pay to regional administrations as part of the new autonomy law, but several local administrations claimed that they never received the funds. Mandatory PGRI contributions are deducted automatically from teachers' salaries.
A regulation requires that police be notified of all meetings of five or more persons of all organizations outside offices or normal work sites. The regulation applies to union meetings. The police periodically show up uninvited at labor seminars and union meetings, which can have an intimidating effect.
All organized workers except civil servants have the legal right to strike. State enterprise employees and teachers rarely exercise this right, but private sector strikes are frequent. Before a strike legally may occur in the private sector, the law requires intensive mediation by the Department of Manpower and prior notice of the intent to strike; however, no approval is required. In practice dispute settlement procedures rarely are followed, and formal notice of the intent to strike rarely is given, because Department of Manpower procedures are slow and have little credibility among workers. Therefore, sudden strikes usually result from longstanding grievances, attempts by employers to prevent the formation of union branches, or denial of legally mandated benefits or rights.
Strikes frequently occurred during the year across a wide range of industries and occasionally were protracted. A series of strikes affecting a number of cities, including Bandung, Gresik, and Surabaya, occurred in June over the repeal of Manpower Ministry Decree 150 on severance pay. A number of factories in Bandung were damaged by strikers. In July and October, 9,000 workers at state aircraft manufacturer P.T. Dirgantara Indonesia went on strike to protest the firing of the chairman and secretary of their union and demanded threefold salary increases. The managing director said that the two officials were fired for organizing a series of demonstrations and strikes. Union leaders met with the Manpower Minister in October and December and the parties agreed to a gradual increase in basic pay as a proportion of the take home pay. Labor activist Ngadinah, an employee of a company that produces shoes, was acquitted on August 30 charges that she committed violence against the authorities, and of offensive, violent, or unpleasant conduct. According to the complaint filed by her employer, P.T. Panarub, she helped 8,000 workers stage a massive strike for better wages from September 8 to 11, 2000. Prior to the trial, she was detained for 2 weeks and harassed by the State Minister (see Section 1.d.).
Most strikes were conducted and resolved peacefully; however, some strikes became violent and persons were killed. On March 29, 2 strikers were killed and 10 others injured when mobs attacked a car upholstery company. Military officers inside the compound and police near the upholstery factory did not intervene.
Some unions claimed that strike leaders were singled out for layoffs when companies downsized. In several cases workers damaged property and intimidated nonstriking workers, and there were disputes among different unions represented in the same company. In most cases, workers were not arrested for these actions. Groups claiming to represent labor also at times resorted to violence. For example, in September thousands of teachers in Bandar Lampung, who tried to enter the office of the mayor, clashed with security forces.
The SPSI maintains international contacts but its only international trade union affiliation as a federation is with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Trade Union Council. Some of the SPSI's federated unions are members of international trade secretariats. The SBSI is affiliated with the World Confederation of Labor and some international trade union secretariats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is provided for by law, and the Department of Manpower promotes it within the context of the national ideology, Pancasila. Until 1994 only recognized trade unions--the SPSI and its components--could engage legally in collective bargaining. By issuing new regulations on union registration and enacting the trade union law, the Government allows for new workers' organizations that register with the Government to conclude legally binding agreements with employers. The act stipulates that if there is more than one union in a company negotiating a collective work agreement, the agreement that gains the support of more than half of the total number of workers in the company would apply to all the workers in the company. If the agreement does not have the support of more than half of the total workers, it would only apply to those who support it.
In companies without unions, the Government discourages workers from utilizing nongovernment outside assistance, such as, during consultations with employers over company regulations. Instead, the Department of Manpower prefers that workers seek its assistance and states that its role is to protect workers. However, there are credible reports that for many companies, consultations are perfunctory at best and usually only occur with management-selected workers; however, there also are credible reports to the contrary from foreign companies. According to government statistics, approximately 80 percent of the factory-level SPSI units have collective bargaining agreements. The degree to which these agreements are negotiated freely between unions and management without government interference varies. By regulation negotiations must be concluded within 30 days or be submitted to the Department of Manpower for mediation and conciliation or arbitration. Most negotiations are concluded within the 30-day period. Agreements are for 2 years and can be extended for 1 year.
According to NGO's involved in labor issues, in practice the provisions of collective bargaining agreements rarely go beyond the legal minimum standards established by the Government, and the agreements often merely are presented to worker representatives for signature rather than negotiation. Although government regulations prohibit employers from discriminating against or harassing employees because of union membership, there are credible reports from union officials of employer retribution against union organizers, including firing workers, that is not prevented effectively or remedied in practice. Some employers reportedly have warned their employees against contact with union organizers. According to a November ILO interim report, management at the Shangri-La Hotel violated the principles of freedom of association when it dismissed 580 members of the Independent Worker's Union (SPMS) for striking in December 2000 (see Section 6.a.). The ILO report criticized the Government's overnight detention of 20 SPMS members in December 2000 for occupying the hotel lobby during the strike, and characterized the detention as "an obstacle to the exercise of trade union rights." In 2000 the SPSI documented 135 cases in which companies violated their workers' right to organize by intimidating, punishing, or firing SBSI members because of their affiliation with the union or because they attempted to organize SBSI units within their factories--a problem other labor organizations and activists have encountered in trying to form unions. In November 2000, police in East Kalimantan arrested Wuaya Kawilarang, a regional coordinator for the SBSI, for investigation of charges that he incited workers to violence. He was sentenced to 7 months' imprisonment and released during the year.
Regional and national labor dispute resolution committees adjudicate charges of antiunion discrimination, and their decisions may be appealed to the State Administrative Court. However, due to adverse decisions many union members believe that the dispute resolution committees generally favor employers. As a result, workers frequently present their grievances directly to the National Human Rights Commission, Parliament, and NGO's. Administrative decisions in favor of dismissed workers usually are monetary awards; workers rarely are reinstated. The law requires that employers obtain the approval of the labor dispute resolution committee before firing workers, but the law often is ignored in practice. A Manpower Bill under consideration during the year does not specify that management and the union or concerned worker must reach a consensus before a worker may be dismissed, and does not address government involvement, except to note that efforts to prevent termination would be determined by Ministerial Decree.
Since 1996 unions affiliated with the SPSI have been able to collect union dues directly through payroll deductions (the "checkoff" system) rather than having the Department of Manpower collect dues and transfer them to the SPSI. Implementation of this system remains uneven, but labor observers generally believe that it has given more authority to factory-level union units in which the checkoff system is practiced. Union officials at SPSI headquarters stated that not all local branches of the unions send a portion of dues collected to regional and central headquarters, as provided in the SPSI's bylaws. Unions other than the SPSI have alleged difficulties in getting companies to set up a checkoff system for their members. Unions report that on many occasions companies automatically deduct union dues for the SPSI from workers affiliated with other unions.
The police and the army continue to be involved in labor matters, although since the mid-1990's there has been a shift from open intervention and demonstrations of force by uniformed troops to less visible measures. On at least two occasions, security forces fired on striking workers in 2000 (see Section 6.a.). However, the most common form of military involvement in labor matters, according to union and NGO representatives, is a longstanding pattern of collusion between police and military personnel and employers, which usually takes the form of intimidation of workers by security personnel in civilian dress, or by youth gangs. The military also employs baiting tactics: infiltrating workers' ranks and encouraging protests or worker actions, and in some cases attempting to provoke a violent worker action, to which the military then forcefully responds. Employer and union representatives also have alleged "invisible costs" of corruption, which they and others estimate constitute up to 30 percent of a company's expenses. On June 8, individuals allegedly belonging to an Islamic organization ransacked the Asia Pacific Labor Solidarity Conference on Neoliberalism at Sawangan, Depok, West Java and reportedly injured some of the Indonesian participants. Police did not intervene to assist the participants, but instead broke up the conference and detained 2 local labor activists and 32 foreigners for questioning regarding possible immigration violations. Police claim that the foreigners had entered on visitor visas; however, this was inconsistent with the activities the police were conducting at the time. All those detained were released June 9, after immigration authorities examined their case.
On June 13, a mob of about 150 persons connected to the Golkar Party disrupted a ACILS workshop on grievance-handling in Samarinda, East Kalimantan. ACILS' Indonesian program officer was punched and kicked while trying to leave the hotel where the seminar was held. According to reliable sources, the mob arrived in military trucks, along with four police officer escorts. The police managed to stop the mob before they reached the conference room. However, police declined to take action against the perpetrators.
There are seven exporting processing zones (EPZ's) in the country. Batam Island, near Singapore, is the largest. Labor law applies in EPZ's and in the rest of the country, although nongovernmental observers believe that in practice enforcement of laws in EPZ's is weaker than in other areas.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law prohibits forced labor and the Government generally enforces this prohibition. The law also prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, the Government does not enforce this provision effectively, and forced and bonded labor by children is a problem. There also were instances of debt bondage of adults. According to the National Child Protection Commission, there are 1.6 million children between the ages of 10 and 14 forced to work, allegedly for of economic reasons. NGO's have estimated that as many as 3,000 once children worked on fishing platforms, known as "jermals," under inhumane and dangerous conditions; however, the number of children working on jermals has gone down. Most children work on jermals recruited from farming communities in inland regions and once they arrive at the work site, miles offshore, they are held as virtual prisoners and are not permitted to leave for at least 3 months or until a replacement worker can be found. They live in isolation on the sea on platforms the size of basketball courts, work 12 to 20 hours per day in dangerous conditions, and sleep in the workspace with no access to sanitary facilities or schooling. There are reports of physical, verbal, and sexual abuse of such children. The law prohibits the hiring of persons under the age of 14 on fishing platforms. Jermals operate under the paid protection of national naval vessels; the navy reportedly has a financial interest in some jermals.
According to the ILO, the number of jermals off North Sumatra has fallen to fewer than 200 due to the combined impact of destruction due to poor construction and the impact of NGO child protection projects. About one third of these jermals have child laborers. In 1999 the Government stopped issuing permits to build new jermals, and announced plans to remove children physically from the jermals and provide them with educational and economic alternatives. Unfortunately, many of the children who used to work on jermals have founds jobs in dangerous condition in agriculture, according to the ILO.
In East Kalimantan a logging company reportedly traps Dayak laborers in a cycle of debt and turns them into bonded laborers (see Section 5).
The country is a source, transit point, and destination for trafficking in women and children, in some cases for forced labor (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
Labor law prohibits children under the age of 15 from working more than 4 hours per day, but an estimated 6 to 8 million children meet or exceed this daily limit. The law prohibits children from working in hazardous sectors, including maritime, plantation, construction, slaughterhouse, textile, leatherworking, entertainment, and manufacturing activities involving the use of hazardous materials and pollutants. Government enforcement of child labor laws is weak or nonexistent. There were no significant government efforts to strengthen enforcement during the year.
Despite legislative and regulatory measures, most children continued to work in unregulated environments, including domestic work. Although the ILO has sponsored training of labor inspectors on child labor matters under the International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), enforcement is weak or nonexistent. During the year, labor inspectors who had received the training had not removed any children from the workplace. According to Manpower Ministry officials, only 30 inspectors received child labor training during the year and with regional autonomy implemented in 2000, labor inspections fell under the jurisdiction of local governments, which did not train any child labor experts during the year.
The Government acknowledges that there is a class of children who must work for socioeconomic reasons, and in 1987 the Minister of Manpower issued a regulation on "Protection of Children Forced to Work." The regulation legalized the employment of children under the age of 14 who must work to contribute to the income of their families. It requires parental consent, prohibits dangerous or difficult work, limits work to 4 hours daily, and requires employers to report the number of children working under its provisions. It did not set a minimum age for children in this category.
According to the Department of Manpower, the number of working children increased from approximately 2 million before the economic downturn began in 1997 to an estimated 2.5 million by mid-1999. The State Bureau of Statistics (BPS) stated that 1.9 million children through age 14 were working in 1998. The ILO and the NGO World Vision argued that official estimates were too low, citing the fact that between 11 and 12 million school-age children (up to age 18) were not attending school, and a large number likely were involved in some form of work. The ILO estimated that between 6 and 8 million children worked, and over 3.4 million children work 10 hours of more per week. World Vision estimated that there were 6.5 million children working. Of these 6.5 million children, 4.1 million worked in the informal sector, and 2.4 million worked in the formal sectors. Other NGO's estimate that more than 10 percent of children worked more than 4 hours per day, and that over 35 percent of these children worked over 35 hours per week. Other NGO's estimate that 8.5 million school-age children are not enrolled in school and most are employed in the underground economy with no legal protection and poor compensation.
It is estimated that more children work in the informal sector than the formal sector, selling newspapers, shining shoes, helping to park or watch cars, and otherwise earning money. In cases in which children work in the formal sector, such work tends to fall between the informal and formal economies, including working alongside their parents in home enterprises and on plantations, and in family-owned shops and small factories, particularly those that are satellites of large industries. There are children working in large factories; however, the number is unknown, largely because documents verifying age are falsified easily. Some employers hire children because they are easier than adults to manage and less likely to organize or make demands on employers. Children working in factories usually work the same number of hours as adults. Children work in the rattan and wood furniture industries, the garment industry, the footwear industry, food processing, toy-making, and small mining operations, and other industries.
Other children, mostly girls, serve as live-in domestic servants. Many begin working when they are between 14 and 16 years old. Although accurate figures are unavailable, it is estimated that the number of child domestic workers is in the millions. Observers agree that this number began increasing in 1998 as a result of the economic downturn. One study conducted by Atma Jaya University in Jakarta estimated that there were at least 400,000 children under age 15 working as domestic servants in Jakarta alone. Most of them are not allowed to study or take academic courses. There are no regulations protecting domestic workers. These children work long hours, receive low pay, are on call 24 hours per day, generally are unaware of their rights, and often are far from their families.
Children are involved in a variety of hazardous work activities. In addition to those working on fishing platforms (see Section 6.c.), children perform piece work in small shoe factories (bengkels) where they are exposed to hazardous bleaches and glues. Thousands of other children work on rubber, sugarcane, tobacco, cocoa, and coffee plantations, often helping their parents meet stiff production quotas. Many companies employing adults condone the practice of children assisting their parents in the fields. Other children are employed in construction work, quarrying, gold and other types of mining, pearl diving, and forestry activities, many of which pose serious hazards. In 2000 the ILO called on the Government to stop the employment of up to 3,000 children in Central Kalimantan in gold mining. The media reported the use of mercury in Central Kalimantan gold mining, underscoring the danger posed to these children.
Some children work as scavengers in dumpsites. In the Bantar Gebang dumpsite in Bekasi (south of Jakarta), an NGO working with children there estimates that as many as 550 children ages 7 to 15 work at the dump to help their parents. Approximetely 74 percent of the children are under age 12. Children work long hours in extremely unsanitary conditions. Almost all of the children have health problems. In one survey, 84 percent of the children suffered from minor infections. NGO's have ongoing programs to teach children to avoid hazardous waste such as syringes and other potentially toxic waste.
It is believed that thousands of Muslim and Christian adolescent children in Maluku province have become soldiers and that younger children provide support services to the militas (see Section 5).
The country is a source, destination, and transit point for trafficking in children (see Section 6.f.).
The President issued a decree providing for the formation of a National Action Committee to Eliminate the Worst Forms of Child
Labor. The Committee met once in September. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but does not enforce this provision effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no national minimum wage. Rather, area wage councils working under the supervision of the National Wage Council establish minimum wages for regions and basic needs figures for each province--a monetary amount considered sufficient to enable a single worker to meet the basic needs of nutrition, clothing, and shelter. However, the minimum wage set by these councils, does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. After the minimum wage increases in April 2000, the monthly minimum wage in Jakarta was approximately $39 (Rp. 407,394), which is equal to 81 percent of the government-determined minimum living need for a single person, and down from 95 percent in 1997. On November 2, the Governor of Jakarta enforced a 38 percent increase in the monthly minimum wage to $55, effective January 2002. The average national minimum wage is approximately $24 per month (Rp. 230,000), although wages in the most heavily populated urban areas (Jakarta area, West Java, East Java, and North Sumatra), are significantly higher.
Labor law and ministerial regulations provide workers with a variety of other benefits, such as social security, and workers in more modern facilities often receive health benefits, free meals, and transportation.
The law establishes 7- or 8-hour workdays and a 40-hour workweek, with one 30-minute rest period for every 4 hours of work. Nevertheless, enforcement of minimum wage and other labor regulations remains inadequate, and sanctions are light.
The law also requires 1 day of rest weekly. The daily overtime rate is 1.5 times the normal hourly rate for the first hour and 2 times the hourly rate for additional overtime. Regulations allow employers to deviate from the normal work hours upon request to the Minister of Manpower and with the consent of the employee. Workers in industries that produce retail goods for export frequently work overtime to fulfill contract quotas. Observance of laws regulating benefits and labor standards varies between sectors and regions. Employer violations of legal requirements are fairly common and often result in strikes and employee protests. The Department of Manpower continues publicly to urge employers to comply with the law. However, in general, government enforcement and supervision of labor standards are weak.
Both law and regulations provide for minimum standards of industrial health and safety. Companies with more than 100 employees may obtain public recognition of their compliance with safety and health standards through a safety audit procedure. In the largely Western-operated oil sector, safety and health programs function reasonably well. However, in the country's 100,000 larger registered companies outside the oil sector, the quality of occupational health and safety programs varies greatly. The enforcement of health and safety standards is hampered severely by the limited number of qualified Department of Manpower inspectors, as well as by the low level of employee appreciation for sound health and safety practices. Allegations of corruption on the part of inspectors are common. Workers are obligated to report hazardous working conditions. Employers are forbidden by law from retaliating against those who do report, but the law is not enforced effectively. As a result, workers who remove themselves from hazardous working conditions may risk loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons
The law prohibits trafficking in persons; however, trafficking in persons is a serious problem. The country is a source, transit point, and destination for trafficking in persons for the purpose of prostitution and in some for forced labor. There are no government statistics on the number of persons trafficked; however, the Indonesian Women's Coalition for Justice and Democracy, a leading NGO advocating for antitrafficking legislation, believes that as many as 400,000 Indonesian women and children are trafficked each year. The ILO estimates that 21,000 children are working as prostitutes in the country.
Prostitution is not prohibited specifically by law and prostitution is widespread. Official statistics reported 75,106 registered prostitutes in 1999, up from 72,000 in 1995. However, NGO's estimate that there are as many as 1.3 million prostitutes in the country, 30 percent of whom may be under 16 years of age. NGO findings indicate a growing trend in child prostitution and sexual exploitation. A university professor estimates that about 150,000 children enter prostitution each year. The prevalence of child prostitutes appears to vary by region. According to an NGO study, approximately 15 percent of the prostitutes in parts of Central Java were between 16 and 20 years of age. In a seminar held in Batam in August, researchers reported that 50 percent of more than 1,800 sex workers whom they interviewed in 1998 were younger than 18 years of age. Other estimates suggest that as many as 6,000 sex workers in Batam are under age 18. An October NGO report found that trafficking in teenage girls from North Sumatra to Singapore and Malaysia was increasing. A growing number of children enter prostitution to help their families or to support drug habits. In September the ILO, in collaboration with the University of Indonesia's department of social welfare, published a preliminary study of trafficking trends in Jakarta, Batam (Sumatra), Medan (Sumatra), and Bali, that found that many girls entered prostitution after failed marriages they had entered when they were as young as 10 to 14 years old.
Some teenage prostitutes come from middle class families. Child prostitutes can earn $500 to $1,000 (about Rp. 4.7 to 9.4 million) per month, 10 to 20 times what an unskilled factory worker earns. The demand for young girls is increasing, as many clients seek young girls who are perceived to be less likely to carry HIV/AIDS.
While not documented thoroughly, the sex trade is believed widely to have increased sharply as women hurt by the economic downturn sought means of support for their families. Instances of families in rural areas of Java and Sumatra being forced by economic circumstances to "sell" their daughters to local men continued to be reported.
Kirsty Sword-Gusmao, the wife of East Timorese independence leader Xanana Gusmao, reported to the international press in November 2000, that 33 pregnant East Timorese women, who had returned to East Timor, claimed that they were abducted and forced to serve as sex slaves for the TNI in West Timor.
There are credible reports of trafficking in girls and women and of temporary "contract marriages" with foreigners in certain areas, such as West Kalimantan and Sumatra, although the extent of this practice is unclear. Many such marriages are not considered legal, and the children born from them are considered born out of wedlock. According to one report, poor Sino-Indonesian parents from Sinkawang, West Kalimantan, who were desperate for money and believed that their daughters would have a better future, have sold thousands of their daughters into contract marriages to Taiwanese men. Some of the girls were as young as 14 years old. If such marriages fail, the women have no legal recourse. According to one source, there were as many as 10,000 Sino-Indonesian women from Sinkawang living in Taiwan whose legal status was uncertain.
Police continue to uncover syndicates involved in trafficking young women and girls, many younger than age 18, to work in brothels on islands in Riau province, Jakarta, Bandung, and Surabaya (all in Java); Denpasar (Bali); Medan (Sumatra); Ambon (Maluku); Manado, Makassar, and Kendari (Sulawesi); and Jayapura, Sorong, and Merauke (Irian Jaya). Others are trafficked to Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan, and Australia. Many of the girls and women were hired under false pretenses. One tactic commonly employed is to offer young women in rural areas jobs as waitresses or hotel employees in distant regions, typically at island resorts. After the new recruits arrive at the site they learn that they have been recruited as sex workers. In some instances, women are held forcibly at brothels or are prevented from leaving an island. In other cases, the women have no option other than to accept the work because they lack money to travel and face other economic pressures. There also have been cases of boys involved in prostitution, especially in popular tourist destinations such as Bali and Lombok; at times such boys have been victims of trafficking, although the incidence reportedly is low.
According to the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), only about 750,000 out of 2 million citizens working abroad in any given year are undocumented. However, because many workers enter Malaysia and other countries without documentation and government methodology for making estimates is questionable, the estimate of 2 million is not reliable. In February the Government signed a joint labor statement with Bangladesh, India, and Nepal in a Bangkok session of the Regional Southeast Asia Trafficking Convention. The statement includes among its points the recognition that trafficking has become a part of the labor migration process.
Hundreds of thousands of women abroad work as domestic servants. According to Ministry of Manpower statistics, there were approximately 1.5 million registered workers employed abroad from 1994 to 1999, and almost 70 percent of these workers were female. Host countries include Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Korea, and the Persian Gulf states. Although the percentage of the total is very low, in numerous cases, these women were subjected to conditions that amounted to trafficking. Recruiting agencies at times abuse and hold captive women recruited to work abroad as domestic servants, even before such women depart the country. The most common allegations among women working abroad are that they are underpaid or not paid at all; extreme working conditions and severe physical and sexual abuse also are common claims. There have been numerous reports of mistreatment of Indonesian laborers, especially of women, in Saudi Arabia. On July 9, the Government imposed a moratorium on labor export to work in Saudi Arabia, in an effort to obtain Saudi Arabia's consent to sign a labor agreement that would provide legal protection to Indonesian workers and the Saudi government subsequently signed such an agreement; however, the moratorium was subsequently lifted 7 weeks later.
The Government, in response to negative publicity and NGO efforts, took steps to improve conditions for female migrant workers in the country and to improve consular protection for those working abroad; however, many women remain vulnerable. In contrast to NGO assertions, a consortium of labor recruiters insists that accounts of severe abuse of female migrant workers are exceptions to the norm.
While there are laws designed to protect children from sexual abuse, prostitution, and incest, the Government has made no special enforcement efforts in these areas. On September 24, the Foreign Minister signed U.N. Resolution 54/263 outlawing the sale of children and protecting children against prostitution. Nonetheless, government efforts to combat the problem are sporadic, relatively small-scale, and of limited effectiveness. In response to public pressure in 2000, the Jakarta city government closed down brothels in the red-light district of Kramat Tunggak in North Jakarta. Corrupt government officials, some of whom are involved in trafficking themselves, at times hinder enforcement efforts that compromise their financial interests. Moreover, NGO's allege that there still is considerable reluctance to acknowledge, both within society and the Government, that prostitution is a major industry.
Muslim religious groups reacted to perceived government inaction against prostitution by attempting to combat the problem themselves. Muslim groups' raids on and destruction of brothels and other venues allegedly involved in prostitution, including massage parlors, karaoke bars, and nightclubs, increased in frequency and in aggressiveness during the year (see Section 1.c.). However, the actions of the religious vigilante groups served to force prostitution further beyond the scrutiny of officials.
The economy, which is market-based with a significant degree of government intervention, increased by approximately 3 percent during the year, following more than 4.8 percent growth in 2000. Industrial exports grew strongly, particularly in labor-intensive textiles, electronics, wood products, and other light manufacturing industries based in the densely populated islands of Java and Bali. Underemployment remained high at approximately 19 million persons. Over 40 percent of the adult working population is employed in agriculture, which in Java, Bali, and southern Sulawesi primarily involves rice and other food crops but elsewhere concentrates on cash crops such as oil palm, rubber, coffee, tea, coconut, and spices. Per capita gross domestic product among the population of 211 million was $738 in 2000, well below the levels achieved before the severe economic downturn that began in July 1997. The downturn affected most severely the urban poor, particularly in Java, partly as a result of a wholesale shift in employment from the higher-paying formal sector to the less secure informal sector. The negative impact of the economic and financial downturn was smaller in less populated, natural resource-rich Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Sumatra. Large disparities in the distribution of wealth and political power contributed to social tensions across the country and continued to create demands for greater regional autonomy. Two laws providing for greater political and economic decentralization and for revenue sharing among the country's provinces and districts came into effect in January. Parliament approved the Aceh Special Autonomy Law in July and the Papua Special Autonomy Bill in October. The two provinces of Aceh and Papua were granted special autonomy, which affords them greater political, cultural, and economic benefits, including the right to retain a larger percentage of their oil and gas revenues.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it continued to commit serious abuses. Security forces were responsible for numerous instances of, at times indiscriminate, shooting of civilians, torture, rape, beatings and other abuse, and arbitrary detention in Aceh, West Timor, Papua (formerly known as Irian Jaya), and elsewhere in the country. TNI personnel often responded with indiscriminate violence after physical attacks on soldiers. They also continued to conduct "sweeps" that led to killing of civilians and property destruction. The Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS) reported that during the period between June 2000 and June 2001, police killed 740 persons. Despite the May 2000 agreement between the Government and the leaders of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to limit armed hostilities, military, police, and GAM forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings. Security forces in Papua assaulted, tortured, and killed persons during search operations for members of militant groups. The security forces inconsistently enforced a no-tolerance policy against flying the Papuan flag, tearing down and destroying flags and flag poles, and killing eight persons, and beating others who tried to raise or protect the flag prior to the signing into law of the Papua Special Autonomy Law, which permits the flying of the flag as a cultural symbol. There continued to be credible reports of the disappearance of civilians, KONTRAS reported 55 cases of forced disappearance between January 1 and September. The killers of two Achenese NGO activists, Jafar Siddiq Hamzah and Tengku Hashiruddin Daud, who had been abducted in 2000 and later found dead with indication of torture, had not been identified by year's end. Papuan independence leader Theys Eluay was kidnaped and killed in November. Crossborder raids into East Timor by East Timorese prointegration militias resident in West Timor, armed and largely supported by the army, diminished during the year as the Indonesian military withdrew its backing. Three Timorese who admitted killing three U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) workers in West Timor were brought to trial in Indonesia and charged with manslaughter instead of murder.
Security forces tortured and otherwise abused persons. Rapes and sexual exploitation by security forces continued to be a problem. Prison conditions are harsh. Security forces employed arbitrary arrest and detention without trial in Aceh. Despite initial steps toward reform, the judiciary remains subordinate to the executive, is corrupt, and does not always ensure due process. Security forces infringe on citizens' privacy rights. Security forces continued to intimidate and assault journalists. The Government places some controls on freedom of assembly; however, it allowed most demonstrations to proceed without hindrance except in Aceh and Papua. Security forces also brutally dispersed demonstrations on several occasions. The Government places some controls on freedom of association. There are some restrictions on certain types of religious activity and on unrecognized religions. The Government continues to restrict freedom of movement to a limited extent. Thousands of Acehnese residents fled their villages during conflicts between the security forces and separatists. Intercommunal conflict forced the relocation of hundreds of thousands of persons in Maluku and North Maluku in 2000 and during the year. In West Timor, the Government's failure to disarm and disband the East Timorese prointegration militias impeded the repatriation or resettlement of thousands of East Timorese IDP's during the first half of the year. During the latter part of the year, obstacles to repatriation were uncertainty about conditions in East Timor and unresolved problems with government pensions.
Domestic human rights organizations continued to play a significant role in advocating for improvements in human rights; however, at times security force members killed, abused, and detained human rights activists and humanitarian workers, most frequently in areas with active insurgencies. On March 29, security forces reportedly killed three human rights workers and left their bodies in a village in South Aceh. In June in Jakarta, police detained and threatened Non Governmental Organization (NGO) members before releasing them. Violence and discrimination against women are widespread problems. Child abuse and child prostitution are problems, and female genital mutilation (FGM) persists in some areas. Discrimination against persons with disabilities, indigenous persons, and religious and ethnic minorities also are widespread problems. Interreligious violence, particularly in the Moluccas, has claimed over 6,000 lives since the onset of hostilities in January 1999, and thousands of Christians in Maluku have been forced to convert to Islam: http://souisapaul81.blogspot.com.au/2012/05/arab-ideology-that-has-influenced.html
Discrimination against ethnic minorities persisted. Attacks against houses of worship continued, and the lack of an effective government response to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks led to allegations of official complicity in some of the incidents.
The Government continued to allow new trade unions to form and operate; however, enforcement of labor standards remains inconsistent and weak in some areas. Millions of children work, often under poor conditions. Forced and bonded child labor remains a problem, although the Government continued to take steps during the year to remove children from fishing platforms, on which bonded child labor most commonly occurs. Trafficking of persons into and from the country for the purpose of prostitution and sometimes for forced labor is a problem.
The Government was ineffective in deterring social, interethnic, and interreligious violence that accounted for the majority of deaths by violence during the year. Enforcement of the law against criminal violence deteriorated, resulting in religious groups purporting to uphold public morality, and mobs dispensing "street justice" operating with impunity.
In Aceh, armed separatists killed dozens of civil society leaders, academics, politicians and other local residents, as well as civil servants, police and soldiers. They also abducted and otherwise harassed such persons. GAM also targeted non-ethnic Acehnese residents of Aceh. On March 23, presumed GAM militants reportedly kidnaped and killed seven Javanese transmigrants. In June attackers believed to be GAM members, killed scores of Javanese and ethnic Gayo in Central Aceh. Ethnic clashes between Dayaks and Madurese transmigrants in February and March claimed 500 lives in Central Kalimantan, according to official sources.
In response to past abuses, joint civilian-military courts and various other investigative bodies continued to pursue cases involving army and police officers. Four military personnel and four civilians were detained in February for the December 2000 killings of three humanitarian workers from the NGO Rehabilitation Action for Torture Victims in Aceh (RATA) in North Aceh. A court was convened to consider the case, but by the year's end, no hearings had been held. The four civilians suspects escaped from police custody; the four military suspects remained in detention. There were no other reports of military or police personnel being prosecuted for crimes in Aceh. The Government has prosecuted several persons in connection with 2 attacks on UN personnel in East and West Timor, but has not prosecuted others for the militia-related crimes in West or East Timor dating back to 1999, although the Attorney General in September and October 2000 named 23 persons as suspects in East Timor human rights cases (one of whom was killed in early September 2000). The Government's critical failure to pursue accountability for human rights violations reinforces the impression that there would be continued impunity for security force abuses.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
Historically, politically related extrajudicial killings have occurred most frequently in areas in which separatist movements were active, such as Aceh, Papua, and formerly East Timor, and security forces continued to employ harsh measures against separatist movements. In addition security forces killed unarmed demonstrators, and there also were numerous instances of reported extrajudicial killings by security forces in cases involving alleged common criminal activity. The Government rarely holds the military or police accountable for committing extrajudicial killings or using excessive force.
In Aceh army and police personnel committed many extrajudicial killings and used excessive force or directed force against noncombatants in an attempt to quell separatist movements; at times the police and army forces were responding to rebel attacks. By year's end, 1,477 persons had been killed in Aceh, including 1,028 civilians, 134 security force members, and 315 GAM members. It was unclear to what extent police investigated such killings, and they made no progress in identifying the persons who committed these killings by year's end. The steep increase in casualties resulted directly from "Operation to Restore Security," a military crackdown begun in May. Local newspapers reported that 11 bodies were found on February 28 around Aceh and another 10 bodies were found on February 27. According to the report, at least several of the bodies were of those persons seized by security forces the night before their bodies were discovered. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that on March 29, security forces killed three human rights workers and left their bodies in the village of Simpang Tiga Alue Pakuk in Sawang subdistrict, South Aceh. One of these victims, Tengku Al-Kamal, a Muslim boarding school director in South Aceh, was a member of the team monitoring the "peace through dialog" agreement between the Government and the GAM. The other two victims were Suprim Sulaiman, Kamal's attorney from the Human Rights Coalition of Aceh, and Kamal's driver, Amirduddin. According to HRW, police questioned the three men earlier in connection with accusations of rape that five women had made against the Mobil Brigade Police, also known as Brimob (see Section 1.c.). According to HRW, on April 11, Brimob forces shot and killed student Usman bin Adam in Aceh. The Government denied any involvement by the security forces; however, human rights workers who conducted an investigation at the site claimed that security forces most likely were responsible. According to press reports, on July 1, security forces shot and killed 24 Acehnese during a military operation near the town of Takengon in Central Aceh. Soldiers claim that the soldiers had attacked a group of rebels who were planning to attack a nearby town; however, rebel spokesman said only four of the persons killed were militants and the rest were villagers. According to press reports, on July 22 security forces shot and killed 22 Acehnese during a joint military-police operation at a village in East Aceh. A GAM spokesman claimed that only one of the victims had been a GAM member. In October during a raid on Krueng Seumideun village in Peukan Baro district in Pidie, TNI forces shot and killed a high-ranking GAM negotiator, Zulfani bin Abdul Rani. There were numerous instances of excessive force by the military, police, and GAM members that went unpunished during the year. In December Lt. Colonel Supartodi said that his troops shot and killed four rebels during an ambush and that government troops also killed eight insurgents in other clashes. However, some separatists claimed that military officers forced the persons to lead them to rebel bases, after which soldiers killed them.
During the year there were numerous killings in Aceh that could not be clearly attributed to either the security forces or to the armed separatist movement, the GAM. Initial reports on August 9 indicated that unknown assailants shot and killed 31 employees of PT Bumi Flora, a palm oil plantation in Idi Rayeuk in East Aceh. According to the Government, GAM members often tried to extort protection money and intimidate the workers into striking. When the workers refused, GAM members shot and killed them. The GAM denied responsibility and called for an independent team to investigate the killings and bring the perpetrators before an international tribunal. An internal government report compiling eyewitness testimony on August 10 indicated possible military involvement in the killings. Security forces and the GAM blamed each other for the September 6 killing of the Rector of Syiah Kuala University Dayan Dawood, who unidentified assailants shot and killed while he was in his car. Dawood previously had offered to mediate between the GAM and the Government. Dawood's killing followed the killing of Aceh provincial legislator Zaini Sulaiman on September 1 and prominent politician Teungku Johan in May. Aceh's Police Chief promised to investigate the killings; however, no action had been taken by year's end. There were numerous other instances of excessive force by the military and police during the year that went unpunished, including the killing of politician Nashiruddin Daud, an NGO activist. As in most cases, there were no results from alleged government investigations into the deaths of Sukardi, Sulaiman Ahmad or Tengku Safwan Idris, who were killed during 2000 (see Section 1.b.).
In Papua security forces allegedly killed proindependence leaders during the year. Local community groups suspect that security forces killed Willem Onde, the leader of the Papua Liberation Front Army (TPNP), and his friend, Johanes Tumeng. Bodies, believed to be theirs, bearing evidence of gunshot wounds, were found floating in the Kumundu River on September 12 with their hands bound and heads shaved. In addition, on November 11, Papuan proindependence leader Theys Hiyo Eluay was found dead in his car outside of the provincial capital Jayapura after his driver reported that he had been kidnaped. Police also continued to shoot and kill persons involved in largely peaceful Papuan independence flag-raisings or demonstrations (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and 5). Police shot and killed eight persons, and detained and beat six others after mobs rioted, blocked roads, burned cars, and damaged buildings in Papua. The mobs allegedly were reacting to reports that the security forces planned to remove the Papuan flag from the house of an indigenous community leader. Police detained 22 persons returning from a traditional ceremony in March and killed six of them in connection with the same incident. Such incidents were similar to a series of police reactions to flag-raisings over the past 3 years; however, after the Papua Special Autonomy law was signed in November, allowing the Papua flag to be displayed as a cultural symbol, security forces seemed to allow the flying of the flag.
Police also killed Papuans while attempting to search for suspects. For example, police killed one person while searching for the killers of three employees of a logging company in Wonggema village, in Papua. In June and July, police shot 13 persons while seeking the persons who killed 5 police officers and 1 local employee of a foreign-owned logging company.
East Timorese prointegration militias based in West Timor, who, according to credible reports, continued to be armed and supported by the army, committed numerous extrajudicial killings in past years. For example, in September 2000, a mob of East Timorese IDP's, led by militia members attacked UNHCR offices in Atambua, West Timor and killed three international UNHCR staff members, then mutilated and burned their bodies. Security forces that were assigned to protect the UNHCR office failed to prevent the militia forces from attacking and left the area before the militia's second attack on the building, when the three UNHCR workers were killed. Six individuals originally were sentenced in May to between 10-to-20 months on charges of mob violence in connection with the incident, after a lower court ruled that they had been provoked. On November 15, the Supreme Court handed down sentences of 5 to 7 years, the maximum for the charge of mob violence, to three of the defendants. The Court had not rendered its decision on the other three defendants by year's end. In November Jacobus Bere, a member of a group accused of the July 2000 killing of a New Zealand Peacekeeper, was retried for first- and second-degree murder, following a joint investigation of the incident by the Government and U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The trial was postponed from October until December because Bere was ill, and had not concluded by year's end. Government prosecutors also indicted three of the five other militia members involved in the incident. The other two militia members still were at large. Johannes Tino and Gabriel Hale Noni were charged with premeditated murder, a charge carrying the death penalty. Fabianus Ulu face up to 15 years in jail if convicted on the lesser charge of homicide. Killings by prointegration militias included those of West Timor resident Bornard Loddo in July 2000 and a Nepali U.N. peacekeeper in August 2000. There were no reports of progress into the investigation into these killings during the year.
According to credible reports, security forces in the Maluku island chain, especially in the centrally located island of Ambon, were responsible for some of the shooting deaths that occurred during widespread riots and communal clashes throughout the year. The National Commission on Human Rights (KOMNAS-HAM) established a fact-finding team to investigate the June 12-14 killings of 20 persons during a crossfire shooting between the military and the Laskar Jihad (the Java based Muslim militia). The fact finding team concluded that the killings were outside KOMNAS jurisdiction, because the Commission's mandate allowed it to investigate only cases involving gross violations of human rights. Despite claims to the contrary, there was no credible evidence to suggest that the security forces as an institution supported one side or the other during the violence (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
The police on several occasions throughout the country used deadly force to disperse demonstrators. For example, in January Central Kalimantan police shot and killed at least 20 persons and wounded many others by shooting indiscriminately into rioting crowds. On February 27, police shot three rioters in Sampit and two in Palangka Raya, killing one. On March 8, police in Palangka Raya fired into a crowd of rioters killing five persons and injuring several others. On April 9, police in Sampit killed 1 and seriously injured 2 civilians, when they opened fire to disperse a crowd of 300 Dayaks protesting harsh measures police imposed on local Dayaks. On July 17, a police officer shot and killed a bystander while attempting to disperse a crowd in Jakarta. Many citizens also claimed that police were slow to respond forcefully to violent civil disorder. For example, police were slow to respond to the killings of Madurese migrants in Central Kalimantan in January and February.
In Pasuruan, East Java, police opened fire on demonstrators protesting the MPR's second censure of then President Wahid on June 20, killing one protester. Fact finding teams from the MPR and KOMNAS-HAM investigated the killing. MPR officials announced that the police followed correct procedures. However, KOMNAS-HAM investigators, in an October 22 letter to the East Java police, called for further investigation of the killing. KOMNAS-HAM also conducted an investigation into police use of excessive force on December 7, 2000 in Abepura, West Papua, when police pulled 23 students from their dormitory rooms and beat them. Two students died from the beatings, and dozens of others sustained serious injuries. The KOMNAS-HAM issued a report recommending that the case be tried by the new human rights court. No investigation into police killings of demonstrators during 2000 had occurred by year's end.
No disciplinary action was taken against the immigration personnel responsible for the disappearance and presumed death of a foreign citizen in March 2000, and there were no developments in the case by year's end.
At times the police and the military killed civilians in the crossfire of their attacks on each other. A Madurese IDP was killed during a February 27 dispute between police and security forces over extortion collections from Madurese IDP's evacuating from Central Kalimantan; 10 soldiers and police were wounded. Police and military exchanged fire on September 15, killing 3 civilians and injuring 15 others in Madiun, East Java. Observers said that the gunfight occurred over "turf battles" for protection of gambling dens and drug trade. Investigators named 112 military personnel and 13 police personnel as suspects in the killings, and announced that their cases would be tried. Twenty-three members of the military and police force were discharged.
The police often employed deadly force in apprehending suspects or dealing with alleged criminals, many of whom were unarmed. For example in September, police shot and killed 23 persons suspected of illegal weapons possession in an incident in Jakarta, claiming that they resisted arrest. During the year, police shot and killed at least 25 Africans suspected of trafficking in narcotics. Africans constitute a disproportionately large percentage of those killed while being arrested, suggesting that such killings are racially motivated. In response to criticism that the methods used were unjustifiably harsh and amounted to execution without trial, police generally claimed that the suspects were fleeing, resisting arrest, or threatening the police. Police did not release complete statistics regarding the number of these cases by year's end (see Section 5).
Four military officers and four civilians were detained in February for the December 2000 killings of three humanitarian workers in Aceh. The court found the officers not guilty of murder, but convicted them of inciting mob violence and sentenced them to prison terms varying from 10 to 20 months in prison.
In July 1999, the Government appointed an independent commission (KPP Aceh) to investigate human rights violations in Aceh. In November 1999, the Commission recommended that the Government investigate five cases of alleged human rights violations. In April 2000, the trial of 24 army personnel and a civilian, who all previously were convicted for the killing of 58 civilians in Beutong Ateuh in July 1999, began; however, none of the accused was above the rank of lieutenant colonel. During the trial, soldiers testified that they had killed civilians, but argued that they were not guilty of murder because they were following their commander's orders. The commander reportedly disappeared; however, NGO's reported a subsequent sighting of him in the company of other military officials. The trial ended in May 2000 when the 24 defendants received sentences of 8 to 10 years in prison. By year's end, no one had been charged in the other four cases, which include: The May 1999 massacre at Krueng Geukey, North Aceh; the February 1999 attack on demonstrators that resulted in seven persons killed in Idi Cut, East Aceh; a series of killings and abductions at a detention facility in Pidie from 1997-98; and the August 1996 rape of Sumiati, an Acehnese women, by a soldier.
The Commission for Investigation of Violations of Human Rights in East Timor (KPP-HAM) delivered its report of human rights violations in East Timor to the Attorney General's Office in January 2000. The Attorney General said that his office initially would prosecute five major cases arising from the April 6, 1999 massacre in Liquisa; the April 17, 1999 killings at the home of independence leader Manuel Carrascalao's house; the September 5, 1999 attack on the compound of the Catholic Diocese in Dili; the September 6, 1999 massacre of priests and displaced persons at a church in Suai; and the September 21, 1999 killing of Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes. The Attorney General's Office named 23 suspects in September and October 2000 (one of whom, an East Timorese militia commander, was killed by militia members in early September 2000). Those accused included several army and police generals, but did not include then-Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto, former Armed Forces intelligence chief Zacky Anwar Makarim, and other senior members of the military leadership who were named as responsible parties in the KPP-HAM report. Progress on these five cases was slow, and the number of suspects named was small in comparison to the number of persons believed responsible. Although Indonesian authorities were assisted greatly in their investigation by UNTAET, the Government did not cooperate fully in December 2000, when UNTAET requested similar support for its own investigations into the atrocities.
There were no new developments during the year in the shooting deaths of at least nine demonstrators at Jakarta's Semanggi interchange in November 1998. The trial of nine low-ranking police officers implicated in the May 1998 shooting deaths of four students at Trisakti University in Jakarta began on June 18. Prosecutors charged the officers with premeditated murder, which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, and assault leading to death, which carries a maximum penalty of 7 years in prison. The trial was ongoing at year's end.
In 2000 the police began conducting an investigation of the July 1996 attack on the headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), questioning the top army and police leadership at the time. A joint police/military team subsequently questioned witnesses and potential suspects, and by November 2000 had begun submitting cases to the Attorney General's Office for prosecution, although no further action was taken during the year (see Section 1.b.).
The East Java police in 2000 reopened an investigation into the 1993 killing of labor activist Marsinah, questioning again over a dozen witnesses and previous suspects, including civilians and army and police personnel. In December 2000, the East Java police chief said Australian laboratory tests confirmed that Marsinah's blood had been found in the home of the owner of the factory where Marsinah worked and in a van believed to have transported her to the place where she was found. However, by year's end, there was no further action on the police investigation.
In February 2000, the National Human Rights Commission formed a commission to investigate the September 1984 killing of an estimated 33 demonstrators by security forces at Tanjung Priok, Jakarta. The commission questioned senior army and police officials, exhumed mass graves where victims were buried, and reported the investigation results, including names of 23 persons considered to be responsible for the killings, to the Attorney General in October (see Sections 1.c. and 4). At year's end, a spokesman for the Attorney General confirmed that the investigation was completed; however, he declined to name any suspects and none were arrested.
Citizens' attacks on other citizens caused the majority of killings during the year.
Throughout the year in Aceh, armed separatist groups killed dozens of civil society leaders, academics, politicians, and other local residents, as well as civil servants, police, and soldiers. For example, on March 23, local newspapers reported that attackers, presumed to be GAM members, kidnaped and killed seven Javanese transmigrants that had been working on a plantation. The seven transmigrants were found shot with their hands tied behind their backs. In June attackers believed to be GAM members, killed scores of Javanese and ethnic groups in Central Aceh. On September 18, armed separatists abducted Muzakir, a Muslim community leader of a village in Batu Itam. Residents of Alur Naga in South Aceh found him dead on September 20 with bullet holes and burn wounds. Armed separatists shot and killed T. Sofyan, the village leader in Lan Tabeh, Aceh Besar, on November 16. Armed separatists, who had constructed roadblocks on the Medan-Aceh road, shot and killed a police captain who attempted to drive through the roadblock on December 18.
Separatist groups also killed numerous civilians and soldiers during the year. The Free Papua movement (OPM) killed five police officers and a security guard at a foreign-owned logging company in Wondiboi, Wasior District, and Papua on June 13. Police blamed the attacks on OPM; however, many local human rights groups believe a disagreement between the local community and the foreign company over compensation for logging on indigenous land may have instigated the attacks. An OPM group took two migrant settlers hostage after police shot and killed two Papuan separatists in a September 23 crossfire after an OPM raid on a military post in Bonggo, Papua. Unknown attackers killed four soldiers in a February 3 attack on a military post in Betaf, Papua.
Fighting in the Moluccan island group, which began in Ambon in January 1999, spread to most major islands in the Moluccas in 2000 and during the year. The fighting in all three provinces (North Maluku, Maluku, and Central Sulawesi) had political, economic, ethnic, and religious overtones (see Sections 2.c. and 5). While initial conflicts emerged over land tenure questions and the political and economic status of local residents versus that of migrants, in many cases the conflicts later evolved into highly charged religious clashes. One of the major factors contributing to the continuation of violence in these islands was the failure to bring the perpetrators to justice (see Sections 2.c. and 5); another factor was the failure of the authorities to prevent armed militants from traveling in large groups to the Moluccas from Java. Christian and Muslim groups increasingly used sophisticated weapons as the fighting continued, causing over 3,000 deaths and destroying many churches, mosques, and, in some cases, entire towns, mostly in 2000. The level of violence intensified in late 1999 and in the early part of 2000, after Christian gangs and militia (and to a lesser extent, Muslim gangs and militia) attacked isolated villages in Halmahera and other parts of North Maluku. During 2000 and following the December 1999 attacks by Christians, Muslim militias drove Christian populations away from many areas of North Maluku and Maluku provinces (see Section 2.d.). As IDP's fled to neighboring areas and islands, their resentment against those who had attacked them often sparked conflict in their new places of residence. In addition unverified reports of provocations and conspiracies fueled the continuous cycle of violence. The violence decreased in Ambon in late January 2000 and this year, after security forces began enforcing a curfew and disarming civilians. At the same time, mutually destructive fighting escalated in Halmahera and other parts of North Maluku. By April 2000, there were some signs of reconciliation in Ambon after the provincial government established reconstruction programs and markets in border areas between Muslim and Christian communities. However, in late April 2000, serious rioting broke out immediately following a visit by then Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri. There was a further upsurge in violence in May 2000, after boats filled with members of the Laskar Jihad, Muslim militants from Java, arrived in Ambon and other parts of the Moluccas (see Section 5). As many as 2,000 to 3,000 militants ultimately arrived via boat. Law and order continued to deteriorate steadily, and in June 2000, violent mobs stormed through Ambon city with little or no security force interference. There also were large-scale Muslim attacks against Christians in Halmahera in May and June 2000. The level of violence decreased, particularly in North Maluku, after then-President Wahid declared a state of civil emergency in both provinces in late June 2000 (see Section 2.d.); the state of emergency still was in effect at end of 2000. However, violent interreligious clashes continued to occur throughout the year, especially in Ambon.
According to HRW, on May 4, the Government arrested the head of Laskar Jihad, Jafar Uman Thalib, and charged him with murder. He was released on June 12. Violence subsequently flared in Ambon, where 18 Christians were killed (see Section 5). In response, on June 14, the army attacked a Laskar Jihad post, killing 22 Muslims.
Beginning in late May 2000, in Central Sulawesi, numerous villages experienced renewed religious riots and violence, resulting in numerous deaths and widespread destruction. A significant increase of killings occurred in November and December, apparently spurred by Laskar Jihad militants. Tens of thousands of Christians fled their homes as villages were attacked. On December 1 and 2, hundreds of Laskar Jihad attacked Christian forces in the villages of Sepe and Batugincu, south of Poso city. Three soldiers and three civilians were shot. A police officer shot and killed a rioter and wounded four on December 3, after a Muslim attacked a church in Poso city. By year's end, the army was able to quell the violence, and a tenuous peace agreement was negotiated. According to local press reports, the three leaders of the Christian Red Force who were convicted of leading rioters in mass killings and given the death penalty, are appealing their sentences to the Supreme Court.
In Kalimantan interethnic clashes resulted in hundreds of killings during February and March. Indigenous Dayak tribesmen killed approximately 600 Madurese migrant settlers and burned more than 1,000 houses and stores in Central Kalimantan (see Section 5). In response, over 105,000 Madurese evacuated back to East Java and Madura Island, where they settled in local communities. In Pontianak, West Kalimantan, the killing of a Malay boy, on June 25, allegedly by Madurese robbers, as well as local resentment of the continued presence of Madurese IDP's in local public sports facilities, led to interethnic clashes between Madurese refugees and ethnic Malay residents which resulted in 7 refugee deaths and destruction of temporary shelters for over 300 families (see Section 5). Three suspects were arrested for the robbery, no arrests in connection with the killings were made by year's end. Over 40,000 Madurese migrants remained in IDP camps located in public sports facilities in Pontianak or in outlying areas at year's end. There were reports from local NGO's, provincial officials, and local press of Dayaks killing an unknown number of Madurese attempting to return to Central Kalimantan.
A series of bombings occurred in Jakarta and other cities, including Depok, Bekasi, Yogyakarta, Banten, and Central Sulawesi from January through June targeting churches, overpasses, shopping malls, and residences. Several bombings between Christmas and New Year's primarily targeted churches. The NGO Coalition (ORNOP) reported that there were 110 bombing incidents, which claimed 26 lives and injured 201 persons during the year. A suspect in the October bombings at Atrium Mall was released on her own recognizance on October 4; however, she was required to report to the Jakarta Police twice a week. Police arrested 13 persons, including 3 Malaysians, in September following another bombing of the Atrium Mall. Police believed the 13 detainees also were responsible for some of the church bombings on Christmas Eve 2000 (see Section 5). The Christmas Eve bombings occurred in 9 cities and injured more than 100 persons, according to press accounts. On July 19, the Bandung District Court sentenced two defendants found guilty of involvement in one of the bombings that killed four persons to 9 years in prison. The court sentenced the owner of the house in which the two defendants allegedly made the bombs to 8 years in prison.
Two defendants suspected of involvement in the Jakarta Stock Exchange bombing, which killed 10 persons and injured dozens of others in September 2000, escaped from custody before they could be tried. One of the defendants, a corporal in the Army's Strategic Reserves Command, escaped while in the custody of four members of the military police. The other suspect, a civilian, escaped from prison in East Jakarta in February. The court sentenced the remaining three defendants, two military and one civilian, to 20 years in prison each (see Section 1.c.).
According to press reports, during 2000 145 persons accused of committing crimes (usually theft or responsibility for vehicular accidents) were killed by mobs of persons on the scene of the alleged crimes in the most populous urban areas of Jakarta, West Java, East Java, and North Sumatra. Countrywide statistics were not available at year's end.
There also were press reports of mobs attacking security forces and civilian guards. For example, on August 14, pedicab drivers beat to death a civilian guard and severely injured eight others attempting to evict the drivers from West Jakarta; by year's end, no one had been arrested in connection with the attack (see Section 1.c. and 6.a.). The city administration had banned pedicabs from operating in Jakarta since 1988.
During the year, there were a number of reports of killings of persons who practice traditional magic ("dukun santet") (see Section 5). For example, on September 2, approximately 40 villagers in Bentarkawung, Central Java killed Warsono, who the villagers believed caused another resident to become ill and die. On October 7, a resident in Tangerang, West Java, beat and killed a newly arrived resident who was believed to have caused the death of seven residents. No one had been charged in the incidents by year's end.
b. Disappearance
According to a report issued in 2000 by the Committee for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS), 843 persons remain missing as a result of military operations, land disputes, and political and religious activities over the past 20 years. In addition KONTRAS reported that 106 persons remained missing in Aceh during the year.
In Aceh there continued to be credible reports of the disappearance of many civilians. KONTRAS reported that 14 persons disappeared in September alone, including 5 Acehnese community leaders, who GAM abducted while returning from a meeting with President Megawati on September 8, but released them on September 10. Aristoteles Masoka, Theys Eluay's driver, has been missing since Eluay's murder; he last was known to be in Kopassus custody. Often, the bodies of missing persons later are discovered, frequently bearing marks of torture (see Section 1.c.). Three prominent Acehnese disappeared in Medan, North Sumatra during 2000; however, only Syahputra remained missing at year's end. The bodies of Member of Parliament and human rights activist Tengku Nashir and NGO activist Jafar Sidiq Hamzah later were found, bearing signs of torture. NGO's allege that TNI forces or police personnel are responsible for many cases of civilian disappearances.
There were no developments in the investigation into the causes of death or the identification of the remains of 32 bodies found floating around Biak, Papua in July 1998 after navy and police forces broke up a proindependence demonstration. Multiple reports claimed that many of the bodies were demonstrators who had been detained and then killed while in custody.
The Government has not taken any significant action deter forces that abduct persons. In most cases in Papua, Brimob or Kopassus forces often round up and detain persons after a violent incident. An atmosphere of impunity by such groups encourages others to continue abductions.
According to Amnesty International (AI) on June 25, armed men abducted Hubertus Wresman, a Sunday school teacher from Betaf. AI believes Wersman's abductors were army personnel. There were no developments in Wresman's case by year's end. Brimob officers kidnaped Daud Yomaki, Henok Marani, and Mais Imburi during search operations after five police were killed on June 13 in Wondiboi village (see Section 1.a.). The body of Felex Urbon, another person who allegedly was abducted by Brimob on June 20, was found on July 16.
There were no developments in the numerous disappearances of persons in East Timor in 1999 and in earlier years.
There was no progress in the case of four members of the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA), an NGO based in Bandung, West Java that advocates for dispossessed farmers, claimed that they were kidnaped at gunpoint by unknown persons on August 14 in 2000. Their alleged abduction came after police forcibly removed them from a demonstration and hunger strike that they were conducting inside the Parliament building in Jakarta. They claimed that after several days in solitary confinement they were driven to different locations and interrogated at length about their organization's activities, finances, and aims. They said that they were not tortured physically, but that their lives and those of their families and colleagues frequently were threatened. Their captors released them on August 27. The KPA then filed suit against the police alleging that the police had kidnaped four of its members. The Jakarta district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of evidence. The KPA filed an appeal; however, the court had not rendered a decision by year's end. Police opened an investigation into the kidnaping, but were unable to identify the perpetrators (see Sections 1.e. and 4).
There were no developments in the case of 12 persons who disappeared (and are presumed dead) in Java during a series of kidnapings of opponents of the Soeharto regime carried out by Army Special Forces (Kopassus) personnel in 1997 and 1998. However, in 2000 the police began conducting an investigation into the 1996 PDI incident in which 16 persons disappeared, and submitted cases to the Attorney General's Office (see Section 1.a.). No new information emerged on the fate of the 16 missing persons by year's end.
In Aceh armed separatists often abduct army members, police personnel, civil servants, and others, although they do not always acknowledge responsibility for these incidents. Militia groups are believed to have killed some civilians suspected of being collaborators or informants of the security forces. For example, the GAM abducted Ghazali Usman, a member of Aceh's provincial parliament in September. He was released on November 26.
On January 16, 12 employees of a Korean firm in Asiki district were kidnaped by the OPM. The OPM also detained a 4-man negotiating team before releasing all 16 persons on January 25. On March 23, two Korean employees of a logging company were kidnaped and released by March 30. Two Belgian filmmakers, who were abducted on June 6 by Papuan separatists and held in Puncak Jaya district, were released on August 16. Papuan separatists kidnaped two transmigrants on September 23 after a raid on a military post in Bonggo district. The six plantation employees who were abducted in July 1999 in Papua near Arso remained missing.
Kidnaping of children for ransom is a recent and reportedly growing phenomenon. In July a 2-year-old boy was kidnaped after his grandparent in Ciwidey failed to pay a debt. The kidnaper surrendered to police before the child's parents paid the ransom.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The Criminal Code makes it a crime punishable by up to 4 years in prison for any official to use violence or force to elicit a confession; however, in practice legal protections are both inadequate and widely ignored, and security forces continued to employ torture and other forms of mistreatment, particularly in regions where there were active security concerns, such as Aceh and Papua. Police often resort to physical abuse, even in minor incidents.
There were numerous credible reports that the army and police continued routinely to torture detainees in Aceh. A July report by KONTRAS stated that police and the TNI tortured 159 persons in Aceh. For example, a suspected GAM member told HRW that a joint security force of police, Brimob, and military arrested and blindfolded him on April 2. He said that his interrogators "used pliers to pull the nail off his left thumb, punctured his nose, and caused other scars on his forearm and nipple." Methods of torture documented in the past include beating, whipping, electric shock, and rape. AI reported that police at a military checkpoint in Southeast Aceh detained and tortured two human rights activists. The activists had been investigating reports that 100 persons in Central Aceh district had been killed in June by the TNI. AI reported that Brimob beat, shot, and killed three high school students detained at the Krueng Sabee police station in Caleng, West Aceh on June 18.
In Aceh army and police officials routinely use excessive force and violence when investigating attacks by armed separatists. Police and army personnel also routinely respond to attacks on soldiers by engaging in indiscriminate violence against bystanders. In March police and military burned hundreds of homes and stores in the East Aceh town of Idi Rayeuk after rebels briefly captured the town. Police and military killed three civilians and injured three others as they retook the town.
There were numerous credible reports that army, paramilitary groups, and police assaulted persons detained in Papua. Police arbitrarily detained, beat, and tortured persons in search operations after attacks on security facilities or private companies by unknown armed groups. According to the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy (ELSHAM), Brimob forces responded to the killing of five Brimob members by unidentified gangs by conducting operations against villagers in Ransiki, and arrested and tortured nine persons, including a 15-year-old boy, who they beat unconscious. The TNI also arbitrarily detained over 100 persons during the search operation. KONTRAS reported that during the operation, the TNI tortured 14 to 16 of the persons it detained in the village of Wondiboi.
During testimony before the U.N. Committee Against Torture, Felice Gaer stated that sexual violence in the country "appeared to be frequently employed" as a form of torture. Gaer added that she had received numerous reports of sexual abuses, including rape, in Aceh, Papua, North Maluku, and Maluku. KONTRAS reports that there were 15 documented cases of rape in Aceh since April. According to a local report in Papua, the TNI raped 94 women and girls in Paniai between 1969 and 1998.
On March 7, 2000 in an isolated area of North Aceh's Matangkuli subdistrict, a group of armed men in army fatigues raped 4 women and sexually molested 12 others; they also beat severely 6 men and robbed their families; no persons had been charged by year's end. The trial for the rape of Sumiati, an Acehnese woman allegedly raped by a TNI soldier in 1999, did not begin by year's end; Sumiati's rape case is one of five human rights trials that the special commission was scheduled to hear (see Section 1.a.). No charges were brought in the August 1999 rape of nine Acehnese women in Kecamatan Tangse Selatan, Pidie district, for which TNI soldiers allegedly were responsible.
There are allegations that prointegration East Timorese militias in West Timor are holding East Timorese women as "sex slaves" (see Section 5). Kristy Sword Gusmao, wife of East Timorese independence leader Xanana Gusmao reported in November 2000 that 33 pregnant East Timorese women returned to East Timor and claimed that the TNI had abducted them and forced them to serve as their sex slaves in West Timor. No one was held accountable for the numerous acts of rape and sexual abuse that TNI-supported militia groups perpetrated against displaced East Timorese women in 1999.
In January 2000, the Minister of State for Women's Empowerment said that the Government would follow up on the recommendations of the joint factfinding team (TGPF) that investigated the May 1998 civil unrest in Jakarta and other cities. The team's report, issued in November 1998, found evidence that some elements of the army may have been involved in provoking the violence, which included attacks against Sino-Indonesian women, and urged further investigation of the at least 85 instances of violence against women that the team verified. However, no further investigations had been undertaken by year's end (see Section 5).
There were instances in which security forces responded with brutality to peaceful demonstrations, although they usually allowed peaceful demonstrations to proceed without resorting to force. For example, the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) reported in June that 19 demonstrators from the Young Christian Worker movement (YCW), the Student League for National Democracy (LMND), and the People's Democratic Party (PRD), were detained and tortured in Bandung. The demonstrators were protesting against changes to the labor laws regarding severance pay and oil-price increases. According to the Legal Aid and Human Rights Association, 18 of the demonstrators were released after 3 months of detention without trial, and 1 was sentenced to one year in prison for spreading hatred of the Government. On June 8, individuals allegedly belonging to an Islamic organization ransacked the Asia Pacific Solidarity Conference on Neoliberalism in West Java and reportedly harming some of the participants. Police did not intervene to protect the participants but instead broke up the conference and detained 2 local and 32 foreign labor activists (see Section 6.f.). On June 13, a mob of approximately 150 persons connected to the Golkar Party disrupted a Solidarity Center (ACILS) workshop on grievance handling in East Kalimantan (see Section 6.f.). In numerous instances in Papua in 2000 and during the year, police attempted to break up peaceful demonstrations in which Papuans raised the Papuan independence flag, and when Papuans resisted, police responded with excessive force, killing and injuring demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 2.a., 2.b., and 5).
Police entered and caused property damage to the building housing the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) and Jakarta Legal Aid Society (LBH) on two occasions in which they pursued demonstrators who sought refuge in the LBH building. LBH reported that Brimob beat and ordered LBH personnel to strip to their undergarments and lie face down on the ground before putting them in a truck and taking them to police headquarters. In addition police broke windows and damaged cars with rocks, nightsticks, and bullets during the incidents.
Students and other civilians also engaged in violent and destructive behavior, resulting in nonlethal injuries and property damage. Ten thousand workers protesting the new severance pay decree in June threw stones, wood, and plastic bottles, injuring at least nine persons and damaging two hotels in Jakarta. Hundreds of pedicab drivers, using Molotov cocktails, machetes, steel bars, and stones, attacked 500 city public security officials, who were about to raid their illegal business in August. The drivers beat an official to death, two officials were injured, and the mob set fire to and stoned vehicles (see Section 1.a.). Muslim students in Makassar, South Sulawesi attacked non-Muslim students during two separate incidents on October 23 and 24, severely injuring six persons. The Muslims claimed to be retaliating against the burning of an effigy of Usama bin Laden in a predominantly Christian town. Hundreds of students from the Indonesian Muslim University (UMI) in Makassar destroyed property at the Japanese Consulate General and demanded the Consul lower the Japanese flag so it could be burned. The students were protesting U.S. military action in Afghanistan.
On August 22, 2000 East Timorese militias beat and severely wounded two UNHCR staff members at the Naen camp near Kefamenanu, West Timor. The UNHCR staff had been invited to the camp to distribute shelter supplies when a machete-wielding man attacked them and a mob stoned them. A series of bombings occurred in Jakarta and other cities, including Depok, Bekasi, Yogyakarta, Banten, and Central Sulawesi, from January through June at churches, overpasses, shopping malls, and residences (see Section 1.a.). An NGO Coalition (ORNOP) reports that there were 110 bombing incidents that claimed 26 lives and injured 201 persons during this year. Except for the case of the Stock Exchange bombing, no suspects were apprehended by year's end.
In the latter part of the year, several Islamic groups threatened Western persons and conducted "sweeping" operations at hotels and other public venues in an attempt to drive Westerners out of the city.
Prison conditions are harsh, and mistreatment and extortion of inmates by guards and violence among prisoners is common. The incidence of mistreatment drops sharply once a prisoner is transferred from police or military custody into the civilian prison system or into the custody of the Attorney General. Nine prisoners at the Kebon Waru Prison in Bandung died from untreated illnesses, according to press reports in July. Credible sources report that criminal prisoners in some facilities are beaten routinely and systematically as punishment for infractions of prison rules and to coerce information about other prisoners. During an August raid of Cipinang Prison in East Jakarta, police seized knives, swords, sickles, machetes, firearms, and hand grenades, which had been smuggled into the prison for the inmates, according to press accounts. Prison brawls frequently occur over drugs or ethnic divisions. Former inmates at Jakarta's Cipinang Prison told the press in November 2000 that drug use among prisoners is common, and that inmates can obtain drugs, better treatment, and better conditions by bribing guards. Government officials admitted publicly that prison guards were involved in prison "drug syndicates."
Women are housed separately from men in prisons, but in similar conditions. Juveniles are not housed separately from adults.
The Government generally does not permit routine prison visits by human rights monitors, although some visits occasionally are permitted; however, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was able to visit 12 convicted prisoners during the year (see Section 4).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Criminal Procedures Code contains provisions against arbitrary arrest and detention, but it lacks adequate enforcement mechanisms, and authorities routinely violate it. The code specifies that prisoners have the right to notify their families promptly and that warrants must be produced during an arrest except under specified conditions, such as when a suspect is caught in the act of committing a crime. The law authorizes investigators to issue warrants to assist in their investigations or if sufficient evidence exists that a crime has been committed. However, authorities at times made arrests without warrants.
The law presumes that defendants are innocent and permits bail. Defendants or their families also may challenge the legality of their arrest and detention in a pretrial hearing and may sue for compensation if wrongfully detained. However, it virtually is impossible for detainees to invoke this procedure or to receive compensation after being released without charge. In both military and civilian courts, appeals based on claims of improper arrest and detention rarely, if ever, are accepted. The Criminal Procedures Code also contains specific limits on periods of pretrial detention and specifies when the courts must approve extensions, usually after 60 days. The courts generally respect these limits.
The authorities routinely approve extensions of periods of detention. In areas in which active guerrilla movements exist, such as Aceh and Papua, there are many instances of persons being detained without warrants, charges, or court proceedings. Bail rarely is granted. The authorities frequently prevent access to defense counsel while suspects are being investigated and limit or prevent access to legal assistance from voluntary legal defense organizations. Special laws on corruption, economic crimes, and narcotics are under the Criminal Code.
Security forces frequently detained participants suspected of inciting demonstrations, although most were released after questioning (see Section 2.b.). Labor activist Ngadinah was arrested on April 23 and charged with "unpleasant behavior" and inciting other workers to strike in an athletic shoe factory. Police detained Ngadinah for 2 weeks. She remained under house arrest until August 30, when a court acquitted her of all charges. On June 8, individuals allegedly belonging to an Islamic Organization ransacked the Asia Pacific Solidarity Conference on Neoliberalism in West Java and reportedly threatened some participants. On June 17, two student activists in Jakarta were arrested and charged with inciting "chaos" following a violent demonstration in Jakarta against a fuel price increase. The two students were sentenced to 5 months in jail in September and remained in detention at year's end (see Section 6.b.).
There is no reliable data on the number of arbitrary arrests or detentions without trial, particularly in Aceh and Papua, but there is ample evidence that arbitrary arrests and detention without trial are employed systematically in Aceh. On November 20, the head of the Aceh NGO (SIRA), Muhammad Nazar, was arrested on charges of "spreading hatred" by hanging banners in favor of a referendum and against the military during a campus rally in August 2000. He was convicted in March, sentenced to 10 months in prison, and released in December. On July 20, in Banda Aceh, police detained six GAM representatives to the "Peace Through Dialog" negotiations sponsored by the Switzerland-based Henri Dunant Center (HDC). Police claimed the individuals were rebels and not negotiators and arrested them on suspicion of subversion. Five of the six negotiators reportedly were released on August 29; the sixth remained in detention at year's end, accused of possession of false passports. In August Acehnese student leader Fasial Saifuddin was detained in Jakarta on similar charges. His trial was ongoing at year's end. Acehnese student leader Kautsar Mohammed Yus was detained in Banda Aceh in July on the charge that he spread hatred of the Government during a demonstration against ExxonMobil operations in Aceh. He remained in detention by year's end. In June and July, the TNI arbitrarily detained over 100 persons during a military operation in search of OPM members (see Section 1.c.).
Police detained numerous persons in Papua after violent clashes in Jayapura in December 2000, Merauke in November 2000, and in Wamena in October 2000 (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5). On December 15, police detained the director of the Institute of Human Rights Study and Advocacy in Papua for 22 hours (see Section 4). Four Papuan students were convicted on August 7 of defaming the Government for a December 2000 proindependence demonstration in front of a foreign embassy. The district court sentenced the students to 3 months in prison, including time served. Prior to the August trial, the students already had been detained for 3 months and released in March pending their trial. In March 2000 the regional police command for Papua investigated criminal charges against 16 leading members of the Papuan Presidium Council for crimes against the security of the state and public order, based on claims that they had organized a gathering of Papuan community leaders in February 2000 and a peaceful Papuan independence flag-raising on December 1, 1999. The investigation against some of the 16 persons later was dropped; however, in November 2000, police arrested the chairman, secretary general, and three other Papuan Presidium Council members on similar charges (see Sections 2.a. and 5). In mid-December 2000, 17 Papuan activists went on trial in Wamena on charges of endangering state security by promoting separatism during an October 6, 2000, flag-raising incident in which police killed 13 Papuans, then later killed 2 dozen migrants. The courts found all guilty of rebellion, attempting to secede from the State of Indonesia, and other lesser offenses, and sentenced them to terms of imprisonment ranging from 1 to 4 years. On June 12, they filed an appeal against their sentences to the Supreme Court. An earlier appeal to the Papua High Court was rejected.
Security forces detained a number of foreign members of both foreign and domestic NGO's during the year (see Section 4).
In past years, several foreign tourists have been subject to arbitrary arrest and detention while traveling in Papua.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for the independence of the judiciary; however, there are a few signs of judicial independence, and in practice, the judiciary is subordinate to the executive and the military. Pursuant to a 1999 law, a gradual transfer of administrative and financial control over the judiciary from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court is to take place by 2004. However, judges are civil servants employed by the executive branch, which controls their assignments, pay, and promotion. Low salaries encourage widespread corruption, and judges are subject to considerable pressure from governmental authorities, who often exert influence over the outcome of cases.
A quadripartite judiciary of general, religious, military, and administrative courts exists below the Supreme Court. The right of appeal from a district court to a high court to the Supreme Court exists in all four systems. The Supreme Court does not consider factual aspects of a case, only the lower courts' application of the law. The Supreme Court theoretically is an equal branch in relation to the executive and legislative branches, and in November the MPR granted the Supreme Court the right of judicial review over laws passed by Parliament (see Section 3).
A panel of judges conducts trials at the district court level, which consists of posing questions, hearing evidence, deciding guilt or innocence, and assessing punishment. Initial judgments rarely are reversed in the appeals process, although sentences can be increased or reduced. Both the defense and the prosecution may appeal cases.
Defendants have the right to confront witnesses and to produce witnesses in their defense. An exception is allowed in cases in which distance or expense is deemed excessive for transporting witnesses to court; in such cases, sworn affidavits may be introduced. State prosecutors are reluctant to use existing legal powers to plea bargain with defendants or witnesses, or to grant witnesses immunity from prosecution. As a result, witnesses generally are unwilling to testify against the authorities. The courts commonly allow forced confessions and limit the presentation of defense evidence. Defendants do not have the right to remain silent and may be compelled to testify against themselves.
The Criminal Procedures Code gives defendants the right to an attorney from the time of arrest, but not during the prearrest investigative period, which may involve prolonged detention. Persons summoned to appear as witnesses in investigations do not have the right to legal assistance, even if information developed during testimony subsequently becomes the basis of an investigation of the witness. The law requires counsel to be appointed in capital punishment cases and those involving a prison sentence of 15 years or more. In cases involving potential sentences of 5 years or more, an attorney must be appointed if the defendant is indigent and requests counsel. In theory indigent defendants may obtain private legal assistance, such as that provided by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation. However, in practice defendants often are persuaded not to hire an attorney, or access to an attorney of their choice is impeded.
In many cases, procedural protections, including those against confessions coerced by the security forces or police, are inadequate to ensure a fair trial. Corruption is a common feature of the legal system, and the payment of bribes can influence prosecution, conviction, and sentencing in civil and criminal cases.
In October the review panel of the Supreme Court overturned the Court's own guilty verdict against former President Soeharto's son, Hutomo "Tommy" Mandala Putra, shortly after the killing of one of its justices. Police accused Tommy Soeharto of ordering the killing of the justice to influence the outcome of the trial. Legislators, the Attorney General, and legal reformers have expressed their disagreement with the review panel's decision in the case. However, in the absence of any law providing for the appeal of a review panel's decision, the decision to overturn the Court's guilty verdict likely would stand.
Despite the beginning of the transfer of administrative and financial control over the judiciary from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court, there were few signs of judicial independence. The Courts continued to be used to take action against, or deny legal remedy to, political activists and government critics.
In November 2000, the DPR enacted a law establishing a permanent human rights court. The law creates four new district courts to adjudicate gross violations of human rights. The law requires that each of the five-member human rights courts include three human rights judges appointed to 5-year terms by the President upon nomination by the Supreme Court. Although cases are appealed to the standing High Court and Supreme Court, the law requires that those courts include three human rights judges on an ad hoc basis on the five-member panel when hearing human rights cases. The law provides for internationally recognized definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and command responsibility as core elements of gross human rights violations. However, it does not include war crimes as a gross violation. The law strengthens the powers of the Attorney General, who is the sole investigating and prosecuting authority in cases of gross human rights violations, and who is empowered to appoint ad hoc investigators and prosecutors. The law also empowers the Attorney General (as well as the courts) to detain suspects or defendants for multiple fixed periods in cases of gross human rights violations. However, the law requires the extension of any detention of alleged violations to be approved by the human rights court. For gross human rights violations that occurred before the enactment of the law, the law allows the President, with the recommendation of the DPR, to create an ad hoc bench within one of the new human rights courts to hear cases associated with a particular offense.
During 2000 victims of human rights violations sought for the first time to use the courts to obtain redress. In July 2000, the People's Democratic Party sued former President Soeharto and 13 other former senior officials for damages associated with the imprisonment of party leaders, the banning of the party, and the destruction of its property. The suit still was being heard at year's end. In addition in 2000, four members of the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA) sued the police in Jakarta for forcibly removing them from a peaceful demonstration and hunger strike that they were conducting inside the Parliament building in Jakarta. After being forcibly removed, they later were kidnaped and threatened by unknown persons (see Sections 1.b. and 4). A district court dismissed the suit, but an appeal to the High Court still was pending at year's end.
President Wahid released all remaining political prisoners from the Soeharto and Habibie eras in December 1999. A number of prisoners since have been convicted and are serving sentences on criminal charges such as subversion, defaming the Government and rebellion (see Section 1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence
Judicial warrants for searches are required except for cases involving suspected subversion, economic crimes, and corruption; however, security agencies regularly made forced or surreptitious entries into homes and offices. Security forces also commonly engaged in surveillance of persons and residences and selective monitoring of local and international telephone calls without legal restraint.
The Government and the DPR discussed implementing the Law on Overcoming Dangerous situations, which the DPR approved in September 1999, but which the President never signed. The law would allow the military to conduct search and seizure operations for weapons during a declared state of emergency without a warrant but would require such searches be reported to the courts within 24 hours. In November 2000, the Cabinet decided to further postpone implementation of the law to permit additional discussion and possible amendments. In January the Government asked the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Justice and Human Rights to revise the bill; however, the law had not been implemented by year's end.
Government security officials monitor the movements and activities of former members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its front organizations, especially persons whom the Government believes were involved in the abortive 1965 coup. However, according to the Action Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners (KAP T/N), these persons and their relatives no longer are subjected to surveillance, required check-ins, periodic indoctrination, and restrictions on travel outside their city of residence. Former PKI members also no longer are required to have official permission to change their place of residence. The requirement that "E.T." ("Ex-Tapol" or political prisoner) be stamped on the identification cards of these prisoners was ended officially in 1995, although in practice it continued to be used in many cases. At least some individuals who had E.T. stamped on their identity cards were able to have the stamp removed. This stamp has been used by the Government to monitor the activities of these persons, allowing the Government and prospective employers to identify alleged former PKI members, thereby subjecting them to official and unofficial discrimination.
Under the government-sponsored transmigration program, large numbers of persons were moved voluntarily from overpopulated areas to more isolated and less developed areas (this program began during the Dutch colonial period and has been carried out more or less continuously since then). It also was used to resettle local populations within East Timor and Papua. However, the Government reduced its support after the economic downturn that began in mid-1997, and in December 2000, Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Alhilal Hamdi announced that the Government had stopped sending transmigrants between islands as of August 2000. He said that henceforth the Government only would support transmigration within the same province. Conditions at some relocation sites are life-threatening, with inadequate measures to protect the transmigrant population against diseases endemic to the sites. In June 2000, 68 transmigrant families left their camp in Bonggo subdistrict, Papua, because of poor living and agricultural conditions, disease, and inadequate support from the Government. They told the Legal Aid Society in Jayapura, where they took refuge, that 39 families at the site were suffering from severe malnutrition, and that lack of health care facilities contributed to a high disease and mortality rate. Transmigrants and migrants outside of the Government's transmigration program received direct and indirect government support in the form of developmental assistance programs and contracts with the TNI or local government officials. This practice, particularly in Papua and parts of Kalimantan, led to resentment among indigenous populations, whose members believed that their rights were infringed upon. Indigenous inhabitants also believed that they were being discriminated against with the disbursement of development funds to other newly arrived groups that they perceived to be their economic rivals (see Section 5). Allegedly this was a contributing factor in the June 25 and 26 attack on the Pontianak IDP camps (see Section 1.a).
The Government used its authority, and at times intimidation, to appropriate land for development projects, particularly in areas claimed by indigenous people, and often without fair compensation (see Section 5).
The Government restricts the import of Chinese-language publications (see Sections 2.a. and 5).
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, journalists continued to suffer intimidation and assaults in areas of unrest. The Constitution contains a general provision for freedom of expression that was strengthened by the MPR's amendment of the Constitution in August 2000, and the 1999 law on human rights provides for substantive protection of press freedom (see Section 1.d.); however, journalists continued to be intimidated and abused during the year. President Megawati revived the Ministry of Information, the institution that controlled media reporting through censorship during former President Soeharto's era. According to the Government, the reinstated Ministry's primary goal is to disseminate information to the public. There were no reports that the Ministry was responsible for restricting freedom of the press by year's end.
The Alliance of Indonesian Journalists (AJI) revealed that police had assaulted journalists 47 times during the first 4 months of the year. AJI stated that the threat of violence from police or even police summons for journalists to be witnesses, as well as threats from members of the public, compel journalists to practice self-censorship.
The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported on the May 24 attack on six journalists in Central Java by the organization Laskar Diponegoro, which was composed of supporters of then-President Wahid. According to local and international sources, the perpetrators verbally and physically abused the journalists, who were reporting on a rally. One reporter, from the Jakarta-based daily newspaper Republika, suffered a concussion and was in the hospital for 5 days.
On August 28, the Maluku governor banned two newspapers, one Christian and one Muslim, accusing both of biased reporting and claiming that they threatened national security (see Section 2.b.). In North Maluku, the provincial government threatened to shut down operations of several local print media outlets for implicating the governor in corrupt practices and for biased reporting on ethno-religious conflicts. By year's end, the local police had taken no action.
During the year, the media often reported on corruption, political protests, national unrest, and the public debate between then-President Wahid and the DPR leading to Wahid's impeachment. Most major media are not hesitant to publish critical and balanced stories on sensitive problems or to criticize public figures. All print media are private. The press has been highly critical of both the GAM and the military in Aceh, reporting both sides of the conflict.
Since the Department of Information was abolished in 1999, most editors have believed that the Government no longer required a license to publish a newspaper or magazine because there no longer was a controlling body to receive reports. President Megawati revived the Ministry of Information, the institution that controlled media reporting through censorship during former President Soeharto's era. According to the Government, the reinstated Ministry's primary goal is to disseminate information to the public. There were no reports that the Ministry was responsible for restricting freedom of the press by year's end.
The Government operates a nationwide television network with 12 regional stations. Private commercial television networks, most with ownership by, or with management ties to, former President Soeharto's family, continued to flourish. All are required to broadcast government-produced news, but they also broadcast news and public affairs programming independently. Television networks increased their news coverage during the year, including extensive coverage of the DPR and MPR sessions.
In September 2000, the Film Censor Board (LSF) issued a circular to television stations stating that recorded talk shows that discuss social and political topics must be reviewed by the Board before they are broadcast. Media figures and legal experts claim that the circular had no legal standing because it conflicted with the 1999 Press Law, which forbids censorship of the press. Some observers called for the abolition of the LSF, which censors films for sex and violence, although there was no attempt at enforcement by the LSF.
As of October, 779 private radio broadcasting companies exist in addition to the Government's radio network. The Government radio station, Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), produces the program "National News." Private radio stations and 53 regional government network affiliates relay the news programming throughout the country.
Regulations issued by the Government in 1998 reduced the number of compulsory government RRI programming broadcasts from 14 to 4 per day. While private radio stations in the provinces generally adhered to the Government's requirement, many private radio stations in larger urban areas broadcast the RRI program only once per day. The regulations allowed stations to produce their own news programs, and many have done so. Candid live coverage of demonstrations and other breaking stories increased markedly during the year. Moreover, "talk radio" call-in programs regularly address timely political and socioeconomic problems.
Foreign television and radio broadcasts are readily accessible. Satellite dishes and cable television networks have proliferated throughout the country, and there is unrestricted access to the Internet. The Government made no effort to restrict access to satellite programming and has proclaimed an "open skies" policy. Foreign periodicals circulate widely without censorship.
The Government restricts the import of Chinese-language publications and music (see Sections 1.f. and 5). There are seven locally published Chinese language newspapers. In November 2000, a new independent television station, Metro TV, began broadcasting 2 hours of news in Mandarin per day. The program was the first Chinese-language television broadcast in the country since 1965.
The Government regulates access to the country by visiting foreign correspondents, particularly to areas of unrest. It occasionally reminds resident foreign correspondents of its authority to deny requests for visa extensions. Special permission is necessary for foreign journalists to travel to Aceh and Papua; however, there are no reports that the Government enforced this regulation during the year.
The Government requires a permit for the import of foreign publications and videotapes, which must be reviewed by government censors. Customs forms require entrants into the country to declare possession of Chinese publications, although significant amounts of material bypass customs and censorship procedures.
Most books by the prominent novelist and former political prisoner Pramoedya Ananta Toer remain banned, although some are in circulation. The Government banned no additional books during the year; however, protests from Islamic groups prompted three publishers to remove books from bookstores. In May the Islamic Youth Movement (GPI), an Islamist organization, burned books on Karl Marx and threatened bookstores with the forcible removal of books dealing with communism. Media and human rights NGO's criticized the calls to withdraw the books from circulation as a violation of freedom of expression.
The 1999 law on crimes against the State (see Section 1.d.) prohibits persons from disseminating or developing the teachings of communism, or from seeking to eliminate or replace the state ideology of Pancasila in a way that causes harm to persons or property.
The security forces inconsistently enforced a no-tolerance policy against flying the Papuan or Acehnese flags until the Papua Autonomy Law, which allows the flying of the Papua flag as a cultural symbol, was signed into law in November. Security forces tore down and destroyed flags and flag poles, and in some cases beat or killed those attempting to raise or protect separatist flags. The Government pressed criminal charges of treason against Alex Manuputty, Secretary General of the FKM, after he refused to abide by a ban on FKM activities and hoisted the separatist South Maluku Republic (RMS) flag on April 24 in Ambon. Manuputty faces maximum penalties of 7 years for hostile intentions and 4 years for treason.
The GAM intimidated journalists in Aceh. Aceh's leading daily newspaper, Serambi Indonesia, closed for a month beginning on August 11 after harassment from the GAM. The GAM also kidnaped three television crew members for 3 weeks, claiming that their media coverage was biased (see Section 1.b.).
Editors of several Jakarta newspapers and major television stations said that they had received letters and telephone calls from extreme religious groups threatening physical violence for articles or editorials the group considered against their beliefs. The editors acknowledged that these threats from citizen groups have a chilling effect on how they report the news.
The law provides for academic freedom, and there are no significant constraints in practice on the activities of scholars. Political activity, open discussions, and blunt criticism of the Government at universities continued to flourish during the year.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government places significant controls on the exercise of this right in certain areas. There are no permit requirements for public social, cultural, religious, or scientific meetings, of five or more persons. However, organizers of political, union, and public policy meetings must notify the police (see Section 6.a.). In practice some public meetings were dispersed forcibly. On July 6, four alleged police intelligence officers interrupted an international NGO workshop in Manado, North Sulawesi. The officers demanded that facilitators provide proof of prior notification about the conference, a written explanation of course activities, and a list of the participants before allowing the workshop to continue.
The law on freedom of expression requires that demonstrators notify the police 3 days in advance and appoint someone accountable for every 100 demonstrators. The law restricts demonstrations near specific sites. Nevertheless, frequent demonstrations are held in Jakarta and around the country with or without official permission. The Government previously had invoked the law to detain and try demonstrators in Jakarta and elsewhere; however, no such trials occurred during the year. Participants in several demonstrations were killed and suffered injuries when security forces seeking to disperse crowds shot, beat, and kicked demonstrators (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Ten thousand workers protesting the new severance pay decree in June threw stones, wood, and plastic bottles, injuring at least nine persons and damaging two hotels in Jakarta. Hundreds of pedicab drivers, using Molotov cocktails, machetes, steel bars, and stones, attacked 500 city public security officials, who were about to raid their illegal business in August. The drivers beat an official to death, two officials were injured, and the mob set fire to and stoned vehicles (see Section 1.a.). Muslim students in Makassar, South Sulawesi attacked non-Muslim students during two separate incidents on October 23 and 24, severely injuring six persons. The Muslims claimed to be retaliating against the burning of an effigy of Usama bin Laden in a predominantly Christian town. Hundreds of students from the Indonesian Muslim University (UMI) in Makassar destroyed property at the Japanese Consulate General and demanded the Consul lower the Japanese flag so it could be burned. The students were protesting U.S. military action in Afghanistan. Police broke up several peaceful demonstrations in Papua. In some instances, police broke up peaceful demonstrations in which Papuans raised the Papuan independence flag and, after demonstrators resisted, killed and injured many demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.a., and 5).
The vast majority of public gatherings and demonstrations, which have proliferated rapidly since President Soeharto's resignation, occurred without any official interference. A number of labor strikes throughout the year and demonstrations during the MPR Special Session to impeach Wahid took place without police or TNI intervention (see Sections 3 and 6.a.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the Government places some controls on the exercise of this right. The Social Organizations Law (ORMAS) requires the adherence of all organizations, including recognized religions and associations, to the official ideology of Pancasila. This provision, limits political activity and prohibits groups from seeking to engage in democratic political competition, to make Indonesia an Islamic state, to revive communism, or to reintroduce partisan ideological division into the country.
The 1999 Law on Crimes Against the State (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.) prohibits the formation of organizations that "are known to or are properly suspected" of embracing the teachings of Communism/Marxism/Leninism "in all its forms and manifestations." It empowers the Government to disband any organization that it believes to be acting against Pancasila, and it requires prior government approval before any organization may accept funds from foreign donors. The Communist party is banned; however, the requirement for prior government approval is ignored so widely as to be meaningless.
The Government announced late in 1995 its intention to relax a regulation requiring police approval for all meetings of five or more persons of all organizations outside offices or normal work sites. However, in practice this regulation continues to apply to union meetings (see Section 6.a.).
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for religious freedom for members of officially recognized religions, and the Government generally respects this provisions in practice; however, there are some restrictions on certain types of religious activity and on unrecognized religions. The Constitution also requires the belief in one supreme God.
The law officially "embraces" five religions--Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, and Hinduism; however, on June 1, the Government lifted its remaining ban on Jehovah's Witnesses, and in January 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid lifted the ban on the practice of Confucianism that had existed since 1967. While only these religions are recognized officially, the law also states that other religions are not forbidden. The Government permits the practice of the mystical, traditional beliefs of "Aliran Kepercayaan." Some religious minorities, including the Baha'i and Rosicrucians, were given the freedom to organize in May 2000. The MPR adopted a Human Rights Charter that provides citizens the freedom to practice their religion without specifying any particular religion.
Jehovah's Witnesses had been banned from practicing their faith since 1976; however, the ban was lifted in June by presidential decree. The Government requires Jehovah's Witnesses to register with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, under the Directorate General of Protestantism. Unlike in previous years, members of Jehovah's Witnesses have not reported any incidents of harassment or any difficulties in conducting civil matters, and some local governments have issued permits to build places of worship.
A presidential decree promulgated in January 2000 repealed the ban on the practice of Chinese religion, its beliefs, and its customs. Confucianists are permitted to celebrate publicly the Chinese New Year. A Ministry of Interior circular issued in late March 2000 permits Confucianism to be listed as a religion on marriage license applications, allowing Confucian marriages to be recognized and registered officially in the country. However, not all communities have implemented the new guidelines.
Members of the Baha'i Faith generally did not report problems during the year. However, in May a crowd of Muslims reportedly expelled two Baha'i families living in a predominantly Muslim village in the Donggala District of Central Sulawesi.
The Government in some provinces has banned the messianic Islamic sect Darul Arqam; the Government also bans the Al-Ma'Unah school in some provinces. The Government attempts to monitor Islamic groups considered to be deviating from orthodox tenets, and in the past has dissolved some groups. Historically, the Government has attempted to control Muslim groups whose practices deviate from mainstream Islamic beliefs because of pressure by nongovernmental leaders of mainstream or conservative and traditional Muslim groups as well as the Government's concern for national unity. A proposal to implement Islamic law failed to gain MPR approval in August 2000.
The legal requirement to adhere to Pancasila extends to all religious and secular organizations. The first tenet of Pancasila is belief in one supreme God; however, individuals are not compelled to practice any particular faith. All citizens must be classified as members of one of the officially recognized religions and atheism is forbidden. As this choice must be noted on official documents, such as the identification card, failure to identify a religion can make it impossible to obtain such documents. The Government actively supports allowing Islamic law in Aceh, although it had not been implemented by year's end, and has dropped previous public opposition to groups who support it elsewhere. The Vice President in fact has publicly expressed support for Islamic law for Muslims in the whole country.
Religious violence and the lack of an effective government response to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks led to allegations that officials were complicit in some of the incidents or, at a minimum, allowed them to occur with impunity. There were numerous instances of attacks on churches, mosques, temples, and other religious facilities during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 5). The most widespread interreligious violence occurred in Maluku province. Governor Latuconsina estimated that 164 houses of worship were damaged or destroyed between June 2000 and July 2001, and that thousands of persons were killed as a result of violence between Christians and Muslims. For example, in June, 20 civilians were killed in a firefight between security forces and Laskar Jihad members (see Section 1.a.). A bomb planted on a passenger ship exploded in the Bay of Ambon on December 11, killing 3 passengers and injuring 39 others. Soon after, several hundred Christian youths and Muslims fought as security forces stood by. On Seram Island in Maluku, hundreds of Christians converted to Islam in July to save their lives (see Section 5). The Government continued to be reluctant to intervene in mob attacks on houses of worship and proved ineffective in controlling the violence in Maluku province; however, governmental efforts to respond to communal violence in the provinces of North Maluku and Sulawesi generally were more effective (see Section 5).
In Maluku Christian sources alleged that elements of the security forces were biased against them. However, there was no evidence to suggest that the security forces, as an institution, supported either side. Some individuals and some units occasionally sided with their coreligionists, but their actions appeared to be random and contrary to orders. Some military troops were detained and interrogated for allegedly openly siding with militia in at least one episode on Haruku; however, there were no reports that such perpetrators ever were punished. Several hundred police officers have themselves been attacked and some killed because of their religion; hundreds of police members and their families, and numerous other government officials, are among the country's IDP's.
According to many Christian officials, the anti-Christian sentiment behind the violence in the Moluccas, Sulawesi, and elsewhere is not new, but the impunity associated with such acts has increased since the resignation of Soeharto in May 1998. In April local courts sentenced to death three Christian suspects who were found guilty of killing hundreds of Muslims and inciting religious hatred in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in May and June 2000. The Government did not investigate fully most cases of attacks on religious facilities that occurred during riots, and in other cases, did not investigate such incidents at all; however, the Government formed a special interagency team to investigate the December 24 bombings on Christian churches, and an NGO has formed a joint fact-finding team with the Government to investigate the Christmas Eve church bombings (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5).
A regulation provides that before a house of worship may be built, consent must be obtained from local residents living near the site, and a license must be obtained from the regional office of the Department of Religion. Some Christians claim that this regulation is used to prevent them from building churches and rebuilding damaged religious facilities. Nonetheless, Christians continued to build churches during the year.
The law allows conversion between faiths, and such conversions do occur. Independent observers note that it is difficult to obtain official recognition for interfaith marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims. Persons who are not members of one of the five accepted religions also have difficulty in obtaining official recognition of their marriages.
The Government views proselytizing by recognized religions in areas heavily dominated by another recognized religion as potentially disruptive, and discourages it. Foreign missionary activities are relatively unimpeded, although in North Maluku, the provincial government requires missionaries to engage in strictly humanitarian work. In the first half of the year, the Government deported Australian missionaries who did not inform the regional government of their activities. In addition visas allowing the official entrance of new foreign clergy are difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, many foreign clergy come to the country. Laws and decrees from the 1970's limit the number of years that foreign missionaries may spend in the country, although some extensions were granted in remote areas like Papua. Foreign missionary work is subject to the funding stipulations of the Social Organizations Law (see Section 2.b.).
The Government does not target or use violence against converts to or from a particular religion; however, witnesses testified to human rights groups of multiple incidents in which active duty and retired military personnel stood by during the torture of Moluccan Christians who refused to convert.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution permits the Government to bar persons from either entering or departing the country, and the Government restricts freedom of movement to some extent. A September 20 press report indicated that 201 suspects were prevented from leaving the country by the Attorney General's office, and that 29 suspects similarly were barred from leaving by the Finance Ministry. A decree issued in July permits the Government to confiscate and revoke the passports of persons banned from travel outside of the country. The Government exercised this authority in September when it banned the travel of two businessmen suspected of involvement in a graft case. In 1999 according to Department of Justice information quoted in the press, the Government maintained a list of 3,665 foreigners who are barred from entering the country, and 417 citizens who are prohibited from leaving the country. Five prominent Papuan leaders who were barred from leaving the country in August 1999 (see Section 5) subsequently were allowed to travel abroad; however, some of them only were able to travel after foreign governments made high-level representations on their behalf.
The Government also restricts movement by citizens and foreigners into and within parts of the country. The 1999 Law on Overcoming Dangerous Situations (see Section 1.f.) allows the military to limit land, air, or sea traffic, to prohibit migration into and out of areas, to order relocation of persons outside areas, and to order house arrest in a declared state of emergency. Following demonstrations against the law, the Parliament sent the law to the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defense for revisions. The law was passed during the year; however, it has yet not been implemented.
The State Intelligence Agency screens the proposed foreign staff members of non-Indonesian institutions that implement technical cooperation programs, including NGO's, before the State Secretariat approves the staffs' entry into the country (see Section 4). Foreign consultants and foreign assistance staff, particularly those working in sensitive parts of the country such as Aceh, Papua, and the Moluccas, must be cleared by the Intelligence Coordination Agency (BAKIN) before their assignments can be approved by the State Secretariat.
On June 23, 2000, then-President Wahid announced a ban on all travel to Maluku and North Maluku provinces; however, the ban was not enforced effectively. On June 26, 2000, the President declared a state of civil emergency for both provinces. The emergency decree, originally in place for 90 days, was extended indefinitely (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.c., and 5).
The Government requires that individuals obtain permits to work in certain areas, primarily to limit further population movement to crowded cities; however, this requirement is universally ignored.
According to the Government, foreigners residing in the country for more than 3 months were required to register with the Immigration Office between August 10 and October 10 for census purposes. This reinforced the Foreigner Registration Law, under which violators may be subject to a maximum of 1 year in prison and a 500 fine (5 million rupiahs).
Although former political prisoners associated with the abortive 1965 coup no longer are officially required to carry the stamp "E.T." on their identity cards, in many cases, the stamps have not been eliminated in practice (see Section 1.f.).
Following the August 30, 1999 consultation vote in East Timor, there was credible evidence that, in a planned and orchestrated operation, the security forces and militia forcibly removed or compelled to flee a substantial percentage of the 250,000 East Timorese who departed the territory at that time. Over 190,000 of these IDP's have returned to East Timor, but during the first half of the year intimidation by East Timorese prointegration militia forces in the camps in West Timor continued to prevent many others from returning (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
All international assistance to the IDP's in West Timor was suspended following the September 6, 2000, attack on UNHCR personnel in Atambua, in which three UNHCR workers were killed, and did not resume during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 4). The Government's failure to disarm and disband the militias created security conditions unfavorable to the resumption of international assistance. There is evidence that TNI elements have supported the militias with supplies and training, although such support apparently declined in 2000. In 2000 and during the year, the Government began to take steps to promote the voluntary and safe return of IDP's, for example, by agreeing to settle pension claims for some IDP's who requested repatriation, or resettlement in Indonesia. There is no evidence that the Government is returning forcibly or resettling East Timorese IDP's. The Government planned to end support to East Timorese IDP's in West Timor, and closed the refugee camps; however, this had not occurred by year's end.
According to a U.N. World Food Program report released in November, there were over 1,321,136 IDP's in Indonesia, up from slightly over a million in 2000. The largest number of IDP's were from the sectarian conflict in Maluku and North Maluku, although some Moluccan IDP's returned to their homes during the year. In Maluku province, there were 338,440 IDP's and 166,318 in North Maluku. There were 46,103 IDP's in North Sulawesi, almost entirely Christians from Maluku and North Maluku; 35,611 in Central Sulawesi (most displaced by sectarian fighting in the Poso area); and 246,904 in South and Northeast Sulawesi. Other IDP's from Maluku are located in Papua, which has a total of 16,870 IDP's. There were 48,585 IDP's in North Sumata and another 14,351 displaced within Aceh. There were 194,596 IDP's on the island of Java. In Kalimantan, there were 60,777 displaced Madurese. Other islands, including Bali, hosted smaller numbers of displaced persons.
The Government generally has encouraged and assisted foreign and domestic humanitarian aid to the Moluccas and Sulawesi (see Section 4). However, on occasion both Muslim and Christian groups have accused some foreign donors of partiality. The Government had not been particularly effective or helpful in promoting the voluntary and safe return or resettlement of the IDP's in these areas by year's end.
In East Java, there were no reports during the year of police forcibly evicting to other areas persons rumored to be practitioners of magic (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
During the year, indigenous Dayaks forced over 105,000 Madurese migrants to flee their homes in Central Kalimantan (see Sections 1.a. and 5). An estimated 40,000 Madurese who fled their homes during interethnic violence in 1999 remained in IDP camps in West Kalimantan and Madura (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
Throughout the year, thousands of rural Acehnese temporarily fled their villages and became IDP's. In some cases, IDP's were fleeing security forces that were patrolling the area or otherwise intimidating them (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In other cases, armed separatists terrorized or coerced villagers into becoming IDP's, in part to create international attention and sympathy. In other cases, rural nonethnic Acehnese residents were targeted by armed separatist GAM members. In June the GAM conducted a series of attacks in Central Aceh against Javanese and Gayo residents, displacing thousands of persons.
Unrest in Papua caused numerous persons to leave their homes in Wasior district and other areas. Hundreds of persons fled security force search operations connected to the killing of five Brimob officers (see Section 1.a.). Approximately 300 Papuan refugees remain in camps in Papua New Guinea, afraid to return for fear of being targeted by security forces as militants. Forty-six families fled a Bonggo transmigration site during an exchange of fire between security forces and militant groups.
The law does not provide for the granting of asylum and/or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the UNHCR, which maintains a regional office in Jakarta. As of December 31, the UNHCR had registered 2,835 asylum seekers and refugees. Of this number, 1,459 were Iraqis, 1,035 were Afghans, 174 were Iranians, and 167 other nationalities. The Government has not formulated a policy regarding asylum; however, there were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government
In 1999 citizens for the first time successfully changed their government through an open, transparent democratic process, following decades of authoritarian rule. The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) meets every 5 years in a "General Session" to elect the President and Vice President in separate secret ballots and to establish the "Broad Guidelines of State Policy" (GBHN), which is intended to serve as a policy plan for the Government.
In July the MPR met to convene an "Extraordinary Session" to require then-President Wahid to account for his performance in office. Claiming the charges politically were motivated, Wahid refused to appear, instead issuing a directive to "freeze" the MPR, the House of Representatives, DPR, and the Golkar party, and to hold new elections, exceeding his authority under the Constitution. The military and police refused to implement the directive, and on July 23, the MPR cancelled Wahid's mandate and Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri replaced Wahid as President provided by law.
The 695-member MPR consists of the 500 Members of the DPR, 130 regional representatives, who are elected by provincial legislatures, and 65 appointed representatives from functional and societal groups. The June 7, 1999 general election, in which 48 political parties participated, was monitored by domestic and international observers and was widely considered open, fair, and free. In October 1999, the newly installed MPR chose Abdurrahman Wahid as President and Megawati Soekarnoputri as Vice President in a transparent process, which was broadcast live on national television. The next round of general and presidential/vice presidential elections is scheduled for 2004.
Reportedly, the military's significant historical and sociopolitical role, is being phased out gradually. Although the police and military are separated, the 2 institutions continue jointly to hold 38 unelected seats in the DPR and 10 percent of the seats in provincial and district parliaments, in partial compensation for not being permitted to vote. In addition to these appointed legislative positions, active-duty military and police officers also may run for election to government office but, in a significant departure from past practice, are expected to retire (except those appointed to legislative bodies) after they are elected; however, retired officers often retain strong ties to their former institutions, and occupy important positions at all levels of government. The military and police have agreed to relinquish their appointed seats in the DPR and regional legislatures by 2004, but an MPR decree passed in August 2000 allows them to retain seats in the MPR until "not later than" 2009. In an apparent effort to decrease demands for an immediate end to their legislative positions, military and police legislators generally have sought to limit their involvement in matters deemed not to affect their core interests.
The legislative branch, which had no independence during the Soeharto era, has moved forcefully to establish its independence from the executive branch. A number of constitutional changes, MPR decrees, and legal changes have enhanced legislative branch authorities, raising some concerns that the balance of power may have shifted too far from the executive branch. However, during its November session, the MPR amended the constitution to provide for direct presidential and vice presidential elections, a bicameral legislation with a regional representative's chamber, and a constitutional court with the power of review of the legislation. The MPR was to decide its precise future role and transitional arrangements through further constitutional changes to be considered in 2002. The legislative branch has demonstrated its independence through the DPR's aggressive pursuit of its government oversight function, as well as the MPR's success in first forcing President Wahid to cede more authority over daily government management to Vice President Megawati because of perceived inefficiency and inconsistency in the Wahid Administration's implementation of policy. Through the first half of the year, the DPR's legislative record reflected its almost exclusive focus on removing Wahid from office; however, it was restricted by cumbersome procedures and a lack of staff expertise. Nonetheless, it exercised considerable influence over the final content of bills introduced by the Government. Legislative reforms passed in October established a legislative code of ethics and streamlined the legislative process.
The MPR is empowered to amend the Constitution and issue decrees, functions that it undertook in the first of its newly instituted "Annual Sessions" held in August 2000. A key demand of the reform movement was an overhaul of the 1945 Constitution, which was perceived to have fostered the development of past authoritarian regimes. In the first amendment of the Constitution, the 1999 MPR passed curbs on executive power, including a limit of two 5-year terms for the President and Vice President. At the same time, the MPR empowered an ad hoc working committee to consider further amendments and to draft MPR decrees. This effort resulted in the passage of the second amendment to the Constitution during the "Annual Session" in August 2000. The second amendment did include many important changes, including provisions for protections of human rights modeled closely on the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, regional autonomy, and further separation of powers. During its November session, the MPR amended the 1945 Constitution to provide, among other changes, for direct presidential and vice-presidential elections, a bicameral legislature with a regional representative's chamber, and a constitutional court with the power of judicial review of legislation. The amendments, if fully implemented, would increase elected officials accountability to constituents by allowing persons to directly elect the President and Vice President.
The remaining 92 percent of national and 90 percent of regional parliamentary seats that are not occupied by members of the military and police are filled through elections held every 5 years. All adult citizens, except active-duty members of the armed forces, persons in prison convicted of crimes punishable by over 5 years' incarceration, persons suffering from mental disorders, and persons deprived of voting rights by an irrevocable verdict of a court of justice, are eligible to vote. Members of the banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) may not run for office.
International and domestic monitoring groups and the major political parties accepted the June 1999 parliamentary election as generally free and fair, notwithstanding many technical problems and irregularities, particularly in remote areas. The numerous technical problems, due to inadequate preparations and ambiguities in the regulations, included inadequate supplies of ballots and reporting forms, poor training of poll workers, confusion over procedures, and insufficient funds to pay poll workers. There were numerous, and in some cases credible, allegations of vote buying and scattered allegations of voter intimidation, particularly in rural areas. In some cases, alleged violations were referred to judicial authorities for legal action; however, in most cases, political parties reached informal solutions among themselves.
The actions of some small party representatives on the General Election Commission (KPU) contributed to a significant delay in validating election results and led to a considerable loss of public faith in the impartiality and integrity of the KPU. In June 2000, the DPR amended the 1999 election laws to establish a new and more independent KPU, which was being formed through a transparent process that encourages public involvement. Some observers are concerned that the new KPU secretariat would remain administratively dependent upon the Ministry of Home Affairs.
While there are no legal restrictions on the role of women in politics, the percentage of women in government and politics does not correspond to their percentage of the population. The President, Megawati Soekarnoputri, is a woman, as are two members of her Cabinet. However, there are fewer women in the DPR and in the MPR than during the Soeharto era. Women represent less than 9 percent of DPR members, a decrease from 13 percent during Soeharto's last term. Nonetheless, many women activists argue that the quality of female politicians has improved. Female Members of Parliament announced in mid-October 2000 the formation of a non partisan women's caucus. Surveys have shown that while more than one-third of civil servants are women, less than 6 percent are in positions of authority (see Section 5). The Papua Special Autonomy Law reserves one-third of the seats on a Papuan Peoples' Assembly for women.
While there are no legal restrictions on the role of minorities in politics, the percentage of minorities in government and politics does not correspond to their percentage of the population. In the Cabinet, there are 15 Javanese, 4 Sundanese, 1 Bugese, 1 Papuan, 1 Sumbawa, 1 Flores, 1 Kalimantan, 1 Bali, 1 Chinese, 2 Acehnese, 2 Minang, and 1 Batak.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
Domestic human rights organization are subject to monitoring, interference, and abuse from the Government; nonetheless, domestic human rights organizations were extremely active in advocating improvements to the Government's human rights performance. They pressured the Government to investigate human rights abuses, acted as defense counsel in political trials, sought to offer assistance--and in some cases protection--to victims and witnesses of human rights abuses, and urged improvements in government policies and legislation.
There are many local NGO human rights organizations, including the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, the Indonesia Legal Aid and Human Rights Association and the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence. The Government meets with these NGO's regularly.
At times security force members killed, abused, and detained human rights activists and humanitarian workers, most frequently in areas with active insurgencies. For example, according to HRW, between November 2000 and October 2001, seven human rights defenders were killed in Aceh. Muhamad Efendi Malikon, secretary of the East Aceh Care Forum for Human Rights was killed on February 28, in Peukan Langsa village. His body was found shortly after he was stopped at a checkpoint by the paramilitary police. By year's end, there were no progress on the investigations of past killings of NGO workers.
In 2000 police summoned the director of Papua's best-known human rights organization, the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy in Papua (ELS-HAM), for questioning; police released him on December 16, 2000, after nearly 22 hours of questioning. The director was ordered to the station after ELS-HAM held a press conference in which it accused the police of the extrajudicial killing of three persons on December 7 (see Section 1.a.).
Four members of an NGO based in Bandung, West Java, that advocates on behalf of dispossessed farmers, claim that they were kidnaped on August 14, 2000, (see Sections 1.e. and 4). The office of the Committee for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS), based in Jakarta, was attacked during a series of bombings in various areas of the country in 2000 (see Section 1.c.).
Intimidation, threats, and violence toward NGO's escalated in West Timor in 2000, greatly hindering humanitarian operations. Intimidation by militias and outright attacks forced all international humanitarian aid organizations to withdraw from West Timor in September 2000; they had not returned by year's end (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
The Government must approve the assignment of staff members of foreign institutions that implement technical cooperation programs, including NGO's, before they are allowed to enter the country (see Sections 2.c. and 2.d.); however, some NGO's allege that the Government has used this requirement to restrict their activities, especially in sensitive areas.
The Government generally considered outside investigations or foreign-based criticism of alleged human rights violations to be interference in the country's internal affairs. In addition security forces and intelligence agencies tended to view foreign NGO's and international organizations with suspicion and distrust, particularly those operating in conflict areas. For example, on June 8, police detained overnight 34 foreigners representing NGO's, as well as the Indonesian organizers of an Asia Pacific Solidarity Conference on Neoliberalism in Depok, West Java (see Section 6.b.). On August 18, police detained overnight six German students, according to press accounts, for activities deemed incompatible with their visitor visas. The students were conducting demographic research in Jakarta with the help of the Urban Poor Consortium, a local NGO. Immigration officials initially said that the students would be deported, but later admitted that they did not have sufficient funds, and the students were permitted to depart at their own expense.
The Government generally encouraged and assisted foreign and domestic humanitarian aid. However, on occasion both Muslim and Christian groups accused some foreign donors of partiality (see Section 2.d.).
The ICRC generally was allowed access to identified detainees by civilian and military officials at the central government level. In Aceh the ICRC maintained an office in Lhokseumawe and was allowed to visit known prisoners and others detained by security forces. The ICRC conducted humanitarian operations in Aceh, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku, and East and West Timor; however, the Government at times hindered the ICRC's access to these areas and was slow in accrediting additional staff members.
The government-appointed National Human Rights Commission (KOMNASHAM), in its 8th year of operation, continued to examine reported human rights violations and to demonstrate independence from the Government. The 1999 Human Rights Law gave KOMNASHAM statutory authority and increased its membership to 35 members. KOMNASHAM lacks enforcement powers, but attempts to work within the system, sending teams to inquire into alleged human rights problems. It employs persuasion, publicity, and moral authority to highlight abuses, to recommend legal and regulatory changes, and to encourage corrective action. The Government appointed KOMNASHAM's original chairman, who then appointed the other 24 initial Commission members. Future members are required to serve 5-year terms and to be nominated by KOMNASHAM, confirmed by the Parliament, and approved by the President.
During the year, the number of commissioners dropped to 18 due to resignations and retirements, and KOMNASHAM began deliberating on nominees to fill the vacancies. The DPR had not selected the new commissioners by year's end. Disputes within KOMNAS-HAM prompted the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS), Legal Advocacy (ELSHAM), and Legal Aid Foundation (LBH) to criticize KOMNASHAM as an ineffective institution.
The law provides KOMNASHAM with subpoena powers and provides that disputes settled by written agreement through the Commission's mediation are enforceable in court. However, the law does not give KOMNASHAM the power to enforce its recommendations or to recommend government action.
In 1999 KOMNASHAM supported the work of the KPP-HAM and forwarded its findings to the Attorney General in late January 2000. In February 2000, KOMNASHAM formed a commission to investigate the 1984 killing of Muslim demonstrators at Tanjung Priok, Jakarta (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In August 2000, KOMNASHAM opened an office in Ambon, Maluku province. Commission members conducted an investigation into human rights violations in Papua in October 2000, following an outbreak of violence in Wamena (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
In response to the U.N. Security Council's (UNSC's) adoption of Resolution 1319 after the September 6, 2000, killing of three UNHCR workers in West Timor (see Section 1.a.), the Government and various political leaders initially indicated that they would oppose the actions that the UNSC mission called for in the resolution. However, the Government later invited the UNSC mission to observe the situation in West Timor and to assess the Government's compliance with the resolution. The UNSC mission, consisting of permanent representatives from five member countries, visited West Timor and Jakarta in November 2000.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status
The Constitution does not forbid explicitly discrimination based on gender, race, disability, language, or social status; however, it stipulates equal rights and obligations for all citizens, both native and naturalized. An amendment to the Constitution adopted during 2000 introduced the possibility of affirmative action to achieve fair and equal treatment; however, some activists believe that because the amendment does not mention men or women specifically, it would not adequately protect women.
The Guidelines of State Policy (legal statutes adopted by the MPR) explicitly state that women have the same rights, obligations, and opportunities as men. However, guidelines adopted in the past 20 years also state that women's participation in the development process must not conflict with their role in improving family welfare and the education of the younger generation. Marriage law designates the man as the head of the family. The Constitution grants citizens the right to practice their individual religions and beliefs; however, the Government only recognizes six religions and imposes some restrictions on other religious activity, although some of these restrictions were lifted during the year (see Section 2.c.).
Women
Violence against women remains poorly documented. The Government does not collect data on domestic violence. Women's rights NGO's estimate that only 15 percent of domestic violence incidents are reported. According to a legal aid organization involved in domestic violence issues, approximately 11 percent of rural women suffer some form of domestic violence. Experts on the subject agree that the number of incidents has risen since the onset of the country's economic downturn starting in mid-1997, which has been aggravated by social changes associated with rapid urbanization. The domestic violence victim advocacy group, Kalyana Mitra, counseled 96 cases in West Java between January and October, 75 domestic violence cases, 17 rape cases, and 4 sexual harassment cases. The Government has acknowledged the problem of domestic violence in society; however, violence against women, especially when it occurs within the home, is perceived by the public to be a private matter and not within the purview of the Government.
The Government, in consultation with women's NGO's, operates a National Commission on Violence against Women. The Commission's mandate is to improve and coordinate government and NGO efforts to combat violence against women and to provide assistance to victims. During the year, the Commission reported that violence against women resulting from the economic crisis continued to rise, and issued a national action plan report.
In November 1999, a group of government officials and NGO representatives signed a declaration calling for the development of a joint strategy to end violence against women. The group drafted a 2001-04 national action plan, which incorporates a "zero tolerance" strategy on violence against women, creates safety mechanisms to protect women against violence, and establishes new legislation to penalize perpetrators of such
violence. However, national legislation and implementing regulations to support the action plan have not yet been enacted. The Government provided technical support, but not funding, to establish and administer a women's crisis center in a leading public hospital in Jakarta. Foreign governments have funded some of these crisis center projects.
The Government provides some counseling for abused women, and several private organizations assist women. Many of these organizations focus on reuniting the family rather than on providing protection to women. Many women rely on the extended family system for assistance in cases of domestic violence. Both public and private initiatives to assist female victims of violence were undertaken during the year. There are a small but growing number of women's crisis centers, including a drop-in center founded in Jakarta by the government-sponsored National Women's Organization (KOWANI) and a crisis center for women in Yogyakarta that is administered by an NGO. Women's Partner (Mitra Perempuan), a crisis center for women that opened in 1997, runs a 24-hour hotline and a temporary shelter for abused women. The hotline receives several calls each day from battered women. The National Commission reports a general increase in the number of female victims of violence seeking assistance from crisis centers, and attributes the increase both to a growing awareness of services and to an increase in the incidence of violence against women. Some public hospitals in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya have integrated crisis centers that assist and protect abused women and children. These centers are cosponsored by the Government and the Women's Crisis Center (Pusat Krisis Perempuan). One of these centers, located in a Jakarta hospital, reported 30 cases of rape, 31 cases of domestic violence, and 37 cases of child abuse during a 4-month period during 2000. Jakarta, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta police have opened "women's desks" in their precincts to assist rape and domestic violence victims and to investigate their cases.
Rape is a punishable offense, and perpetrators have been arrested and sentenced for rape and attempted rape, but reliable statistics are unavailable. Women's rights activists believe that rape is seriously underreported due to the social stigma attached to victims. Some legal experts report that unless a woman immediately seeks an examination at a hospital that produces physical evidence of rape, she would be unable to bring charges successfully. A witness also is required in order to prosecute for rape, and only in rare cases can a witness be produced, according to legal experts. Some women reportedly fail to report rape to police because the police do not take their allegations seriously. The maximum prison sentence for rape is 12 years, but observers claim that sentences usually are much shorter. Mob violence against accused rapists frequently is reported. An August 1999 conference of forensic experts recommended that standard procedures be adopted for examining and taking statements from rape victims, in an effort to improve the successfulness of rape prosecutions. However, by year's end, no rape investigation standards were in place, nor were uniform procedures followed.
Rape by a husband of a wife is not considered a crime under the law. Cultural norms dictate that problems between a husband and wife are private matters, and violence against women in the home rarely is reported. While police could bring assault charges against a husband for beating his wife, they are unlikely to do so.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely criticized by international health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health, is practiced in some parts of the country. No national legislation exists on FGM. Customary ("adat") law has allowed for symbolic female circumcision and small-cut (mild) incisions of the clitoris, which would fall under the World Health Organization's (WHO's) type IV classification of FGM (this category includes pricking, piercing or incising of the clitoris). According to reports, FGM practices appear to be increasingly symbolic in nature (for example, a pinprick or the cutting of a ceremonial root). More invasive FGM practices--removal of the clitoral prepuce, partial removal of the sensitive tip of the clitoris, and even total removal--reportedly occur in Madura, South Sulawesi, and parts of East Java. However, there are no epidemiological reports on the frequency of these practices. Since FGM is not regulated, and religious leaders have taken no formal position, the method used often is left to the discretion of the local traditional practitioner. FGM usually occurs within the first year after birth, often on the 40th day, although it is performed in some areas up to age 10. It is performed either at a hospital or, especially in rural areas, by the local traditional practitioner. Both government officials and NGO leaders familiar with FGM problems believe invasive FGM practices are declining. The Government included FGM as a gender issue in its National Action Plan to End Violence against Women, published in late November. FGM heads the Action Plan's list of religious teachings requiring investigation and modification. The Government and NGO's are targeting awareness campaigns at Muslim religious leaders and those directly involved in performing female circumcisions (such as traditional birth attendants), and towards society at large, to bring about an end to these practices.
There were reports of the forced conversion of hundreds of Christians in Maluku in November and December 2000. Both male and female converts later were forced to undergo circumcision.
The country is a significant source, transit point, and destination for trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced prostitution and in some cases for forced labor (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). It is widely alleged that TNI-backed militias raped numerous women during the 1999 violence in East Timor and kept many as sex slaves (see Section 1.c.). Kirsty Sword-Gusmao, the wife of East Timorese independence leader Xanana Gusmao, reported to the international press in November 2000 that 33 pregnant East Timorese women returned to East Timor and claimed they had been abducted and forced to serve as sex slaves for the TNI in West Timor.
Female domestic servants also are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. In some cases, unscrupulous recruitment agencies have promised women employment as domestic servants overseas and then held them against their would for extended periods until jobs are found for them. Women working abroad as domestic servants often risk various forms of abuse, exploitation, and other cruel treatment. The Government has taken some steps to assist its citizens working abroad, but advocates charge that much more needs to be done (see Section 6.f.).
Harassment is not a crime under the law, only "indecent behavior." However, sexual harassment charges may damage a civil service career. The law reportedly only covers physical abuse, and requires two witnesses. Female job applicants and workers have complained of being victimized sexually by supervisors. Many groups criticized the Manpower Law for failing to address sexual harassment and violence against women in the workplace and for providing inadequate protection in areas of employment in which women regularly suffer abuse, such as overseas employment and household service. However, the Manpower Development and Protection Bill contains provisions requiring employers to ensure that female workers who work at night are safe and free from sexual abuse or harassment. A separate article in the bill also states that all workers have the right to receive protection against immorality and sexual harassment or abuse.
Women disproportionately suffer from illiteracy, poor health, and inadequate nutrition. The illiteracy rate among women is 17 percent, compared to 10 percent among men; the national illiteracy rate average for citizens over 15 years old is 12 percent, according to a UNICEF report. The high maternal mortality rate is approximately 18,000 deaths per year. In Papua the maternal mortality rate is 1,025 deaths per 100,000 and in Maluku 796 deaths per 100,000 live births.
During the year, hundreds of thousands of women and children were displaced by violent conflicts in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku provinces, West and Central Kalimantan, Papua, and Aceh (see Section 2.d.). In addition to those directly victimized by violence, a substantial number of those displaced suffered from nutritional deficiencies and other health problems.
Under the Constitution, women are equal to and have the same rights, obligations, and opportunities as men. However, in practice, women face some legal discrimination. Marriage law defines the man as the head of the family. Marriage law for Muslims, based on Shari'a (Islamic law), allows men to have up to four wives if the husband is able to provide equally for each of them. Court permission and consent of the first wife is required, but reportedly most women cannot refuse. Cabinet officials and military personnel customarily have been forbidden from taking second wives, although reportedly a few ministers have had second wives. A government regulation stipulates that a male civil servant must receive the permission of his superior to take a second wife. The regulation has come under considerable attack and renewed scrutiny. Some women's groups urged the Government to ban polygyny altogether.
Women often bear a heavier evidentiary burden than men in obtaining a divorce, especially in the Islamic-based family court system. Divorced women rarely receive alimony. There is no enforcement mechanism for alimony payment, and according to Shari'a, a divorced wife is entitled to only 3 months of alimony, and even alimony for this brief period is not always granted.
The Citizenship Law states that children's citizenship is derived solely from the citizenship of the father. Children of citizen mothers and foreign fathers are considered foreigners and require visas to remain in the country until the age of 18, at which time they may apply for citizenship. They are prohibited from attending public schools and must attend private, international schools, which usually are more expensive.
Foreign women married to citizens also face difficulties. Their children are citizens and thus are not allowed to attend international schools unless they receive special permission from the Ministry of Education. Such women usually are taxed as foreign heads of households, but they do not have property, business, or inheritance rights. NGO's and the Government appear to agree that the law needed revision; however, by year's end, the Government had not taken any action to remedy these problems.
Although some women (such as President Megawati Soekarnoputri) have a high degree of economic and social freedom and occupy important positions in both the public and private sectors, most women do not have such status and they constitute a disproportionately high percentage of the lower end of the socioeconomic and political scale (see Section 3). The latest survey showed that while more than one-third of civil servants are women, less than 6 percent are in positions of authority.
Female workers in manufacturing generally receive lower wages than men. Many female factory workers are hired as day laborers instead of as full-time permanent employees, and companies are not required to provide benefits, such as maternity leave, to day laborers. Women's rights activists report that there is a growing trend in manufacturing to hire women to do work in their homes for less than the minimum wage (see Section 6.e.).
Unemployment rates for women are approximately 50 percent higher than those for men. Women often are not provided the extra benefits and salary that men are given when they are the heads of households, and in many cases do not receive employment benefits for their family members, such as medical insurance and income tax deductions. Nevertheless, female university graduates receive an average salary that is 25 percent less than their male counterparts. Some women's activists believe that a growing number of professional women are advancing in a variety of fields, especially in the legal profession. However, no statistics are available to support this assertion. According to a study conducted during the year, only 20 percent of top managers and affluent consumers in Jakarta are female.
The law requires the Government to formulate national policies to forbid and eliminate discrimination (including by gender) in the workplace. However, there were no implementing regulations in effect and discrimination continued in practice.
Despite laws that provide women with a 3-month maternity leave, the Government acknowledged that pregnant women often are dismissed or replaced while on leave from their jobs. Some companies require women to sign statements that they do not intend to become pregnant. Labor laws mandate 2 days of menstrual leave per month for women, although this leave is not allowed in all cases. The Manpower Development and Protection Bill includes specific protections for female workers. For example, employers may not require pregnant women or unmarried women under 18 to work at night.
Women's advocacy groups remained active throughout the year. Numerous NGO-organized conferences and rallies dealing with women's issues were held, as well as some that were organized by academic institutions and government ministries.
Children
The Government has stated its a commitment to children's rights, education, and welfare, but lacks the resources to implement such a commitment. The Ministry of Women's Empowerment is responsible for children's issues. In its budget for 2002, the Government allocated 1.0 percent of the GDP to education, or 0.74 percent of the country's GDP. A 1979 law on children's welfare defines the responsibility of the State and parents to nurture and protect children; however, implementing regulations have never been promulgated and, despite DPR deliberations during the year, the law's provisions on protection of children had not gone into effect by year's end.
The Government estimates that the country has 40 million school-age children or about 19 percent of the country's population. During the year, the Ministry of Education began a national program to keep children in school through alternative programs as a means to combat child labor. According to International Labor Organization (ILO) and UNICEF statistics, about 6.1 to 6.4 million children between the ages of 7 and 15 have dropped out of school since the economic downturn that began in 1997. An academic source estimated in November 2000 that the number of students not enrolled in school for that age group was even higher, approximately 6.8 million. According to Ministry of Education data, 11.7 million children through the age of 18 were not attending school in 1999, while the ILO estimated that 11.9 million school-aged children did not attend school between 2000 and 2001.
A 1994 law increased mandatory education requirements from 6 to 9 years (6 years of elementary education and 3 years of junior high school education). However, the law has not been implemented fully, due to a lack of government enforcement, inadequate school facilities, and inability of families to pay children's school fees. Official and unofficial fees for public education, including payments for registration, books, meals, transport, and uniforms have become prohibitively high for many families. Boys and girls have mostly equal access to basic education according to 1998 Indonesian government statistics.
The Government allocates only 8 percent of its human resources development budget to health care. Low-cost medical care is available, although access and availability sometimes are sporadic, especially in rural areas. The results of a Ministry of Health study conducted in 2000 on public health services concluded that over 40 percent of the country's public health centers had no attending physicians. According to a UNICEF report issued during 2000, the percentage of women and children without access to health care ranged from 20 to 50 percent, with the most limited access occurring in rural areas and poorer provinces. Moreover, government spending on health care also has dropped in real terms due to the economic downturn. In some cases, women and children unable to pay medical bills have been detained by hospitals that maintained their own "debtors' prisons." There also were reports of hospitals refusing treatment to children suffering from malnutrition, due to insufficient resources.
According to a credible report from a local NGO, infant mortality rates nearly have doubled as a result of the economic downturn, increasing from 55 per 1,000 deaths in 1995 to 100 per 1,000 in 1998. According to UNICEF'S report, 7 percent of the country's children die before they are 5 years old and 5 percent die before their first birthdays. Almost 50 percent of children grow up in unhealthy or unsafe environments. The overall use of health care facilities by children has dropped significantly since the economic downturn began in mid-1997.
Throughout the year, UNICEF continued to warn of a "lost generation" of youth as a result of the economic crisis. In 2000 UNICEF estimated that 8 million preschool-age children were undernourished, which threatens the development of brain function. According to U.N. data, as many as 30 to 50 percent of the country's children under the age of 5 may be suffering from some form of malnutrition, an increase from 9.8 percent in 1995. One university source in 2000 estimated that 20 million children were malnourished, an increase from 8 million in 1997. Specifically, researchers have begun to document an increase in children suffering from deficiencies of Vitamin A, iron, and protein. According to the same UNICEF study many of the country's children suffer from "hidden hunger" or malnourishment.
In previous years, the media frequently reported on instances of children dying from malnutrition or lack of treatment for the condition. Such reports were most frequent in Java, but also originated from Sumatra and other regions.
Schooling for children in areas of conflict was disrupted severely during the year. Hundreds of thousands of children in Maluku and North Maluku provinces and in Central Sulawesi fled their homes to escape violence (see Section 2.d.), interrupting their education and exposing them to malnutrition, disease, and other hazards. NGO's and religious groups in Maluku province estimate that thousands of Muslim and Christian children between the ages of 12 and 17 have become child soldiers (see Sections 6.d.). Younger children between the ages of 7 and 12 provide support services to the militias. Some of the children involved in fighting reportedly are from outside the province. In one incident in 2000, a 16-year-old from Java, who had joined the Laskar Jihad militia, was killed while fighting on Saparua Island, Maluku province.
According to the Department of Manpower, the number of working children increased from approximately 2 million before the economic downturn began in 1997 to an estimated 2.5 million in mid-1999. Children's advocates and labor analysts agree that the number of working children has increased significantly due to the downturn, but contend that the number of working children was higher than the Government's estimate even before the downturn, and has increased significantly since 1997 (see Section 6.d.). The ILO estimated that between 6 and 8 million children worked during 2000, and World Vision, an international NGO, estimated that there were 6.5 million children working in the country. It is estimated that millions of girls work as live-in domestic servants (see Section 6.d.).
According to a study, there are about 170,000 street children in 12 urban areas. Of these, about 20 percent are girls. At least 60 percent of the street children polled were not enrolled in school. There were about 10,000 street children in Jakarta. Medan, Bandung, Surabaya, Makassar (Ujung Pandang), and Yogyakarta are other cities with substantial populations of street children. Of the 1,600 street children living in Yogyakarta, about 25 percent are girls. Many of them are victims of sexual abuse or are engaged in prostitution. Another NGO survey suggests that there are at least 100,000 street children and 6 million abandoned children in the country.
Street children sell newspapers, shine shoes, help to park or watch cars, and otherwise attempt to earn money. Many street children work under hazardous conditions as scavengers, garbage pickers, and on fishing platforms and fishing boats. According to credible sources, there are hundreds, perhaps over 1,000 children working in hazardous conditions on fishing platforms off the east coast of North Sumatra (see Section 6.c.). Many thousands of children work in factories and fields (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
A number of local and international NGO's work with street children. NGO's have criticized the Government's inadequate efforts to help street children and working children. The Government works in cooperation with the U.N. Development Program, UNICEF, the ILO, and with NGO's to create programs for street children and child laborers. One project includes the establishment of "open houses" in targeted areas to provide vocational training and basic education to street children. Open houses for street children have been established in several provinces. The Indonesian Children's Welfare Foundation reports that 100 open houses have been established.
Another approach to the problem of street children is the National Program for Discipline and Clean Cities Decree. Under this program, street children are removed physically from cities by bus. Usually, they are taken outside the city and left there. Sometimes they are taken to "holding houses" where they first are interrogated and later released. NGO's criticize this practice as ineffective and inhumane.
Child abuse is not prohibited specifically by law. According to Unicef's 2000 report, close family members frequently discipline children; however, there are no reliable sources for violence within families. Governmental efforts to combat child abuse have been slow and ineffective due to cultural sensitivities, lack of monitoring mechanisms and verification procedures regarding child abuse.
In September 2000, a network of illegal baby adoptions was uncovered by the authorities. Four persons were arrested and three babies were rescued and used as evidence. The babies allegedly were bought from low-income families and were sold to wealthy infertile couples.
Child prostitution (see Section 6.f.) and other sexual abuses occur, but firm data are lacking. Police continue to uncover syndicates involved in trafficking girls to work in brothels on various islands or in other countries (see Section 6.f.). According to a 1998 NGO study, there were 406 cases of child abuse that year, 900 to 1,200 cases of child rape, and 40,000 to 70,000 cases of other sexual abuse against children.
There is no separate criminal justice system for juveniles. Ordinary courts handle juvenile crime, and juveniles often are imprisoned with adult offenders. A Juvenile Justice Law was passed by Parliament in 1996 and was signed by then-President Soeharto in 1997. It defines juveniles as children between the ages of 8 and 18 and establishes a special court system and criminal code to handle juvenile cases; however, it has not been implemented. An estimated 400,000 children are brought to court annually, according to UNICEF statistics. Sixty percent of the children are involved in petty crimes such as theft. Areas with the highest reported incidences of juvenile crime are Java, including Jakarta (7,281), South Sumatra (1,336 cases), and North Sumatra (994).
Persons with Disabilities
There is some discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, and in the provision of other state services. The law mandates access to buildings for persons with disabilities; however, the Government generally does not enforce these provisions in practice. Precise statistics on the number of persons with disabilities in the country are not available. In 1999 the U.N. estimated that about 5.43 percent of the population (about 10 million persons) were persons with disabilities, while the Government estimated that 3 percent of the population (6 million persons) were persons with disabilities. Families often hide family members with disabilities to avoid social stigma or embarrassment. Several provinces have established rehabilitation centers for persons with disabilities. Authorities reportedly take persons with disabilities off the streets and bring them to these centers for job training. Nevertheless, many citizens with disabilities citizens beg for a living.
The Constitution requires that the Government provide care for orphans and persons with disabilities; however, it does not specify the definition of the term "care", and the provision of education to all children with mental and physical disabilities never has been inferred from the requirement. Regulations require the Government to establish and regulate a national curriculum for special education by stipulating that the community should provide special education services to its children.
According to a 2000 UNICEF report in 2000, there are approximately 2 million children with disabilities between the ages of 10 and 14. Law No. 4/1997 on Disability and Government Regulation No. 72 on Special Education stipulate that every child with disabilities has the right to access to all levels and types of education and rehabilitative treatment as necessary. However, this does not occur in practice. NGO's are the primary providers of education for children with disabilities. There are 1,084 schools for persons with disabilities; 680 are private and 404 are government-operated. Of the government schools, 165 are "integrated," serving both regular and special education students. In Jakarta there are 98 schools for persons with disabilities, 2 of which are government-operated and 96 of which are private. The Government also runs three national schools for the visually and hearing impaired, and persons with mental disabilities. These schools accept children from throughout the country.
The Disability Law was designed to provide access to education, employment, and assistance for persons with disabilities. It requires companies employing over 100 persons to give 1 percent of their positions to persons with disabilities. However, persons with disabilities face considerable discrimination in employment, although some factories have made special efforts to hire workers with disabilities. The law mandates accessibility to public facilities for persons with disabilities; however, virtually no buildings or public transportation provide such accessibility.
Indigenous People
The Government considers the term "indigenous people" to be a misnomer, because it considers all citizens except ethnic Chinese to be indigenous. Nonetheless, it publicly recognizes the existence of several "isolated communities," and their right to participate fully in political and social life. The Government estimates that the number of persons in isolated communities is 1.5 million. This includes, but is not limited to, groups such as the Dayak population in Kalimantan, some of whom live in remote forest areas, indigenous communities located throughout Papua, and economically disadvantaged families living as sea nomads on boats near Riau in eastern Sumatra and near Makassar (Ujung Pandang) in southern Sulawesi. In October the Government passed the Papua Special Autonomy Law, which had not come into effect by year's end. The law provides indigenous tribes the right to protect and maintain their customs and laws, and significant participation by tribes in the government and economy of Papua. Human rights monitors criticize the Government's transmigration program for violating the rights of indigenous people (see Section 1.f.) and for encouraging exploitation of natural resources upon which indigenous people depend for their livelihood.
Sixty percent of the country's population of over 200 million lives in Java, which represents only 7 percent of the country's territory. The government-sponsored transmigration program seeks to resettle persons from densely populated areas to sparsely populated areas outside Java (see Section 1.f). The majority of migrants are spontaneous migrants who are not part of the official program.
Critics of transmigration claim that it often threatens indigenous cultures and causes social resentment. Some critics claim that transmigration has been used as a political tool to increase the number of nonindigenous persons in certain areas in part to preclude secessionist movements by indigenous people. In some areas, such as in certain parts of Sulawesi, the Moluccas, Kalimantan, Aceh, and Papua, relations between transmigrants and indigenous people are hostile. NGO's also report tensions between transmigrated Javanese and indigenous populations in the Mentawai Islands off the west coast of Sumatra. Indigenous groups often claim that they receive less government support and funding than transmigrants, and transmigrants claim that in some cases they are moved to areas with undesirable land and inadequate infrastructure. Transmigrants sometimes are settled on land who ownership is disputed.
Acute tensions continued in West and Central Kalimantan between the indigenous Dayak and Madurese migrants over land disputes, economic competition, and cultural differences (see Section 1.a.). The Madurese community in Kalimantan developed around an earlier group of transmigrants, although the majority of Madurese in the area are spontaneous immigrants. An estimated 40,000 Madurese remain in camps in West Kalimantan and over 105,000 Madurese were forced to evacuate to East Java and Madura Island after over 600 died in ethnic violence in February and March.
Land disputes are a major source of tension throughout the country, particularly in many sparsely populated resource-rich areas traditionally inhabited by indigenous people. The tension often is expressed along racial and ethnic lines because developers frequently are ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Land disputes represent the largest category of complaints submitted to the National Human Rights Commission and a significant portion of the cases brought to legal aid foundations and other assistance organizations. According to a law derived from colonial era practices, all subsurface mineral resources belong to the Government. The Basic Agrarian Law states that land rights cannot be "in conflict with national and state interests," which provides the Government with a broad legal basis for land seizures. When disputes cannot be settled, the Government has the authority to define fair compensation for land.
However, in practice compensation for the land often is minimal or even nonexistent. Decisions regarding development projects, resource-use concessions, and other economic activities generally are carried out without the participation or informed consent of the affected communities. When indigenous people clash with those promoting private sector development projects, the developers almost always prevail. There are numerous instances of the use of intimidation, sometimes by the military, and often by hired "thugs," to acquire land for development projects, particularly in areas claimed by indigenous people. Such intimidation has been used in Jakarta, other parts of Java, North Sumatra, Aceh, and other areas. According to credible sources in West Sumatra, large tracts of land in the province have been confiscated over the past several years by commercial plantation developers who bribed the local governor. In some cases, NGO's report that farmers were evicted from the land without compensation to allow for new palm oil plantations staffed by Javanese transmigrants. Competition for land and resources remains acute in Sumatra. Some NGO's that seek to aid these communities are subjected to verbal attacks, raids, and other forms of intimidation by government security forces. Since 1999 NGO's have been more vocal and effective in lobbying for indigenous people's rights.
NGO's assert that violations of the rights of indigenous people are frequent in the mining and logging areas, and that violations stem from the Government's denial of ownership by indigenous people of ancestral land, erosion of indigenous groups' traditional social structure, and forced takeover of land. These problems are most prevalent in Papua, where disputes over compensation for logging resources led to several violent incidents between locals and logging companies (see Section 1.a.).
In Southeast Sulawesi, the Moronene people have been struggling for more than 40 years to secure government recognition of their claim to ancestral lands in what is now Rawa Aopa Watumohai National Park. The Government insists, on the basis of the 1999 Forestry Law, that the Moronene people must resettle on land outside the park. In September 2000, they reached agreement with the local government that they would be allowed to remain on their lands until a court decided the merits of their claim. However, from November 23 to 25, 2000, approximately 70 security personnel sought to evict the Moronene from the park. The security team, which consisted of local police, Brimob members, and forest police and officials, reportedly destroyed 23 homes in the 3 villages of Hukaea-Laeya, Lampopola, and Lanowulu. At year's end, the Moronene still were living in Hukaea-Laeya village, but they feared further destruction of their settlements since the Government has not changed its position that they must leave.
Bonded labor has become a problem for some Dayaks in East Kalimantan (see Section 6.c.). According to the ILO in 2000, on at least one project, a logging company established a company store in a remote area, in which workers had to purchase necessities at inflated prices. Since the workers could not afford the prices, they bought the goods using vouchers representing future wages, thereby, according to the ILO, "turning once independent and relatively well-off farmers into impoverished bonded laborers trapped in an ever-mounting cycle of debt."
Tensions with indigenous people in Papua continued. Papuans complain of racism, religious bias, paternalism, and condescension as constant impediments to better relations with non-Papuans, including members of the Government, the military, and the non-Papuan business community. A large percentage of the population of Papua consists of migrants, who are economically and politically dominant. Most civil servants in local governments in Papua and other isolated areas continue to come primarily from other parts of the country, rather than from the local indigenous population. Tensions between Papuans and migrants continued during the year, particularly after Papuans killed 24 migrants in Wamena on October 6 and 7, 2000, after security forces opened fire on Papuans who resisted efforts to take down Papuan independence flags (see Sections 1.a. and 2.a.). The attack caused an exodus of several thousand migrants from the Wamena area and from Papua (see Section 2.d.). In 2000 Papuans and migrants clashed again in Merauke in early November and December 2000 and at the Abepura market area in Jayapura from November 11 to 13, 2000 resulting in injuries on both sides and the burning or looting of migrant shops. Unknown attackers killed two police and a security guard in Abepura, Papua, on December 7, 2000 and two timber workers near the Papua-Papua New Guinea border on December 9, 2000. Police blamed both attacks on the Free Papua Organization (OPM) (see Section 1.a.).
Since 1999 Papuans have asserted themselves politically to a greater extent than in the past. Beginning in late 1999, Papuan political figures and traditional tribal organizations began forming Papuan "task forces" (Satgas Papua). In February 2000, Papuan community and tribal leaders organized a "great consultation" of Papuan leaders to set an agenda for self-government and designate a Papuan Presidium Council to speak on behalf of Papuans. The consultation's closing statement called for the holding of a congress comprised of the entire Papuan community. The congress was held from May 29 through June 4 2000 in Jayapura, and involved more than 2,000 delegates from each of Papua's districts, other parts of the country, and the Papuan community overseas. Delegates approved a resolution rejecting the 1969 "Act of Free Choice," which confirmed Papua's incorporation into Indonesia; called on the central Government, along with the U.N. and the U.S. and Dutch governments, to review the process by which the territory became a part of Indonesia and to recognize Papua's sovereignty since 1961; and mandated the Papuan Presidium Council to strive for international recognition and to report back to the congress on December 1 2000, regarding progress toward these goals. On December 1, 2000, Presidium leaders led a peaceful commemoration of the 1961 declaration of independence by Papuan community leaders, then under Dutch rule. Presidium vice chairman Tom Beanal recounted the Presidium's efforts since the Papuan Congress to start a dialog with Jakarta, and appealed for calm. The day was observed peacefully in most parts of Papua. In 2000 Presidium Council leaders traveled throughout the province to publicize the results of the congress, regularly met with government officials in Jakarta, and journeyed to other countries to advance the Papuan cause.
The Government initially responded to Papuan initiatives by welcoming the call for dialog and offering special autonomy within the context of a united Indonesia. Then-President Wahid met several times with Papuan leaders and visited Papua on December 31, 1999 and January 1, 2000, when he announced that the name of the province would be changed to Papua. Then-Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri visited the province in May and September 2000, and then-President Wahid provided $110,000 (Rp. 1 billion) for the holding of the Papuan congress. After the congress, he met with Presidium Council leaders and reemphasized the Government's firm stance against Papuan independence, but said it was permissible to fly Papuan independence flags as long as they were smaller and flown below the Indonesian flag. However, during the August 2000 MPR session, legislators attacked Wahid's stance toward Papuans and demanded a tougher approach that rejected the flying of the independence flag, the use of the name Papua, and other perceived manifestations of proindependence sentiment. In late September 2000, new National Police Chief Suryo Bimantoro ordered all Papuan independence flags to be taken down. Police attempts to remove forcibly flags in Wamena on October 6, 2000, Merauke on November 4, 2000 and December 2, 2000, and Fak Fank on December 1, 2000 sparked violent clashes with Satgas Papua members, resulting in many deaths and heightened tensions between Papuans and non-Papuan migrants (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). After Papuans attacked a police station in Jayapura on December 7, 2000, police shot and killed a student at a nearby dormitory and detained and beat more than 100 others, 2 of whom died as a result of the beatings. Police revived criminal charges against five leading members of the Papuan Presidium Council for crimes against the security of the State and public order in November 2000 (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.). Police encouragement of the formation of migrant "solidarity" organizations, and the arming of some of those organizations by security forces, also sharpened divisions between the two communities. Moreover, the creation of an armed "Red and White Task Force" (Satgas Merah Putih) in Papua, reportedly at the instigation of the army, has raised concerns that certain elements of the national security forces may be seeking to create an armed Papuan paramilitary force, modeled on East Timorese militias, to oppose Papuan independence efforts, and to oppose specifically, the Satgas Papua groups, the vast majority of which were considered proindependence, and which were disbanded in late 2000.
The Papua Special Autonomy Law was signed into law in November, but by year's end had not come into effect. A March conference debated whether to pursue independence or special autonomy, resulting in numerous meetings with local communities to explain autonomy and solicit input. A special team was established in Jakarta to lobby Parliament and the administration and explain the intent and background of the Papuan Special Autonomy Law. This effort was effective in convincing the Parliamentary Special Committee to use the Papuan draft as the basis for the final law. Most of the provisions in the Papuan version survived largely intact in the final text, including permission to rename the province Papua and permission for a Papuan flag and anthem. The laws provisions include: acknowledgement of the Government's shortcomings in governing Papua; acknowledgement of the special cultural identity of Papuans and recognition of indigenous rights; establishment of a Human Rights Commission to clarify the history of Papua; redirection a large percentage of local revenues from the central government to the province; and a stipulation that the provincial government has authority in all fields, except foreign policy, defense, monetary and fiscal policy, religion, and justice.
Security forces did not obstruct political activities related to the Papuan Special Autonomy Law; however, they did sporadically enforce a no-tolerance policy on flying the Papuan flag, until the Special Autonomy Bill passed Parliament, after which time security forces allowed the flying of the flag. Security forces targeted separatist groups in attacks in Ilaga and Kali Kopi (see Section 1.a.).
Religious Minorities
Despite constitutional and legal provisions regarding freedom of religion, there are some restrictions on certain types of religious activity and on unrecognized religions. Closures and attacks on churches, temples, and other religious facilities, ranging from minor vandalism to arson, continued during the year, according to the Indonesian Christian Communications Forum (ICCF). The ICCF recorded 235 religiously motivated attacks on Christian churches or other Christian facilities from October 1999 through September 2001. The Ministry of Religion estimates that 181 mosques were damaged or destroyed during the year. The largest number of attacks on persons and places of worship occurred in 2000 in Maluku and Central Sulawesi provinces in the eastern part of the country, causing more than 3,000 deaths, the displacement of nearly 500,000 persons, and damage to at least 81 churches and dozens of mosques (see Sections 1.a., 2.c., and 2.d.).
Attacks on places of worship reflect religious tensions, but other contributing factors include underlying socioeconomic and political tensions between poor Muslims and more affluent Sino-Indonesian Christians. Similarly, in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi, economic tensions between native Christians and Muslims who migrated to these areas in recent decades were a significant factor in incidents of interreligious violence. Christian and Muslim communities in these provinces blamed each other for initiating and perpetuating the violence.
The Government failed to suppress or respond to most cases of violence, and did not resolve fully the many cases of attacks on religious facilities and churches that occurred during riots; in other cases, the Government did not investigate such incidents at all (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
Anti-Christian sermons and publications also increased, leading to concerns that societal support for religious tolerance was eroding. Muslim University students in Makassar, South Sulawesi severely beat four non-Muslims in October, after hearing that residents of a prodomendity Christian town, Tondano, had burned an effigy of Usama bin Ladin. The following day, Muslim students in Makassar severely beat two other non-Muslims. In 2000 a movement known as the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) emerged on university campuses in Java. There were sporadic reports from some neighborhoods of Jakarta that student followers of the NII movement set up roadblocks, checked identification cards, and harassed passing non-Muslims, in some cases forcing them to recite passages from the Koran. Similar incidents occurred in Makassar, South Sulawesi. Many of the country's religious minorities expressed growing concern over what they perceived to be increasing demands by certain Muslim groups to impose Shari'a law in the country. A proposal to implement Islamic law in 2000 failed (see Section 2.c.); however, Islamic law sometimes is implemented in communities, especially in Aceh. The regional autonomy plan in Aceh recognizes Islamic law as the local law there.
The Laskar Jihad ("holy war troops," a Muslim group that was formed in 2000) engaged in paramilitary training, and leaders of the group announced that they intended to wage war on Christians in the Moluccas and other parts of the country. An upswelling of killings occurred in Central Sulawesi in November and December, apparently spurred by Laskar Jihad militants. Tens of thousands of Christians fled their homes, as villages were attacked and in some cases burned to the ground. However, the Government moved in troops, who were able to quell the violence. By year's end, a peace agreement had been negotiated under government auspices; however, Laskar Jihad had not been removed from the area (see Section 1.a.).
Between June 2000 and July, thousands of persons were killed in violence between Muslims and Christians (see Section 2.c.). Local sources estimate that over 3,000 Laskar Jihad militia participated in attacks on Christians in Maluku Province and Central Sulawesi during the year. Police arrested Laskar Jihad leader Jafar Umar Thalib on May 4 on charges of inciting religious violence and ordering the killing by stoning of a follower, Abdullah. Police released Thalib on June 12, but placed him under house arrest pending further investigation.
In late December 2000, then-President Wahid conceded that hundreds of Christians on Keswui and Teor Islands in Maluku had converted to Islam in November and December 2000 to save their lives. By year's end, only an estimated 165 converts had been able to leave the 2 islands. There also were credible reports of forced conversions occurring in other parts of Maluku and North Maluku. Estimates range from over 3,500 to 8,000 cases. While most documented cases involve Christians who converted to Islam, there have been reports of Muslims who were forced to convert to Christianity in Halmahera, North Maluku.
Christian IDP's from Keswui and Teor who had undergone conversion said in media interviews that Muslim militants told Christians to convert to Islam or face probable death at the hands of Muslim militias. According to these sources, Christians were herded into mosques and converted to Islam en masse. Both male and female converts later were forced to undergo circumcision to prove that they were genuine Muslims, despite the fact that Muslim women in Maluku were not customarily circumcised.
A number of bombings and bombing attempts primarily targeted against Christian facilities occurred throughout the year, including at the Santa Anna Catholic Church in Jakarta on July 22. The bombing injured at least 70 persons, including a 7-month old infant and a 4-year old girl. Police accused 13 persons whom police arrested in September in connection with a mall bombing. On December 31, simultaneous bomb explosions damaged three churches near Palu; however, no persons were injured. A number of other bombings also occurred during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
Muslims are a religious minority in the easternmost province of Papua. Local sentiment against the efforts of Muslim missionaries to win converts in the predominantly Christian province, as well as resentment of the arrival in the province of mainly Muslim migrants from other parts of the country, has in the past led to attacks on mosques in Papua. However, there were no reports of attacks on mosques in Papua during the year.
In May a crowd of Muslims reportedly expelled two Baha'i families living in predominately Muslim villages in Central Sulawesi (see Section 2.c.).
During the year there were occasional reports of killings of persons who practice traditional magic ("dukun santets") (see Section 1.a.) in East, Central, and West Java. The number of such killings is believed to have declined since 1998, when nearly 200 such persons were killed in East Java, and since 1999, when more than 30 persons, believed to be dukun santet were killed in West Java.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The Government officially promotes racial and ethnic tolerance. Ethnic Chinese, who represent approximately 3 percent of the population--by far the largest nonindigenous minority group--historically have played a major role in the economy. In 1998 anti-Chinese sentiment led to serious and widespread attacks on Chinese-owned businesses. Despite the Wahid Government's commitment to reopen the investigation into these attacks, the Megawati government has failed to pursue the 1999 recommendations of the joint fact-finding team (TGPF) that was commissioned to investigate the 1998 attacks (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 4).
Racially motivated attacks against Sino-Indonesians have dropped sharply since mid-1998, although Sino-Indonesians continued to report instances of discrimination and harassment.
An undetermined number of Sino-Indonesians remain abroad or away from their normal places of residence in the country. While many reside in Singapore, there also are sizeable Sino-Indonesian populations in Australia and the U.S. Prominent Sino-Indonesians estimate that approximately half of the Sino-Indonesian men living abroad occasionally return to their homes for short visits to protect their remaining business interests, but most keep their families and the bulk of their capital offshore or in other parts of the country.
With the revocation of Presidential Decree 14/1967 in January 2000, Confucianism may be practiced in public and the law no longer forbids the celebration of the Chinese New Year in temples or public places (see Section 2.c.). Chinese New Year decorations are displayed prominently and sold in public shopping areas in several major cities. The Chinese language may be taught, spoken, and printed, and private instruction in Chinese no longer is prohibited. Some universities, including the University of Indonesia, offer Chinese-language instruction. A number of private institutions openly offer courses as well. Chinese-language publications in the country no longer are banned; however, customs regulations still prohibit the import of Chinese language publications and music (see Section 2.a.). State universities still have informal quotas that limit the enrollment of ethnic Chinese students.
Authorities no longer are required to note a special code on the national identification card for citizens of Chinese extraction. However, some Sino-Indonesians have claimed that this practice continues.
Noncitizen ethnic Chinese may not operate businesses in rural areas; however, the Government does not restrict this right for Sino-Indonesians.
Indigenous residents of Papua and various human rights groups charge that Papuans are underrepresented in the civil service in that province. The Government has made some efforts to recruit more civil servants in Papua, and there has been some increase in the number of civil servant trainees in this province, despite a "no growth" policy in the civil service as a whole.
In Kalimantan indigenous Dayaks claim that they are not considered in civil service jobs, and that they are marginalized in many other economic sectors by transmigrants. This led to recurrences of interethnic conflict in Central and West Kalimantan in which hundreds of indigenous Dayaks were killed (see Section 1.a.). In addition, Africans form a disproportionately large percentage of those killed while being arrested, suggesting that such killings are racially motivated.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The law provides that 10 or more workers have the right to form a union. Union membership must be open to all regardless of political affiliation, religion, ethnicity, or gender. Private sector workers are by law free to form worker organizations without prior authorization, and unions may draw up their own constitutions and rules and elect their representatives. In addition the law provides that union dues must finance union activities, but does not indicate how dues should be collected or whether management has a role in collecting dues.
Employers criticize the act's provision permitting any 10 workers to form a union. Employers claim that this provision encourages the creation of too many unions, which they say complicates collective bargaining and increases the possibility of strikes.
Under the law and registration regulations, more than 20 new or previously unrecognized union federations have notified the Department of Manpower of their existence since 1998, and thousands of workplace-level units have registered with the Department of Manpower, although some unions have complained of difficulty in registering their workplace units.
The Federation of All-Indonesian Trade Unions (SPSI), which was formed by the merger (under the Government's direction) of labor organizations in 1973, is the oldest trade union organization. The head of the SPSI and many members of the executive council also are members of the Golkar political organization and its constituent functional groups. The Department of Manpower, whose minister is the leader of the SPSI, does not intervene in organizational disputes within trade unions nor provides guidance to any unions.
The law allows the Government to petition the courts to dissolve a union if its basis conflicts with Pancasila or the 1945 constitution, or if a union's leaders or members, in the name of the union, commit crimes against the security of the State and are sentenced to at least 5 years in prison. Once a union is dissolved, its leaders and members may not form another union for at least 3 years after the original union's dissolution.
The law does not address the adjudication of jurisdictional disputes among multiple unions in a workplace, and existing laws and regulations do not provide clear guidance on how jurisdictional disputes should be handled. Such ambiguity occasionally has led to clashes between unions in a workplace.
Since 1999 civil servants have not been required to belong to KORPRI, a nonunion association. Employees of several government departments announced that they would form their own employee associations, and union organizations began to seek members among civil servants. Unions also are seeking to organize state-owned enterprise (SOE) employees, defined to include those working in enterprises in which the State has at least 5-percent ownership, although they have encountered some resistance from enterprise management, and the legal basis for registering unions in SOE's remains unclear. Teachers must belong to the Teachers' Association (PGRI). While technically classified as a union, the PGRI continues to function more as a welfare organization and does not appear to have engaged in trade union activities such as collective bargaining. Some groups of teachers have formed unofficial unions outside the PGRI. Other teachers have gone on strike for better wages and allowances, a rare and technically illegal action for teachers. For instance, in September public school teachers in Atambua, Lampung, Bandung, Banjarmasin, Gorontalo, went on strike over back pay owed to them. The central Government claimed that it had allocated funds for back pay to regional administrations as part of the new autonomy law, but several local administrations claimed that they never received the funds. Mandatory PGRI contributions are deducted automatically from teachers' salaries.
A regulation requires that police be notified of all meetings of five or more persons of all organizations outside offices or normal work sites. The regulation applies to union meetings. The police periodically show up uninvited at labor seminars and union meetings, which can have an intimidating effect.
All organized workers except civil servants have the legal right to strike. State enterprise employees and teachers rarely exercise this right, but private sector strikes are frequent. Before a strike legally may occur in the private sector, the law requires intensive mediation by the Department of Manpower and prior notice of the intent to strike; however, no approval is required. In practice dispute settlement procedures rarely are followed, and formal notice of the intent to strike rarely is given, because Department of Manpower procedures are slow and have little credibility among workers. Therefore, sudden strikes usually result from longstanding grievances, attempts by employers to prevent the formation of union branches, or denial of legally mandated benefits or rights.
Strikes frequently occurred during the year across a wide range of industries and occasionally were protracted. A series of strikes affecting a number of cities, including Bandung, Gresik, and Surabaya, occurred in June over the repeal of Manpower Ministry Decree 150 on severance pay. A number of factories in Bandung were damaged by strikers. In July and October, 9,000 workers at state aircraft manufacturer P.T. Dirgantara Indonesia went on strike to protest the firing of the chairman and secretary of their union and demanded threefold salary increases. The managing director said that the two officials were fired for organizing a series of demonstrations and strikes. Union leaders met with the Manpower Minister in October and December and the parties agreed to a gradual increase in basic pay as a proportion of the take home pay. Labor activist Ngadinah, an employee of a company that produces shoes, was acquitted on August 30 charges that she committed violence against the authorities, and of offensive, violent, or unpleasant conduct. According to the complaint filed by her employer, P.T. Panarub, she helped 8,000 workers stage a massive strike for better wages from September 8 to 11, 2000. Prior to the trial, she was detained for 2 weeks and harassed by the State Minister (see Section 1.d.).
Most strikes were conducted and resolved peacefully; however, some strikes became violent and persons were killed. On March 29, 2 strikers were killed and 10 others injured when mobs attacked a car upholstery company. Military officers inside the compound and police near the upholstery factory did not intervene.
Some unions claimed that strike leaders were singled out for layoffs when companies downsized. In several cases workers damaged property and intimidated nonstriking workers, and there were disputes among different unions represented in the same company. In most cases, workers were not arrested for these actions. Groups claiming to represent labor also at times resorted to violence. For example, in September thousands of teachers in Bandar Lampung, who tried to enter the office of the mayor, clashed with security forces.
The SPSI maintains international contacts but its only international trade union affiliation as a federation is with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Trade Union Council. Some of the SPSI's federated unions are members of international trade secretariats. The SBSI is affiliated with the World Confederation of Labor and some international trade union secretariats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is provided for by law, and the Department of Manpower promotes it within the context of the national ideology, Pancasila. Until 1994 only recognized trade unions--the SPSI and its components--could engage legally in collective bargaining. By issuing new regulations on union registration and enacting the trade union law, the Government allows for new workers' organizations that register with the Government to conclude legally binding agreements with employers. The act stipulates that if there is more than one union in a company negotiating a collective work agreement, the agreement that gains the support of more than half of the total number of workers in the company would apply to all the workers in the company. If the agreement does not have the support of more than half of the total workers, it would only apply to those who support it.
In companies without unions, the Government discourages workers from utilizing nongovernment outside assistance, such as, during consultations with employers over company regulations. Instead, the Department of Manpower prefers that workers seek its assistance and states that its role is to protect workers. However, there are credible reports that for many companies, consultations are perfunctory at best and usually only occur with management-selected workers; however, there also are credible reports to the contrary from foreign companies. According to government statistics, approximately 80 percent of the factory-level SPSI units have collective bargaining agreements. The degree to which these agreements are negotiated freely between unions and management without government interference varies. By regulation negotiations must be concluded within 30 days or be submitted to the Department of Manpower for mediation and conciliation or arbitration. Most negotiations are concluded within the 30-day period. Agreements are for 2 years and can be extended for 1 year.
According to NGO's involved in labor issues, in practice the provisions of collective bargaining agreements rarely go beyond the legal minimum standards established by the Government, and the agreements often merely are presented to worker representatives for signature rather than negotiation. Although government regulations prohibit employers from discriminating against or harassing employees because of union membership, there are credible reports from union officials of employer retribution against union organizers, including firing workers, that is not prevented effectively or remedied in practice. Some employers reportedly have warned their employees against contact with union organizers. According to a November ILO interim report, management at the Shangri-La Hotel violated the principles of freedom of association when it dismissed 580 members of the Independent Worker's Union (SPMS) for striking in December 2000 (see Section 6.a.). The ILO report criticized the Government's overnight detention of 20 SPMS members in December 2000 for occupying the hotel lobby during the strike, and characterized the detention as "an obstacle to the exercise of trade union rights." In 2000 the SPSI documented 135 cases in which companies violated their workers' right to organize by intimidating, punishing, or firing SBSI members because of their affiliation with the union or because they attempted to organize SBSI units within their factories--a problem other labor organizations and activists have encountered in trying to form unions. In November 2000, police in East Kalimantan arrested Wuaya Kawilarang, a regional coordinator for the SBSI, for investigation of charges that he incited workers to violence. He was sentenced to 7 months' imprisonment and released during the year.
Regional and national labor dispute resolution committees adjudicate charges of antiunion discrimination, and their decisions may be appealed to the State Administrative Court. However, due to adverse decisions many union members believe that the dispute resolution committees generally favor employers. As a result, workers frequently present their grievances directly to the National Human Rights Commission, Parliament, and NGO's. Administrative decisions in favor of dismissed workers usually are monetary awards; workers rarely are reinstated. The law requires that employers obtain the approval of the labor dispute resolution committee before firing workers, but the law often is ignored in practice. A Manpower Bill under consideration during the year does not specify that management and the union or concerned worker must reach a consensus before a worker may be dismissed, and does not address government involvement, except to note that efforts to prevent termination would be determined by Ministerial Decree.
Since 1996 unions affiliated with the SPSI have been able to collect union dues directly through payroll deductions (the "checkoff" system) rather than having the Department of Manpower collect dues and transfer them to the SPSI. Implementation of this system remains uneven, but labor observers generally believe that it has given more authority to factory-level union units in which the checkoff system is practiced. Union officials at SPSI headquarters stated that not all local branches of the unions send a portion of dues collected to regional and central headquarters, as provided in the SPSI's bylaws. Unions other than the SPSI have alleged difficulties in getting companies to set up a checkoff system for their members. Unions report that on many occasions companies automatically deduct union dues for the SPSI from workers affiliated with other unions.
The police and the army continue to be involved in labor matters, although since the mid-1990's there has been a shift from open intervention and demonstrations of force by uniformed troops to less visible measures. On at least two occasions, security forces fired on striking workers in 2000 (see Section 6.a.). However, the most common form of military involvement in labor matters, according to union and NGO representatives, is a longstanding pattern of collusion between police and military personnel and employers, which usually takes the form of intimidation of workers by security personnel in civilian dress, or by youth gangs. The military also employs baiting tactics: infiltrating workers' ranks and encouraging protests or worker actions, and in some cases attempting to provoke a violent worker action, to which the military then forcefully responds. Employer and union representatives also have alleged "invisible costs" of corruption, which they and others estimate constitute up to 30 percent of a company's expenses. On June 8, individuals allegedly belonging to an Islamic organization ransacked the Asia Pacific Labor Solidarity Conference on Neoliberalism at Sawangan, Depok, West Java and reportedly injured some of the Indonesian participants. Police did not intervene to assist the participants, but instead broke up the conference and detained 2 local labor activists and 32 foreigners for questioning regarding possible immigration violations. Police claim that the foreigners had entered on visitor visas; however, this was inconsistent with the activities the police were conducting at the time. All those detained were released June 9, after immigration authorities examined their case.
On June 13, a mob of about 150 persons connected to the Golkar Party disrupted a ACILS workshop on grievance-handling in Samarinda, East Kalimantan. ACILS' Indonesian program officer was punched and kicked while trying to leave the hotel where the seminar was held. According to reliable sources, the mob arrived in military trucks, along with four police officer escorts. The police managed to stop the mob before they reached the conference room. However, police declined to take action against the perpetrators.
There are seven exporting processing zones (EPZ's) in the country. Batam Island, near Singapore, is the largest. Labor law applies in EPZ's and in the rest of the country, although nongovernmental observers believe that in practice enforcement of laws in EPZ's is weaker than in other areas.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law prohibits forced labor and the Government generally enforces this prohibition. The law also prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, the Government does not enforce this provision effectively, and forced and bonded labor by children is a problem. There also were instances of debt bondage of adults. According to the National Child Protection Commission, there are 1.6 million children between the ages of 10 and 14 forced to work, allegedly for of economic reasons. NGO's have estimated that as many as 3,000 once children worked on fishing platforms, known as "jermals," under inhumane and dangerous conditions; however, the number of children working on jermals has gone down. Most children work on jermals recruited from farming communities in inland regions and once they arrive at the work site, miles offshore, they are held as virtual prisoners and are not permitted to leave for at least 3 months or until a replacement worker can be found. They live in isolation on the sea on platforms the size of basketball courts, work 12 to 20 hours per day in dangerous conditions, and sleep in the workspace with no access to sanitary facilities or schooling. There are reports of physical, verbal, and sexual abuse of such children. The law prohibits the hiring of persons under the age of 14 on fishing platforms. Jermals operate under the paid protection of national naval vessels; the navy reportedly has a financial interest in some jermals.
According to the ILO, the number of jermals off North Sumatra has fallen to fewer than 200 due to the combined impact of destruction due to poor construction and the impact of NGO child protection projects. About one third of these jermals have child laborers. In 1999 the Government stopped issuing permits to build new jermals, and announced plans to remove children physically from the jermals and provide them with educational and economic alternatives. Unfortunately, many of the children who used to work on jermals have founds jobs in dangerous condition in agriculture, according to the ILO.
In East Kalimantan a logging company reportedly traps Dayak laborers in a cycle of debt and turns them into bonded laborers (see Section 5).
The country is a source, transit point, and destination for trafficking in women and children, in some cases for forced labor (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
Labor law prohibits children under the age of 15 from working more than 4 hours per day, but an estimated 6 to 8 million children meet or exceed this daily limit. The law prohibits children from working in hazardous sectors, including maritime, plantation, construction, slaughterhouse, textile, leatherworking, entertainment, and manufacturing activities involving the use of hazardous materials and pollutants. Government enforcement of child labor laws is weak or nonexistent. There were no significant government efforts to strengthen enforcement during the year.
Despite legislative and regulatory measures, most children continued to work in unregulated environments, including domestic work. Although the ILO has sponsored training of labor inspectors on child labor matters under the International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), enforcement is weak or nonexistent. During the year, labor inspectors who had received the training had not removed any children from the workplace. According to Manpower Ministry officials, only 30 inspectors received child labor training during the year and with regional autonomy implemented in 2000, labor inspections fell under the jurisdiction of local governments, which did not train any child labor experts during the year.
The Government acknowledges that there is a class of children who must work for socioeconomic reasons, and in 1987 the Minister of Manpower issued a regulation on "Protection of Children Forced to Work." The regulation legalized the employment of children under the age of 14 who must work to contribute to the income of their families. It requires parental consent, prohibits dangerous or difficult work, limits work to 4 hours daily, and requires employers to report the number of children working under its provisions. It did not set a minimum age for children in this category.
According to the Department of Manpower, the number of working children increased from approximately 2 million before the economic downturn began in 1997 to an estimated 2.5 million by mid-1999. The State Bureau of Statistics (BPS) stated that 1.9 million children through age 14 were working in 1998. The ILO and the NGO World Vision argued that official estimates were too low, citing the fact that between 11 and 12 million school-age children (up to age 18) were not attending school, and a large number likely were involved in some form of work. The ILO estimated that between 6 and 8 million children worked, and over 3.4 million children work 10 hours of more per week. World Vision estimated that there were 6.5 million children working. Of these 6.5 million children, 4.1 million worked in the informal sector, and 2.4 million worked in the formal sectors. Other NGO's estimate that more than 10 percent of children worked more than 4 hours per day, and that over 35 percent of these children worked over 35 hours per week. Other NGO's estimate that 8.5 million school-age children are not enrolled in school and most are employed in the underground economy with no legal protection and poor compensation.
It is estimated that more children work in the informal sector than the formal sector, selling newspapers, shining shoes, helping to park or watch cars, and otherwise earning money. In cases in which children work in the formal sector, such work tends to fall between the informal and formal economies, including working alongside their parents in home enterprises and on plantations, and in family-owned shops and small factories, particularly those that are satellites of large industries. There are children working in large factories; however, the number is unknown, largely because documents verifying age are falsified easily. Some employers hire children because they are easier than adults to manage and less likely to organize or make demands on employers. Children working in factories usually work the same number of hours as adults. Children work in the rattan and wood furniture industries, the garment industry, the footwear industry, food processing, toy-making, and small mining operations, and other industries.
Other children, mostly girls, serve as live-in domestic servants. Many begin working when they are between 14 and 16 years old. Although accurate figures are unavailable, it is estimated that the number of child domestic workers is in the millions. Observers agree that this number began increasing in 1998 as a result of the economic downturn. One study conducted by Atma Jaya University in Jakarta estimated that there were at least 400,000 children under age 15 working as domestic servants in Jakarta alone. Most of them are not allowed to study or take academic courses. There are no regulations protecting domestic workers. These children work long hours, receive low pay, are on call 24 hours per day, generally are unaware of their rights, and often are far from their families.
Children are involved in a variety of hazardous work activities. In addition to those working on fishing platforms (see Section 6.c.), children perform piece work in small shoe factories (bengkels) where they are exposed to hazardous bleaches and glues. Thousands of other children work on rubber, sugarcane, tobacco, cocoa, and coffee plantations, often helping their parents meet stiff production quotas. Many companies employing adults condone the practice of children assisting their parents in the fields. Other children are employed in construction work, quarrying, gold and other types of mining, pearl diving, and forestry activities, many of which pose serious hazards. In 2000 the ILO called on the Government to stop the employment of up to 3,000 children in Central Kalimantan in gold mining. The media reported the use of mercury in Central Kalimantan gold mining, underscoring the danger posed to these children.
Some children work as scavengers in dumpsites. In the Bantar Gebang dumpsite in Bekasi (south of Jakarta), an NGO working with children there estimates that as many as 550 children ages 7 to 15 work at the dump to help their parents. Approximetely 74 percent of the children are under age 12. Children work long hours in extremely unsanitary conditions. Almost all of the children have health problems. In one survey, 84 percent of the children suffered from minor infections. NGO's have ongoing programs to teach children to avoid hazardous waste such as syringes and other potentially toxic waste.
It is believed that thousands of Muslim and Christian adolescent children in Maluku province have become soldiers and that younger children provide support services to the militas (see Section 5).
The country is a source, destination, and transit point for trafficking in children (see Section 6.f.).
The President issued a decree providing for the formation of a National Action Committee to Eliminate the Worst Forms of Child
Labor. The Committee met once in September. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but does not enforce this provision effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no national minimum wage. Rather, area wage councils working under the supervision of the National Wage Council establish minimum wages for regions and basic needs figures for each province--a monetary amount considered sufficient to enable a single worker to meet the basic needs of nutrition, clothing, and shelter. However, the minimum wage set by these councils, does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. After the minimum wage increases in April 2000, the monthly minimum wage in Jakarta was approximately $39 (Rp. 407,394), which is equal to 81 percent of the government-determined minimum living need for a single person, and down from 95 percent in 1997. On November 2, the Governor of Jakarta enforced a 38 percent increase in the monthly minimum wage to $55, effective January 2002. The average national minimum wage is approximately $24 per month (Rp. 230,000), although wages in the most heavily populated urban areas (Jakarta area, West Java, East Java, and North Sumatra), are significantly higher.
Labor law and ministerial regulations provide workers with a variety of other benefits, such as social security, and workers in more modern facilities often receive health benefits, free meals, and transportation.
The law establishes 7- or 8-hour workdays and a 40-hour workweek, with one 30-minute rest period for every 4 hours of work. Nevertheless, enforcement of minimum wage and other labor regulations remains inadequate, and sanctions are light.
The law also requires 1 day of rest weekly. The daily overtime rate is 1.5 times the normal hourly rate for the first hour and 2 times the hourly rate for additional overtime. Regulations allow employers to deviate from the normal work hours upon request to the Minister of Manpower and with the consent of the employee. Workers in industries that produce retail goods for export frequently work overtime to fulfill contract quotas. Observance of laws regulating benefits and labor standards varies between sectors and regions. Employer violations of legal requirements are fairly common and often result in strikes and employee protests. The Department of Manpower continues publicly to urge employers to comply with the law. However, in general, government enforcement and supervision of labor standards are weak.
Both law and regulations provide for minimum standards of industrial health and safety. Companies with more than 100 employees may obtain public recognition of their compliance with safety and health standards through a safety audit procedure. In the largely Western-operated oil sector, safety and health programs function reasonably well. However, in the country's 100,000 larger registered companies outside the oil sector, the quality of occupational health and safety programs varies greatly. The enforcement of health and safety standards is hampered severely by the limited number of qualified Department of Manpower inspectors, as well as by the low level of employee appreciation for sound health and safety practices. Allegations of corruption on the part of inspectors are common. Workers are obligated to report hazardous working conditions. Employers are forbidden by law from retaliating against those who do report, but the law is not enforced effectively. As a result, workers who remove themselves from hazardous working conditions may risk loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons
The law prohibits trafficking in persons; however, trafficking in persons is a serious problem. The country is a source, transit point, and destination for trafficking in persons for the purpose of prostitution and in some for forced labor. There are no government statistics on the number of persons trafficked; however, the Indonesian Women's Coalition for Justice and Democracy, a leading NGO advocating for antitrafficking legislation, believes that as many as 400,000 Indonesian women and children are trafficked each year. The ILO estimates that 21,000 children are working as prostitutes in the country.
Prostitution is not prohibited specifically by law and prostitution is widespread. Official statistics reported 75,106 registered prostitutes in 1999, up from 72,000 in 1995. However, NGO's estimate that there are as many as 1.3 million prostitutes in the country, 30 percent of whom may be under 16 years of age. NGO findings indicate a growing trend in child prostitution and sexual exploitation. A university professor estimates that about 150,000 children enter prostitution each year. The prevalence of child prostitutes appears to vary by region. According to an NGO study, approximately 15 percent of the prostitutes in parts of Central Java were between 16 and 20 years of age. In a seminar held in Batam in August, researchers reported that 50 percent of more than 1,800 sex workers whom they interviewed in 1998 were younger than 18 years of age. Other estimates suggest that as many as 6,000 sex workers in Batam are under age 18. An October NGO report found that trafficking in teenage girls from North Sumatra to Singapore and Malaysia was increasing. A growing number of children enter prostitution to help their families or to support drug habits. In September the ILO, in collaboration with the University of Indonesia's department of social welfare, published a preliminary study of trafficking trends in Jakarta, Batam (Sumatra), Medan (Sumatra), and Bali, that found that many girls entered prostitution after failed marriages they had entered when they were as young as 10 to 14 years old.
Some teenage prostitutes come from middle class families. Child prostitutes can earn $500 to $1,000 (about Rp. 4.7 to 9.4 million) per month, 10 to 20 times what an unskilled factory worker earns. The demand for young girls is increasing, as many clients seek young girls who are perceived to be less likely to carry HIV/AIDS.
While not documented thoroughly, the sex trade is believed widely to have increased sharply as women hurt by the economic downturn sought means of support for their families. Instances of families in rural areas of Java and Sumatra being forced by economic circumstances to "sell" their daughters to local men continued to be reported.
Kirsty Sword-Gusmao, the wife of East Timorese independence leader Xanana Gusmao, reported to the international press in November 2000, that 33 pregnant East Timorese women, who had returned to East Timor, claimed that they were abducted and forced to serve as sex slaves for the TNI in West Timor.
There are credible reports of trafficking in girls and women and of temporary "contract marriages" with foreigners in certain areas, such as West Kalimantan and Sumatra, although the extent of this practice is unclear. Many such marriages are not considered legal, and the children born from them are considered born out of wedlock. According to one report, poor Sino-Indonesian parents from Sinkawang, West Kalimantan, who were desperate for money and believed that their daughters would have a better future, have sold thousands of their daughters into contract marriages to Taiwanese men. Some of the girls were as young as 14 years old. If such marriages fail, the women have no legal recourse. According to one source, there were as many as 10,000 Sino-Indonesian women from Sinkawang living in Taiwan whose legal status was uncertain.
Police continue to uncover syndicates involved in trafficking young women and girls, many younger than age 18, to work in brothels on islands in Riau province, Jakarta, Bandung, and Surabaya (all in Java); Denpasar (Bali); Medan (Sumatra); Ambon (Maluku); Manado, Makassar, and Kendari (Sulawesi); and Jayapura, Sorong, and Merauke (Irian Jaya). Others are trafficked to Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan, and Australia. Many of the girls and women were hired under false pretenses. One tactic commonly employed is to offer young women in rural areas jobs as waitresses or hotel employees in distant regions, typically at island resorts. After the new recruits arrive at the site they learn that they have been recruited as sex workers. In some instances, women are held forcibly at brothels or are prevented from leaving an island. In other cases, the women have no option other than to accept the work because they lack money to travel and face other economic pressures. There also have been cases of boys involved in prostitution, especially in popular tourist destinations such as Bali and Lombok; at times such boys have been victims of trafficking, although the incidence reportedly is low.
According to the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), only about 750,000 out of 2 million citizens working abroad in any given year are undocumented. However, because many workers enter Malaysia and other countries without documentation and government methodology for making estimates is questionable, the estimate of 2 million is not reliable. In February the Government signed a joint labor statement with Bangladesh, India, and Nepal in a Bangkok session of the Regional Southeast Asia Trafficking Convention. The statement includes among its points the recognition that trafficking has become a part of the labor migration process.
Hundreds of thousands of women abroad work as domestic servants. According to Ministry of Manpower statistics, there were approximately 1.5 million registered workers employed abroad from 1994 to 1999, and almost 70 percent of these workers were female. Host countries include Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Korea, and the Persian Gulf states. Although the percentage of the total is very low, in numerous cases, these women were subjected to conditions that amounted to trafficking. Recruiting agencies at times abuse and hold captive women recruited to work abroad as domestic servants, even before such women depart the country. The most common allegations among women working abroad are that they are underpaid or not paid at all; extreme working conditions and severe physical and sexual abuse also are common claims. There have been numerous reports of mistreatment of Indonesian laborers, especially of women, in Saudi Arabia. On July 9, the Government imposed a moratorium on labor export to work in Saudi Arabia, in an effort to obtain Saudi Arabia's consent to sign a labor agreement that would provide legal protection to Indonesian workers and the Saudi government subsequently signed such an agreement; however, the moratorium was subsequently lifted 7 weeks later.
The Government, in response to negative publicity and NGO efforts, took steps to improve conditions for female migrant workers in the country and to improve consular protection for those working abroad; however, many women remain vulnerable. In contrast to NGO assertions, a consortium of labor recruiters insists that accounts of severe abuse of female migrant workers are exceptions to the norm.
While there are laws designed to protect children from sexual abuse, prostitution, and incest, the Government has made no special enforcement efforts in these areas. On September 24, the Foreign Minister signed U.N. Resolution 54/263 outlawing the sale of children and protecting children against prostitution. Nonetheless, government efforts to combat the problem are sporadic, relatively small-scale, and of limited effectiveness. In response to public pressure in 2000, the Jakarta city government closed down brothels in the red-light district of Kramat Tunggak in North Jakarta. Corrupt government officials, some of whom are involved in trafficking themselves, at times hinder enforcement efforts that compromise their financial interests. Moreover, NGO's allege that there still is considerable reluctance to acknowledge, both within society and the Government, that prostitution is a major industry.
Muslim religious groups reacted to perceived government inaction against prostitution by attempting to combat the problem themselves. Muslim groups' raids on and destruction of brothels and other venues allegedly involved in prostitution, including massage parlors, karaoke bars, and nightclubs, increased in frequency and in aggressiveness during the year (see Section 1.c.). However, the actions of the religious vigilante groups served to force prostitution further beyond the scrutiny of officials.
Domestic NGO's lead the efforts to monitor and prevent trafficking. At least a dozen NGO's are active in combating trafficking in persons. The Indonesian Women's Association for Justice facilitates public awareness programs in Jakarta to educate young women regarding the dangers of trafficking. The Indonesian Child Advocacy Foundation and the City Social Worker Group work to eliminate child employment on jermal fishing platforms in North Sumatra. Mitra Perempuan an NGO, operates a hotline to record abuse cases and help abused women. The Indonesian Child Welfare Foundation issues anecdotal reports on trafficking incidents. The child labor umbrella organization, JARAK (NGO Network for Action Programs to Eliminate Child Labor in Indonesia), has 63 organizational members in 15 provinces and is involved in efforts to eliminate all aspects of child labor, including trafficking.
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Indonesian:
Selama tahun terdapat banyak pembunuhan di Aceh yang tidak dapat dengan jelas dikaitkan baik pasukan keamanan atau gerakan separatis bersenjata, GAM. Laporan awal pada tanggal 9 Agustus menunjukkan bahwa para penyerang tak dikenal menembak dan menewaskan 31 karyawan PT Bumi Flora, sebuah perkebunan kelapa sawit di Idi Rayeuk di Aceh Timur. Menurut Pemerintah, anggota GAM sering mencoba memeras uang perlindungan dan mengintimidasi pekerja ke mencolok. Ketika para buruh menolak, anggota GAM menembak dan membunuh mereka. GAM menolak bertanggung jawab dan meminta tim independen untuk menyelidiki pembunuhan dan membawa para pelaku ke depan pengadilan internasional. Sebuah laporan internal pemerintah kompilasi kesaksian saksi mata pada 10 Agustus menunjukkan keterlibatan militer mungkin dalam pembunuhan. Pasukan keamanan dan GAM saling menyalahkan atas pembunuhan 6 September Rektor Universitas Syiah Kuala Dayan Dawood, yang orang tak dikenal menembak mati saat ia berada di mobilnya. Dawood sebelumnya telah menawarkan untuk menengahi antara GAM dan Pemerintah. Pembunuhan Dawood yang diikuti pembunuhan Aceh legislator provinsi Zaini Sulaiman pada tanggal 1 dan politisi terkemuka Teungku Johan pada bulan Mei. Kepala Kepolisian Aceh berjanji untuk menyelidiki pembunuhan, namun tidak ada tindakan yang telah diambil pada akhir tahun ini. Ada banyak contoh lain dari kekuatan yang berlebihan oleh militer dan polisi selama tahun itu pergi tanpa hukuman, termasuk pembunuhan politisi Nashiruddin Daud, seorang aktivis LSM. Seperti dalam kebanyakan kasus, tidak ada hasil dari investigasi pemerintah dugaan atas kematian Sukardi, Sulaiman Ahmad atau Tengku Safwan Idris yang tewas selama 2000 (lihat Bagian 1.b.).Di Papua pasukan keamanan dituduh membunuh pemimpin proindependence sepanjang tahun. Kelompok masyarakat setempat menduga bahwa pasukan keamanan membunuh Willem Onde, pemimpin Front Pembebasan Tentara Papua (TPNP), dan temannya, Johanes Tumeng. Tubuh, diyakini menjadi milik mereka, membawa bukti luka tembak, ditemukan mengambang di Sungai Kumundu pada tanggal 12 September dengan tangan terikat dan kepala dicukur. Selain itu, pada tanggal 11 November Papua proindependence pemimpin Theys Hiyo Eluay ditemukan tewas di mobilnya di luar ibukota provinsi Jayapura setelah sopirnya melaporkan bahwa ia telah diculik. Polisi juga terus menembak dan membunuh orang yang terlibat dalam kemerdekaan Papua sebagian besar damai pengibaran bendera atau demonstrasi (lihat Bagian 1.c., 2.a., dan 5). Polisi menembak dan membunuh delapan orang, dan ditahan dan mengalahkan enam orang lainnya setelah kerusuhan massa, jalan diblokir, membakar mobil, dan bangunan rusak di Papua. Massa diduga bereaksi terhadap laporan bahwa pasukan keamanan direncanakan untuk menghapus bendera Papua dari rumah pemimpin masyarakat adat. Polisi menahan 22 orang yang kembali dari upacara tradisional di bulan Maret dan menewaskan enam dari mereka dalam hubungannya dengan kejadian yang sama. Peristiwa-peristiwa tersebut adalah sama dengan serangkaian reaksi polisi untuk pengibaran bendera selama 3 tahun terakhir, namun setelah undang-undang Otonomi Khusus Papua ditandatangani pada bulan November, yang memungkinkan bendera Papua yang akan ditampilkan sebagai simbol budaya, pasukan keamanan tampaknya memungkinkan pengibaran bendera.Polisi juga membunuh orang Papua ketika mencoba untuk mencari tersangka. Misalnya, polisi menewaskan satu orang ketika mencari para pembunuh tiga karyawan perusahaan penebangan di Wonggema desa, di Papua. Pada bulan Juni dan Juli, polisi menembak 13 orang sementara mencari orang-orang yang membunuh polisi 5 dan 1 orang karyawan lokal sebuah perusahaan penebangan milik asing.Milisi Timor Timur prointegration berbasis di Timor Barat, yang menurut laporan yang dapat dipercaya, terus dipersenjatai dan didukung oleh tentara, melakukan pembunuhan di luar hukum banyak dalam beberapa tahun terakhir. Sebagai contoh, pada bulan September 2000, segerombolan pengungsi Timor Timur, yang dipimpin oleh anggota milisi menyerang kantor UNHCR di Atambua, Timor Barat dan membunuh tiga anggota staf internasional UNHCR, kemudian dimutilasi dan dibakar tubuh mereka. Pasukan keamanan yang ditugaskan untuk melindungi kantor UNHCR gagal mencegah pasukan milisi menyerang dan meninggalkan daerah itu sebelum serangan kedua milisi di gedung, ketika tiga pekerja UNHCR tewas. Enam individu awalnya dijatuhi hukuman pada bulan Mei untuk antara 10-ke-20 bulan atas tuduhan kekerasan massa sehubungan dengan insiden tersebut, setelah pengadilan yang lebih rendah memutuskan bahwa mereka telah terprovokasi. Pada tanggal 15 November, Mahkamah Agung menjatuhkan hukuman 5 sampai 7 tahun, maksimum untuk biaya dari kekerasan massa, untuk tiga dari terdakwa. Pengadilan belum memberikan keputusannya pada tiga terdakwa lain pada akhir tahun ini. Pada bulan November Jacobus Bere, seorang anggota kelompok dituduh pembunuhan 2000 Juli Selandia Baru Peacekeeper, telah dicoba untuk pembunuhan pertama dan kedua derajat, setelah investigasi gabungan dari insiden tersebut oleh Pemerintah dan Pemerintahan Transisi PBB di Timor Leste (UNTAET). Sidang ini ditunda dari bulan Oktober sampai Desember karena Bere sakit, dan tidak diakhiri dengan akhir tahun. Jaksa pemerintah juga didakwa tiga dari lima anggota milisi lainnya yang terlibat dalam insiden itu. Dua lainnya anggota milisi masih beredar bebas. Johannes Tino dan Gabriel Hale Noni didakwa dengan pembunuhan direncanakan, dengan tuduhan membawa hukuman mati. Fabianus Ulu menghadapi 15 tahun penjara jika terbukti bersalah atas tuduhan yang lebih rendah dari pembunuhan. Pembunuhan oleh milisi prointegration termasuk orang-orang dari Timor Barat penduduk Bornard Loddo pada bulan Juli 2000 dan PBB Nepal penjaga perdamaian pada bulan Agustus 2000. Tidak ada laporan kemajuan ke dalam penyelidikan pembunuhan ini sepanjang tahun.Menurut laporan yang kredibel, aparat keamanan dalam rantai pulau Maluku, terutama di pulau yang terletak di pusat kota Ambon, yang bertanggung jawab untuk beberapa kematian penembakan yang terjadi selama kerusuhan meluas dan bentrokan komunal sepanjang tahun. Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (KOMNAS-HAM) membentuk tim pencari fakta untuk menyelidiki 12-14 Juni pembunuhan 20 orang selama penembakan baku tembak antara militer dan Laskar Jihad (milisi Jawa Muslim based). TPF menyimpulkan bahwa pembunuhan berada di luar yurisdiksi KOMNAS, karena mandat Komisi memungkinkan untuk menyelidiki kasus-kasus hanya melibatkan pelanggaran HAM berat. Meskipun klaim yang bertentangan, tidak ada bukti kredibel untuk menunjukkan bahwa pasukan keamanan sebagai sebuah institusi yang didukung satu sisi atau yang lain selama kekerasan (lihat Bagian 2.c. dan 5).Polisi beberapa kali di seluruh negeri menggunakan kekuatan yang mematikan untuk membubarkan demonstran. Sebagai contoh, pada Januari Kalimantan Tengah polisi menembak dan menewaskan sedikitnya 20 orang dan banyak lainnya terluka dengan menembak tanpa pandang bulu ke orang banyak kerusuhan. Pada tanggal 27 Februari, polisi menembak tiga perusuh di Sampit dan dua di Palangka Raya, menewaskan seorang. Pada tanggal 8 Maret, polisi di Palangka Raya menembak ke kerumunan para perusuh menewaskan lima orang dan melukai beberapa orang lainnya. Pada tanggal 9 April, polisi di Sampit tewas dan terluka parah 1 2 warga sipil, ketika mereka melepaskan tembakan untuk membubarkan kerumunan 300 orang Dayak memprotes keras tindakan polisi yang dikenakan pada orang Dayak lokal. Pada tanggal 17 Juli, seorang polisi menembak dan membunuh orang di sekitar korban ketika mencoba untuk membubarkan kerumunan di Jakarta. Banyak warga juga mengaku bahwa polisi lambat untuk merespon tegas gangguan sipil kekerasan. Misalnya, polisi lambat untuk menanggapi pembunuhan migran Madura di Kalimantan Tengah pada bulan Januari dan Februari.Di Pasuruan, Jawa Timur, polisi melepaskan tembakan pada demonstran memprotes kecaman kedua MPR dari maka Presiden Wahid pada tanggal 20 Juni, menewaskan seorang pengunjuk rasa. Pencarian fakta tim dari MPR dan KOMNAS-HAM menyelidiki pembunuhan itu. Pejabat MPR mengumumkan bahwa polisi mengikuti prosedur yang benar. Namun, KOMNAS-HAM penyidik, dalam surat tanggal 22 Oktober Jawa Timur polisi, menyerukan pemeriksaan lebih lanjut atas pembunuhan itu. KOMNAS-HAM juga melakukan penyelidikan polisi menggunakan kekerasan yang berlebihan pada 7 Desember 2000 di Abepura, Papua Barat, ketika polisi mengeluarkan 23 siswa dari kamar asrama mereka dan mengalahkan mereka. Dua siswa meninggal akibat pemukulan, dan puluhan lainnya menderita luka serius. Para KOMNAS-HAM mengeluarkan laporan merekomendasikan bahwa kasus tersebut diadili oleh pengadilan hak baru manusia. Tidak ada penyelidikan pembunuhan polisi demonstran selama tahun 2000 telah terjadi pada akhir tahun ini.
Tidak ada tindakan disipliner yang diambil terhadap personil imigrasi bertanggung jawab atas hilangnya dan kematian yang diduga dari warga negara asing pada Maret 2000, dan tidak ada perkembangan dalam kasus ini pada akhir tahun ini.Pada saat polisi dan warga sipil yang tewas dalam baku tembak militer serangan mereka pada satu sama lain. Seorang pengungsi Madura tewas dalam sengketa 27 Feb antara polisi dan pasukan keamanan atas koleksi pemerasan dari Madura yang mengevakuasi pengungsi dari Kalimantan Tengah, 10 tentara dan polisi terluka. Polisi dan militer api dipertukarkan pada tanggal 15 September, menewaskan 3 warga sipil dan melukai 15 lainnya di Madiun, Jawa Timur. Para pengamat mengatakan bahwa tembak-menembak itu terjadi atas "wilayah pertempuran" untuk perlindungan tempat perjudian dan perdagangan narkoba. Penyidik bernama 112 personil militer dan polisi 13 sebagai tersangka dalam pembunuhan, dan mengumumkan bahwa kasus mereka akan diadili. Dua puluh tiga anggota satuan militer dan polisi habis.Polisi sering digunakan kekuatan mematikan dalam menangkap tersangka atau menangani penjahat yang diduga, banyak dari mereka tidak bersenjata. Misalnya pada bulan September, polisi menembak dan menewaskan 23 orang yang dicurigai atas kepemilikan senjata ilegal dalam sebuah insiden di Jakarta, mengklaim bahwa mereka menolak penangkapan. Selama tahun ini, polisi menembak dan menewaskan sedikitnya 25 warga Afrika yang diduga perdagangan narkotika. Afrika merupakan persentase yang proporsional besar dari mereka tewas ketika ditangkap, menunjukkan bahwa pembunuhan tersebut bermotif rasial. Menanggapi kritik bahwa metode yang digunakan adalah tidak dibenarkan keras dan sebesar eksekusi tanpa pengadilan, polisi umumnya menyatakan bahwa para tersangka melarikan diri, melawan penangkapan, atau mengancam polisi. Polisi tidak merilis statistik lengkap mengenai jumlah kasus ini pada akhir tahun ini (lihat Bagian 5).Empat perwira militer dan empat penduduk sipil ditahan pada bulan Februari 2000 untuk pembunuhan Desember tiga pekerja kemanusiaan di Aceh. Pengadilan menemukan petugas tidak bersalah atas pembunuhan, tapi dihukum mereka dari kekerasan massa menghasut dan menghukum mereka hukuman penjara bervariasi dari 10 hingga 20 bulan penjara.Pada Juli 1999, Pemerintah menunjuk sebuah komisi independen (KPP Aceh) untuk menyelidiki pelanggaran HAM di Aceh. Pada bulan November 1999, Komisi merekomendasikan agar Pemerintah menyelidiki lima kasus dugaan pelanggaran HAM. Pada bulan April 2000, pengadilan 24 personil tentara dan seorang warga sipil, yang semuanya sebelumnya dihukum atas pembunuhan 58 warga sipil di Beutong Ateuh pada bulan Juli 1999, mulai, namun, tidak satupun dari terdakwa atas pangkat letnan kolonel. Selama persidangan, prajurit bersaksi bahwa mereka telah membunuh warga sipil, tetapi berpendapat bahwa mereka tidak bersalah atas pembunuhan karena mereka mengikuti perintah komandan mereka. Komandan itu dikabarkan menghilang, namun LSM melaporkan penampakan berikutnya dia di perusahaan pejabat militer lainnya. Sidang berakhir pada Mei 2000 ketika 24 terdakwa menerima hukuman 8 sampai 10 tahun penjara. Sampai akhir tahun, tidak ada yang telah dibebankan dalam empat kasus lainnya, yang meliputi: Mei 1999 pembantaian di Krueng Geukey, Aceh Utara, sedangkan Februari 1999 serangan terhadap demonstran yang mengakibatkan tujuh orang tewas di Idi Cut, Aceh Timur; seri pembunuhan dan penculikan di fasilitas penahanan di Pidie 1997-98, dan pada bulan Agustus 1996 perkosaan Sumiati, seorang perempuan Aceh, oleh seorang prajurit.Komisi Investigasi Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur (KPP HAM) menyampaikan laporannya pelanggaran hak asasi manusia di Timor Timur ke Kantor Kejaksaan Agung pada Januari 2000. Jaksa Agung mengatakan bahwa kantornya awalnya akan menuntut lima kasus utama yang timbul dari, 6 April 1999 pembantaian di Liquisa, sedangkan April 17, 1999 pembunuhan di rumah rumah pemimpin kemerdekaan Manuel Carrascalao, sedangkan September 5, 1999 serangan terhadap senyawa Katolik Keuskupan di Dili, sedangkan tanggal 6 September 1999 pembantaian para imam dan orang terlantar di sebuah gereja di Suai, dan 21 September 1999 pembunuhan Sander Thoenes wartawan Belanda. Kantor Kejaksaan Agung bernama 23 tersangka pada bulan September dan Oktober 2000 (salah satunya, seorang komandan milisi Timor Timur, dibunuh oleh anggota milisi di awal September 2000). Mereka yang dituduh termasuk tentara dan beberapa jenderal polisi, tapi tidak termasuk lalu-Panglima TNI Jenderal Wiranto, mantan kepala intelijen Angkatan Bersenjata Zacky Anwar Makarim, dan anggota senior lainnya dari kepemimpinan militer yang disebut sebagai pihak yang bertanggung jawab dalam laporan KPP-HAM . Kemajuan ini lima kasus lambat, dan jumlah tersangka itu kecil dibandingkan dengan jumlah orang percaya bertanggung jawab. Meskipun bahasa Indonesia berwenang dibantu sangat dalam penyelidikan mereka oleh UNTAET, pemerintah tidak bekerja sama sepenuhnya pada bulan Desember 2000, ketika UNTAET meminta dukungan serupa untuk penyelidikan sendiri ke dalam kekejaman.Tidak ada perkembangan baru selama tahun berjalan dalam kematian penembakan sedikitnya sembilan demonstran di Jakarta Semanggi interchange pada November 1998. Persidangan sembilan berpangkat rendah polisi terlibat dalam penembakan 1998 kematian Mei empat mahasiswa Universitas Trisakti di Jakarta dimulai pada tanggal 18 Juni. Jaksa menuduh petugas melakukan pembunuhan direncanakan, yang diancam hukuman maksimal penjara seumur hidup, dan penyerangan yang menyebabkan kematian, yang diancam hukuman maksimal 7 tahun penjara. Persidangan masih berjalan pada akhir tahun.Pada tahun 2000 polisi mulai melakukan investigasi serangan Juli 1996 di markas besar Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), mempertanyakan tentara atas dan kepemimpinan polisi pada saat itu. Sebuah tim polisi / militer bersama kemudian mempertanyakan saksi dan tersangka potensial, dan pada bulan November 2000 yang mulai mengajukan kasus ke Kejaksaan Agung untuk penuntutan, meskipun tidak ada tindakan lebih lanjut diambil selama tahun berjalan (lihat Bagian 1.b.).Jawa Timur polisi pada tahun 2000 dibuka kembali penyelidikan atas pembunuhan Marsinah 1993 dari tenaga kerja aktivis, mempertanyakan kembali atas saksi lusin dan tersangka sebelumnya, termasuk warga sipil dan tentara dan personil polisi. Pada bulan Desember 2000, Jawa Timur kepala polisi mengatakan tes laboratorium Australia menegaskan bahwa darah Marsinah ditemukan di rumah pemilik pabrik tempat Marsinah bekerja dan dalam van yang diyakini telah diangkut ke tempat di mana ia ditemukan. Namun, pada akhir tahun ini, tidak ada tindakan lebih lanjut pada penyelidikan polisi.Pada bulan Februari 2000, Komnas HAM membentuk komisi untuk menyelidiki September 1984 pembunuhan dari 33 demonstran diperkirakan oleh pasukan keamanan di Tanjung Priok, Jakarta. Komisi ini mempertanyakan pejabat senior militer dan polisi, kuburan massal digali di mana korban dikuburkan, dan melaporkan hasil penyelidikan, termasuk nama dari 23 orang yang dianggap bertanggung jawab atas pembunuhan itu, untuk Jaksa Agung pada bulan Oktober (lihat Bagian 1.c. dan 4). Pada akhir tahun, juru bicara Kejaksaan Agung menegaskan bahwa penyelidikan telah selesai, namun ia menolak menyebutkan nama tersangka dan tidak ada yang ditangkap.Serangan warga terhadap warga lain yang disebabkan sebagian besar pembunuhan sepanjang tahun.Sepanjang tahun di Aceh, kelompok separatis bersenjata menewaskan puluhan pemimpin masyarakat sipil, akademisi, politisi, dan penduduk lokal lainnya, serta pegawai negeri, polisi, dan tentara. Misalnya, pada tanggal 23 Maret, surat kabar setempat melaporkan bahwa penyerang, dianggap sebagai anggota GAM, menculik dan membunuh tujuh transmigran Jawa yang telah bekerja pada perkebunan. Tujuh transmigran ditemukan ditembak dengan tangan terikat di belakang punggung mereka. Pada bulan Juni penyerang diyakini anggota GAM, menewaskan sejumlah kelompok Jawa dan etnis di Aceh Tengah. Pada tanggal 18 September separatis bersenjata menculik Muzakir, pemimpin komunitas Muslim dari sebuah desa di Batu Itam. Warga Alur Naga di Aceh Selatan menemukannya tewas pada tanggal 20 September dengan lubang peluru dan luka bakar. Separatis bersenjata menembak dan membunuh T. Sofyan, pemimpin desa di Lan Tabeh, Aceh Besar, pada 16 November. Separatis bersenjata, yang telah membangun penghalang jalan di jalan Medan-Aceh, menembak dan membunuh seorang kapten polisi yang berusaha untuk melewati hambatan pada 18 Desember.Kelompok separatis juga banyak membunuh warga sipil dan tentara sepanjang tahun. Organisasi Papua Merdeka gerakan (OPM) membunuh lima polisi dan seorang penjaga keamanan di sebuah perusahaan penebangan milik asing di Wondiboi, Wasior Kabupaten, dan Papua pada 13 Juni. Polisi menyalahkan serangan terhadap OPM, namun banyak kelompok hak asasi manusia lokal percaya perselisihan antara masyarakat lokal dan perusahaan asing lebih kompensasi untuk penebangan di lahan pribumi mungkin telah menghasut serangan. Sebuah kelompok OPM mengambil dua sandera migran pemukim setelah polisi menembak mati dua separatis Papua dalam baku tembak 23 September setelah serangan OPM terhadap pos militer di Bonggo, Papua. Penyerang tak dikenal menewaskan empat tentara dalam serangan 3 Februari pada pos militer di Betaf, Papua.Pertempuran di Maluku kelompok pulau, yang dimulai di Ambon pada Januari 1999, menyebar ke pulau-pulau paling utama di Maluku pada tahun 2000 dan sepanjang tahun. Pertempuran di ketiga provinsi (Maluku Utara, Maluku, dan Sulawesi Tengah) memiliki nuansa politis, ekonomi, etnis, dan agama (lihat Bagian 2.c. dan 5). Sementara konflik awal muncul selama pertanyaan kepemilikan tanah dan status politik dan ekonomi penduduk lokal versus bahwa migran, dalam banyak kasus konflik kemudian berkembang menjadi bentrokan agama sangat dituntut. Salah satu faktor utama yang berkontribusi terhadap kelanjutan kekerasan di pulau-pulau ini adalah kegagalan untuk membawa para pelaku ke pengadilan (lihat Bagian 2.c. dan 5); faktor lain adalah kegagalan pihak berwenang untuk mencegah militan bersenjata berkeliaran di besar kelompok ke Maluku dari Jawa. Kelompok Kristen dan Muslim semakin digunakan sebagai senjata canggih pertempuran berlanjut, menyebabkan lebih dari 3.000 kematian dan menghancurkan banyak gereja, masjid, dan, dalam beberapa kasus, seluruh kota, terutama di 2000. Tingkat kekerasan meningkat pada tahun 1999-an dan pada awal tahun 2000, setelah geng dan milisi Kristen (dan pada tingkat lebih rendah, kelompok-kelompok Muslim dan milisi) menyerang desa-desa terpencil di Halmahera dan bagian lain dari Maluku Utara. Selama tahun 2000 dan mengikuti Desember 1999 serangan oleh orang Kristen, milisi Muslim melaju populasi Kristen dari banyak daerah Maluku Utara dan provinsi Maluku (lihat Bagian 2.d.). Sebagai pengungsi yang melarikan diri ke daerah tetangga dan pulau-pulau, kebencian mereka terhadap orang-orang yang menyerang mereka sering memicu konflik di tempat-tempat baru tinggal mereka. Selain laporan yang belum diverifikasi dari provokasi dan konspirasi memicu siklus kekerasan terus menerus. Kekerasan menurun di Ambon pada akhir Januari 2000 dan tahun ini, setelah pasukan keamanan mulai memberlakukan jam malam dan melucuti senjata warga sipil. Pada saat yang sama, pertempuran saling merusak meningkat di bagian lain dari Halmahera dan Maluku Utara. Pada April 2000, ada beberapa tanda-tanda rekonsiliasi di Ambon setelah program rekonstruksi provinsi didirikan pemerintah dan pasar di daerah perbatasan antara komunitas Muslim dan Kristen. Namun, pada akhir April 2000, kerusuhan serius terjadi segera setelah kunjungan saat itu Wakil Presiden Megawati Soekarnoputri. Ada kenaikan lebih lanjut dalam kekerasan pada Mei 2000, setelah perahu yang penuh dengan anggota Laskar Jihad, militan Muslim dari Jawa, tiba di Ambon dan bagian lain dari Maluku (lihat Bagian 5). Sebanyak 2.000 sampai 3.000 militan akhirnya tiba melalui perahu. Hukum dan ketertiban terus memburuk terus, dan pada bulan Juni 2000, massa menyerbu kekerasan melalui kota Ambon dengan gangguan keamanan sedikit atau tidak ada kekuatan. Ada juga serangan besar-besaran Muslim terhadap umat Kristen di Halmahera pada bulan Mei dan Juni 2000. Tingkat kekerasan menurun, terutama di Maluku Utara, setelah kemudian-Presiden Wahid mengumumkan keadaan darurat sipil di kedua provinsi pada akhir Juni 2000 (lihat Bagian 2.d.); keadaan darurat masih berlaku pada akhir tahun 2000 . Namun, bentrokan antar agama kekerasan terus terjadi sepanjang tahun, terutama di Ambon.Menurut HRW, pada 4 Mei, Pemerintah ditangkap kepala Laskar Jihad, Jafar Uman Thalib, dan menuduhnya dengan pembunuhan. Ia dibebaskan pada 12 Juni. Kekerasan kemudian berkobar di Ambon, di mana 18 orang Kristen tewas (lihat Bagian 5). Sebagai tanggapan, pada 14 Juni, tentara menyerang sebuah pos Laskar Jihad, menewaskan 22 Muslim.Dimulai pada akhir Mei 2000, di Sulawesi Tengah, banyak desa mengalami kerusuhan agama diperbaharui dan kekerasan, mengakibatkan kematian banyak dan kerusakan yang luas. Sebuah peningkatan yang signifikan pembunuhan terjadi pada bulan November dan Desember, tampaknya didorong oleh militan Laskar Jihad. Puluhan ribu orang Kristen meninggalkan rumah mereka sebagai desa diserang. Pada tanggal 1 dan 2, ratusan Laskar Jihad diserang pasukan Kristen di desa Sepe dan Batugincu, selatan Poso kota. Tiga tentara dan tiga warga sipil ditembak. Seorang polisi menembak dan membunuh penjarah dan melukai empat pada tanggal 3 Desember setelah Muslim menyerang sebuah gereja di Poso kota. Sampai akhir tahun, tentara mampu memadamkan kekerasan, dan perjanjian perdamaian rapuh yang sedang dinegosiasikan. Menurut laporan pers lokal, tiga pemimpin Angkatan Merah Kristen yang dihukum karena perusuh terkemuka di pembunuhan massal dan diberi hukuman mati, kalimat yang menarik mereka ke Mahkamah Agung.
Di Kalimantan bentrokan antaretnis mengakibatkan ratusan pembunuhan selama Februari dan Maret. Adat Dayak suku menewaskan sekitar 600 pemukim migran Madura dan membakar lebih dari 1.000 rumah dan toko di Kalimantan Tengah (lihat Bagian 5). Sebagai tanggapan, lebih dari 105.000 orang Madura dievakuasi kembali ke Jawa Timur dan Pulau Madura, di mana mereka menetap di komunitas lokal. Di Pontianak, Kalimantan Barat, pembunuhan seorang anak Melayu, pada tanggal 25 Juni diduga dilakukan oleh perampok Madura, serta kebencian lokal kehadiran lanjutan dari Madura itu pengungsi di daerah fasilitas olahraga umum, menyebabkan bentrokan antaretnis antara pengungsi Madura dan etnis Melayu warga yang mengakibatkan 7 kematian pengungsi dan penghancuran tempat tinggal sementara selama lebih dari 300 keluarga (lihat Bagian 5). Tiga tersangka ditangkap karena perampokan, tidak ada penangkapan sehubungan dengan pembunuhan dilakukan pada akhir tahun ini. Lebih dari 40.000 migran Madura tinggal di kamp-kamp pengungsi yang terletak di fasilitas olahraga publik di Pontianak atau di daerah terpencil di akhir tahun. Ada laporan dari LSM lokal, pejabat provinsi, dan pers lokal orang Dayak membunuh jumlah yang tidak diketahui orang Madura berusaha untuk kembali ke Kalimantan Tengah.Serangkaian pemboman terjadi di Jakarta dan kota-kota lainnya, termasuk Depok, Bekasi, Yogyakarta, Banten, dan Sulawesi Tengah dari bulan Januari sampai Juni menargetkan gereja-gereja, layang, pusat perbelanjaan, dan tempat tinggal. Beberapa pemboman antara Natal dan Tahun Baru yang terutama ditujukan gereja. Koalisi LSM (Ornop) melaporkan bahwa ada insiden pengeboman 110, yang diklaim 26 jiwa dan melukai 201 orang sepanjang tahun. Seorang tersangka dalam pemboman bulan Oktober di Mall Atrium dirilis pada pengakuan sendiri pada tanggal 4 Oktober, namun ia diminta untuk melaporkan ke Polda Metro Jaya dua kali seminggu. Polisi menangkap 13 orang, termasuk 3 warga Malaysia, pada bulan September menyusul lain pengeboman Mall Atrium. Polisi percaya bahwa 13 tahanan juga bertanggung jawab atas beberapa pengeboman gereja pada malam Natal 2000 (lihat Bagian 5). Para pemboman malam Natal terjadi di 9 kota dan melukai lebih dari 100 orang, menurut laporan pers. Pada tanggal 19 Juli, Pengadilan Kabupaten Bandung hukuman kedua terdakwa dinyatakan bersalah terlibat dalam salah satu serangan bom yang menewaskan empat orang sampai 9 tahun penjara. Pengadilan menghukum pemilik rumah di mana kedua terdakwa diduga membuat bom sampai 8 tahun penjara.Dua terdakwa yang diduga terlibat dalam pengeboman Bursa Efek Jakarta, yang menewaskan 10 orang dan puluhan orang lain terluka pada September 2000, melarikan diri dari tahanan sebelum mereka bisa dicoba. Salah satu terdakwa, seorang kopral di Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, melarikan diri sementara dalam tahanan empat anggota polisi militer. Tersangka lain, seorang warga sipil, melarikan diri dari penjara di Jakarta Timur pada bulan Februari. Pengadilan menghukum tiga terdakwa yang tersisa, dua militer dan seorang warga sipil, untuk 20 tahun penjara masing-masing (lihat Bagian 1.c.).Menurut laporan pers, selama 2000 145 orang yang dituduh melakukan kejahatan (biasanya pencurian atau tanggung jawab untuk kecelakaan kendaraan) dibunuh oleh massa dari orang-orang di tempat kejadian kejahatan yang dituduhkan di daerah perkotaan terpadat di Jakarta, Jawa Barat, Jawa Timur, dan Sumatera Utara. Countrywide statistik tidak tersedia pada akhir tahun.Ada juga laporan media massa menyerang pasukan keamanan dan penjaga sipil. Misalnya, pada tanggal 14 Agustus tukang becak memukuli sampai mati seorang penjaga sipil dan terluka parah delapan lainnya mencoba untuk mengusir driver dari Jakarta Barat, pada akhir tahun ini, tidak ada yang ditangkap sehubungan dengan serangan tersebut (lihat Bagian 1.c. dan 6.a.). Pemerintah kota telah melarang becak dari operasi di Jakarta sejak 1988.Selama tahun ini, ada sejumlah laporan pembunuhan dari orang yang mempraktekkan sihir tradisional ("dukun santet") (lihat Bagian 5). Sebagai contoh, pada 2 September, sekitar 40 warga desa di Bentarkawung, Jawa Tengah tewas Warsono, warga desa yang diyakini disebabkan penduduk lain menjadi sakit dan mati. Pada tanggal 7 Oktober, warga di Tangerang, Jawa Barat, mengalahkan dan membunuh penduduk yang baru tiba yang diyakini telah menyebabkan kematian tujuh warga. Tidak ada yang dituduh dalam insiden pada akhir tahun ini.b. HilangnyaMenurut laporan yang dikeluarkan pada tahun 2000 oleh Komite untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (KONTRAS), 843 orang masih hilang sebagai akibat dari operasi militer, sengketa tanah, dan kegiatan politik dan agama selama 20 tahun terakhir. Selain Kontras melaporkan bahwa 106 orang masih hilang di Aceh sepanjang tahun.Di Aceh ada terus menjadi laporan yang dapat dipercaya hilangnya banyak warga sipil. KONTRAS melaporkan bahwa 14 orang hilang pada September saja, termasuk 5 tokoh masyarakat Aceh, GAM yang diculik ketika kembali dari pertemuan dengan Presiden Megawati pada tanggal 8 September, tetapi mereka dirilis pada 10 September. Aristoteles Masoka, sopir Theys Eluay, telah hilang sejak pembunuhan Eluay, dia yang terakhir diketahui berada di tahanan Kopassus. Seringkali, mayat orang hilang kemudian ditemukan, sering membawa tanda penyiksaan (lihat Bagian 1.c.). Tiga Aceh menonjol menghilang di Medan, Sumatera Utara selama tahun 2000, namun hanya Syahputra masih hilang pada akhir tahun. Mayat anggota parlemen dan aktivis HAM Tengku Nashir dan aktivis LSM Jafar Sidiq Hamzah kemudian ditemukan, bantalan tanda-tanda penyiksaan. LSM menuduh bahwa TNI pasukan atau personil polisi bertanggung jawab atas banyak kasus penghilangan sipil.Tidak ada kemajuan dalam penyelidikan tentang penyebab kematian atau identifikasi sisa-sisa 32 mayat ditemukan mengambang di sekitar Biak, Papua pada Juli 1998 setelah pasukan angkatan laut dan polisi membubarkan demonstrasi proindependence. Beberapa laporan mengklaim bahwa banyak mayat-mayat itu demonstran yang ditahan dan kemudian tewas saat dalam tahanan.Pemerintah tidak mengambil tindakan signifikan mencegah kekuatan yang menculik orang. Dalam kebanyakan kasus di Papua, Brimob atau pasukan Kopassus sering menangkap dan menahan orang setelah insiden kekerasan. Situasi impunitas oleh kelompok-kelompok seperti mendorong orang lain untuk melanjutkan penculikan.Menurut Amnesti Internasional (AI) pada tanggal 25 Juni pria bersenjata menculik Hubertus Wresman, seorang guru sekolah minggu dari Betaf. AI percaya penculik Wersman itu adalah personil militer. Tidak ada kemajuan dalam kasus Wresman oleh akhir tahun. Anggota Brimob menculik Daud Yomaki, Henok Marani, dan Mais Imburi selama operasi pencarian setelah lima polisi tewas pada tanggal 13 Juni di desa Wondiboi (lihat Bagian 1.a.). Tubuh Felex Urbon, orang lain yang diduga diculik oleh Brimob pada 20 Juni, ditemukan pada 16 Juli.Tidak ada kemajuan dalam penghilangan banyak orang di Timor Timur pada 1999 dan di tahun sebelumnya.Tidak ada kemajuan dalam kasus empat anggota Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria (KPA), sebuah LSM yang berbasis di Bandung, Jawa Barat yang melakukan advokasi untuk petani direbut, mengklaim bahwa mereka menculik di bawah todongan senjata oleh orang tak dikenal pada tanggal 14 Agustus tahun 2000. Penculikan yang dituduhkan mereka datang setelah polisi secara paksa memindahkan mereka dari demonstrasi dan mogok makan yang mereka melakukan di dalam gedung Parlemen di Jakarta. Mereka menyatakan bahwa setelah beberapa hari di sel isolasi mereka diusir ke lokasi yang berbeda dan diinterogasi panjang lebar tentang kegiatan organisasi mereka, keuangan, dan tujuan. Mereka mengatakan bahwa mereka tidak disiksa secara fisik, tetapi kehidupan mereka dan keluarga mereka dan rekan sering terancam. Penculik mereka melepaskan mereka pada 27 Agustus. KPA kemudian mengajukan gugatan terhadap polisi menyatakan bahwa polisi telah menculik empat anggotanya. Jakarta pengadilan negeri menolak gugatan karena kurangnya bukti. KPA mengajukan banding, namun pengadilan tidak mengeluarkan keputusan pada akhir tahun ini. Polisi membuka penyelidikan atas penculikan itu, tetapi tidak dapat mengidentifikasi para pelaku (lihat Bagian 1.e. dan 4).Tidak ada kemajuan dalam kasus 12 orang yang hilang (dan diperkirakan tewas) di Jawa selama serangkaian kidnapings dari penentang rezim Soeharto dilakukan oleh Komando Pasukan Khusus (Kopassus) karyawan pada tahun 1997 dan 1998. Namun, pada tahun 2000 polisi mulai melakukan penyelidikan atas insiden PDI 1996 di mana 16 orang hilang, dan menyerahkan kasus ke Kejaksaan Agung (lihat Bagian 1.a.). Tidak ada informasi baru muncul pada nasib 16 orang hilang sampai akhir tahun.Di Aceh separatis bersenjata sering menculik anggota militer, personil polisi, pegawai negeri, dan lainnya, meskipun mereka tidak selalu mengakui tanggung jawab atas insiden ini. Kelompok-kelompok milisi yang diduga telah menewaskan beberapa warga sipil yang dicurigai sebagai kolaborator atau informan pasukan keamanan. Sebagai contoh, diculik GAM Ghazali Usman, anggota parlemen provinsi Aceh pada bulan September. Ia dibebaskan pada 26 November.Pada tanggal 16 Januari 12 karyawan dari sebuah perusahaan Korea di Asiki distrik yang diculik oleh OPM. OPM juga ditahan tim 4 orang negosiasi sebelum melepaskan semua 16 orang pada tanggal 25 Januari. Pada tanggal 23 Maret, dua karyawan dari sebuah perusahaan Korea penebangan menculik dan dirilis pada bulan Maret 30. Dua pembuat film Belgia, yang diculik pada tanggal 6 Juni oleh separatis Papua dan diselenggarakan di Puncak Jaya, dibebaskan pada 16 Agustus. Separatis Papua menculik dua transmigran pada tanggal 23 September setelah serangan terhadap sebuah pos militer di distrik Bonggo. Para karyawan perkebunan enam yang diculik pada bulan Juli 1999 di Papua dekat Arso masih hilang.Penculikan anak untuk tebusan merupakan fenomena baru dan dilaporkan tumbuh. Pada bulan Juli seorang bocah berusia 2 tahun itu diculik setelah kakek di Ciwidey gagal membayar utang. Para penculik menyerahkan diri kepada polisi sebelum orang tua anak membayar uang tebusan.c. Penyiksaan dan Perlakuan, atau HukumanKUHP membuatnya menjadi kejahatan dihukum sampai 4 tahun penjara untuk setiap pejabat untuk menggunakan kekerasan atau paksaan untuk memperoleh pengakuan, namun, dalam prakteknya perlindungan hukum keduanya tidak memadai dan banyak diabaikan, dan pasukan keamanan terus menggunakan penyiksaan dan bentuk perlakuan buruk, terutama di daerah di mana ada kekhawatiran keamanan aktif, seperti Aceh dan Papua. Polisi sering resor untuk kekerasan fisik, bahkan dalam insiden kecil.Beberapa laporan terpercaya bahwa banyak tentara dan polisi terus secara rutin menyiksa tahanan di Aceh. Sebuah laporan Juli oleh KONTRAS menyatakan bahwa polisi dan TNI disiksa 159 orang di Aceh. Misalnya, anggota GAM diduga mengatakan kepada HRW bahwa pasukan keamanan gabungan dari polisi, Brimob, dan militer ditangkap dan ditutup matanya dia di 2 April. Dia mengatakan bahwa interogator "digunakan tang untuk menarik kuku dari ibu jari kirinya, menusuk hidungnya, dan menyebabkan bekas luka lainnya di lengannya dan puting." Metode penyiksaan didokumentasikan di masa lalu termasuk pemukulan, mencambuk, sengatan listrik, dan pemerkosaan. AI melaporkan bahwa polisi di sebuah pos pemeriksaan militer di Aceh Tenggara ditahan dan disiksa dua aktivis hak asasi manusia. Para aktivis telah menyelidiki laporan bahwa 100 orang di Aceh Tengah Kabupaten tewas pada bulan Juni oleh TNI. AI melaporkan bahwa mengalahkan Brimob, ditembak, dan menewaskan tiga siswa SMA ditahan di kantor polisi di Krueng Sabee Caleng, Aceh Barat pada tanggal 18 Juni.Di Aceh tentara dan polisi pejabat secara rutin menggunakan kekerasan yang berlebihan dan kekerasan saat menyelidiki serangan oleh separatis bersenjata. Polisi dan tentara personil juga secara rutin menanggapi serangan terhadap tentara dengan terlibat dalam kekerasan tanpa pandang bulu terhadap pengamat. Pada bulan Maret polisi dan ratusan rumah terbakar militer dan toko di kota Aceh Timur Idi Rayeuk setelah pemberontak ditangkap singkat kota. Polisi dan militer menewaskan tiga warga sipil dan melukai tiga orang lainnya saat mereka merebut kembali kota.Ada laporan yang dapat dipercaya banyak yang tentara, kelompok paramiliter, dan polisi menyerang orang ditahan di Papua. Polisi sewenang-wenang ditahan, mengalahkan, dan orang yang disiksa dalam operasi pencarian setelah serangan terhadap fasilitas keamanan atau perusahaan swasta oleh kelompok bersenjata tidak dikenal. Menurut Institut Studi Hak Asasi Manusia dan Advokasi (ELSHAM), pasukan Brimob menanggapi pembunuhan lima anggota Brimob oleh kelompok-kelompok tak dikenal dengan melakukan operasi terhadap penduduk desa di Ransiki, dan ditangkap dan disiksa sembilan orang, termasuk seorang anak 15 tahun , yang mereka mengalahkan sadar. TNI juga sewenang-wenang menahan lebih dari 100 orang selama operasi pencarian. KONTRAS melaporkan bahwa selama operasi, TNI disiksa 14 sampai 16 dari orang-orang itu ditahan di desa Wondiboi.Selama kesaksian di depan Komite PBB Anti Penyiksaan, Felice Gaer menyatakan bahwa kekerasan seksual di negara ini "tampaknya sering digunakan" sebagai bentuk penyiksaan. Gaer menambahkan bahwa ia telah menerima banyak laporan pelanggaran seksual, termasuk pemerkosaan, di Aceh, Papua, Maluku Utara, dan Maluku. KONTRAS melaporkan bahwa ada 15 kasus yang terdokumentasi perkosaan di Aceh sejak April. Menurut laporan lokal di Papua, TNI memperkosa 94 perempuan dan anak perempuan di Paniai antara tahun 1969 dan 1998.Pada tanggal 7 Maret 2000 di daerah terpencil Utara Aceh Matangkuli kecamatan, sekelompok pria bersenjata di seragam tentara diperkosa 4 perempuan dan pelecehan seksual 12 orang lain, mereka juga mengalahkan parah 6 pria dan merampok keluarga mereka, tidak ada orang yang telah dibebankan oleh tahun akhir. Sidang untuk pemerkosaan terhadap Sumiati, seorang wanita Aceh diduga diperkosa oleh seorang tentara TNI pada tahun 1999, tidak dimulai pada akhir tahun ini, kasus perkosaan Sumiati adalah salah satu dari lima uji HAM bahwa komisi khusus dijadwalkan untuk mendengar (lihat Bagian 1. a.). Tidak ada biaya yang dibawa dalam pemerkosaan Agustus 1999 dari sembilan perempuan Aceh di Kecamatan Tangse Selatan, Pidie, yang diduga prajurit TNI yang bertanggung jawab.Ada dugaan bahwa prointegration milisi Timor Timur di Timor Barat memegang perempuan Timor Timur sebagai "budak seks" (lihat Bagian 5). Kristy Sword Gusmao, istri kemerdekaan Timor Leste Xanana Gusmao dilaporkan pada bulan November 2000 bahwa 33 hamil wanita Timor Timur kembali ke Timor Timur dan menyatakan bahwa TNI telah menculik mereka dan memaksa mereka untuk dijadikan sebagai budak seks mereka di Timor Barat. Tidak ada yang bertanggung jawab atas berbagai tindak perkosaan dan pelecehan seksual bahwa TNI yang didukung kelompok-kelompok milisi yang dilakukan terhadap pengungsi Timor perempuan Timor pada tahun 1999.Pada bulan Januari 2000, Menteri Negara Pemberdayaan Perempuan mengatakan bahwa pemerintah akan menindaklanjuti rekomendasi dari tim factfinding bersama (TGPF) yang menyelidiki kerusuhan sipil Mei 1998 di Jakarta dan kota-kota lain. Laporan tim ini, yang dikeluarkan pada bulan November 1998, menemukan bukti bahwa beberapa elemen dari tentara mungkin telah terlibat dalam memprovokasi kekerasan, termasuk serangan terhadap Sino-perempuan Indonesia, dan mendesak lebih lanjut penyelidikan dari paling sedikit 85 kasus kekerasan terhadap perempuan yang tim diverifikasi. Namun, tidak ada penyelidikan lebih lanjut telah dilakukan pada akhir tahun ini (lihat Bagian 5).Ada kasus di mana pasukan keamanan menanggapi dengan brutal untuk demonstrasi damai, meskipun mereka biasanya diperbolehkan untuk melanjutkan demonstrasi damai tanpa memaksa. Sebagai contoh, Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) melaporkan pada Juni bahwa 19 demonstran dari gerakan Pekerja Muda Kristen (YCW), Liga Mahasiswa untuk Demokrasi Nasional (LMND), dan Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD), ditahan dan disiksa di Bandung. Para demonstran yang memprotes perubahan pada undang-undang ketenagakerjaan mengenai uang pesangon dan harga minyak meningkat. Menurut Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Asosiasi, 18 dari para demonstran dibebaskan setelah 3 bulan penahanan tanpa pengadilan, dan 1 dijatuhi hukuman satu tahun penjara karena menyebarkan kebencian terhadap Pemerintah. Pada tanggal 8 Juni individu yang diduga milik sebuah organisasi Islam mengobrak-abrik Asia Pasifik Konferensi Solidaritas pada Neoliberalisme di Jawa Barat dan dilaporkan merusak beberapa peserta. Polisi tidak melakukan intervensi untuk melindungi peserta melainkan putus konferensi dan ditahan 2 lokal dan 32 aktivis buruh asing (lihat Bagian 6.f.). Pada tanggal 13 Juni, sekelompok massa sekitar 150 orang terhubung ke Partai Golkar terganggu Pusat Solidaritas (ACILS) lokakarya tentang penanganan pengaduan di Kalimantan Timur (lihat Bagian 6.f.). Dalam banyak contoh di Papua pada tahun 2000 dan sepanjang tahun, polisi berusaha membubarkan demonstrasi damai di mana orang Papua mengibarkan bendera kemerdekaan Papua, dan ketika orang Papua menolak, polisi menanggapi dengan kekuatan yang berlebihan, membunuh dan melukai demonstran (lihat Bagian 1.a. , 2.a., 2.b., dan 5).Polisi masuk dan menyebabkan kerusakan properti untuk perumahan gedung Hukum Indonesia Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan (YLBHI) dan Jakarta Masyarakat Bantuan Hukum (LBH) pada dua kesempatan di mana mereka mengejar demonstran yang mencari perlindungan di gedung LBH. LBH melaporkan bahwa mengalahkan Brimob dan memerintahkan personil LBH untuk strip untuk pakaian mereka dan berbaring telungkup di tanah sebelum menempatkan mereka dalam sebuah truk dan membawa mereka ke markas polisi. Selain itu polisi membubarkan jendela dan mobil yang rusak dengan batu, tongkat, dan peluru selama insiden.Mahasiswa dan warga sipil lainnya juga terlibat dalam perilaku kekerasan dan merusak, mengakibatkan cedera tidak mematikan dan kerusakan properti. Sepuluh ribu pekerja memprotes SK membayar pesangon baru pada bulan Juni melemparkan batu, kayu, dan botol plastik, melukai sedikitnya sembilan orang dan merusak dua hotel di Jakarta. Ratusan tukang becak, dengan menggunakan bom molotov, parang, bar baja, dan batu, menyerang 500 pejabat kota keamanan publik, yang hendak menyerang bisnis ilegal mereka di bulan Agustus. Driver mengalahkan seorang pejabat mati, dua pejabat terluka, dan massa membakar dan kendaraan dirajam (lihat Bagian 1.a.). Mahasiswa Muslim di Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan menyerang siswa non-Muslim selama dua insiden terpisah pada tanggal 23 dan 24, sangat melukai enam orang. Kaum Muslim mengaku akan membalas pembakaran patung Usamah bin Laden di sebuah kota yang didominasi Kristen. Ratusan mahasiswa dari Universitas Muslim Indonesia (UMI) di Makassar menghancurkan properti di Konsulat Jenderal Jepang dan menuntut Konsul menurunkan bendera Jepang sehingga bisa dibakar. Para mahasiswa memprotes aksi militer AS di Afghanistan.Pada 22 Agustus 2000 Timor Leste milisi memukul dan terluka parah dua anggota staf UNHCR di kamp Naen dekat Kefamenanu, Timor Barat. Staf UNHCR telah diundang ke kamp untuk mendistribusikan persediaan tempat tinggal ketika seorang pria bersenjata parang menyerang mereka dan massa melempari mereka. Serangkaian pemboman terjadi di Jakarta dan kota-kota lainnya, termasuk Depok, Bekasi, Yogyakarta, Banten, dan Sulawesi Tengah, dari Januari hingga Juni di gereja, layang, pusat perbelanjaan, dan tempat tinggal (lihat Bagian 1.a.). Sebuah Koalisi LSM (Ornop) melaporkan bahwa ada insiden pemboman yang menewaskan 26 110 jiwa dan melukai 201 orang selama tahun ini. Kecuali untuk kasus pengeboman Bursa Efek, tidak ada tersangka ditangkap pada akhir tahun ini.Pada akhir tahun, beberapa kelompok Islam mengancam orang Barat dan melakukan "sweeping" operasi di hotel-hotel dan tempat-tempat publik lainnya dalam upaya untuk mendorong Barat ke luar kota.Kondisi penjara yang keras, dan penganiayaan dan pemerasan terhadap narapidana oleh penjaga dan kekerasan di antara tahanan umum. Insiden penganiayaan turun tajam sekali tahanan dipindahkan dari polisi atau tahanan militer ke dalam sistem penjara sipil atau ke dalam tahanan Kejaksaan Agung. Sembilan tahanan di Penjara Kebon Waru di Bandung meninggal karena penyakit yang tidak diobati, menurut laporan pers pada bulan Juli. Sumber yang dapat dipercaya melaporkan bahwa tahanan kriminal di beberapa fasilitas yang dipukul secara rutin dan sistematis sebagai hukuman atas pelanggaran aturan penjara dan untuk memaksa informasi tentang tahanan lain. Selama serangan bulan Agustus LP Cipinang di Jakarta Timur, polisi menyita pisau, pedang, clurit, golok, senjata api, dan granat tangan, yang telah diselundupkan ke dalam penjara untuk narapidana, menurut laporan pers. Penjara perkelahian sering terjadi atas obat atau perpecahan etnis. Mantan narapidana di Penjara Cipinang Jakarta mengatakan kepada pers pada bulan November 2000 bahwa penggunaan narkoba di kalangan tahanan adalah umum, dan bahwa narapidana dapat memperoleh obat-obatan, pengobatan yang lebih baik, dan kondisi yang lebih baik dengan menyuap penjaga. Pejabat pemerintah mengakui secara terbuka bahwa penjaga penjara terlibat dalam penjara "sindikat obat."Wanita ditempatkan secara terpisah dari laki-laki di penjara, tetapi dalam kondisi yang sama. Remaja tidak ditempatkan secara terpisah dari orang dewasa.Pemerintah biasanya tidak mengizinkan kunjungan rutin penjara oleh pemantau hak asasi manusia, meskipun beberapa kunjungan sesekali diperbolehkan, namun, Komite Internasional Palang Merah (ICRC) telah mengunjungi 12 tahanan yang sudah dihukum selama tahun berjalan (lihat Bagian 4).d. Sewenang-wenang Penangkapan, Penahanan, atau ExileKode Acara Pidana berisi ketentuan terhadap penangkapan sewenang-wenang dan penahanan, tetapi tidak memiliki mekanisme penegakan yang memadai, dan otoritas rutin melanggarnya. Kode menetapkan bahwa tahanan memiliki hak untuk segera memberitahu keluarga mereka dan bahwa surat penangkapan harus diberikan saat penangkapan kecuali dalam kondisi tertentu, seperti ketika tersangka tertangkap basah melakukan kejahatan. Hukum kewenangan penyidik untuk menerbitkan waran untuk membantu dalam penyelidikan mereka atau jika ada bukti yang cukup bahwa suatu kejahatan telah dilakukan. Namun, pihak berwenang di kali melakukan penangkapan tanpa surat perintah.Undang-undang menganggap bahwa terdakwa tidak bersalah dan jaminan izin. Terdakwa atau keluarganya juga berhak mempertanyakan keabsahan penangkapan dan penahanannya dalam sidang praperadilan dan bisa menuntut kompensasi bila salah ditahan. Namun, hampir mustahil bagi tahanan untuk memohon prosedur ini atau menerima kompensasi setelah dibebaskan tanpa dakwaan. Dalam pengadilan baik militer maupun sipil, banding yang didasarkan pada klaim salah tangkap dan salah tahan jarang, jika pernah, diterima. Kode Acara Pidana juga mengandung batas-batas tertentu di masa penahanan praperadilan dan menentukan kapan pengadilan harus menyetujui perpanjangan, biasanya setelah 60 hari. Pengadilan umumnya menghormati batas-batas ini.Pihak berwenang secara rutin menyetujui perpanjangan masa penahanan. Di daerah di mana gerakan gerilya aktif ada, seperti Aceh dan Papua, ada banyak contoh orang ditahan tanpa surat perintah, tuduhan, atau proses pengadilan. Bail jarang diberikan. Pihak berwenang sering mencegah akses ke penasihat hukum sementara tersangka sedang diselidiki dan membatasi atau mencegah akses ke bantuan hukum dari organisasi pembelaan hukum. Undang-undang khusus tentang korupsi, kejahatan ekonomi, dan narkotika berada di bawah KUHP.Pasukan keamanan peserta sering ditahan diduga menghasut demonstrasi, meskipun sebagian besar dibebaskan setelah diinterogasi (lihat Bagian 2.b.). Buruh aktivis Ngadinah ditangkap pada tanggal 23 April dan didakwa dengan "perilaku tidak menyenangkan" dan mempengaruhi pekerja lain untuk mogok di pabrik sepatu atletik. Polisi menahan Ngadinah selama 2 minggu. Dia tetap berada di bawah tahanan rumah sampai dengan 30 Agustus ketika pengadilan membebaskannya dari semua tuduhan. Pada tanggal 8 Juni individu yang diduga milik sebuah Organisasi Islam mengobrak-abrik Asia Pasifik Konferensi Solidaritas pada Neoliberalisme di Jawa Barat dan dilaporkan mengancam beberapa peserta. Pada tanggal 17 Juni dua aktivis mahasiswa di Jakarta ditangkap dan dituntut dengan tuduhan memicu "kekacauan" menyusul demonstrasi kekerasan di Jakarta terhadap kenaikan harga bahan bakar. Kedua mahasiswa dijatuhi hukuman 5 bulan penjara pada bulan September dan tetap ditahan pada akhir tahun (lihat Bagian 6.b.).Tidak ada data yang dapat diandalkan mengenai jumlah penangkapan sewenang-wenang atau penahanan tanpa pengadilan, terutama di Aceh dan Papua, tetapi ada banyak bukti bahwa penangkapan sewenang-wenang dan penahanan tanpa pengadilan bekerja secara sistematis di Aceh. Pada tanggal 20 November, kepala dari LSM Aceh (SIRA), Muhammad Nazar, ditangkap atas tuduhan "penyebaran kebencian" dengan menggantung spanduk yang mendukung referendum dan melawan militer selama reli kampus pada bulan Agustus 2000. Dia dinyatakan bersalah pada Maret, dihukum 10 bulan penjara, dan dirilis pada bulan Desember. Pada tanggal 20 Juli di Banda Aceh, polisi menahan enam perwakilan GAM kepada "Perdamaian Melalui Dialog" perundingan yang disponsori oleh Dunant Swiss berbasis Henri Center (HDC). Polisi mengklaim individu yang pemberontak dan tidak negosiator dan menangkap mereka dengan tuduhan subversi. Lima dari enam negosiator dilaporkan telah dirilis pada tanggal 29; keenam tetap ditahan di akhir tahun, dituduh memiliki paspor palsu. Pada bulan Agustus pemimpin mahasiswa Aceh Fasial Saifuddin ditahan di Jakarta atas tuduhan serupa. Persidangannya masih berlangsung sampai akhir tahun. Aceh mahasiswa pemimpin Kautsar Muhammad Yus ditahan di Banda Aceh pada bulan Juli dengan tuduhan bahwa ia menyebar kebencian terhadap pemerintah selama demonstrasi menentang operasi ExxonMobil di Aceh. Dia tetap ditahan sampai akhir tahun. Pada bulan Juni dan Juli, TNI sewenang-wenang menahan lebih dari 100 orang dalam operasi militer untuk mencari anggota OPM (lihat Bagian 1.c.).Polisi menahan orang banyak di Papua setelah bentrokan di Jayapura pada bulan Desember 2000, Merauke pada bulan November 2000, dan di Wamena pada bulan Oktober 2000 (lihat Bagian 1.a., 1.c., dan 5). Pada tanggal 15 Desember, polisi menahan direktur Institut Studi Hak Asasi Manusia dan Advokasi di Papua selama 22 jam (lihat Bagian 4). Empat mahasiswa Papua dihukum pada 7 Agustus memfitnah Pemerintah untuk demonstrasi 2000 proindependence Desember di depan sebuah kedutaan asing. Pengadilan memvonis siswa untuk 3 bulan penjara, termasuk waktu dilayani. Sebelum sidang Agustus, siswa sudah ditahan selama 3 bulan dan dirilis pada bulan Maret menunggu sidang. Pada bulan Maret 2000 perintah polisi daerah untuk Papua diselidiki tuntutan pidana terhadap 16 anggota terkemuka dari Dewan Presidium Papua untuk kejahatan terhadap keamanan dari tatanan negara dan masyarakat, berdasarkan klaim bahwa mereka telah menyelenggarakan pertemuan para pemimpin masyarakat Papua pada Februari 2000 dan kemerdekaan damai Papua pengibaran bendera pada tanggal 1 Desember 1999. Penyelidikan terhadap beberapa 16 orang kemudian dijatuhkan, namun, pada bulan November 2000, polisi menangkap ketua, sekretaris umum, dan tiga lainnya anggota Presidium Dewan Papua dengan tuduhan serupa (lihat Bagian 2.a. dan 5). Pada pertengahan Desember 2000, 17 aktivis Papua diadili di Wamena dengan tuduhan membahayakan keamanan negara dengan mempromosikan separatisme selama, 6 Oktober 2000, pengibaran bendera insiden dimana polisi menewaskan 13 orang Papua, lalu kemudian dibunuh 2 lusin migran. Pengadilan menemukan semua bersalah karena pemberontakan, mencoba untuk memisahkan diri dari Negara Indonesia, dan pelanggaran kecil yang lain, dan menghukum mereka hukuman penjara berkisar antara 1 sampai 4 tahun. Pada tanggal 12 Juni, mereka mengajukan banding atas hukuman mereka ke Mahkamah Agung. Banding sebelumnya ke Pengadilan Tinggi Papua ditolak.Pasukan keamanan menahan sejumlah anggota asing dari kedua LSM asing dan domestik selama tahun berjalan (lihat Bagian 4).Dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, beberapa wisatawan asing telah dikenakan penangkapan sewenang-wenang dan penahanan saat bepergian di Papua.Pemerintah tidak menggunakan pengasingan paksa.e. Penolakan Pengadilan Umum AdilKonstitusi menyediakan untuk independensi peradilan, namun ada beberapa tanda-tanda independensi peradilan, dan dalam praktek, kehakiman adalah bawahan eksekutif dan militer. Berdasarkan undang-undang tahun 1999, transfer bertahap kontrol administratif dan keuangan atas peradilan dari Departemen Kehakiman ke Mahkamah Agung itu harus terjadi pada tahun 2004. Namun, hakim adalah pegawai negeri yang dipekerjakan oleh cabang eksekutif, yang mengontrol tugas-tugas mereka, membayar, dan promosi. Upah yang rendah mendorong korupsi, dan hakim tunduk pada tekanan dari otoritas pemerintah, yang sering menggunakan pengaruh atas hasil kasus.Sebuah peradilan quadripartite umum, pengadilan agama, militer, dan administrasi ada di bawah Mahkamah Agung. Hak banding dari pengadilan negeri ke pengadilan tinggi ke Mahkamah Agung ada di semua empat sistem. Mahkamah Agung tidak mempertimbangkan aspek faktual dari sebuah kasus, aplikasi hanya pengadilan yang lebih rendah dari hukum. Mahkamah Agung secara teoritis merupakan cabang setara dalam relasi dengan eksekutif dan legislatif, dan pada bulan November MPR diberikan Mahkamah Agung hak judicial review atas undang-undang disahkan oleh Parlemen (lihat Bagian 3).Sebuah panel hakim melakukan uji di tingkat pengadilan negeri, yang terdiri dari mengajukan pertanyaan, mendengar pembuktian, memutuskan bersalah atau tidak, dan menilai hukuman. Penilaian awal jarang dibalik dalam proses banding, meskipun hukuman dapat ditambah atau dikurangi. Baik pembela hukum maupun jaksa penuntut dapat mengajukan banding kasus.Terdakwa memiliki hak untuk menanyai para saksi dan menghadirkan saksi demi pembelaannya. Pengecualian berlaku dalam kasus-kasus di mana jarak atau biaya dianggap terlalu besar untuk mendatangkan saksi ke persidangan; dalam kasus tersebut, keterangan tertulis sumpah dapat digunakan. Para jaksa enggan menggunakan kekuatan hukum yang ada untuk permohonan tawar-menawar dengan terdakwa atau saksi, atau saksi untuk memberikan kekebalan dari penuntutan. Akibatnya, saksi pada umumnya tidak bersedia untuk bersaksi melawan penguasa. Pengadilan umum memungkinkan pengakuan paksa dan membatasi presentasi bukti pertahanan. Terdakwa tidak memiliki hak untuk tetap diam dan dapat dipaksa untuk bersaksi melawan diri mereka sendiri.Kode Acara Pidana memberi terdakwa hak untuk pengacara dari saat penangkapan, tetapi tidak selama periode investigasi prearrest, yang mungkin melibatkan penahanan berkepanjangan. Orang dipanggil untuk hadir sebagai saksi dalam penyelidikan tidak memiliki hak untuk bantuan hukum, bahkan jika informasi yang dikembangkan selama kesaksian sesudah itu menjadi dasar penyelidikan saksi. Undang-undang mengharuskan pengacara untuk diangkat dalam kasus hukuman mati dan yang melibatkan hukuman penjara 15 tahun atau lebih. Dalam kasus yang melibatkan hukuman potensial dari 5 tahun atau lebih, seorang pengacara harus diangkat jika terdakwa adalah miskin dan nasihat permintaan. Dalam teori tersangka yang tidak mampu dapat memperoleh bantuan hukum swasta, seperti yang disediakan oleh Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia. Namun, dalam prakteknya terdakwa sering dibujuk untuk tidak menyewa pengacara, atau akses ke pengacara pilihan mereka terhambat.Dalam banyak kasus, perlindungan prosedural, termasuk pengakuan terhadap dipaksa oleh aparat keamanan atau polisi, tidak memadai untuk menjamin pengadilan yang adil. Korupsi adalah fitur umum dari sistem hukum, dan pembayaran suap dapat mempengaruhi tuntutan, putusan dan penghukuman dalam kasus perdata dan pidana.Pada bulan Oktober panel review Mahkamah Agung membatalkan vonis bersalah Pengadilan sendiri terhadap putra mantan Presiden Soeharto, Hutomo "Tommy" Mandala Putra, tak lama setelah pembunuhan salah satu hakim nya. Polisi menuduh Tommy Soeharto memerintahkan pembunuhan keadilan untuk mempengaruhi hasil persidangan. Legislator, Jaksa Agung, dan reformis hukum telah menyatakan ketidaksetujuan mereka dengan keputusan panel review ini dalam kasus tersebut. Namun, dalam hal tidak adanya hukum yang mengatur masalah banding atas keputusan sebuah panel review ini, keputusan untuk membatalkan vonis bersalah Pengadilan kemungkinan akan berdiri.Meskipun awal transfer kontrol administratif dan keuangan atas peradilan dari Departemen Kehakiman ke Mahkamah Agung, ada beberapa tanda-tanda independensi peradilan. Pengadilan terus digunakan untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap, atau menolak upaya hukum untuk, aktivis politik dan kritikus pemerintah.Pada bulan November 2000, DPR membuat undang-undang pembentukan pengadilan hak asasi manusia permanen. Hukum menciptakan empat pengadilan distrik baru untuk mengadili pelanggaran HAM berat. Undang-undang mengharuskan bahwa masing-masing lima anggota pengadilan hak asasi manusia termasuk tiga hakim HAM ditunjuk untuk 5-tahun oleh Presiden atas nominasi dari Mahkamah Agung. Meskipun kasus-kasus yang mengajukan banding ke Pengadilan Tinggi dan Mahkamah Agung berdiri, hukum mengharuskan bahwa mereka termasuk tiga hakim pengadilan HAM secara ad hoc pada panel beranggotakan lima orang ketika mendengar kasus-kasus HAM. Hukum memberikan definisi yang diakui secara internasional dari genosida, kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan, dan tanggung jawab komando sebagai elemen inti dari pelanggaran HAM berat. Namun, tidak termasuk kejahatan perang sebagai pelanggaran berat. Hukum memperkuat kekuasaan Jaksa Agung, yang adalah satu-satunya menyelidiki dan menuntut otoritas dalam kasus-kasus pelanggaran HAM berat, dan yang berwenang untuk menunjuk penyidik ad hoc dan jaksa. Undang-undang juga memberdayakan Jaksa Agung (dan juga pengadilan) untuk menahan tersangka atau terdakwa untuk waktu yang tetap beberapa dalam kasus-kasus pelanggaran HAM berat. Namun, hukum mengharuskan perpanjangan penahanan dari setiap dugaan pelanggaran harus disetujui oleh pengadilan hak asasi manusia. Untuk pelanggaran HAM berat yang terjadi sebelum berlakunya undang-undang, hukum memungkinkan Presiden, dengan rekomendasi dari DPR, untuk membuat sebuah bangku ad hoc dalam satu pengadilan hak asasi manusia baru mendengar kasus terkait dengan pelanggaran tertentu.Selama tahun 2000 korban pelanggaran hak asasi manusia dicari untuk pertama kalinya untuk menggunakan pengadilan untuk mendapatkan ganti rugi. Pada bulan Juli 2000, Partai Demokratik Rakyat menggugat mantan Presiden Soeharto dan 13 pejabat senior mantan untuk kerusakan terkait dengan pemenjaraan pemimpin partai, pelarangan partai, dan penghancuran properti. Gugatan masih sedang terdengar pada akhir tahun. Selain itu pada tahun 2000, empat anggota dari Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria (KPA) menggugat polisi secara paksa di Jakarta untuk mengeluarkan mereka dari demonstrasi damai dan mogok makan yang mereka melakukan di dalam gedung Parlemen di Jakarta. Setelah dipaksa pindah, mereka kemudian telah menculik dan diancam oleh orang tak dikenal (lihat Bagian 1.b. dan 4). Sebuah pengadilan distrik menolak gugatan itu, tapi banding ke Pengadilan Tinggi masih ditangguhkan di akhir tahun.Presiden Wahid membebaskan semua tahanan politik yang tersisa dari era Soeharto dan Habibie pada Desember 1999. Sejumlah tahanan karena telah divonis dan menjalani hukuman atas tuduhan kriminal seperti subversi, memfitnah Pemerintah dan pemberontakan (lihat Bagian 1.d.).f. Sewenang-wenang Interferensi dengan Privasi, Family Home, atau korespondensiWaran pengadilan untuk penggeledahan diperlukan kecuali untuk kasus yang melibatkan subversi tersangka, kejahatan ekonomi, dan korupsi, namun badan-badan keamanan secara teratur dibuat paksa atau entri diam-diam ke rumah-rumah dan kantor. Pasukan keamanan juga sering terlibat dalam pengawasan orang dan tempat tinggal dan pemantauan selektif panggilan telepon lokal dan internasional tanpa hambatan hukum.Pemerintah dan DPR membahas pelaksanaan UU Mengatasi situasi berbahaya, yang disetujui DPR pada bulan September 1999, tetapi Presiden tidak pernah ditandatangani. Hukum akan memungkinkan militer untuk melakukan operasi pencarian dan penyitaan untuk senjata selama keadaan dinyatakan darurat tanpa surat perintah tetapi akan memerlukan pencarian tersebut dilaporkan ke pengadilan dalam waktu 24 jam. Pada bulan November 2000, Kabinet memutuskan untuk lebih menunda pelaksanaan hukum untuk mengizinkan diskusi tambahan dan perubahan mungkin. Pada bulan Januari Pemerintah meminta Departemen Pertahanan dan Departemen Hukum dan HAM untuk merevisi tagihan, namun hukum belum dilaksanakan oleh akhir tahun.Pejabat pemerintah keamanan memantau gerakan dan kegiatan bekas anggota Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) dan organisasi depannya, terutama orang yang Pemerintah percaya terlibat dalam kudeta 1965 yang gagal. Namun, menurut Komite Aksi Pelepasan Narapidana Politik (KAP T / N), orang-orang ini dan keluarga mereka tidak lagi menjadi sasaran pengawasan, diperlukan cek-in, indoktrinasi periodik, dan pembatasan perjalanan di luar kota mereka tinggal. Mantan anggota PKI juga tidak lagi wajib memiliki izin resmi untuk mengubah tempat tinggal mereka. Persyaratan bahwa "E.T." Cap ini telah digunakan oleh Pemerintah untuk memantau kegiatan orang-orang ini, yang memungkinkan Pemerintah dan calon majikan untuk mengidentifikasi diduga mantan anggota PKI, sehingga menundukkan mereka untuk diskriminasi resmi dan tidak resmi.Di bawah program transmigrasi yang disponsori pemerintah, sejumlah besar orang dipindahkan secara sukarela dari daerah berpenduduk padat ke daerah yang lebih terpencil dan kurang berkembang (program ini dimulai pada masa kolonial Belanda dan telah dilakukan kurang lebih terus menerus sejak saat itu). Hal ini juga digunakan untuk memukimkan kembali penduduk lokal di Timor Timur dan Papua. Dia mengatakan bahwa untuk selanjutnya Pemerintah hanya akan mendukung transmigrasi dalam provinsi yang sama. Transmigran dan migran di luar program transmigrasi pemerintah mendapat dukungan langsung pemerintah dan tidak langsung dalam bentuk program bantuan pembangunan dan kontrak dengan para pejabat pemerintah TNI atau lokal. Praktek ini, terutama di Papua dan sebagian Kalimantan, menyebabkan kebencian di antara penduduk asli yang anggotanya percaya bahwa hak mereka dilanggar,. Diduga ini adalah faktor yang berkontribusi pada bulan Juni 25 dan 26 serangan terhadap kamp-kamp pengungsi Pontianak (lihat Bagian 1.a).Pemerintah menggunakan wewenangnya, dan terkadang intimidasi, untuk lahan yang tepat untuk proyek pembangunan, khususnya di daerah yang diklaim oleh penduduk asli, dan seringkali tanpa kompensasi yang adil (lihat Bagian 5).Pemerintah membatasi impor berbahasa Cina publikasi (lihat Bagian 2.a. dan 5).a.Konstitusi memberikan kebebasan berbicara dan pers, dan pemerintah biasanya menghargai hak ini dalam praktek, namun wartawan terus menderita intimidasi dan kekerasan di daerah-daerah kerusuhan. Konstitusi memuat ketentuan umum untuk kebebasan berekspresi yang diperkuat oleh amandemen MPR Konstitusi pada bulan Agustus 2000, dan hukum 1999 tentang hak asasi manusia menyediakan perlindungan substantif kebebasan pers (lihat Bagian 1.d.), namun, wartawan terus diintimidasi dan dilecehkan sepanjang tahun.AJI menyatakan bahwa ancaman kekerasan dari polisi atau bahkan panggilan polisi bagi wartawan untuk menjadi saksi, serta ancaman dari anggota masyarakat, memaksa wartawan untuk berlatih self-censorship.Menurut sumber lokal dan internasional, para pelaku secara verbal dan fisik disalahgunakan para wartawan, yang melaporkan unjuk rasa.Tokoh media dan para ahli hukum mengklaim bahwa lingkaran tidak memiliki dasar hukum karena bertentangan dengan UU, Pers 1999 yang melarang sensor pers.Pada Oktober, 779 perusahaan penyiaran radio swasta yang ada di samping jaringan radio pemerintah. Radio Pemerintah stasiun, Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), menghasilkan program "Berita Nasional."
Peraturan yang dikeluarkan oleh Pemerintah pada tahun 1998 mengurangi jumlah siaran program pemerintah wajib RRI 14-4 per hari. Sementara stasiun radio swasta di propinsi umumnya melekat dengan kebutuhan Pemerintah, stasiun radio swasta di banyak daerah perkotaan lebih besar siaran program RRI hanya sekali per hari. Peraturan memungkinkan stasiun untuk menghasilkan program mereka sendiri berita, dan banyak yang melakukannya. Liputan langsung Candid demonstrasi dan cerita melanggar lainnya meningkat tajam sepanjang tahun. Selain itu, "radio talk" ajakan dalam program secara teratur mengatasi masalah-masalah politik dan sosial ekonomi yang tepat waktu.Televisi asing dan siaran radio yang mudah diakses. Piring satelit dan jaringan televisi kabel telah menjamur di seluruh negeri, dan ada akses tidak terbatas ke Internet. Pemerintah tidak berusaha untuk membatasi akses ke program satelit dan telah menyatakan sebuah "terbuka langit" kebijakan. Majalah asing beredar luas tanpa sensor.Pemerintah membatasi impor berbahasa Cina publikasi dan musik (lihat Bagian 1.f. dan 5). Ada tujuh lokal diterbitkan surat kabar berbahasa Cina. Pada bulan November 2000, sebuah stasiun televisi baru yang independen, Metro TV, mulai disiarkan 2 jam berita dalam bahasa Mandarin per hari. Program ini adalah berbahasa Cina pertama siaran televisi di negara itu sejak 1965.Pemerintah mengatur akses ke negara itu dengan mengunjungi koresponden asing, terutama ke daerah-daerah kerusuhan. Hal ini terkadang mengingatkan penduduk wartawan asing dari kewenangannya untuk menolak permintaan visa untuk ekstensi. Ijin khusus diperlukan bagi wartawan asing untuk melakukan perjalanan ke Aceh dan Papua, namun tidak ada laporan bahwa Pemerintah diberlakukan peraturan ini sepanjang tahun.Pemerintah mewajibkan izin untuk impor publikasi asing dan rekaman video, yang harus ditinjau oleh sensor pemerintah. Bentuk Bea Cukai meminta pendatang ke negara itu untuk menyatakan kepemilikan publikasi Cina, meskipun sejumlah besar kebiasaan memotong bahan dan prosedur sensor.Kebanyakan buku oleh novelis terkemuka dan mantan tahanan politik Pramoedya Ananta Toer tetap dilarang, meskipun beberapa yang beredar. Pemerintah melarang ada buku tambahan sepanjang tahun, namun protes dari kelompok Islam mendorong tiga penerbit untuk menghapus buku dari toko buku. Pada bulan Mei Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI), sebuah organisasi Islam, membakar buku-buku tentang Karl Marx dan mengancam toko buku dengan pemindahan paksa buku berurusan dengan komunisme. Media dan LSM hak asasi manusia yang mengkritik panggilan untuk menarik buku dari peredaran sebagai pelanggaran terhadap kebebasan berekspresi.Hukum 1999 tentang kejahatan terhadap negara (lihat Bagian 1.d.) melarang orang dari menyebarkan atau mengembangkan ajaran komunisme, atau dari berusaha untuk menghilangkan atau mengganti ideologi negara Pancasila dengan cara yang menyebabkan kerugian bagi orang atau properti.Pasukan keamanan tidak konsisten ditegakkan dalam kebijakan anti toleransi terhadap mengibarkan bendera Papua atau Aceh sampai UU Otonomi Papua, yang memungkinkan terbang bendera Papua sebagai simbol budaya, ditandatangani menjadi undang-undang pada bulan November. Pasukan keamanan merobek dan menghancurkan bendera dan tiang bendera, dan dalam beberapa kasus mengalahkan atau membunuh mereka yang berusaha untuk meningkatkan atau melindungi bendera separatis. Pemerintah menekan tuntutan pidana pengkhianatan terhadap Alex Manuputty, Sekretaris Jenderal FKM, setelah ia menolak untuk mematuhi larangan kegiatan FKM dan mengibarkan Selatan separatis Republik Maluku (RMS) bendera pada tanggal 24 April di Ambon. Manuputty menghadapi hukuman maksimal 7 tahun untuk niat bermusuhan dan 4 tahun karena pengkhianatan.GAM diintimidasi wartawan di Aceh. Surat kabar harian terkemuka Aceh, Serambi Indonesia, tutup untuk awal bulan pada 11 Agustus setelah gangguan dari GAM. GAM juga menculik anggota televisi tiga kru selama 3 minggu, mengklaim bahwa mereka liputan media yang bias (lihat Bagian 1.b.).Editor surat kabar Jakarta beberapa stasiun televisi besar mengatakan bahwa mereka telah menerima surat dan panggilan telepon dari kelompok agama ekstrim mengancam kekerasan fisik untuk artikel atau editorial kelompok dianggap melawan kepercayaan mereka. Para editor mengakui bahwa ancaman-ancaman dari kelompok masyarakat memiliki efek mengerikan pada bagaimana mereka melaporkan berita.Hukum memberikan kebebasan akademis, dan tidak ada kendala yang signifikan dalam praktek pada kegiatan ulama. Kegiatan politik, diskusi terbuka, dan kritik tumpul Pemerintah di universitas terus berkembang sepanjang tahun.b. Kebebasan Majelis Damai dan AsosiasiKonstitusi memberikan kebebasan berkumpul, namun Pemerintah menempatkan kontrol signifikan terhadap pelaksanaan hak ini di daerah tertentu. Tidak ada izin persyaratan untuk publik sosial, pertemuan budaya, agama atau ilmu pengetahuan, lima atau lebih orang. Namun, penyelenggara pertemuan kebijakan politik, serikat buruh, dan masyarakat harus memberitahu polisi (lihat Bagian 6.a.). Dalam prakteknya beberapa pertemuan umum dibubarkan secara paksa. Pada tanggal 6 Juli, empat perwira polisi yang diduga intelijen sela lokakarya LSM internasional di Manado, Sulawesi Utara. Para petugas menuntut agar fasilitator memberikan bukti pemberitahuan terlebih dahulu tentang konferensi, penjelasan tertulis tentu saja kegiatan, dan daftar peserta sebelum mengizinkan lokakarya untuk melanjutkan.Undang-undang tentang kebebasan berekspresi mengharuskan demonstran memberitahu polisi 3 hari sebelumnya dan menunjuk seseorang bertanggung jawab untuk setiap 100 demonstran. Hukum melarang demonstrasi di dekat lokasi tertentu. Namun demikian, demonstrasi sering diadakan di Jakarta dan di seluruh negeri dengan atau tanpa izin resmi. Pemerintah sebelumnya telah dipanggil hukum untuk menahan dan mencoba demonstran di Jakarta dan tempat lain, namun tidak ada uji tersebut terjadi sepanjang tahun. Peserta dalam demonstrasi beberapa tewas dan menderita luka ketika pasukan keamanan berusaha membubarkan kerumunan tembakan, memukuli, dan menendang demonstran (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 1.c.). Sepuluh ribu pekerja memprotes SK membayar pesangon baru pada bulan Juni melemparkan batu, kayu, dan botol plastik, melukai sedikitnya sembilan orang dan merusak dua hotel di Jakarta. Ratusan tukang becak, dengan menggunakan bom molotov, parang, bar baja, dan batu, menyerang 500 pejabat kota keamanan publik, yang hendak menyerang bisnis ilegal mereka di bulan Agustus. Driver mengalahkan seorang pejabat mati, dua pejabat terluka, dan massa membakar dan kendaraan dirajam (lihat Bagian 1.a.). Mahasiswa Muslim di Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan menyerang siswa non-Muslim selama dua insiden terpisah pada tanggal 23 dan 24, sangat melukai enam orang. Kaum Muslim mengaku akan membalas pembakaran patung Usamah bin Laden di sebuah kota yang didominasi Kristen. Ratusan mahasiswa dari Universitas Muslim Indonesia (UMI) di Makassar menghancurkan properti di Konsulat Jenderal Jepang dan menuntut Konsul menurunkan bendera Jepang sehingga bisa dibakar. Para mahasiswa memprotes aksi militer AS di Afghanistan. Polisi membubarkan demonstrasi damai di Papua. Dalam beberapa kasus, polisi membubarkan demonstrasi damai di mana orang Papua mengibarkan bendera kemerdekaan Papua dan, setelah demonstran menolak, membunuh dan melukai banyak demonstran (lihat Bagian 1.a., 1.c., 2.a., dan 5).Sebagian besar pertemuan umum dan demonstrasi, yang telah tumbuh dan berkembang pesat sejak pengunduran diri Presiden Soeharto, terjadi tanpa campur tangan resmi. Sejumlah pemogokan tenaga kerja sepanjang tahun dan demonstrasi selama Sidang Istimewa MPR untuk mendakwa Wahid berlangsung tanpa intervensi polisi atau TNI (lihat bagian 3 dan 6.a.).Konstitusi memberikan kebebasan berserikat, namun Pemerintah menempatkan beberapa kontrol terhadap pelaksanaan hak ini. Hukum Organisasi Sosial (ORMAS) mensyaratkan kepatuhan dari semua organisasi, termasuk agama yang diakui dan asosiasi, dengan ideologi resmi Pancasila. Ketentuan ini, membatasi kegiatan politik dan melarang kelompok dari mencari untuk terlibat dalam kompetisi politik yang demokratis, untuk menjadikan Indonesia negara Islam, untuk menghidupkan kembali komunisme, atau untuk memperkenalkan kembali pembagian ideologi partisan ke negara itu.UU 1999 tentang Kejahatan Terhadap Negara (lihat Bagian 1.d. dan 2.a.) melarang pembentukan organisasi yang "diketahui atau dicurigai benar" merangkul ajaran Komunisme / Marxisme / Leninisme "dalam semua nya bentuk dan manifestasi. " Memberdayakan Pemerintah untuk membubarkan setiap organisasi yang percaya akan bertindak bertentangan dengan Pancasila, dan membutuhkan persetujuan pemerintah sebelum sebelum setiap organisasi dapat menerima dana dari donor asing. Partai Komunis dilarang, namun kebutuhan untuk persetujuan pemerintah sebelum diabaikan begitu luas untuk menjadi tidak berarti.Pemerintah mengumumkan akhir tahun 1995 niatnya untuk bersantai peraturan yang mengharuskan persetujuan polisi untuk semua pertemuan lima orang atau lebih dari semua organisasi di luar kantor atau situs kerja normal. Namun, dalam prakteknya peraturan ini terus diterapkan pada pertemuan serikat pekerja (lihat Bagian 6.a.).c. Kebebasan BeragamaKonstitusi memberikan kebebasan beragama bagi pemeluk agama yang diakui secara resmi, dan pemerintah biasanya menghargai ketentuan ini dalam praktek, namun ada sejumlah pembatasan pada jenis kegiatan keagamaan tertentu dan agama-agama yang tidak diakui. Konstitusi juga membutuhkan kepercayaan Tuhan Yang Maha Esa.Hukum resmi "merangkul" lima agama - Islam, Katolik, Protestan, Buddha, dan Hindu, namun, pada 1 Juni, Pemerintah mencabut larangan yang tersisa pada Saksi-Saksi Yehuwa, dan pada bulan Januari 2000, Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid mencabut larangan pada praktek Konfusianisme yang sudah ada sejak tahun 1967. Sementara hanya agama-agama ini diakui secara resmi, hukum juga menyatakan bahwa agama-agama lain tidak dilarang. Pemerintah memperbolehkan praktek, keyakinan mistik tradisional "Aliran Kepercayaan." Beberapa agama minoritas, termasuk Baha'i dan Rosicrucian, diberi kebebasan untuk mengatur pada Mei 2000. MPR mengadopsi Piagam Hak Asasi Manusia yang memberikan warga negara kebebasan untuk menjalankan agama mereka tanpa menyebutkan agama tertentu.Saksi-Saksi Yehuwa telah dilarang mempraktekkan iman mereka sejak 1976, namun larangan tersebut dicabut pada bulan Juni oleh keputusan presiden. Pemerintah mengharuskan Saksi-Saksi Yehuwa untuk mendaftar dengan Departemen Agama, di bawah Direktorat Jenderal Protestan. Tidak seperti tahun-tahun sebelumnya, anggota Saksi-Saksi Yehuwa tidak melaporkan adanya insiden pelecehan atau kesulitan dalam melakukan hal-hal sipil, dan beberapa pemerintah daerah telah mengeluarkan izin untuk membangun tempat ibadah.Satu keputusan presiden diumumkan pada bulan Januari 2000 mencabut larangan praktek agama Cina, keyakinan, dan adat istiadat nya. Konfusius diijinkan untuk merayakan publik Tahun Baru Cina. Sebuah Departemen melingkar Interior dikeluarkan pada akhir Maret 2000 memungkinkan Konfusianisme untuk dicatatkan sebagai agama pada aplikasi surat nikah, sehingga pernikahan Konghucu untuk diakui dan terdaftar resmi di negara ini. Namun, tidak semua masyarakat telah menerapkan pedoman baru.Pemeluk Baha'i umumnya tidak melaporkan masalah sepanjang tahun. Namun, pada bulan Mei kerumunan Muslim dilaporkan mengusir dua keluarga Baha'i tinggal di sebuah desa mayoritas Muslim di Kabupaten Donggala Sulawesi Tengah.Pemerintah di beberapa provinsi telah melarang sekte Islam mesianik Darul Arqam, Pemerintah juga melarang sekolah Al-Ma'Unah di beberapa provinsi. Pemerintah berupaya untuk memantau kelompok-kelompok Islam dianggap menyimpang dari ajaran ortodoks, dan di masa lalu telah dibubarkan beberapa kelompok. Secara historis, Pemerintah telah berusaha untuk mengendalikan kelompok-kelompok Muslim yang praktik menyimpang dari keyakinan Islam mainstream karena tekanan oleh para pemimpin non-pemerintah dari kelompok Islam yang besar atau konservatif dan tradisional serta perhatian pemerintah persatuan nasional. Sebuah proposal untuk menerapkan hukum Islam gagal untuk mendapatkan persetujuan MPR pada Agustus 2000.Persyaratan hukum untuk mematuhi Pancasila meluas ke semua organisasi agama dan sekuler. Prinsip pertama Pancasila adalah kepercayaan Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, namun orang tidak terdorong untuk mempraktekkan setiap iman tertentu. Semua warga negara harus diklasifikasikan sebagai anggota salah satu agama yang resmi diakui dan ateisme dilarang. Sebagai pilihan ini harus dicatat pada dokumen resmi, seperti kartu identifikasi, gagal untuk mengidentifikasi sebuah agama dapat membuat tidak mungkin untuk mendapatkan dokumen tersebut. Pemerintah secara aktif mendukung memungkinkan hukum Islam di Aceh, meskipun belum diimplementasikan pada akhir tahun ini, dan telah menjatuhkan oposisi publik sebelumnya untuk kelompok-kelompok yang mendukungnya di tempat lain. Wakil Presiden bahkan secara terbuka menyatakan dukungan untuk hukum Islam bagi umat Islam di seluruh negeri.Kekerasan agama dan kurangnya respon pemerintah yang efektif untuk menghukum pelaku dan mencegah serangan lebih lanjut menimbulkan tuduhan-tuduhan bahwa para pejabat ikut terlibat dalam beberapa insiden atau, minimal, memungkinkan mereka untuk terjadi dengan impunitas. Ada banyak contoh serangan terhadap gereja, masjid, kuil, dan fasilitas keagamaan lainnya selama tahun berjalan (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 5). Kekerasan antaragama yang paling luas terjadi di Provinsi Maluku. Gubernur Latuconsina memperkirakan bahwa 164 rumah ibadah rusak atau hancur antara Juni 2000 dan Juli 2001, dan bahwa ribuan orang tewas akibat kekerasan antara Kristen dan Muslim. Sebagai contoh, pada bulan Juni, 20 warga sipil tewas dalam baku tembak antara pasukan keamanan dan anggota Laskar Jihad (lihat Bagian 1.a.). Sebuah bom yang ditanam di kapal penumpang meledak di Teluk Ambon pada 11 Desember, menewaskan 3 penumpang dan melukai 39 lainnya. Segera setelah itu, beberapa ratus pemuda Kristen dan Muslim berjuang sebagai pasukan keamanan berdiri. Di Pulau Seram di Maluku, ratusan orang Kristen masuk Islam pada bulan Juli untuk menyelamatkan nyawa mereka (lihat Bagian 5). Pemerintah masih enggan untuk campur tangan dalam serangan massa di rumah ibadah dan terbukti tidak efektif dalam mengendalikan kekerasan di Provinsi Maluku, namun upaya pemerintah untuk menanggapi kekerasan komunal di Provinsi Maluku Utara dan Sulawesi umumnya lebih efektif (lihat Bagian 5).Dalam sumber-sumber Maluku Kristen menuduh bahwa unsur-unsur pasukan keamanan bias terhadap mereka. Namun, tidak ada bukti yang menunjukkan bahwa pasukan keamanan, sebagai sebuah institusi, didukung kedua sisi. Beberapa individu dan beberapa unit sesekali memihak sesama mereka, tetapi tindakan mereka tampaknya acak dan bertentangan dengan perintah. Beberapa pasukan militer ditahan dan diinterogasi karena diduga secara terbuka berpihak pada milisi di setidaknya satu episode di Haruku, namun tidak ada laporan bahwa pelaku tersebut pernah dihukum. Beberapa ratus polisi sendiri telah diserang dan beberapa dibunuh karena agama mereka; ratusan anggota polisi dan keluarga mereka, dan sejumlah pejabat pemerintah lainnya, adalah salah satu negara IDP.Menurut pejabat Kristen, sentimen anti-Kristen di balik kekerasan di Maluku, Sulawesi, dan di tempat lain tidak baru, tetapi kekebalan hukum yang terkait dengan tindakan seperti itu telah meningkat sejak pengunduran diri Soeharto pada bulan Mei 1998. Pada April pengadilan setempat dijatuhi hukuman mati tiga tersangka Kristen yang dinyatakan bersalah membunuh ratusan umat Islam dan menghasut kebencian agama di Poso, Sulawesi Tengah, pada bulan Mei dan Juni 2000. Pemerintah tidak menyelidiki sepenuhnya kasus serangan terhadap fasilitas keagamaan yang terjadi selama kerusuhan, dan dalam kasus lain, tidak menyelidiki insiden tersebut sama sekali, namun, Pemerintah membentuk tim antar khusus untuk menyelidiki 24 Desember pemboman gereja-gereja Kristen, dan LSM telah membentuk tim pencari fakta bersama dengan Pemerintah untuk menyelidiki pemboman malam Natal gereja (lihat Bagian 1.a., 1.c., dan 5).A memberikan peraturan bahwa sebelum sebuah rumah ibadah dapat dibangun, harus diperoleh persetujuan dari penduduk lokal yang tinggal di dekat situs, dan lisensi harus diperoleh dari kantor wilayah Departemen Agama. Beberapa orang Kristen mengklaim bahwa regulasi ini digunakan untuk mencegah mereka membangun gereja dan membangun kembali sarana ibadah rusak. Meskipun demikian, orang Kristen terus membangun gereja-gereja sepanjang tahun.Undang-undang mengizinkan berganti agama, dan pergantian semacam ini memang terjadi. Pengamat independen mencatat bahwa sulit untuk mendapatkan pengakuan resmi untuk pernikahan antar agama antara Muslim dan non-Muslim. Orang yang bukan anggota salah satu dari lima agama yang diterima juga mengalami kesulitan dalam memperoleh pengakuan resmi dari pernikahan mereka.Pemerintah memandang penyebarluasan agama oleh agama yang diakui di daerah sangat didominasi oleh agama lain yang diakui sebagai berpotensi mengganggu, dan menghambat itu. Kegiatan misionaris asing relatif tanpa hambatan, meskipun di Maluku Utara, pemerintah provinsi memerlukan misionaris untuk terlibat dalam pekerjaan ketat kemanusiaan. Pada semester pertama tahun ini, Pemerintah dideportasi misionaris Australia yang tidak memberitahu pemerintah daerah kegiatan mereka. Selain itu visa yang memungkinkan pintu masuk resmi ulama asing baru sulit untuk mendapatkan. Meskipun demikian, pendeta asing datang ke negara itu. Hukum dan keputusan dari pagu tahun 1970-an jumlah tahun bahwa misionaris asing dapat menghabiskan di negara itu, meskipun beberapa ekstensi diberikan di daerah terpencil seperti Papua. Pekerjaan misionaris asing tunduk pada ketentuan pendanaan UU Organisasi Sosial (lihat Bagian 2.b.).Pemerintah tidak menargetkan atau menggunakan kekerasan terhadap mengkonversi ke atau dari agama tertentu, namun saksi bersaksi kepada kelompok-kelompok hak asasi manusia insiden di mana beberapa tugas aktif dan personil militer pensiunan berdiri selama penyiksaan orang Kristen Maluku yang menolak untuk dikonversi.d. Kebebasan Dalam Gerakan Negara, Perjalanan Luar Negeri, Emigrasi, dan RepatriasiKonstitusi memungkinkan Pemerintah untuk melarang orang-orang baik dari memasuki atau meninggalkan negeri ini, dan Pemerintah membatasi kebebasan bergerak sampai batas tertentu. Sebuah September 20 laporan pers menunjukkan bahwa 201 tersangka dilarang meninggalkan negara oleh kantor Kejaksaan Agung, dan bahwa 29 tersangka juga dilarang meninggalkan oleh Departemen Keuangan. Sebuah keputusan yang dikeluarkan pada bulan Juli memungkinkan Pemerintah untuk menyita dan mencabut paspor orang dilarang bepergian ke luar negeri. Pemerintah melaksanakan wewenang ini pada bulan September ketika melarang perjalanan dua pengusaha yang diduga terlibat dalam kasus korupsi. Pada tahun 1999 menurut Departemen Kehakiman informasi dikutip dalam pers, Pemerintah mempertahankan daftar 3.665 orang asing yang dilarang memasuki negeri, dan 417 warga yang dilarang meninggalkan negara itu. Lima pemimpin Papua terkemuka yang dilarang meninggalkan negara itu pada Agustus 1999 (lihat Bagian 5) kemudian diizinkan untuk bepergian ke luar negeri, namun beberapa dari mereka hanya mampu melakukan perjalanan setelah pemerintah asing membuat tingkat tinggi representasi atas nama mereka.Pemerintah juga membatasi gerakan oleh warga negara dan orang asing ke dan di dalam bagian negara. UU 1999 tentang Mengatasi Situasi Berbahaya (lihat Bagian 1.f.) memungkinkan militer untuk membatasi tanah, udara, atau lalu lintas laut, untuk melarang migrasi masuk dan keluar dari daerah, untuk memesan relokasi orang luar daerah, dan memerintahkan tahanan rumah dalam keadaan dinyatakan darurat. Setelah demonstrasi melawan hukum, Parlemen dikirim hukum ke Departemen Kehakiman dan Departemen Pertahanan untuk revisi. Hukum disahkan pada tahun yang bersangkutan, namun belum belum dilaksanakan.Badan Intelijen Negara menyaring anggota staf yang diusulkan asing non-Indonesia lembaga yang melaksanakan program kerja sama teknis, termasuk LSM, sebelum Sekretariat Negara menyetujui masuknya staf 'ke negara itu (lihat Bagian 4). Konsultan asing dan staf bantuan asing, terutama yang bekerja di bagian-bagian sensitif dari negara seperti Aceh, Papua, dan Maluku, harus dibersihkan oleh Badan Koordinasi Intelijen (BAKIN) sebelum tugas-tugas mereka dapat disetujui oleh Sekretariat Negara.Pada tanggal 23 Juni 2000, maka Presiden Wahid mengumumkan larangan ke-ke Maluku dan Maluku Utara, namun larangan tersebut tidak ditegakkan secara efektif. Pada tanggal 26 Juni 2000, Presiden mengumumkan keadaan darurat sipil untuk kedua provinsi. Keputusan darurat, awalnya di tempat selama 90 hari, diperpanjang tanpa batas waktu (lihat Bagian 1.a., 1.c., 2.c., dan 5).Pemerintah mengharuskan bahwa individu memperoleh izin untuk bekerja di daerah tertentu, terutama untuk membatasi pergerakan populasi lebih lanjut untuk kota yang padat, namun persyaratan ini secara universal diabaikan.Menurut Pemerintah, orang asing yang berada di negara ini selama lebih dari 3 bulan diharuskan untuk mendaftar dengan Kantor Imigrasi antara 10 Agustus dan 10 Oktober untuk tujuan sensus. Hal ini diperkuat Hukum Asing Pendaftaran, dimana pelanggar dapat dikenakan maksimal 1 tahun penjara dan denda 500 (5 juta rupiah).Meskipun mantan tahanan politik yang terkait dengan kudeta 1965 yang gagal tidak lagi secara resmi diminta untuk membawa cap "ET" pada kartu identitas mereka, dalam banyak kasus, perangko belum dieliminasi dalam praktek (lihat Bagian 1.f.).Setelah pemungutan suara 30 Agustus 1999 konsultasi di Timor Timur, ada bukti kuat bahwa, dalam operasi yang direncanakan dan diatur, pasukan keamanan dan milisi secara paksa dihapus atau terpaksa melarikan diri persentase yang besar dari 250.000 orang Timor Timur yang berangkat wilayah pada saat itu waktu. Lebih dari 190.000 dari IDP yang telah kembali ke Timor Timur, tetapi selama paruh pertama tahun intimidasi oleh prointegration pasukan milisi Timor Timur di kamp-kamp di Timor Barat terus mencegah banyak orang lain dari kembali (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 1.c .).Semua bantuan internasional kepada pengungsi di Timor Barat dihentikan menyusul, 6 September 2000, serangan terhadap personil UNHCR di Atambua, di mana tiga UNHCR pekerja tewas, dan tidak melanjutkan selama tahun berjalan (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 4) . Kegagalan Pemerintah untuk melucuti dan membubarkan milisi menciptakan kondisi keamanan yang kurang baik untuk dimulainya kembali bantuan internasional. Ada bukti bahwa TNI elemen telah mendukung milisi dengan perlengkapan dan pelatihan, meskipun dukungan tersebut tampaknya menurun pada tahun 2000. Pada tahun 2000 dan selama tahun ini, Pemerintah mulai mengambil langkah-langkah untuk mempromosikan pemulangan sukarela dan aman di IDP, misalnya, dengan menyetujui untuk menyelesaikan klaim pensiun untuk beberapa pengungsi ada yang meminta repatriasi atau pemukiman kembali di Indonesia. Tidak ada bukti bahwa Pemerintah kembali paksa atau pemukiman kembali pengungsi Timor Timur itu. Pemerintah merencanakan untuk mengakhiri dukungan kepada Timor Timur pengungsi di Timor Barat, dan menutup kamp-kamp pengungsi, namun, ini tidak terjadi pada akhir tahun ini.Menurut sebuah laporan PBB World Food Program dirilis pada bulan November, ada lebih dari 1.321.136 di IDP di Indonesia, naik dari sedikit di atas satu juta pada tahun 2000. Jumlah terbesar yang berasal dari pengungsi konflik sektarian di Maluku dan Maluku Utara, meskipun beberapa pengungsi Maluku yang kembali ke rumah mereka sepanjang tahun. Di provinsi Maluku, ada 338.440 yang IDP dan 166.318 di Maluku Utara. Ada 46.103 pengungsi yang di Sulawesi Utara, hampir seluruhnya orang Kristen dari Maluku dan Maluku Utara; 35.611 di Sulawesi Tengah (paling terlantar akibat pertempuran sektarian di daerah Poso), dan 246.904 di Asia Selatan dan Timur Laut Sulawesi. Lain pengungsi dari Maluku terletak di Papua, yang memiliki total 16.870 pengungsi itu. Ada 48.585 itu IDP di North Sumata dan lain 14.351 pengungsi di Aceh. Ada 194.596 pengungsi yang ada di pulau Jawa. Di Kalimantan, ada 60.777 pengungsi Madura. Pulau lainnya, termasuk Bali, diselenggarakan sejumlah kecil pengungsi.Pemerintah umumnya telah didorong dan dibantu bantuan kemanusiaan asing dan domestik ke Maluku dan Sulawesi (lihat Bagian 4). Namun, pada kesempatan kedua kelompok Muslim dan Kristen menuduh beberapa donor asing memihak. Pemerintah belum terlalu efektif atau membantu dalam mempromosikan pengembalian sukarela dan aman atau pemukiman IDP di daerah-daerah pada akhir tahun ini.Di Jawa Timur, tidak ada laporan selama tahun polisi secara paksa kepada orang-orang daerah lain dikabarkan akan praktisi sihir (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 5).Selama tahun ini, pribumi Dayak dipaksa lebih dari 105.000 migran Madura meninggalkan rumah mereka di Kalimantan Tengah (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 5). Sebuah Madura diperkirakan 40.000 yang lari dari rumah mereka selama kekerasan antaretnis di tahun 1999 tetap di kamp-kamp pengungsi di Kalimantan Barat dan Madura (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 5).Sepanjang tahun, ribuan warga Aceh pedesaan sementara meninggalkan desa mereka dan menjadi pengungsi itu. Dalam beberapa kasus, itu IDP melarikan diri pasukan keamanan yang berpatroli di daerah itu atau mengintimidasi mereka (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 1.c.). Dalam kasus lain, separatis bersenjata diteror atau dipaksa untuk menjadi penduduk desa itu IDP, sebagian untuk membuat perhatian internasional dan simpati. Dalam kasus lain, warga nonethnic pedesaan Aceh menjadi sasaran bersenjata anggota GAM separatis. Pada bulan Juni GAM melakukan serangkaian serangan di Aceh Tengah terhadap Jawa dan penduduk Gayo, menggusur ribuan orang.Kerusuhan di Papua disebabkan banyak orang meninggalkan rumah mereka di distrik Wasior dan daerah lainnya. Ratusan orang melarikan diri pasukan keamanan operasi pencarian terhubung dengan pembunuhan lima anggota Brimob (lihat Bagian 1.a.). Sekitar 300 pengungsi Papua tetap berada di kamp-kamp di Papua Nugini, takut untuk kembali karena takut menjadi target pasukan keamanan sebagai militan. Empat puluh enam keluarga mengungsi situs transmigrasi Bonggo selama tembak-menembak antara pasukan keamanan dan kelompok militan.Hukum tidak menyediakan untuk pemberian suaka dan / atau status pengungsi sesuai dengan Konvensi PBB tahun 1951 berkaitan dengan Status Pengungsi dan Protokol 1967. Pemerintah bekerja sama dengan UNHCR, yang mempertahankan kantor regional di Jakarta. Pada tanggal 31 Desember, UNHCR telah mendaftarkan 2.835 pencari suaka dan pengungsi. Dari jumlah ini, 1.459 adalah warga Irak, 1.035 adalah warga Afghanistan, 174 adalah warga Iran, dan 167 negara lain. Pemerintah belum merumuskan kebijakan mengenai suaka, namun tidak ada laporan dari pengembalian paksa orang ke sebuah negara di mana mereka terancam penganiayaan.Bagian 3 Penghormatan atas Hak-hak Politik: Hak Warga Negara untuk Mengubah Pemerintah MerekaPada tahun 1999 warga negara untuk pertama kalinya berhasil diubah pemerintah mereka melalui proses yang terbuka, demokratis transparan, setelah dekade pemerintahan otoriter. Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) bertemu setiap 5 tahun dalam "Sidang Umum" untuk memilih Presiden dan Wakil Presiden dalam surat suara rahasia terpisah dan untuk menetapkan "Pedoman Besar Haluan Negara" (GBHN), yang dimaksudkan untuk melayani sebagai rencana kebijakan Pemerintah.Pada bulan Juli MPR bertemu untuk mengadakan "Sidang Luar Biasa" untuk butuhkan maka Presiden Wahid untuk mempertanggungjawabkan kinerjanya di kantor. Mengklaim tuduhan politik termotivasi, Gus Dur menolak untuk muncul, bukannya mengeluarkan direktif untuk "membekukan" MPR, DPR, DPR, dan partai Golkar, dan untuk menyelenggarakan pemilihan umum baru, melebihi kewenangannya di bawah UUD. Militer dan polisi menolak untuk melaksanakan ketetapan ini, dan pada tanggal 23 Juli mandat MPR dibatalkan Wahid dan Wakil Presiden Megawati Soekarnoputri diganti Wahid sebagai Presiden ditentukan oleh hukum.MPR 695-anggota terdiri dari 500 Anggota DPR, 130 utusan daerah, yang dipilih oleh legislatif provinsi, dan 65 wakil yang ditunjuk dari kelompok fungsional dan masyarakat. The 7 Juni 1999 pemilihan umum, dimana 48 partai politik berpartisipasi, dipantau oleh pemantau domestik dan internasional dan secara luas dianggap terbuka, adil, dan gratis. Pada bulan Oktober 1999, MPR yang baru diinstal memilih Abdurrahman Wahid sebagai Presiden dan Megawati Soekarnoputri sebagai Wakil Presiden dalam proses yang transparan, yang disiarkan langsung di televisi nasional. Putaran berikutnya pemilihan presiden umum dan presiden / wakil dijadwalkan untuk 2004.Kabarnya, signifikan peran militer historis dan sosial politik, sedang dihapus secara bertahap. Meskipun polisi dan militer dipisahkan, 2 lembaga terus bersama-sama memegang 38 kursi terpilih di DPR dan 10 persen kursi di parlemen provinsi dan kabupaten, di sebagian kompensasi tidak diizinkan untuk memilih. Selain posisi legislatif yang ditunjuk, aktif-tugas militer dan polisi juga bisa berjalan untuk pemilihan jabatan pemerintah tetapi, dalam pengembangan signifikan dari praktek masa lalu, diharapkan untuk pensiun (kecuali yang ditunjuk untuk badan legislatif) setelah mereka terpilih; Namun, purnawirawan sering mempertahankan ikatan yang kuat kepada lembaga mereka sebelumnya, dan menduduki posisi penting di semua tingkat pemerintahan. Militer dan polisi telah sepakat untuk melepaskan ditunjuk kursi mereka di DPR dan badan legislatif daerah pada tahun 2004, tetapi sebuah Tap MPR disahkan pada bulan Agustus 2000 memungkinkan mereka untuk mempertahankan kursi di MPR sampai "tidak lebih dari" 2009. Dalam upaya nyata untuk mengurangi tuntutan untuk segera mengakhiri posisi legislatif mereka, militer dan polisi legislator umumnya telah berusaha membatasi keterlibatan mereka dalam hal-hal yang dianggap tidak mempengaruhi kepentingan inti mereka.Cabang legislatif, yang tidak memiliki kemerdekaan selama era Soeharto, telah pindah paksa untuk membangun kemerdekaannya dari cabang eksekutif. Sejumlah perubahan konstitusi, MPR dekrit, dan perubahan hukum telah meningkatkan otoritas legislatif, meningkatkan beberapa kekhawatiran bahwa keseimbangan kekuasaan mungkin telah bergeser terlalu jauh dari cabang eksekutif. Namun, selama sesi pertemuan November, MPR diubah konstitusi untuk menyediakan langsung pemilihan presiden dan wakil presiden, sebuah legislasi bikameral dengan kamar perwakilan daerah, dan pengadilan konstitusional dengan kekuatan review undang-undang. MPR adalah untuk memutuskan masa depan peran yang tepat dan pengaturan transisi melalui perubahan konstitusi lebih lanjut untuk dipertimbangkan pada tahun 2002. Cabang legislatif telah menunjukkan kemerdekaannya melalui pengejaran agresif DPR fungsi pengawasan pemerintah, serta keberhasilan MPR di Presiden memaksa pertama Wahid untuk menyerahkan wewenang lebih besar atas manajemen pemerintahan sehari-hari kepada Wakil Presiden Megawati karena inefisiensi yang dirasakan dan inkonsistensi dalam Wahid Administrasi pelaksanaan kebijakan. Melalui semester pertama tahun ini, catatan legislatif DPR tercermin fokusnya hampir eksklusif pada menghapus Wahid dari kantor, namun dibatasi oleh prosedur rumit dan kurangnya keahlian staf. Meskipun demikian, pengaruh yang cukup besar dilaksanakan atas isi terakhir dari tagihan diperkenalkan oleh Pemerintah. Reformasi legislatif disetujui Oktober membentuk kode etik legislatif dan efisien proses legislatif.MPR ini diberdayakan untuk mengubah Konstitusi dan mengeluarkan keputusan, fungsi yang melakukan dalam pertama dari baru dilembagakan nya "Sesi Tahunan" yang diselenggarakan pada bulan Agustus 2000. Sebuah tuntutan utama dari gerakan reformasi adalah perbaikan UUD 1945, yang dianggap telah membantu perkembangan pembangunan rezim otoriter masa lalu. Dalam amandemen pertama dari Konstitusi, MPR 1999 berlalu pembatasan pada kekuasaan eksekutif, termasuk batas dua masa jabatan 5 tahun bagi Presiden dan Wakil Presiden. Pada saat yang sama, MPR diberdayakan ad hoc panitia kerja untuk mempertimbangkan amandemen lebih lanjut dan untuk rancangan keputusan MPR. Upaya ini menghasilkan berlalunya perubahan kedua Undang-Undang Dasar selama "Sidang Tahunan" pada Agustus 2000. Perubahan kedua tidak termasuk perubahan penting, termasuk ketentuan untuk perlindungan hak asasi manusia dimodelkan erat pada Deklarasi Universal PBB tentang Hak Asasi Manusia, otonomi daerah, dan pemisahan lebih lanjut dari kekuasaan. Selama sesi pertemuan November, MPR melakukan amandemen UUD 1945 untuk menyediakan, di antara perubahan lain, untuk pemilihan presiden dan wakil presiden secara langsung, sebuah badan legislatif bikameral dengan kamar perwakilan daerah, dan pengadilan konstitusional dengan kekuatan judicial review undang-undang. Perubahan, jika sepenuhnya dilaksanakan, akan meningkatkan akuntabilitas pejabat terpilih untuk konstituen dengan memungkinkan orang untuk langsung memilih Presiden dan Wakil Presiden.Yang 92 persen sisanya dari nasional dan 90 persen kursi parlemen daerah yang tidak diduduki oleh anggota militer dan polisi diisi melalui pemilihan diadakan setiap 5 tahun. Semua warga negara dewasa, kecuali aktif-tugas anggota, orang angkatan bersenjata di penjara dihukum atas kejahatan yang diancam dengan hukuman penjara selama 5 tahun, orang yang menderita gangguan mental, dan orang yang dirampas hak suara oleh putusan tidak dapat dibatalkan pengadilan keadilan, berhak untuk memilih. Anggota Partai Komunis Indonesia dilarang (PKI) tidak dapat berjalan untuk kantor.Kelompok pemantau internasional dan domestik dan partai politik besar menerima Juni 1999 pemilihan parlemen secara umum bebas dan adil, meskipun banyak masalah teknis dan penyimpangan, terutama di daerah terpencil. Masalah teknis banyak, karena persiapan yang tidak memadai dan ambiguitas dalam peraturan, termasuk pasokan yang tidak memadai surat suara dan bentuk pelaporan, pelatihan miskin pekerja jajak pendapat, kebingungan atas prosedur, dan dana cukup untuk membayar pekerja polling. Ada banyak, dan dalam beberapa kasus yang kredibel, tuduhan pembelian suara dan dugaan tersebar intimidasi pemilih, terutama di daerah pedesaan. Dalam beberapa kasus, dugaan pelanggaran dirujuk ke kekuasaan kehakiman untuk tindakan hukum, namun dalam banyak kasus, partai politik mencapai solusi informal di antara mereka sendiri.Tindakan beberapa perwakilan partai kecil di Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) memberikan kontribusi untuk penundaan yang signifikan dalam memvalidasi hasil pemilu dan menyebabkan banyak kehilangan iman publik di imparsialitas dan integritas KPU. Pada bulan Juni 2000, DPR telah diubah tahun 1999 undang-undang pemilu untuk membentuk KPU baru dan lebih independen, yang dibentuk melalui proses yang transparan yang mendorong keterlibatan publik. Beberapa pengamat khawatir bahwa baru KPU sekretariat akan tetap administratif tergantung pada Departemen Dalam Negeri.Meskipun tidak ada pembatasan hukum tentang peran perempuan dalam politik, persentase perempuan dalam pemerintahan dan politik tidak sesuai dengan persentase mereka dari populasi. Presiden, Megawati Soekarnoputri, adalah seorang wanita, sebagai dua anggota kabinet nya. Namun, ada sedikit perempuan di DPR dan di MPR daripada selama era Soeharto. Perempuan mewakili kurang dari 9 persen dari anggota DPR, turun dari 13 persen selama semester lalu Soeharto. Meskipun demikian, banyak aktivis perempuan berpendapat bahwa kualitas politisi perempuan telah meningkat. Anggota Perempuan Parlemen diumumkan pada pertengahan Oktober 2000, pembentukan kaukus non partisan perempuan. Survei telah menunjukkan bahwa sementara lebih dari sepertiga pegawai negeri adalah perempuan, kurang dari 6 persen di posisi otoritas (lihat Bagian 5). Papua cadangan UU Otonomi Khusus sepertiga kursi di Majelis Rakyat Papua yang 'bagi perempuan.Meskipun tidak ada pembatasan hukum atas peran minoritas dalam politik, persentase minoritas dalam pemerintahan dan politik tidak sesuai dengan persentase mereka dari populasi. Dalam Kabinet, ada 15 Jawa, 4 Sunda, 1 Bugese, 1 Papua, 1 Sumbawa, Flores 1, 1 Kalimantan Bali 1, 1 Cina, 2 Aceh, Minang 2, dan 1 Batak.Bagian 4 Sikap Pemerintah Mengenai Penyelidikan Internasional dan Non-Pemerintahan Terhadap Tuduhan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi ManusiaDomestik organisasi hak asasi manusia tunduk pada pemantauan, gangguan penyalahgunaan, dan dari Pemerintah; namun, domestik organisasi hak asasi manusia yang sangat aktif dalam mengadvokasi perbaikan kinerja HAM pemerintah. Mereka mendesak Pemerintah untuk menyelidiki pelanggaran HAM, bertindak sebagai pembela di pengadilan politik, berusaha untuk menawarkan bantuan - dan dalam beberapa kasus perlindungan - untuk korban dan saksi pelanggaran hak asasi manusia, dan mendesak perbaikan dalam kebijakan pemerintah dan undang-undang.
Ada banyak LSM lokal organisasi hak asasi manusia, termasuk Yayasan Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum Indonesia dan Hak Asasi Manusia Asosiasi dan Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan. Pemerintah bertemu dengan LSM secara teratur.Pada angkatan kali anggota keamanan tewas, disiksa, dan ditahan aktivis HAM dan pekerja kemanusiaan, yang paling sering di daerah dengan pemberontakan aktif. Sebagai contoh, menurut HRW, antara November 2000 dan Oktober 2001, tujuh pembela HAM tewas di Aceh. Muhamad Efendi Malikon, sekretaris dari Forum Peduli Aceh Timur untuk Hak Asasi Manusia dibunuh pada 28 Februari di Peukan Langsa desa. Mayatnya ditemukan tak lama setelah ia dihentikan di pos pemeriksaan oleh polisi paramiliter. Sampai akhir tahun, tidak ada kemajuan dalam penyelidikan pembunuhan terakhir pekerja LSM.Pada tahun 2000 polisi memanggil direktur paling terkenal organisasi hak asasi manusia Papua, Lembaga Studi Hak Asasi Manusia dan Advokasi di Papua (ELS-HAM), untuk ditanyai, polisi membebaskannya pada tanggal 16 Desember 2000, setelah hampir 22 jam interogasi. Direktur diperintahkan untuk stasiun setelah ELS-HAM mengadakan konferensi pers di mana ia menuduh polisi pembunuhan di luar hukum dari tiga orang pada tanggal 7 (lihat Bagian 1.a.).Empat anggota sebuah LSM yang berbasis di Bandung, Jawa Barat, yang menganjurkan atas nama petani direbut, mengklaim bahwa mereka menculik pada tanggal 14 Agustus 2000, (lihat Bagian 1.e. dan 4). Kantor Komite untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (KONTRAS), yang berbasis di Jakarta, diserang dalam serangkaian pemboman di berbagai daerah negara itu pada tahun 2000 (lihat Bagian 1.c.).Intimidasi, ancaman, dan kekerasan terhadap LSM yang meningkat di Timor Barat pada tahun 2000, sangat menghambat operasi kemanusiaan. Intimidasi oleh milisi dan serangan langsung memaksa semua organisasi bantuan kemanusiaan internasional untuk menarik diri dari Timor Barat pada bulan September 2000, mereka tidak kembali pada akhir tahun ini (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 1.c.).Pemerintah harus menyetujui penugasan anggota staf dari lembaga asing yang melaksanakan program kerja sama teknis, termasuk LSM, sebelum mereka diizinkan untuk memasuki negara itu (lihat Bagian 2.c. dan 2.d.), namun, beberapa LSM menyatakan bahwa Pemerintah telah menggunakan persyaratan ini untuk membatasi kegiatan mereka, terutama di daerah sensitif.Pemerintah umumnya dianggap investigasi dari luar atau asing berbasis kritik atas dugaan terjadinya pelanggaran hak asasi manusia untuk campur tangan dalam urusan internal negara itu. Selain itu aparat keamanan dan lembaga intelijen cenderung melihat LSM asing dan organisasi internasional dengan kecurigaan dan ketidakpercayaan, khususnya operasi mereka di daerah konflik. Misalnya, pada tanggal 8 Juni, polisi menahan 34 orang asing dalam semalam mewakili LSM, serta penyelenggara Bahasa Indonesia dari sebuah Konferensi Solidaritas Asia Pasifik pada Neoliberalisme di Depok, Jawa Barat (lihat Bagian 6.b.). Pada tanggal 18 Agustus, polisi menahan enam mahasiswa Jerman semalam, menurut laporan pers, untuk kegiatan yang dianggap tidak sesuai dengan visa kunjungan mereka. Para mahasiswa melakukan penelitian demografis di Jakarta dengan bantuan Urban Poor Consortium, sebuah LSM lokal. Pejabat Imigrasi awalnya mengatakan bahwa siswa akan dideportasi, tetapi kemudian mengakui bahwa mereka tidak memiliki dana yang cukup, dan para siswa diizinkan untuk berangkat dengan biaya sendiri.Pemerintah umumnya didorong dan dibantu bantuan kemanusiaan asing dan domestik. Namun, pada kesempatan kedua kelompok Muslim dan Kristen menuduh beberapa donor asing memihak (lihat Bagian 2.d.).ICRC umumnya diizinkan akses ke tahanan yang diidentifikasi oleh pejabat sipil dan militer di tingkat pemerintah pusat. Di Aceh ICRC mempertahankan kantor di Lhokseumawe dan diizinkan mengunjungi tahanan yang diketahui dan lainnya ditahan oleh pasukan keamanan. ICRC melakukan operasi kemanusiaan di Aceh, Sulawesi Tengah, Maluku, Maluku Utara, dan Timur dan Timor Barat, namun, pemerintah berkali-kali menghalangi akses ICRC ke daerah-daerah dan lambat dalam akreditasi anggota staf tambahan.Pemerintah yang ditunjuk Komnas HAM (Komnas HAM), di tahun ke-8 operasinya, terus memeriksa melaporkan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia dan untuk menunjukkan kemerdekaan dari Pemerintah. Tahun 1999 Hukum Hak Asasi Manusia Komnas HAM memberikan otoritas hukum dan meningkatkan jumlah anggotanya menjadi 35 anggota. Komnas HAM tidak memiliki kekuasaan penegakan hukum, tetapi mencoba untuk bekerja di dalam sistem, mengirimkan tim untuk menyelidiki dugaan masalah hak asasi manusia. Ini mempekerjakan persuasi, publisitas, dan otoritas moral untuk menyoroti pelanggaran, untuk merekomendasikan perubahan hukum dan peraturan, serta mendorong tindakan korektif. Pemerintah menunjuk ketua asli Komnas HAM, yang kemudian menunjuk 24 anggota lain Komisi awal. Anggota Masa Depan diperlukan untuk melayani 5-tahun syarat dan akan dicalonkan oleh Komnas HAM, dikonfirmasi oleh DPR, dan disetujui oleh Presiden.Selama tahun ini, jumlah komisaris turun menjadi 18 karena pengunduran diri dan pensiun, dan Komnas HAM mulai berunding di nominasi untuk mengisi kekosongan. DPR tidak memilih komisaris baru pada akhir tahun ini. Perselisihan dalam KOMNAS-HAM diminta Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (KONTRAS), Advokasi Hukum (ELSHAM), dan Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) untuk mengkritik Komnas HAM sebagai lembaga yang tidak efektif.Hukum memberikan Komnas HAM dengan kekuasaan panggilan pengadilan dan menyatakan bahwa sengketa diselesaikan melalui perjanjian tertulis melalui mediasi Komisi diberlakukan dalam pengadilan. Namun, hukum tidak memberikan Komnas HAM kekuasaan untuk memaksakan rekomendasinya atau merekomendasikan tindakan pemerintah.Pada tahun 1999 Komnas HAM mendukung kerja KPP HAM-dan diteruskan temuannya kepada Jaksa Agung pada akhir Januari 2000. Pada Februari 2000, Komnas HAM membentuk komisi untuk menyelidiki pembunuhan 1984 demonstran Muslim di Tanjung Priok, Jakarta (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 1.c.). Pada bulan Agustus 2000, Komnas HAM membuka kantor di Ambon, Provinsi Maluku. Anggota Komisi juga melakukan penyelidikan atas pelanggaran HAM di Papua pada Oktober 2000, menyusul pecahnya kekerasan di Wamena (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 5).Menanggapi (di DK PBB) adopsi Dewan Keamanan PBB Resolusi 1319 setelah, 6 September 2000, menewaskan tiga pekerja UNHCR di Timor Barat (lihat Bagian 1.a.), Pemerintah dan pemimpin politik berbagai awalnya mengindikasikan bahwa mereka akan menentang tindakan yang misi DK PBB menyerukan dalam resolusi. Namun, Pemerintah kemudian mengundang misi DK PBB untuk mengamati situasi di Timor Barat dan untuk menilai kepatuhan Pemerintah dengan resolusi. Misi DK PBB, yang terdiri dari perwakilan permanen dari lima negara anggota, mengunjungi Timor Barat dan Jakarta pada bulan November 2000.Bagian 5 Diskriminasi Berdasarkan Ras, Jenis Kelamin, Agama, Cacat, Bahasa, atau Status SosialKonstitusi tidak secara eksplisit melarang diskriminasi berdasarkan jenis kelamin, ras, cacat tubuh, bahasa, atau status sosial, namun menetapkan hak dan kewajiban yang sama bagi semua warga negara, baik asli dan naturalisasi. Sebuah perubahan UUD yang diambil selama 2000 memperkenalkan kemungkinan tindakan afirmatif untuk mencapai perlakuan yang adil dan setara, namun, beberapa aktivis percaya bahwa karena perubahan tersebut tidak menyebutkan laki-laki atau perempuan secara khusus, tidak akan cukup melindungi perempuan.Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara (ketetapan hukum yang diadopsi oleh MPR) secara eksplisit menyatakan bahwa perempuan memiliki hak yang sama, kewajiban, dan kesempatan dengan pria. Namun, pedoman diadopsi dalam 20 tahun terakhir juga menyatakan bahwa partisipasi perempuan dalam proses pembangunan tidak boleh bertentangan dengan peran mereka dalam meningkatkan kesejahteraan keluarga dan pendidikan generasi muda. Hukum perkawinan menunjuk pria sebagai kepala keluarga. Konstitusi memberikan hak kepada warga untuk mempraktekkan agama mereka masing-masing dan keyakinan, namun Pemerintah hanya mengakui enam agama dan menerapkan beberapa pembatasan kegiatan keagamaan lain, meskipun beberapa pembatasan dicabut pada tahun yang bersangkutan (lihat Bagian 2.c.).WanitaKekerasan terhadap perempuan masih kurang didokumentasikan. Pemerintah tidak mengumpulkan data tentang kekerasan domestik. Hak-hak perempuan LSM memperkirakan bahwa hanya 15 persen dari insiden kekerasan dalam rumah tangga dilaporkan. Menurut organisasi bantuan hukum yang terlibat dalam isu-isu kekerasan dalam rumah tangga, sekitar 11 persen wanita pedesaan menderita beberapa bentuk kekerasan dalam rumah tangga. Para ahli pada subjek setuju bahwa jumlah insiden meningkat sejak terjadinya krisis ekonomi negara itu mulai pertengahan tahun 1997, yang telah diperburuk oleh perubahan sosial yang terkait dengan urbanisasi yang cepat. Korban kekerasan dalam rumah tangga kelompok advokasi, Kalyana Mitra, menasihati 96 kasus di Jawa Barat antara bulan Januari dan Oktober, 75 kasus kekerasan rumah tangga, 17 kasus pemerkosaan, dan 4 kasus pelecehan seksual. Pemerintah telah mengakui masalah kekerasan dalam rumah tangga dalam masyarakat, namun, kekerasan terhadap perempuan, terutama ketika terjadi di dalam rumah, dianggap oleh masyarakat sebagai urusan pribadi dan bukan dalam lingkup Pemerintah.Pemerintah, melalui konsultasi dengan perempuan LSM, mengoperasikan Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan. Mandat Komisi adalah untuk meningkatkan dan mengkoordinasikan upaya pemerintah dan LSM untuk memerangi kekerasan terhadap perempuan dan untuk memberikan bantuan kepada korban. Selama tahun ini, Komisi melaporkan bahwa kekerasan terhadap perempuan akibat krisis ekonomi terus meningkat, dan mengeluarkan laporan rencana aksi nasional.Pada bulan November 1999, sekelompok pejabat pemerintah dan perwakilan LSM menandatangani deklarasi yang menyerukan pengembangan strategi bersama untuk mengakhiri kekerasan terhadap perempuan. Kelompok ini menyusun rencana aksi nasional 2001-04, yang juga memiliki "toleransi nol" strategi tentang kekerasan terhadap perempuan, menciptakan mekanisme keamanan untuk melindungi perempuan dari kekerasan, dan menetapkan undang-undang baru untuk menghukum pelaku sepertikekerasan. Namun, undang-undang nasional dan peraturan pelaksanaan untuk mendukung rencana aksi belum ditetapkan. Pemerintah memberikan dukungan teknis, tetapi tidak pendanaan, untuk membangun dan mengelola pusat krisis perempuan di rumah sakit umum terkemuka di Jakarta. Pemerintah asing telah mendanai beberapa proyek pusat krisis.Pemerintah menyediakan beberapa konseling bagi perempuan korban kekerasan, dan beberapa organisasi swasta membantu perempuan. Banyak dari organisasi fokus pada penyatuan keluarga bukan pada memberikan perlindungan bagi perempuan. Banyak wanita mengandalkan sistem keluarga besar untuk bantuan dalam kasus kekerasan domestik. Kedua inisiatif publik dan swasta untuk membantu perempuan korban kekerasan yang dilakukan sepanjang tahun. Ada sejumlah kecil namun tumbuh dari pusat krisis perempuan, termasuk drop-in center didirikan di Jakarta oleh Organisasi disponsori pemerintah Nasional Perempuan (KOWANI) dan pusat krisis untuk perempuan di Yogyakarta yang dikelola oleh sebuah LSM. Mitra Perempuan (Mitra Perempuan), sebuah pusat krisis untuk perempuan yang dibuka pada tahun 1997, menjalankan 24-jam hotline dan tempat penampungan sementara bagi perempuan korban kekerasan. Hotline menerima beberapa panggilan setiap hari dari perempuan butut. Komisi Nasional melaporkan peningkatan secara umum dalam jumlah perempuan korban kekerasan mencari bantuan dari pusat krisis, dan atribut peningkatan baik untuk tumbuh kesadaran layanan dan peningkatan kejadian kekerasan terhadap perempuan. Beberapa rumah sakit umum di Jakarta, Yogyakarta, dan Surabaya telah terintegrasi pusat krisis yang membantu dan melindungi perempuan korban kekerasan dan anak. Pusat-pusat ini cosponsored oleh Pemerintah dan Krisis Women Center (Pusat Krisis Perempuan). Salah satu pusat, yang terletak di sebuah rumah sakit Jakarta, melaporkan 30 kasus pemerkosaan, 31 kasus kekerasan domestik, dan 37 kasus kekerasan pada anak selama periode 4-bulan selama 2000. Jakarta, Surabaya, Yogyakarta dan polisi telah membuka "bagian perempuan" di daerah sekitar mereka untuk membantu korban perkosaan dan kekerasan rumah tangga dan untuk menyelidiki kasus mereka.Perkosaan adalah pelanggaran dihukum, dan pelaku telah ditangkap dan dihukum karena perkosaan perkosaan dan percobaan, tetapi statistik yang dapat diandalkan tidak tersedia. Hak-hak perempuan aktivis percaya perkosaan yang serius tidak dilaporkan karena stigma sosial yang melekat pada korban. Beberapa ahli hukum melaporkan bahwa jika seorang wanita segera berusaha pemeriksaan di sebuah rumah sakit yang menghasilkan bukti fisik dari perkosaan, ia tak bisa mengajukan tuntutan berhasil. Seorang saksi juga diperlukan untuk mengadili untuk pemerkosaan, dan hanya dalam kasus yang jarang dapat saksi diproduksi, menurut para ahli hukum. Beberapa wanita dilaporkan tidak melaporkan perkosaan ke polisi karena polisi tidak mengambil tuduhan mereka secara serius. Hukuman penjara maksimum untuk perkosaan adalah 12 tahun, tetapi pengamat mengklaim bahwa kalimat biasanya jauh lebih pendek. Kekerasan massa terhadap pemerkosa dituduh sering dilaporkan. Sebuah Agustus 1999 konferensi ahli forensik merekomendasikan bahwa prosedur standar dapat diterapkan untuk memeriksa dan mengambil pernyataan dari korban pemerkosaan, dalam upaya untuk meningkatkan keberhasilan penuntutan perkosaan. Namun, pada akhir tahun ini, standar pemerkosaan tidak ada investigasi berada di tempat, tidak pula prosedur yang seragam diikuti.Perkosaan oleh suami dari seorang istri tidak dianggap sebagai kejahatan di bawah hukum. Norma-norma budaya mendikte bahwa masalah antara suami dan istri adalah urusan pribadi, dan kekerasan terhadap perempuan di rumah jarang dilaporkan. Sementara polisi bisa membawa tuduhan penyerangan terhadap seorang suami untuk memukul istrinya, mereka tidak mungkin untuk melakukannya.Pemotongan kelamin perempuan (FGM), yang secara luas dikritik oleh para ahli kesehatan internasional sebagai merusak kesehatan baik fisik dan psikologis, dipraktekkan di beberapa bagian negara. Tidak ada legislasi nasional ada pada FGM. Adat ("adat") hukum telah memungkinkan untuk khitan perempuan simbolis dan kecil-cut (ringan) sayatan dari klitoris, yang akan jatuh di bawah Dunia Kesehatan Organization (WHO) tipe IV klasifikasi FGM (kategori ini termasuk menusuk, menusuk atau menggores klitoris). Menurut laporan, praktek FGM tampaknya semakin simbolis di alam (misalnya, cocokan peniti atau pemotongan akar seremonial). Lebih invasif FGM praktek - penghapusan atas klitoris, pengangkatan sebagian ujung sensitif klitoris, dan bahkan penghapusan total - dilaporkan terjadi di Madura, Sulawesi Selatan, dan sebagian Jawa Timur. Namun, tidak ada laporan epidemiologis pada frekuensi dari praktik ini. Sejak FGM tidak diatur, dan pemimpin agama tidak mengambil posisi formal, metode yang digunakan sering diserahkan kepada kebijaksanaan dari praktisi tradisional setempat. FGM biasanya terjadi dalam tahun pertama setelah lahir, sering pada hari ke-40, meskipun itu dilakukan di beberapa daerah sampai dengan usia 10. Hal ini dilakukan baik di rumah sakit atau, terutama di daerah pedesaan, oleh praktisi tradisional setempat. Kedua pejabat pemerintah dan pemimpin LSM yang kenal dengan masalah FGM percaya invasif FGM praktek menurun. Pemerintah termasuk FGM sebagai isu gender dalam Rencana Aksi Nasional untuk Mengakhiri Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan, yang diterbitkan pada akhir November. FGM memimpin daftar Action Plan terhadap ajaran agama yang membutuhkan penyelidikan dan modifikasi. Pemerintah dan LSM menargetkan kampanye kesadaran pada pemimpin agama Muslim dan mereka yang terlibat langsung dalam melakukan penyunatan perempuan (seperti dukun bayi), dan terhadap masyarakat pada umumnya, untuk menghasilkan mengakhiri praktek tersebut.Ada laporan dari konversi paksa ratusan orang Kristen di Maluku pada bulan November dan Desember 2000. Kedua petobat pria dan wanita kemudian dipaksa menjalani sunat.Negara ini merupakan sumber yang penting, titik transit, dan tujuan perdagangan perempuan dan anak-anak untuk tujuan pelacuran paksa dan dalam beberapa kasus untuk kerja paksa (lihat Bagian 6.c. dan 6.f.). Hal ini banyak diduga bahwa TNI-milisi dukungan sejumlah perempuan diperkosa selama kekerasan 1999 di Timor Timur dan terus banyak sebagai budak seks (lihat Bagian 1.c.). Kirsty Sword-Gusmao, istri kemerdekaan Timor Timur Xanana Gusmao, dilaporkan pers internasional pada bulan November 2000 bahwa 33 hamil wanita Timor Timur kembali ke Timor Timur dan menyatakan mereka telah diculik dan dipaksa menjadi budak seks bagi TNI dalam Timor Barat.Pembantu rumah tangga perempuan juga rentan terhadap eksploitasi dan penyalahgunaan. Dalam beberapa kasus, agen perekrutan yang tidak bermoral telah berjanji perempuan bekerja sebagai pembantu rumah tangga di luar negeri dan kemudian menahan mereka terhadap calon mereka untuk waktu yang lama sampai pekerjaan ditemukan untuk mereka. Perempuan bekerja di luar negeri sebagai pembantu rumah tangga sering mengambil risiko berbagai bentuk pelecehan, eksploitasi dan perlakuan kejam lainnya. Pemerintah telah mengambil beberapa langkah untuk membantu warganya bekerja di luar negeri, tetapi pendukung biaya yang jauh lebih banyak yang dilakukan (lihat Bagian 6.f.).Pelecehan adalah bukan kejahatan menurut hukum, hanya "perilaku tidak senonoh." Namun, tuntutan pelecehan seksual dapat merusak karir pegawai negeri. Hukum dilaporkan hanya mencakup kekerasan fisik, dan memerlukan dua saksi. Pelamar kerja perempuan dan pekerja mengeluh menjadi korban seksual oleh supervisor. Banyak kelompok mengkritik UU Ketenagakerjaan karena gagal mengatasi pelecehan seksual dan kekerasan terhadap perempuan di tempat kerja dan untuk menyediakan perlindungan yang tidak memadai di daerah kerja di mana perempuan secara teratur menderita pelecehan, seperti pekerjaan di luar negeri dan pelayanan rumah tangga. Namun, Pengembangan Tenaga Kerja dan Bill Perlindungan berisi ketentuan yang mengharuskan majikan untuk memastikan bahwa pekerja perempuan yang bekerja di malam hari aman dan bebas dari pelecehan seksual atau pelecehan. Sebuah artikel terpisah dalam RUU juga menyatakan bahwa semua pekerja memiliki hak untuk menerima perlindungan terhadap amoralitas dan pelecehan seksual atau pelecehan.Perempuan secara tidak proporsional menderita buta huruf, miskin kesehatan, dan gizi tidak memadai. Tingkat buta huruf di kalangan perempuan adalah 17 persen, dibandingkan dengan 10 persen di antara pria, rata-rata buta huruf nasional bagi warga negara lebih dari 15 tahun adalah 12 persen, menurut laporan UNICEF. Tingkat kematian ibu yang tinggi adalah sekitar 18.000 kematian per tahun. Di Papua angka kematian ibu adalah 1.025 kematian per 100.000 dan di Maluku 796 kematian per 100.000 kelahiran hidup.Selama tahun ini, ratusan ribu perempuan dan anak-anak terlantar akibat konflik kekerasan di Sulawesi Tengah, Maluku dan Maluku Utara, Kalimantan Barat dan Tengah, Papua, dan Aceh (lihat Bagian 2.d.). Selain mereka yang secara langsung menjadi korban kekerasan, sejumlah besar dari mereka mengungsi menderita kekurangan gizi dan masalah kesehatan lainnya.Di bawah Konstitusi, wanita adalah sama dan mempunyai hak, kewajiban, dan kesempatan dengan pria. Namun, dalam praktiknya, wanita menghadapi sejumlah diskriminasi hukum. Hukum perkawinan mendefinisikan manusia sebagai kepala keluarga. Hukum pernikahan bagi Muslim berdasarkan Syariah (hukum Islam), memungkinkan pria memiliki hingga empat istri jika suami bisa berlaku adil untuk masing-masing. Pengadilan izin dan persetujuan dari istri pertama diperlukan, tetapi wanita dilaporkan paling tidak bisa menolak. Kabinet pejabat dan personil militer lazim telah dilarang dari mengambil istri kedua, meskipun dilaporkan sebagai menteri beberapa memiliki istri kedua. Sebuah peraturan pemerintah menetapkan bahwa seorang PNS laki-laki harus menerima izin dari atasannya untuk mengambil istri kedua. Peraturan ini telah diserang dan pengawasan yang cukup baru. Beberapa kelompok perempuan mendesak Pemerintah untuk melarang poligami sama sekali.Perempuan sering menanggung beban pembuktian yang lebih berat daripada laki-laki dalam memperoleh perceraian, khususnya dalam sistem pengadilan Islam berbasis keluarga. Wanita yang bercerai jarang menerima tunjangan. Tidak ada mekanisme penegakan untuk pembayaran tunjangan, dan menurut syariat, istri bercerai berhak hanya 3 bulan tunjangan, dan bahkan tunjangan untuk periode singkat tidak selalu diberikan.Menyatakan UU Kewarganegaraan bahwa kewarganegaraan anak-anak semata-mata berasal dari kewarganegaraan sang ayah. Anak-anak dari ibu dan ayah warga negara asing dianggap asing dan membutuhkan visa untuk tetap di negara itu sampai usia 18, pada saat itu mereka dapat mengajukan permohonan kewarganegaraan. Mereka dilarang dari menghadiri sekolah negeri dan harus menghadiri swasta, sekolah internasional, yang biasanya lebih mahal.Perempuan asing menikah dengan warga negara juga menghadapi kesulitan. Anak-anak mereka adalah warga negara dan dengan demikian tidak diizinkan untuk menghadiri sekolah internasional kecuali mereka menerima izin khusus dari Departemen Pendidikan. Perempuan tersebut biasanya dikenakan pajak sebagai kepala rumah tangga asing, tetapi mereka tidak memiliki hak kekayaan, bisnis, atau warisan. LSM dan pemerintah tampaknya setuju bahwa hukum diperlukan revisi, namun pada akhir tahun ini, Pemerintah tidak mengambil tindakan apapun untuk memperbaiki masalah ini.Meskipun beberapa wanita (seperti Presiden Megawati Soekarnoputri) memiliki tingkat tinggi kebebasan ekonomi dan sosial dan menduduki posisi penting baik di sektor publik dan swasta, kebanyakan wanita tidak memiliki status tersebut dan mereka merupakan persentase yang amat tinggi dari ujung bawah skala sosial ekonomi dan politik (lihat Bagian 3). Survei terbaru menunjukkan bahwa sementara lebih dari sepertiga pegawai negeri adalah perempuan, kurang dari 6 persen di posisi otoritas.Pekerja perempuan di bidang manufaktur umumnya menerima upah lebih rendah daripada pria. Banyak pekerja pabrik perempuan dipekerjakan sebagai pekerja harian bukan sebagai penuh waktu karyawan tetap, dan perusahaan tidak diharuskan untuk memberikan manfaat, seperti cuti melahirkan, bagi pekerja harian. Hak-hak perempuan aktivis melaporkan bahwa ada tren yang berkembang di bidang manufaktur untuk mempekerjakan wanita untuk melakukan pekerjaan di rumah mereka kurang dari upah minimum (lihat Bagian 6.e.).Tingkat pengangguran untuk perempuan sekitar 50 persen lebih tinggi daripada para pria. Wanita sering tidak memberikan manfaat ekstra dan gaji yang diberikan pria ketika mereka adalah kepala rumah tangga, dan dalam banyak kasus tidak menerima imbalan kerja untuk anggota keluarga mereka, seperti asuransi kesehatan dan pemotongan pajak penghasilan. Namun demikian, perempuan lulusan universitas menerima gaji rata-rata yaitu 25 persen lebih sedikit dari rekan-rekan pria mereka. Beberapa aktivis perempuan percaya bahwa semakin banyak perempuan profesional yang maju dalam berbagai bidang, terutama dalam profesi hukum. Namun, ada statistik yang tersedia untuk mendukung pernyataan ini. Menurut sebuah penelitian yang dilakukan sepanjang tahun, hanya 20 persen dari manajer puncak dan konsumen kaya di Jakarta adalah perempuan.Undang-undang mengharuskan Pemerintah untuk merumuskan kebijakan nasional untuk melarang dan menghapus diskriminasi (termasuk gender) di tempat kerja. Namun, tidak ada peraturan pelaksanaan yang berlaku dan diskriminasi terus dalam praktek.Meskipun undang-undang yang menyediakan wanita dengan cuti hamil 3 bulan, Pemerintah mengakui bahwa wanita hamil sering diberhentikan atau diganti sementara cuti dari pekerjaan mereka. Beberapa perusahaan mengharuskan wanita untuk menandatangani pernyataan bahwa mereka tidak berniat untuk menjadi hamil. Hukum perburuhan mandat 2 hari cuti haid per bulan bagi wanita, meskipun cuti ini tidak diperbolehkan dalam semua kasus. Pengembangan Tenaga Kerja dan Bill Perlindungan meliputi perlindungan khusus bagi pekerja perempuan. Misalnya, pengusaha mungkin tidak memerlukan wanita hamil atau wanita yang belum menikah di bawah 18 untuk bekerja di malam hari.Kelompok advokasi perempuan tetap aktif sepanjang tahun. Sejumlah LSM yang terorganisasi konferensi dan demonstrasi berurusan dengan isu-isu perempuan diadakan, serta beberapa yang diselenggarakan oleh lembaga akademik dan kementerian pemerintah.Anak-anakPemerintah telah menyatakan komitmen untuk hak-hak anak, pendidikan, dan kesejahteraan, tetapi tidak memiliki sumber daya untuk mengimplementasikan komitmen. Kementerian Pemberdayaan Perempuan bertanggung jawab untuk masalah anak-anak. Dalam anggaran untuk tahun 2002, Pemerintah mengalokasikan 1,0 persen dari PDB untuk pendidikan, atau 0,74 persen dari PDB negara itu. Sebuah undang-undang 1979 tentang kesejahteraan anak-anak mendefinisikan tanggung jawab Negara dan orang tua untuk mengasuh dan melindungi anak-anak, namun, peraturan pelaksanaan belum pernah diumumkan dan, meskipun pertimbangan DPR selama tahun berjalan, ketentuan hukum terhadap perlindungan anak-anak tidak diberlakukan oleh tahun akhir.Pemerintah memperkirakan bahwa negara itu memiliki 40 juta anak usia sekolah atau sekitar 19 persen dari penduduk negara itu. Selama tahun ini, Departemen Pendidikan memulai program nasional untuk menjaga anak-anak di sekolah melalui program alternatif sebagai alat untuk memerangi pekerja anak. Menurut Organisasi Buruh Internasional (ILO) dan UNICEF statistik, sekitar 6,1-6.400.000 anak-anak antara usia 7 dan 15 telah putus sekolah sejak krisis ekonomi yang dimulai pada tahun 1997. Sebuah sumber akademis diperkirakan pada bulan November 2000 bahwa jumlah siswa tidak terdaftar di sekolah untuk kelompok usia tersebut bahkan lebih tinggi, sekitar 6,8 juta. Menurut data Departemen Pendidikan, 11,7 juta anak-anak melalui usia 18 tahun tidak bersekolah pada tahun 1999, sementara ILO memperkirakan bahwa 11,9 juta anak usia sekolah tidak bersekolah antara tahun 2000 dan 2001.Sebuah hukum 1994 meningkat persyaratan pendidikan wajib 6 sd 9 tahun (6 tahun pendidikan dasar dan 3 tahun pendidikan SMP). Namun, hukum belum dilaksanakan sepenuhnya, karena kurangnya penegakan pemerintah, fasilitas sekolah tidak memadai, dan ketidakmampuan keluarga untuk membayar biaya sekolah anak-anak. Biaya resmi dan tidak resmi untuk pendidikan umum, termasuk pembayaran untuk pendaftaran, buku, makanan, transportasi, dan seragam telah menjadi sangat tinggi bagi banyak keluarga. Anak-anak memiliki akses sebagian besar sama dengan pendidikan dasar sampai 1998 menurut statistik pemerintah Indonesia.Pemerintah mengalokasikan hanya 8 persen dari anggaran pembangunan sumber daya manusia untuk perawatan kesehatan. Rendah biaya perawatan medis tersedia, meskipun akses dan ketersediaan terkadang sporadis, terutama di daerah pedesaan. Hasil dari penelitian Departemen Kesehatan dilakukan pada tahun 2000 pada layanan kesehatan masyarakat menyimpulkan bahwa lebih dari 40 persen dari pusat publik negara itu kesehatan tidak memiliki dokter hadir. Menurut laporan UNICEF yang dikeluarkan selama tahun 2000, persentase perempuan dan anak yang tidak memiliki akses ke perawatan kesehatan berkisar antara 20 sampai 50 persen, dengan akses yang terbatas terjadi di daerah pedesaan dan provinsi miskin. Selain itu, pengeluaran pemerintah pada perawatan kesehatan juga telah menurun secara riil akibat krisis ekonomi. Dalam beberapa kasus, perempuan dan anak tidak mampu membayar tagihan medis telah ditahan oleh rumah sakit yang dikelola mereka sendiri "penjara debitur." Ada juga laporan dari rumah sakit menolak pengobatan untuk anak-anak menderita kekurangan gizi, karena sumber daya tidak cukup.Menurut laporan yang kredibel dari sebuah LSM lokal, tingkat kematian bayi hampir dua kali lipat sebagai hasil dari penurunan ekonomi, meningkat dari 55 per 1.000 kematian pada tahun 1995 menjadi 100 per 1.000 pada tahun 1998. Menurut laporan UNICEF'S, 7 persen anak di negara itu mati sebelum mereka 5 tahun dan 5 persen meninggal sebelum ulang tahun pertama mereka. Hampir 50 persen anak-anak tumbuh dalam lingkungan yang tidak sehat atau tidak aman. Penggunaan keseluruhan fasilitas pelayanan kesehatan oleh anak-anak telah menurun secara signifikan sejak krisis ekonomi dimulai pada pertengahan-1997.
Sepanjang tahun, UNICEF terus memperingatkan sebuah "generasi yang hilang" dari kaum muda sebagai akibat dari krisis ekonomi. Pada tahun 2000 UNICEF memperkirakan bahwa 8 juta prasekolah usia anak-anak kekurangan gizi, yang mengancam perkembangan fungsi otak. Menurut data PBB, sebanyak 30 sampai 50 persen anak-anak di negara itu di bawah usia 5 mungkin menderita beberapa bentuk kekurangan gizi, meningkat dari 9,8 persen pada tahun 1995. Salah satu sumber universitas pada tahun 2000 memperkirakan bahwa 20 juta anak kekurangan gizi, meningkat dari 8 juta pada tahun 1997. Secara khusus, para peneliti telah mulai mendokumentasikan peningkatan anak-anak menderita kekurangan Vitamin A, zat besi, dan protein. Menurut penelitian UNICEF yang sama banyak anak-anak di negara itu menderita "kelaparan tersembunyi" atau kekurangan gizi.Dalam tahun-tahun sebelumnya, media sering dilaporkan pada kasus anak meninggal akibat gizi buruk atau kurangnya perawatan untuk kondisi tersebut. Laporan tersebut yang paling sering di Jawa, tetapi juga berasal dari Sumatera dan daerah lain.Sekolah untuk anak-anak di daerah konflik terganggu parah sepanjang tahun. Ratusan ribu anak-anak di Maluku dan Maluku Utara dan Sulawesi Tengah meninggalkan rumah mereka untuk menghindari kekerasan (lihat Bagian 2.d.), mengganggu pendidikan mereka dan mengekspos mereka pada bahaya kekurangan gizi, penyakit, dan lainnya. LSM dan kelompok agama estimasi propinsi Maluku bahwa ribuan anak-anak Muslim dan Kristen antara usia 12 dan 17 telah menjadi tentara anak-anak (lihat Bagian 6.d.). Anak yang lebih muda antara usia 7 dan 12 memberikan layanan dukungan kepada milisi. Beberapa anak terlibat dalam memerangi dilaporkan berasal dari luar provinsi. Dalam satu insiden pada tahun 2000, 16-tahun dari Jawa, yang telah bergabung dengan milisi Laskar Jihad, tewas saat berperang di Saparua Island, Provinsi Maluku.Menurut Departemen Tenaga Kerja, jumlah anak yang bekerja meningkat dari sekitar 2 juta sebelum krisis ekonomi mulai pada tahun 1997 menjadi sekitar 2,5 juta diperkirakan pada pertengahan 1999. Pendukung anak-anak dan analis perburuhan sependapat bahwa jumlah anak yang bekerja telah meningkat secara signifikan karena penurunan ini, tetapi berpendapat bahwa jumlah anak yang bekerja lebih tinggi dari perkiraan pemerintah bahkan sebelum penurunan ini, dan telah meningkat secara signifikan sejak 1997 (lihat Bagian 6. d.). ILO memperkirakan bahwa antara 6 dan 8 juta anak bekerja selama 2000, dan World Vision, LSM internasional, memperkirakan bahwa ada 6,5 juta anak yang bekerja di negara ini. Diperkirakan jutaan gadis bekerja sebagai tinggal di pembantu rumah tangga (lihat Bagian 6.d.).Menurut penelitian, ada sekitar 170.000 anak jalanan di 12 wilayah perkotaan. Dari jumlah tersebut, sekitar 20 persen adalah anak perempuan. Setidaknya 60 persen dari anak jalanan yang disurvei tidak terdaftar di sekolah. Ada anak jalanan sekitar 10.000 di Jakarta. Medan, Bandung, Surabaya, Makassar (Ujung Pandang), dan Yogyakarta adalah kota-kota lain dengan populasi besar anak jalanan. Dari 1.600 anak jalanan yang tinggal di Yogyakarta, sekitar 25 persen adalah anak perempuan. Banyak dari mereka adalah korban pelecehan seksual atau terlibat dalam prostitusi. Survei lain LSM menunjukkan bahwa setidaknya ada 100.000 anak jalanan dan 6 juta anak-anak terlantar di negeri ini.Anak jalanan menjual koran, sepatu bersinar, membantu untuk taman atau menonton mobil, dan lain berupaya untuk mendapatkan uang. Banyak anak jalanan bekerja dalam situasi berbahaya sebagai pemulung, pemulung, dan pada platform memancing dan perahu nelayan. Menurut sumber yang dapat dipercaya, ada ratusan, mungkin lebih dari 1.000 anak yang bekerja dalam kondisi berbahaya di jermal lepas pantai timur Sumatera Utara (lihat Bagian 6.c.). Ribuan anak-anak bekerja di pabrik-pabrik dan ladang (lihat Bagian 6.c., 6.d., dan 6.f.).Sejumlah kerja LSM lokal dan internasional dengan anak jalanan. LSM mengkritik upaya memadai Pemerintah untuk membantu anak jalanan dan pekerja anak. Pemerintah bekerjasama dengan Program Pembangunan PBB, UNICEF, ILO, dan dengan LSM untuk membuat program bagi anak jalanan dan pekerja anak. Salah satu proyek termasuk pembentukan "rumah terbuka" di daerah ditargetkan untuk memberikan pelatihan kejuruan dan pendidikan dasar untuk anak jalanan. Open house bagi anak jalanan telah dibentuk di beberapa propinsi. Yayasan Kesejahteraan Anak Indonesia yang melaporkan bahwa 100 rumah terbuka telah ditetapkan.Pendekatan lain terhadap masalah anak jalanan adalah Program Nasional Disiplin dan Bersih Keputusan Kota. Dalam program ini, anak jalanan dihapus secara fisik dari kota-kota dengan bus. Biasanya, mereka dibawa keluar kota dan ditinggalkan di sana. Terkadang mereka dibawa ke "rumah induk" di mana mereka pertama kali diinterogasi dan kemudian dibebaskan. LSM mengkritik praktek ini tidak efektif dan tidak manusiawi.Pelecehan anak tidak dilarang secara khusus oleh hukum. Menurut laporan Unicef 2000, anggota keluarga dekat sering anak-anak disiplin, namun tidak ada sumber terpercaya untuk kekerasan dalam keluarga. Upaya pemerintah untuk memerangi penganiayaan anak telah lambat dan tidak efektif karena kepekaan budaya, tidak adanya mekanisme monitoring dan prosedur verifikasi tentang pelecehan anak.Pada bulan September 2000, jaringan adopsi bayi ilegal yang ditemukan oleh pihak berwenang. Empat orang ditangkap dan tiga bayi berhasil diselamatkan dan digunakan sebagai bukti. Bayi-bayi diduga dibeli dari keluarga berpenghasilan rendah dan dijual kepada pasangan subur kaya.Pelacuran anak (lihat Bagian 6.f.) dan pelanggaran seksual lain terjadi, namun data perusahaan masih kurang. Polisi terus mengungkap sindikat yang terlibat dalam perdagangan anak perempuan untuk bekerja di rumah bordil di berbagai pulau atau di negara lain (lihat Bagian 6.f.). Menurut penelitian LSM 1998, ada 406 kasus pelecehan anak tahun itu, 900 sampai 1.200 kasus pemerkosaan anak, dan 40.000 sampai 70.000 kasus kekerasan seksual lainnya terhadap anak.Tidak ada sistem peradilan pidana yang terpisah untuk remaja. Pengadilan biasa menangani kejahatan remaja, dan remaja sering dipenjara dengan pelaku dewasa. Sebuah Hukum Keadilan Juvenile disahkan oleh Parlemen pada tahun 1996 dan ditandatangani oleh maka-Presiden Soeharto pada tahun 1997. Ini mendefinisikan remaja sebagai anak-anak antara usia 8 dan 18 dan menetapkan sistem pengadilan khusus dan kode kriminal untuk menangani kasus remaja, namun belum dilaksanakan. Diperkirakan 400.000 anak-anak dibawa ke pengadilan setiap tahun, menurut data UNICEF. Enam puluh persen dari anak-anak terlibat dalam kejahatan kecil seperti pencurian. Daerah dengan insiden yang dilaporkan tertinggi kejahatan remaja adalah Jawa, termasuk Jakarta (7281), Sumatera Selatan (1.336 kasus), dan Sumatera Utara (994).Penyandang CacatAda beberapa diskriminasi terhadap penyandang cacat dalam pekerjaan, pendidikan, dan dalam penyediaan layanan negara lain. Mandat hukum akses ke bangunan bagi penyandang cacat, namun pemerintah biasanya tidak menegakkan ketentuan ini dalam praktek. Statistik yang tepat pada jumlah penyandang cacat di negara ini tidak tersedia. Pada tahun 1999 PBB memperkirakan bahwa sekitar 5,43 persen dari populasi (sekitar 10 juta orang) adalah penyandang cacat, sementara Pemerintah memperkirakan bahwa 3 persen dari populasi (6 juta orang) adalah penyandang cacat. Keluarga sering menyembunyikan anggota keluarga penyandang cacat untuk menghindari stigma sosial atau malu. Beberapa propinsi telah mendirikan pusat rehabilitasi bagi penyandang cacat. Pihak berwenang dilaporkan mengambil penyandang cacat dari jalanan dan membawa mereka ke pusat-pusat pelatihan kerja. Namun demikian, banyak warga negara dengan warga cacat mengemis untuk hidup.Konstitusi mengharuskan Pemerintah menyediakan perawatan untuk anak yatim dan penyandang cacat, namun tidak menentukan definisi dari "perawatan" panjang, dan penyediaan pendidikan untuk semua anak-anak cacat mental dan fisik tidak pernah telah disimpulkan dari kewajiban tersebut . Peraturan mengharuskan Pemerintah untuk menetapkan dan mengatur kurikulum nasional untuk pendidikan khusus dengan menetapkan bahwa masyarakat harus menyediakan pelayanan pendidikan khusus untuk anak-anaknya.Menurut laporan UNICEF 2000 di 2000, ada sekitar 2 juta anak-anak cacat antara usia 10 dan 14. UU No 4/1997 tentang Penyandang cacat dan Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 72 tentang Pendidikan Khusus menetapkan bahwa setiap anak berkelainan berhak untuk mengakses ke semua tingkat dan jenis pendidikan dan pengobatan rehabilitasi yang diperlukan. Namun, ini tidak terjadi dalam praktek. LSM merupakan penyedia utama pendidikan bagi anak cacat. Ada 1.084 sekolah bagi penyandang cacat; 680 swasta dan 404 yang dioperasikan pemerintah. Dari sekolah-sekolah pemerintah, 165 adalah "terintegrasi", melayani baik reguler dan siswa pendidikan khusus. Di Jakarta ada 98 sekolah bagi penyandang cacat, 2 di antaranya dioperasikan pemerintah dan 96 di antaranya swasta. Pemerintah juga mengelola tiga sekolah nasional untuk visual dan pendengaran terganggu, dan penyandang cacat mental. Sekolah-sekolah ini menerima anak-anak dari seluruh negeri.Hukum Cacat dirancang untuk menyediakan akses ke pendidikan, pekerjaan, dan bantuan bagi penyandang cacat. Ini mengharuskan perusahaan mempekerjakan lebih dari 100 orang untuk memberikan 1 persen posisi untuk penyandang cacat. Namun, para penyandang cacat menghadapi banyak diskriminasi dalam pekerjaan, meskipun beberapa pabrik telah melakukan upaya khusus untuk mempekerjakan pekerja penyandang cacat. Hukum adanya akses terhadap fasilitas umum bagi penyandang cacat, namun hampir tidak ada bangunan atau transportasi publik memberikan akses tersebut.Masyarakat AdatPemerintah menganggap "orang pribumi" untuk menjadi keliru, karena menganggap semua warga negara kecuali etnis Cina menjadi pribumi. Meskipun demikian, secara terbuka mengakui keberadaan beberapa "masyarakat terpencil" dan hak mereka untuk berpartisipasi penuh dalam kehidupan politik dan sosial. Pemerintah memperkirakan bahwa jumlah orang dalam komunitas terpencil adalah 1,5 juta. Ini mencakup, namun tidak terbatas pada, kelompok-kelompok seperti populasi Dayak di Kalimantan, beberapa di antaranya tinggal di daerah hutan terpencil, masyarakat adat di seluruh Papua, dan keluarga ekonomi kurang beruntung yang hidup sebagai pengembara di laut kapal dekat Riau di timur Sumatera dan dekat Makassar (Ujung Pandang) di bagian selatan Sulawesi. Pada bulan Oktober Pemerintah lewat UU Otonomi Khusus Papua, yang belum mulai berlaku pada akhir tahun ini. Hukum memberikan suku-suku asli hak untuk melindungi dan mempertahankan adat istiadat mereka dan hukum, dan partisipasi signifikan oleh suku-suku dalam pemerintahan dan ekonomi di Papua. HAM monitor mengkritik program transmigrasi pemerintah untuk melanggar hak-hak masyarakat adat (lihat Bagian 1.f.) dan untuk mendorong eksploitasi sumber daya alam sebagai masyarakat adat menggantungkan mata pencaharian mereka.Enam puluh persen dari penduduk negara itu lebih dari 200 juta jiwa di Jawa, yang mewakili hanya 7 persen dari wilayah negara itu. Program transmigrasi yang disponsori pemerintah berusaha memukimkan kembali orang-orang dari daerah padat penduduk ke daerah yang jarang penduduknya di luar Jawa (lihat Bagian 1.f). Mayoritas pendatang adalah migran spontan yang bukan bagian dari program resmi.Kritik klaim transmigrasi bahwa sering mengancam budaya asli dan menyebabkan kebencian sosial. Beberapa kritikus menyatakan bahwa transmigrasi telah digunakan sebagai alat politik untuk meningkatkan jumlah orang non pribumi di daerah tertentu sebagian untuk menghalangi gerakan pemisahan diri oleh orang-orang pribumi. Di beberapa daerah, seperti di bagian tertentu dari Sulawesi, Maluku, Kalimantan, Aceh, dan Papua, hubungan antara transmigran dan penduduk asli yang bermusuhan. LSM yang juga melaporkan ketegangan antara populasi transmigrasi Jawa dan adat di Kepulauan Mentawai di lepas pantai barat Sumatera. Kelompok pribumi sering mengklaim bahwa mereka menerima dukungan pemerintah kurang dan pendanaan dari transmigran, dan transmigran menyatakan bahwa dalam beberapa kasus mereka dipindahkan ke daerah dengan tanah yang tidak diinginkan dan infrastruktur yang tidak memadai. Transmigran terkadang menetap di tanah yang kepemilikannya masih diperdebatkan.Ketegangan akut berlanjut di Kalimantan Barat dan Tengah antara Dayak dan migran Madura akibat konflik lahan, persaingan ekonomi, dan perbedaan budaya (lihat Bagian 1.a.). Masyarakat Madura di Kalimantan dikembangkan di sekitar kelompok transmigran sebelumnya, meskipun sebagian orang Madura di daerah tersebut adalah imigran spontan. Sebuah Madura diperkirakan 40.000 tetap berada di kamp-kamp di Kalimantan Barat dan lebih dari 105.000 orang Madura terpaksa mengungsi ke Jawa Timur dan Pulau Madura setelah lebih dari 600 tewas dalam kekerasan etnis pada bulan Februari dan Maret.Sengketa tanah merupakan sumber utama ketegangan di seluruh negeri, terutama di banyak jarang penduduknya daerah yang kaya sumberdaya secara tradisional dihuni oleh penduduk asli. Ketegangan sering dinyatakan berdasarkan garis ras dan etnis karena pengembang sering adalah etnis Cina Indonesia. Sengketa tanah merupakan kategori terbesar dari keluhan yang disampaikan kepada Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia dan sebagian besar dari kasus yang dibawa ke yayasan bantuan hukum dan organisasi bantuan lainnya. Menurut hukum yang berasal dari praktek-praktek era kolonial, semua sumber daya mineral bawah permukaan milik Pemerintah. Menyatakan Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria bahwa hak atas tanah tidak dapat "bertentangan dengan kepentingan nasional dan negara," yang menyediakan Pemerintah dengan dasar hukum yang luas untuk perampasan tanah. Bila perselisihan tidak dapat diselesaikan, Pemerintah memiliki kewenangan untuk menentukan kompensasi yang adil atas tanah.Namun, dalam praktik kompensasi untuk tanah sering adalah minimal atau bahkan tidak ada. Keputusan mengenai proyek pembangunan, penggunaan sumberdaya konsesi, dan kegiatan ekonomi lainnya umumnya dilakukan tanpa keikutsertaan atau persetujuan dari masyarakat yang terkena dampak. Ketika orang-orang pribumi bentrokan dengan mereka mempromosikan proyek-proyek pembangunan sektor swasta, pengembang hampir selalu menang. Ada banyak contoh penggunaan intimidasi, kadang-kadang oleh militer, dan sering oleh menyewa "preman", untuk memperoleh tanah untuk proyek pembangunan, khususnya di daerah yang diklaim oleh penduduk asli. Intimidasi tersebut telah digunakan di Jakarta, daerah lain di Jawa, Sumatera Utara, Aceh, dan daerah lainnya. Menurut sumber yang kredibel di Sumatera Barat, lahan yang luas di provinsi tersebut telah disita selama beberapa tahun terakhir oleh pengembang perkebunan komersial yang menyuap gubernur setempat. Dalam beberapa kasus, laporan LSM bahwa petani diusir dari tanah tanpa kompensasi untuk memungkinkan minyak baru perkebunan kelapa dikelola oleh transmigran Jawa. Kompetisi untuk tanah dan sumber daya tetap akut di Sumatera. Beberapa LSM yang berusaha untuk membantu komunitas ini menjadi sasaran serangan verbal, penggerebekan, dan bentuk-bentuk intimidasi oleh pasukan keamanan pemerintah. Sejak tahun 1999 LSM telah lebih vokal dan efektif dalam melobi untuk hak-hak masyarakat adat.LSM menegaskan bahwa pelanggaran terhadap hak penduduk asli sering terjadi di pertambangan dan daerah penebangan, dan bahwa pelanggaran berasal dari penolakan Pemerintah kepemilikan oleh masyarakat adat dari tanah leluhur, erosi struktur sosial tradisional kelompok adat, dan pengambilalihan paksa tanah . Masalah ini paling umum di Papua, di mana perselisihan kompensasi untuk penebangan sumber daya menyebabkan beberapa insiden kekerasan antara penduduk lokal dan perusahaan penebangan (lihat Bagian 1.a.).Di Sulawesi Tenggara, orang Moronene telah berjuang selama lebih dari 40 tahun untuk menjamin pengakuan pemerintah klaim mereka atas tanah leluhur di tempat yang sekarang Rawa Aopa Watumohai National Park. Pemerintah menegaskan, berdasarkan UU Kehutanan tahun 1999, bahwa orang-orang Moronene harus bermukim kembali di lahan di luar taman. Pada bulan September 2000, mereka mencapai kesepakatan dengan pemerintah setempat bahwa mereka akan diizinkan untuk tetap tinggal di tanah mereka sampai pengadilan memutuskan manfaat dari klaim mereka. Namun, dari 23-25 November 2000, sekitar 70 personel keamanan berusaha mengusir Moronene dari taman. Tim keamanan, yang terdiri dari polisi setempat, anggota Brimob, dan polisi hutan dan pejabat, dilaporkan menghancurkan 23 rumah di 3 desa dari Hukaea-Laeya, Lampopola, dan Lanowulu. Pada akhir tahun, yang masih Moronene yang tinggal di Hukaea-Laeya desa, tetapi mereka takut kerusakan lebih lanjut permukiman mereka sejak pemerintah tidak berubah posisinya bahwa mereka harus pergi.Tenaga kerja Berikat telah menjadi masalah untuk beberapa orang Dayak di Kalimantan Timur (lihat Bagian 6.c.). Menurut ILO pada tahun 2000, pada setidaknya satu proyek, sebuah perusahaan logging mendirikan toko perusahaan di daerah terpencil, di mana pekerja harus membeli kebutuhan dengan harga yang meningkat. Karena pekerja tidak sanggup membayar harga, mereka membeli barang menggunakan voucher mewakili upah masa depan, sehingga, menurut ILO, "berpaling sekali independen dan petani relatif kaya menjadi buruh terikat miskin terjebak dalam siklus yang terus pemasangan utang. "Ketegangan dengan penduduk asli di Papua terus berlanjut. Papua mengeluhkan rasisme, prasangka agama, paternalisme, dan sikap merendahkan sebagai hambatan konstan untuk hubungan yang lebih baik dengan non-Papua, termasuk anggota Pemerintah, militer, dan masyarakat bisnis non-Papua. Sebagian besar penduduk Papua terdiri dari migran, yang secara ekonomi dan politik dominan. Kebanyakan pegawai sipil di pemerintah daerah di Papua dan daerah terpencil lain terus datang terutama dari bagian lain negara itu, bukan dari penduduk asli setempat. Ketegangan antara orang Papua dan pendatang terus sepanjang tahun, terutama setelah orang Papua membunuh 24 migran di Wamena pada tanggal 6 dan 7 2000, setelah pasukan keamanan menembaki orang Papua yang menolak upaya untuk mencatat bendera kemerdekaan Papua (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 2.a.). Serangan itu menyebabkan eksodus beberapa ribu migran dari daerah Wamena dan dari Papua (lihat Bagian 2.d.). Pada tahun 2000 orang Papua dan pendatang bentrok lagi di Merauke pada awal November dan Desember 2000 dan di daerah pasar Abepura di Jayapura dari 11-13 November, 2000 yang mengakibatkan cedera pada kedua sisinya dan pembakaran atau penjarahan toko-toko migran. Penyerang tidak dikenal membunuh dua polisi dan seorang penjaga keamanan di Abepura, Papua, pada tanggal 7 Desember 2000 dan pekerja kayu dua dekat Guinea Papua-Papua New perbatasan pada tanggal 9 Desember 2000. Polisi menyalahkan kedua serangan terhadap Papua Merdeka Organisasi (OPM) (lihat Bagian 1.a.).Sejak tahun 1999 Papua telah menegaskan diri secara politis untuk tingkat yang lebih besar daripada di masa lalu. Dimulai pada akhir 1999, Papua tokoh politik dan organisasi kesukuan tradisional mulai membentuk "gugus tugas" Papua (Satgas Papua). Pada Februari 2000, masyarakat Papua dan pemimpin suku mengadakan "konsultasi besar" dari pemimpin Papua untuk mengatur agenda untuk pemerintahan sendiri dan menunjuk Presidium Dewan Papua untuk berbicara atas nama orang Papua. Pernyataan penutup konsultasi menyerukan diadakannya suatu kongres terdiri dari masyarakat Papua. Kongres ini diselenggarakan dari tanggal 29 sampai 4 Juni 2000 di Jayapura, dan melibatkan lebih dari 2.000 delegasi dari masing-masing kabupaten di Papua, bagian lain dari negara, dan masyarakat Papua di luar negeri. Para delegasi menyetujui resolusi menolak 1969 "Act of Free Choice", yang dikonfirmasi penggabungan Papua ke Indonesia; menyerukan kepada pemerintah pusat, bersama dengan PBB dan pemerintah Amerika Serikat dan Belanda, untuk meninjau proses dimana wilayah itu menjadi bagian dari Indonesia dan mengakui kedaulatan Papua sejak tahun 1961, dan memberikan mandat kepada Presidium Dewan Papua untuk mengupayakan pengakuan internasional dan melaporkan kembali ke kongres pada tanggal 1 Desember 2000 tentang kemajuan ke arah tujuan ini. Pada tanggal 1 Desember 2000, para pemimpin Presidium memimpin peringatan damai deklarasi kemerdekaan 1961 oleh tokoh masyarakat Papua, maka di bawah kekuasaan Belanda. Wakil Ketua Presidium Tom Beanal menceritakan upaya Presidium sejak Kongres Papua untuk memulai dialog dengan Jakarta, dan meminta tenang. Hari diamati damai di sebagian besar Papua. Pada tahun 2000 Dewan Presidium pemimpin perjalanan ke seluruh provinsi untuk mempublikasikan hasil kongres, secara teratur bertemu dengan pejabat pemerintah di Jakarta, dan melakukan perjalanan ke negara lain untuk memajukan Papua.Pemerintah awalnya menanggapi inisiatif Papua dengan menyambut seruan untuk dialog dan menawarkan otonomi khusus dalam konteks negara kesatuan Republik Indonesia. Kemudian Presiden Wahid bertemu beberapa kali dengan para pemimpin Papua dan mengunjungi Papua pada tanggal 31 Desember 1999 dan Januari 1 Januari 2000, ketika ia mengumumkan bahwa nama provinsi ini akan diubah menjadi Papua. Kemudian-Wakil Presiden Megawati Soekarnoputri mengunjungi provinsi pada bulan Mei dan September 2000, dan kemudian-Presiden Wahid memberikan $ 110.000 (Rp. 1 milyar) untuk penyelenggaraan kongres Papua. Setelah kongres, ia bertemu dengan para pemimpin Presidium Dewan dan menekankan kembali sikap tegas pemerintah terhadap kemerdekaan Papua, namun mengatakan hal itu diperbolehkan untuk terbang bendera kemerdekaan Papua selama mereka lebih kecil dan diterbangkan di bawah bendera Indonesia. Namun, selama sesi Agustus 2000 MPR, legislator menyerang sikap Wahid terhadap orang Papua dan menuntut pendekatan yang lebih kuat yang menolak terbang bendera kemerdekaan, penggunaan nama Papua, dan manifestasi yang dirasakan lain dari sentimen proindependence. Pada akhir September 2000, baru Kapolri Suryo Bimantoro memerintahkan semua bendera kemerdekaan Papua diturunkan. Polisi upaya untuk menghapus secara paksa bendera di Wamena pada tanggal 6 Oktober, 2000 Merauke pada tanggal 4 Nopember 2000 dan 2 Desember 2000, dan Fak Fank pada 1 Desember 2000 memicu bentrokan dengan anggota Satgas Papua, yang mengakibatkan banyak kematian dan meningkatnya ketegangan antara orang Papua dan non-Papua pendatang (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 1.c.). Setelah Papua menyerang sebuah kantor polisi di Jayapura pada tanggal 7 Desember 2000, polisi menembak dan membunuh seorang siswa di sebuah asrama di dekatnya dan ditahan dan mengalahkan lebih dari 100 lainnya, 2 di antaranya meninggal sebagai akibat dari pemukulan. Polisi kembali tuntutan pidana terhadap lima anggota terkemuka dari Dewan Presidium Papua untuk kejahatan terhadap keamanan dari tatanan Negara dan publik pada bulan November 2000 (lihat Bagian 1.e. dan 2.a.). Polisi dorongan dari pembentukan organisasi migran "solidaritas", dan mempersenjatai beberapa organisasi-organisasi tersebut oleh pasukan keamanan, juga mempertajam perpecahan antara dua komunitas. Selain itu, penciptaan sebuah "Task Force Merah Putih" bersenjata (Satgas Merah Putih) di Papua, dikabarkan atas prakarsa tentara, telah menimbulkan kekhawatiran bahwa unsur-unsur tertentu dari pasukan keamanan nasional mungkin mau membuat bersenjata Papua paramiliter kekuatan, meniru milisi Timor Timur, menentang upaya kemerdekaan Papua, dan untuk menentang khusus, kelompok Satgas Papua, sebagian besar yang dianggap proindependence, dan yang bubar pada akhir 2000.Undang-Undang Otonomi Khusus Papua ditandatangani menjadi undang-undang pada bulan November, tetapi pada akhir tahun ini belum mulai berlaku. Sebuah konferensi Maret diperdebatkan apakah akan mengejar kemerdekaan atau otonomi khusus, mengakibatkan sejumlah pertemuan dengan masyarakat setempat untuk menjelaskan otonomi dan meminta masukan. Sebuah tim khusus didirikan di Jakarta untuk melobi Parlemen dan administrasi dan menjelaskan maksud dan latar belakang Undang-Undang Otonomi Khusus Papua. Upaya ini sangat efektif dalam meyakinkan Komite Khusus Parlemen untuk menggunakan draft Papua sebagai dasar hukum akhir. Sebagian besar ketentuan dalam versi Papua selamat utuh dalam teks akhir, termasuk izin untuk mengubah nama Provinsi Papua dan izin untuk suatu bendera Papua dan lagu. Ketentuan hukum meliputi: pengakuan kekurangan Pemerintah dalam mengatur Papua; pengakuan identitas budaya khusus Papua dan pengakuan hak masyarakat adat; pembentukan Komisi Hak Asasi Manusia untuk menjelaskan sejarah Papua; pengalihan sebagian besar pendapatan daerah dari pemerintah pusat ke provinsi, dan suatu ketentuan bahwa pemerintah provinsi memiliki kewenangan dalam seluruh bidang, kecuali politik luar negeri, pertahanan, kebijakan moneter dan fiskal, agama, dan keadilan.Pasukan keamanan tidak menghalangi kegiatan politik yang berkaitan dengan Undang-Undang Otonomi Khusus Papua, namun, mereka secara sporadis menerapkan kebijakan tanpa toleransi untuk mengibarkan bendera Papua, sampai RUU Otonomi Khusus disahkan DPR, setelah pasukan keamanan waktu memungkinkan terbang dari bendera. Pasukan keamanan kelompok separatis ditargetkan dalam serangan di Ilaga dan Kali Kopi (lihat Bagian 1.a.).Agama MinoritasMeskipun ketentuan konstitusional dan hukum tentang kebebasan beragama, ada sejumlah pembatasan pada jenis kegiatan keagamaan tertentu dan agama-agama yang tidak diakui. Penutup dan serangan terhadap gereja-gereja, kuil, dan fasilitas keagamaan lainnya, mulai dari vandalisme kecil untuk pembakaran, terus sepanjang tahun, menurut Kristen Indonesia Forum Komunikasi (FKKI). FKKI mencatat 235 serangan alasan agama di gereja-gereja Kristen atau fasilitas Kristen lainnya dari Oktober 1999 hingga September 2001. Departemen Agama memperkirakan bahwa 181 masjid rusak atau hancur selama tahun berjalan. Jumlah terbesar serangan terhadap orang dan tempat ibadah terjadi pada tahun 2000 di Maluku dan Sulawesi Tengah provinsi di bagian timur negara itu, menyebabkan lebih dari 3.000 kematian, perpindahan dari hampir 500.000 orang, dan merusak sedikitnya 81 gereja dan puluhan masjid (lihat Bagian 1.a., 2.c., dan 2.d.).Serangan terhadap tempat ibadah mencerminkan ketegangan agama, tetapi faktor lain yang memberikan kontribusi termasuk mendasari ketegangan sosial ekonomi dan politik antara miskin Muslim dan lebih makmur Sino-Indonesia Kristen. Demikian pula, di Maluku dan Sulawesi Tengah, ketegangan ekonomi antara Kristen dan Muslim pribumi yang bermigrasi ke daerah-daerah tersebut dalam beberapa dekade terakhir adalah faktor penting dalam insiden kekerasan antaragama. Komunitas Kristen dan Muslim di provinsi-provinsi menyalahkan satu sama lain untuk memulai dan melanggengkan kekerasan.Pemerintah gagal untuk menekan atau menanggapi kasus kekerasan, dan tidak menyelesaikan sepenuhnya banyak kasus serangan terhadap fasilitas keagamaan dan gereja yang terjadi selama kerusuhan, dalam kasus lain, Pemerintah tidak menyelidiki insiden tersebut sama sekali (lihat Bagian 1 a.. dan 2.c.).Anti-Kristen khotbah dan publikasi juga meningkat, yang menyebabkan kekhawatiran bahwa dukungan masyarakat untuk toleransi beragama mengikis. Universitas Muslim siswa di Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan memukul empat non-Muslim pada Oktober, setelah mendengar bahwa penduduk kota prodomendity Kristen, Tondano, telah membakar patung Usama bin Ladin. Hari berikutnya, mahasiswa Muslim di Makassar memukul dua non-Muslim. Pada tahun 2000 sebuah gerakan yang dikenal sebagai Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) muncul di kampus-kampus universitas di Jawa. Ada laporan sporadis dari beberapa wilayah di Jakarta yang mahasiswa pengikut gerakan NII mendirikan penghalang jalan, kartu identitas diperiksa, dan dilecehkan lewat non-Muslim, dalam beberapa kasus memaksa mereka untuk membacakan ayat-ayat dari Quran. Insiden serupa terjadi di Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan. Banyak agama minoritas di negara itu menyatakan kekhawatiran atas apa yang mereka dianggap kebutuhan yang semakin meningkat oleh kelompok muslim tertentu untuk menerapkan hukum Syariah di negara ini. Sebuah proposal untuk menerapkan hukum Islam pada tahun 2000 gagal (lihat Bagian 2.c.), namun, kadang-kadang hukum Islam diimplementasikan di masyarakat, khususnya di Aceh. Rencana otonomi daerah di Aceh mengakui hukum Islam sebagai hukum lokal di sana.Laskar Jihad ("pasukan perang suci," sebuah kelompok Muslim yang dibentuk tahun 2000) bergerak dalam pelatihan paramiliter, dan pemimpin kelompok mengumumkan bahwa mereka dimaksudkan untuk mengobarkan perang terhadap orang Kristen di Maluku dan bagian lain negara itu. Sebuah upswelling pembunuhan terjadi di Sulawesi Tengah pada bulan November dan Desember, tampaknya didorong oleh militan Laskar Jihad. Puluhan ribu orang Kristen meninggalkan rumah mereka, desa-desa diserang dan dalam beberapa kasus terbakar habis. Namun, Pemerintah bergerak pasukan, yang mampu memadamkan kekerasan. Sampai akhir tahun, kesepakatan damai telah dinegosiasikan di bawah naungan pemerintah, namun, Laskar Jihad belum dikeluarkan dari daerah tersebut (lihat Bagian 1.a.).Antara Juni 2000 dan Juli, ribuan orang tewas dalam kekerasan antara Muslim dan Kristen (lihat Bagian 2.c.). Sumber-sumber lokal memperkirakan bahwa lebih dari 3.000 milisi Laskar Jihad terlibat dalam serangan terhadap orang Kristen di Propinsi Maluku dan Sulawesi Tengah sepanjang tahun. Polisi menangkap pemimpin Laskar Jihad Ja'far Umar Thalib pada 4 Mei atas tuduhan menghasut kekerasan agama dan memerintahkan pembunuhan itu dengan rajam dari pengikut, Abdullah. Polisi merilis Thalib pada tanggal 12, tapi menempatkannya dalam tahanan rumah sambil menunggu penyelidikan lebih lanjut.Pada akhir Desember 2000, maka Presiden Wahid mengakui bahwa ratusan orang Kristen di Keswui dan Teor Kepulauan di Maluku telah masuk Islam pada bulan November dan Desember 2000 untuk menyelamatkan nyawa mereka. Sampai akhir tahun, diperkirakan hanya 165 petobat telah mampu meninggalkan 2 pulau. Ada juga laporan yang dapat dipercaya konversi paksa terjadi di bagian lain dari Maluku dan Maluku Utara. Perkiraan berkisar dari lebih dari 3.500 hingga 8.000 kasus. Sementara sebagian besar kasus didokumentasikan melibatkan orang-orang Kristen yang masuk Islam, ada laporan dari Muslim yang dipaksa untuk masuk agama Kristen di Halmahera, Maluku Utara.Kristen IDP dari Keswui dan Teor yang telah menjalani konversi mengatakan dalam wawancara media bahwa militan Muslim mengatakan kepada orang Kristen untuk masuk Islam atau menghadapi kematian kemungkinan di tangan milisi Muslim. Menurut sumber ini, orang Kristen digiring ke masjid dan masuk Islam secara massal en. Kedua petobat pria dan wanita kemudian dipaksa untuk menjalani sunat untuk membuktikan bahwa mereka adalah Muslim sejati, meskipun fakta bahwa perempuan Muslim di Maluku tidak lazim disunat.Sejumlah pemboman dan bom mencoba terutama ditujukan terhadap fasilitas Kristen terjadi sepanjang tahun, termasuk di Santa Anna Gereja Katolik di Jakarta pada tanggal 22 Juli. Pemboman itu melukai sedikitnya 70 orang, termasuk bayi 7-bulan tua dan seorang gadis 4-tahun. Polisi menuduh 13 orang ditangkap oleh polisi pada bulan September sehubungan dengan pemboman mal. Pada tanggal 31, ledakan bom simultan rusak tiga gereja dekat Palu, namun tidak ada orang terluka. Sejumlah serangan bom lainnya juga terjadi selama tahun berjalan (lihat Bagian 1.a. dan 1.c.).Muslim adalah minoritas agama di provinsi paling timur, Papua. Sentimen lokal terhadap upaya misionaris Muslim untuk memenangkan petobat di provinsi yang didominasi Kristen, serta kebencian dari kedatangan di provinsi migran terutama Muslim dari bagian lain negara itu, telah di masa lalu menyebabkan serangan terhadap masjid di Papua. Namun, tidak ada laporan serangan terhadap masjid di Papua sepanjang tahun.Pada bulan Mei kerumunan Muslim dilaporkan mengusir dua keluarga Baha'i tinggal di desa mayoritas Muslim di Sulawesi Tengah (lihat Bagian 2.c.).Sepanjang tahun ada laporan sesekali pembunuhan orang-orang yang mempraktekkan sihir tradisional ("dukun santets") (lihat Bagian 1.a.) di Timur, Tengah, dan Jawa Barat. Jumlah pembunuhan tersebut diyakini telah menurun sejak 1998, ketika hampir 200 orang tersebut tewas di Jawa Timur, dan sejak tahun 1999, ketika lebih dari 30 orang, diyakini menjadi dukun santet tewas di Jawa Barat.Nasional / Ras / Etnis MinoritasPemerintah secara resmi mendorong toleransi ras dan etnis. Etnis Cina, yang mewakili sekitar 3 persen dari populasi - sejauh ini kelompok minoritas non pribumi terbesar - historis telah memainkan peran utama dalam perekonomian. Pada tahun 1998 anti-Cina sentimen menyebabkan serangan serius dan luas di Cina bisnis milik. Meskipun komitmen Pemerintah Wahid untuk membuka kembali investigasi terhadap serangan ini, pemerintah Megawati telah gagal untuk mengejar tahun 1999 rekomendasi dari tim pencari fakta bersama (TGPF) yang ditugaskan untuk menyelidiki serangan tahun 1998 (lihat Bagian 1.a., 1 c, dan. 4)..Serangan rasial termotivasi terhadap Tiongkok-Indonesia telah menurun tajam sejak pertengahan-1998, meskipun Tiongkok-Indonesia terus melaporkan kasus diskriminasi dan pelecehan.Jumlah yang belum ditentukan Sino-Indonesia tetap luar negeri atau jauh dari tempat tinggal mereka di negara ini. Sementara banyak berada di Singapura, ada juga yang cukup besar Sino-Indonesia populasi di Australia dan Amerika Serikat terkemuka Sino-Indonesia memperkirakan bahwa sekitar setengah dari Sino-pria Indonesia tinggal di luar negeri kadang-kadang kembali ke rumah mereka untuk kunjungan singkat untuk melindungi kepentingan bisnis mereka yang masih tersisa, tetapi kebanyakan menjaga keluarga dan sebagian besar modal mereka lepas pantai atau di bagian lain negara itu.Dengan pencabutan Keputusan Presiden 14/1967 pada bulan Januari 2000, Konfusianisme dapat dipraktekkan di depan umum dan hukum tidak lagi melarang perayaan Tahun Baru Cina di kuil-kuil atau tempat-tempat umum (lihat Bagian 2.c.). Cina dekorasi tahun baru ditampilkan mencolok dan dijual di pusat perbelanjaan umum di beberapa kota besar. Bahasa Cina bisa diajarkan, diucapkan, dan dicetak, dan instruksi pribadi dalam bahasa Cina tidak lagi dilarang. Beberapa universitas, termasuk Universitas Indonesia, menawarkan berbahasa Cina instruksi. Sejumlah lembaga swasta secara terbuka menawarkan kursus juga. Berbahasa Cina publikasi di negara ini tidak lagi dilarang, namun, peraturan pabean masih melarang impor terbitan bahasa Cina dan musik (lihat Bagian 2.a.). Universitas negeri masih memiliki kuota informal yang membatasi pendaftaran mahasiswa etnis Cina.Pihak berwenang tidak lagi diwajibkan untuk dicatat kode khusus pada kartu identifikasi nasional untuk warga keturunan Tionghoa. Namun, beberapa Sino-Indonesia telah menyatakan bahwa praktek ini terus berlanjut.Noncitizen etnis Cina mungkin tidak menjalankan usaha di daerah pedesaan, namun Pemerintah tidak membatasi hak ini bagi Tiongkok-Indonesia.Penduduk asli Papua dan berbagai kelompok hak asasi manusia menuduh bahwa orang Papua kurang terwakili dalam pelayanan masyarakat di provinsi itu. Pemerintah telah melakukan sejumlah upaya untuk merekrut pegawai lebih sipil di Papua, dan telah ada beberapa peningkatan jumlah peserta pelatihan PNS di provinsi ini, meskipun kebijakan "tidak ada pertumbuhan" sebagai pegawai negeri secara keseluruhan.Di Kalimantan Dayak pribumi mengklaim bahwa mereka tidak dianggap dalam pekerjaan pegawai negeri, dan bahwa mereka terpinggirkan di banyak sektor ekonomi lainnya oleh transmigran. Hal ini menyebabkan kambuh konflik antaretnis di Kalimantan Tengah dan Barat di mana ratusan pribumi Dayak terbunuh (lihat Bagian 1.a.). Selain itu, Afrika membentuk persentase yang proporsional besar dari mereka tewas ketika ditangkap, menunjukkan bahwa pembunuhan tersebut bermotif rasial.Bagian 6 Hak Pekerjaa. Hak DasarUndang-undang mengatur bahwa 10 atau lebih pekerja berhak untuk membentuk serikat buruh. Keanggotaan serikat harus terbuka untuk semua orang tanpa memandang afiliasi politik, agama, etnis, atau gender. Pekerja sektor swasta menurut hukum bebas untuk membentuk organisasi pekerja tanpa izin sebelumnya, dan serikat dapat membuat anggaran dasar dan aturan mereka sendiri dan memilih perwakilan mereka. Selain undang-undang menyatakan bahwa serikat iuran harus membiayai kegiatan serikat, tetapi tidak menunjukkan bagaimana iuran harus dikumpulkan atau apakah manajemen memiliki peran dalam pengumpulan iuran.Pengusaha mengkritik ketentuan tindakan itu memungkinkan setiap 10 pekerja untuk membentuk serikat buruh. Pengusaha menyatakan bahwa ketentuan ini mendorong penciptaan serikat terlalu banyak, yang mereka katakan mempersulit perundingan bersama dan meningkatkan kemungkinan pemogokan.Berdasarkan peraturan hukum dan pendaftaran, lebih dari 20 federasi serikat baru atau yang sebelumnya tidak dikenal telah memberitahukan Departemen Tenaga Kerja keberadaan mereka sejak tahun 1998, dan ribuan tempat kerja tingkat unit telah terdaftar di Departemen Tenaga Kerja, meskipun beberapa serikat mengeluhkan kesulitan dalam mendaftar unit tempat kerja mereka.Federasi Seluruh Indonesia Serikat Buruh (SPSI), yang dibentuk oleh penggabungan (di bawah arahan Pemerintah) dari organisasi buruh pada tahun 1973, adalah organisasi serikat pekerja tertua. Kepala SPSI dan banyak anggota dewan eksekutif juga adalah anggota dari organisasi politik Golkar dan kelompok konstituen fungsional. Departemen Tenaga Kerja, yang menteri adalah pemimpin dari SPSI, tidak campur tangan dalam perselisihan dalam organisasi serikat pekerja juga memberikan panduan kepada setiap serikat.Undang-undang mengizinkan pemerintah untuk mengajukan petisi kepada pengadilan untuk membubarkan serikat jika dasarnya bertentangan dengan Pancasila atau UUD 1945, atau jika pemimpin atau anggota serikat pekerja, atas nama serikat pekerja, melakukan kejahatan terhadap keamanan negara dan dihukum paling sedikit 5 tahun penjara. Setelah serikat pekerja dibubarkan, pemimpin dan anggotanya tidak dapat membentuk serikat lain selama 3 tahun setelah pembubaran serikat asli.Hukum tidak mengatasi ajudikasi sengketa yurisdiksi antara beberapa serikat di tempat kerja, dan hukum dan peraturan yang ada tidak memberikan panduan yang jelas tentang bagaimana sengketa yurisdiksi harus ditangani. Ambiguitas tersebut kadang-kadang telah menyebabkan bentrokan antara serikat pekerja di tempat kerja.Sejak tahun 1999 pegawai negeri sipil belum diperlukan milik KORPRI, sebuah asosiasi nonunion. Karyawan beberapa departemen pemerintah mengumumkan bahwa mereka akan membentuk asosiasi mereka sendiri karyawan, dan organisasi serikat mulai mencari anggota di kalangan PNS. Serikat pekerja juga sedang mencari untuk mengatur perusahaan milik negara (BUMN) karyawan, didefinisikan untuk memasukkan mereka yang bekerja di perusahaan di mana negara memiliki setidaknya kepemilikan 5-persen, meskipun mereka telah mengalami beberapa perlawanan dari manajemen perusahaan, dan dasar hukum untuk mendaftarkan serikat pekerja di BUMN yang masih belum jelas. Guru harus berasal dari Persatuan Guru (PGRI). Meskipun secara teknis digolongkan sebagai serikat pekerja, PGRI terus berfungsi lebih sebagai organisasi kesejahteraan dan tidak tampak telah terlibat dalam kegiatan serikat pekerja seperti tawar-menawar kolektif. Beberapa kelompok guru telah membentuk serikat pekerja tidak resmi di luar PGRI. Guru lainnya telah pergi mogok untuk upah dan tunjangan yang lebih baik, tindakan langka dan teknis ilegal untuk guru. Misalnya, pada bulan September guru sekolah umum di Atambua, Lampung, Bandung, Banjarmasin, Gorontalo, melakukan mogok atas punggung membayar utang kepada mereka. Pemerintah pusat mengklaim bahwa pihaknya telah mengalokasikan dana untuk membayar kembali kepada pemerintahan daerah sebagai bagian dari undang-undang otonomi baru, tetapi beberapa pemerintah daerah mengklaim bahwa mereka pernah menerima dana. Wajib PGRI kontribusi dikurangkan secara otomatis dari gaji guru.Sebuah peraturan mengharuskan polisi diberitahu semua pertemuan lima orang atau lebih dari semua organisasi di luar kantor atau situs kerja normal. Peraturan ini berlaku untuk pertemuan serikat. Polisi secara berkala muncul tanpa diundang di seminar dan pertemuan serikat buruh, yang dapat memiliki efek menakutkan.Semua pekerja terorganisir, kecuali pegawai negeri sipil memiliki hak hukum untuk menyerang. Karyawan BUMN dan guru jarang menggunakan hak ini, tapi pemogokan sektor swasta sering terjadi. Sebelum pemogokan secara hukum dapat terjadi di sektor swasta, hukum mengharuskan mediasi intensif oleh Departemen Tenaga Kerja dan pemberitahuan sebelumnya dari maksud untuk menyerang, namun, persetujuan tidak diperlukan. Dalam prosedur praktek penyelesaian sengketa jarang diikuti, dan pemberitahuan formal dari niat untuk mogok jarang diberikan, karena Departemen Tenaga Kerja prosedur yang lambat dan memiliki kredibilitas sedikit di antara pekerja. Oleh karena itu, pemogokan mendadak biasanya dihasilkan dari keluhan berlangsung lama, upaya oleh pengusaha untuk mencegah pembentukan cabang serikat pekerja, atau penolakan manfaat yang diamanatkan secara hukum atau hak.Pemogokan sering terjadi selama tahun di berbagai industri dan kadang-kadang itu berlarut-larut. Serangkaian serangan yang mempengaruhi sejumlah kota, termasuk Bandung, Gresik, dan Surabaya, terjadi pada bulan Juni atas pencabutan Keputusan Menteri Tenaga Kerja 150 pada pesangon. Sejumlah pabrik di Bandung rusak akibat striker. Pada bulan Juli dan Oktober, 9.000 pekerja di negara produsen pesawat PT Dirgantara Indonesia melakukan pemogokan untuk memprotes pemecatan ketua dan sekretaris serikat mereka dan menuntut kenaikan gaji tiga kali lipat. Direktur pelaksana mengatakan bahwa kedua pejabat dipecat karena mengorganisir serangkaian demonstrasi dan pemogokan. Pemimpin serikat bertemu dengan Menteri Tenaga Kerja pada bulan Oktober dan Desember dan para pihak sepakat untuk secara bertahap peningkatan gaji dasar sebagai proporsi gaji take home. Buruh aktivis Ngadinah, karyawan di sebuah perusahaan yang memproduksi sepatu, dibebaskan pada 30 Agustus tuduhan bahwa dia melakukan kekerasan terhadap penguasa, dan ofensif, perilaku kekerasan, atau tidak menyenangkan. Menurut pengaduan yang diajukan oleh majikannya, PT Panarub, ia membantu 8.000 pekerja menggelar pemogokan besar-besaran untuk upah yang lebih baik dari September 08-11, 2000. Sebelum sidang, dia ditahan selama 2 minggu dan dilecehkan oleh Menteri Negara (lihat Bagian 1.d.).Kebanyakan serangan dilakukan dan diselesaikan secara damai, namun, beberapa pemogokan menjadi kekerasan dan orang tewas. Pada tanggal 29 Maret 2 striker tewas dan 10 lainnya cedera ketika massa menyerang sebuah perusahaan jok mobil. Para perwira militer di dalam kompleks dan polisi di dekat pabrik kain pelapis tidak campur tangan.Beberapa serikat pekerja menyatakan bahwa pemimpin pemogokan dipilih untuk dipecat saat perusahaan mengurangi pegawai. Dalam beberapa kasus pekerja rusak properti dan mengintimidasi pekerja nonstriking, dan ada perselisihan di antara serikat yang berbeda diwakili dalam perusahaan yang sama. Dalam kebanyakan kasus, pekerja tidak ditangkap karena tindakan ini. Grup yang mengaku mewakili buruh juga kadang-kadang kekerasan. Sebagai contoh, pada bulan September ribuan guru di Bandar Lampung, yang mencoba memasuki kantor walikota, bentrok dengan pasukan keamanan.SPSI memelihara kontak internasional tapi hanya perdagangan afiliasi serikat internasional sebagai federasi adalah dengan Association of Southeast Asia Nations Trade Union Council. Beberapa serikat SPSI federasi adalah anggota sekretariat perdagangan internasional. SBSI berafiliasi dengan Konfederasi Buruh Dunia dan beberapa sekretariat serikat perdagangan internasional.b. Hak untuk Berorganisasi dan Perundingan BersamaPerundingan bersama disediakan oleh hukum, dan Departemen Tenaga Kerja mempromosikan itu dalam konteks ideologi nasional, Pancasila. Hingga 1994 serikat buruh hanya diakui - SPSI dan komponennya - bisa terlibat secara hukum dalam perjanjian kerja bersama. Dengan mengeluarkan peraturan baru tentang serikat pendaftaran dan memberlakukan hukum serikat pekerja, pemerintah memungkinkan untuk organisasi pekerja baru yang mendaftar pada pemerintah untuk membuat persetujuan yang mengikat secara hukum dengan majikan. Tindakan itu menetapkan bahwa jika ada lebih dari satu serikat di sebuah perusahaan menegosiasikan perjanjian kerja bersama, perjanjian bahwa keuntungan dukungan lebih dari setengah dari jumlah pekerja di perusahaan akan berlaku untuk semua pekerja di perusahaan. Jika perjanjian tidak memiliki dukungan lebih dari setengah dari total pekerja, itu hanya akan berlaku bagi mereka yang mendukungnya.Dalam perusahaan tanpa serikat pekerja, pemerintah enggan memanfaatkan pekerja dari luar bantuan nonpemerintah, seperti, dalam konsultasi dengan majikan atas peraturan perusahaan. Sebaliknya, Departemen Tenaga Kerja lebih suka bahwa pekerja meminta bantuan dan menyatakan bahwa perannya adalah untuk melindungi pekerja. Namun, ada laporan yang dapat dipercaya bahwa bagi banyak perusahaan, konsultasi yang asal-asalan yang terbaik dan biasanya hanya terjadi dengan manajemen yang dipilih pekerja, namun ada juga laporan yang dapat dipercaya sebaliknya dari perusahaan asing. Menurut statistik pemerintah, sekitar 80 persen dari pabrik-tingkat unit SPSI memiliki perjanjian perundingan bersama. Tingkat dimana perjanjian ini dirundingkan secara bebas antara serikat pekerja dan manajemen tanpa campur tangan pemerintah bervariasi. Dengan peraturan negosiasi harus diselesaikan dalam waktu 30 hari atau diserahkan kepada Departemen Tenaga Kerja untuk mediasi dan konsiliasi atau arbitrase. Negosiasi Kebanyakan menyimpulkan dalam periode 30-hari. Perjanjian ini selama 2 tahun dan dapat diperpanjang selama 1 tahun.Menurut LSM yang terlibat dalam masalah perburuhan, dalam prakteknya ketentuan-ketentuan perjanjian tawar menawar kolektif jarang melampaui standar minimum hukum yang didirikan oleh Pemerintah, dan kesepakatan sering hanya disajikan untuk wakil pekerja untuk ditandatangani ketimbang negosiasi. Meskipun peraturan pemerintah melarang majikan untuk mendiskriminasikan atau melecehkan karyawan karena keanggotaan serikat, ada laporan yang dapat dipercaya dari para pejabat serikat dari perusahaan terhadap pengelola serikat, termasuk pemecatan pekerja, yang tidak dicegah secara efektif atau diperbaiki dalam praktek. Beberapa majikan memperingatkan karyawan mereka terhadap kontak dengan pengelola serikat. Menurut laporan ILO November sementara, manajemen di Shangri-La Hotel melanggar prinsip kebebasan berserikat ketika diberhentikan 580 anggota Perhimpunan Pekerja Independen (SPMS) untuk memukul pada bulan Desember 2000 (lihat Bagian 6.a.). Laporan ILO mengkritik penahanan semalam pemerintah dari 20 anggota SPMS pada bulan Desember 2000 untuk menduduki lobi hotel selama pemogokan, dan ditandai penahanan itu sebagai "hambatan bagi pelaksanaan hak-hak serikat buruh." Pada tahun 2000 SPSI didokumentasikan 135 kasus di mana perusahaan melanggar hak pekerja mereka untuk mengatur dengan mengintimidasi, menghukum, atau menembak anggota SBSI karena afiliasi mereka dengan serikat pekerja atau karena mereka mencoba untuk mengatur unit SBSI di pabrik-pabrik mereka - masalah tenaga kerja lainnya organisasi dan aktivis jumpai dalam mencoba untuk membentuk serikat pekerja. Pada bulan November 2000, polisi di Kalimantan Timur ditangkap Wuaya Kawilarang, koordinator regional untuk SBSI, untuk investigasi tuduhan bahwa ia menghasut pekerja untuk kekerasan. Dia dijatuhi hukuman penjara 7 bulan dan dirilis di tahun tersebut.Komite resolusi perselisihan perburuhan regional dan nasional mengadili tuduhan diskriminasi anti serikat pekerja, dan keputusan mereka dapat dimintakan banding ke PTUN. Namun, karena keputusan yang tidak menguntungkan banyak anggota serikat percaya bahwa komite penyelesaian sengketa pada umumnya mendukung pengusaha. Akibatnya, pekerja sering menyampaikan keluhan mereka langsung kepada Komnas HAM, DPR, dan LSM. Keputusan administratif yang mendukung pekerja yang dipecat biasanya adalah penghargaan moneter; pekerja jarang yang kembali. Undang-undang mengharuskan bahwa pengusaha mendapatkan persetujuan komite resolusi sengketa perburuhan sebelum menembak pekerja, tetapi hukum sering diabaikan dalam praktek. Sebuah RUU Tenaga Kerja yang dipertimbangkan pada tahun yang bersangkutan tidak menentukan bahwa manajemen dan serikat pekerja atau pekerja yang bersangkutan harus mencapai konsensus sebelum seorang pekerja dapat diberhentikan, dan tidak membahas keterlibatan pemerintah, kecuali untuk dicatat bahwa upaya untuk mencegah pemutusan akan ditentukan oleh Menteri Keputusan.Sejak tahun 1996 serikat yang berafiliasi dengan SPSI telah mampu mengumpulkan iuran serikat pekerja langsung melalui pemotongan gaji (yang "checkoff" sistem) daripada memiliki Departemen Tenaga Kerja mengumpulkan iuran dan mentransfernya ke SPSI. Penerapan sistem ini tetap tidak merata, tapi pengamat perburuhan pada umumnya percaya bahwa itu telah memberikan kewenangan yang lebih ke pabrik-tingkat unit serikat di mana sistem checkoff dipraktekkan. Uni pejabat di kantor pusat SPSI mengatakan bahwa tidak semua cabang lokal dari serikat mengirimkan sebagian iuran yang dikumpulkan untuk kantor pusat regional dan pusat, sebagaimana diatur dalam peraturan SPSI. Serikat pekerja selain SPSI telah menuduh kesulitan dalam mendapatkan perusahaan untuk membuat sebuah sistem checkoff bagi anggotanya. Serikat melaporkan bahwa pada perusahaan kesempatan banyak otomatis mengurangi iuran serikat pekerja untuk SPSI dari pekerja berafiliasi dengan serikat pekerja lain.Polisi dan tentara terus terlibat dalam masalah perburuhan, meskipun sejak pertengahan 1990-an telah terjadi pergeseran dari intervensi terbuka dan demonstrasi kekuatan oleh pasukan berseragam untuk tindakan kurang terlihat. Paling tidak pada dua kesempatan, pasukan keamanan menembaki pekerja yang mogok pada tahun 2000 (lihat Bagian 6.a.). Namun, bentuk paling umum keterlibatan militer dalam urusan perburuhan, menurut serikat pekerja dan perwakilan LSM, adalah pola lama kolusi antara polisi dan personil militer dan pengusaha, yang biasanya mengambil bentuk intimidasi terhadap pekerja oleh petugas keamanan berpakaian sipil, atau dengan geng pemuda. Militer juga mempekerjakan taktik memancing: infiltrasi jajaran pekerja dan mendorong protes atau aksi pekerja, dan dalam beberapa kasus mencoba untuk memprovokasi aksi pekerja keras, yang militer kemudian tegas merespon. Majikan dan perwakilan serikat juga telah diduga "biaya tak terlihat" dari korupsi, yang mereka dan lain-lain merupakan memperkirakan hingga 30 persen dari biaya perusahaan. Pada tanggal 8 Juni individu yang diduga milik sebuah organisasi Islam mengobrak-abrik Asia Pasifik Konferensi Buruh Solidaritas pada Neoliberalisme di Sawangan, Depok, Jawa Barat dan dilaporkan terluka beberapa peserta Indonesia. Polisi tidak melakukan intervensi untuk membantu para peserta, tetapi bubar konferensi dan ditahan 2 aktivis buruh lokal dan 32 asing untuk ditanyai mengenai pelanggaran imigrasi mungkin. Polisi mengklaim bahwa orang asing telah masuk pada pengunjung visa, namun, ini tidak konsisten dengan kegiatan polisi sedang melakukan pada saat itu. Semua mereka yang ditahan dibebaskan 9 Juni setelah pihak berwenang imigrasi memeriksa kasus mereka.Pada tanggal 13 Juni, sekelompok massa sekitar 150 orang terhubung ke Partai Golkar terganggu lokakarya ACILS pada keluhan penanganan di Samarinda, Kalimantan Timur. ACILS 'Bahasa Indonesia program officer dipukul dan ditendang ketika mencoba untuk meninggalkan hotel tempat seminar diselenggarakan. Menurut sumber terpercaya, massa tiba di truk-truk militer, bersama dengan empat pengawalan polisi. Polisi berhasil menghentikan massa sebelum mereka sampai di ruang konferensi. Namun, polisi menolak untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap pelaku.Ada tujuh zona pengolahan ekspor (EPZ ini) di negara ini. Pulau Batam, dekat Singapura, adalah yang terbesar. Hukum perburuhan yang berlaku di EPZ dan di seluruh negara itu, meskipun pengamat non pemerintah percaya bahwa dalam penegakan praktek hukum di EPZ yang lebih lemah dibandingkan di daerah lain.c. Larangan Kerja Paksa atau WajibUndang-undang melarang kerja paksa dan pemerintah biasanya memberlakukan larangan ini. Peraturan tersebut juga melarang kerja paksa dan terikat oleh anak-anak, namun, pemerintah tidak menegakkan ketentuan ini efektif, dan paksa dan buruh kontrak oleh anak-anak adalah masalah. Ada juga kasus jeratan utang dari orang dewasa. Menurut Komisi Nasional Perlindungan Anak, ada 1,6 juta anak-anak antara usia 10 dan 14 dipaksa bekerja, diduga untuk alasan ekonomi. LSM telah memperkirakan bahwa sebanyak 3.000 anak-anak pernah bekerja di jermal, yang dikenal sebagai "jermal," di bawah kondisi yang tidak manusiawi dan berbahaya, namun jumlah anak yang bekerja di jermal telah turun. Sebagian besar anak bekerja di jermal direkrut dari masyarakat petani di daerah pedalaman dan begitu mereka tiba di tempat kerja, mil lepas pantai, mereka ditahan sebagai tahanan virtual dan tidak diizinkan untuk meninggalkan selama 3 bulan atau sampai pekerja pengganti dapat ditemukan. Mereka hidup dalam isolasi di laut pada platform ukuran lapangan basket, bekerja 12 sampai 20 jam per hari dalam kondisi berbahaya, dan tidur di ruang kerja tanpa akses ke fasilitas sanitasi atau sekolah. Ada laporan kekerasan fisik, verbal, dan seksual terhadap anak tersebut. Jermal beroperasi di bawah perlindungan dibayar dari kapal angkatan laut nasional; angkatan laut dilaporkan memiliki kepentingan keuangan di beberapa jermal.Menurut ILO, jumlah jermal dari Sumatera Utara turun menjadi kurang dari 200 karena dampak gabungan dari kehancuran karena konstruksi miskin dan dampak dari proyek perlindungan anak LSM.Di Kalimantan Timur sebuah perusahaan logging dilaporkan perangkap buruh Dayak dalam lingkaran utang dan mengubah mereka menjadi buruh terikat (lihat Bagian 5).d.Tidak ada upaya pemerintah yang signifikan untuk memperkuat penegakan sepanjang tahun.Selama tahun ini, inspektur ketenagakerjaan yang telah menerima pelatihan tidak dihapus setiap anak dari tempat kerja.Pemerintah mengakui bahwa ada kelas anak-anak yang harus bekerja karena alasan sosial ekonomi, dan pada tahun 1987 Menteri Tenaga Kerja mengeluarkan peraturan tentang "Perlindungan Anak Dipaksa Kerja." Peraturan ini disahkan kerja dengan anak di bawah usia 14 yang harus bekerja untuk membantu menambah penghasilan keluarga mereka. Ini tidak menetapkan usia minimum untuk anak-anak dalam kategori ini.Menurut Departemen Tenaga Kerja, jumlah anak yang bekerja meningkat dari sekitar 2 juta sebelum krisis ekonomi mulai pada tahun 1997 menjadi sekitar 2,5 juta diperkirakan pada pertengahan-1999. Negara Biro Statistik (BPS) menyatakan bahwa 1,9 juta anak-anak sampai usia 14 bekerja pada tahun 1998. ILO memperkirakan bahwa antara 6 dan 8 juta anak bekerja, dan lebih dari 3,4 juta anak bekerja 10 jam lebih per minggu. World Vision memperkirakan ada 6,5 juta anak yang bekerja. Perkiraan LSM lain yang lebih dari 10 persen anak-anak bekerja lebih dari 4 jam per hari, dan bahwa lebih dari 35 persen dari anak-anak bekerja lebih dari 35 jam per minggu. LSM lain memperkirakan bahwa 8,5 juta anak usia sekolah yang tidak terdaftar di sekolah dan sebagian besar bekerja di ekonomi bawah tanah tanpa perlindungan hukum dan kompensasi miskin.Diperkirakan bahwa lebih banyak anak bekerja di sektor informal daripada sektor formal, menjual koran, penyemir sepatu, membantu untuk taman atau menonton mobil, dan jika tidak mendapatkan uang. Dalam kasus di mana anak-anak bekerja di sektor formal, pekerjaan tersebut cenderung turun antara ekonomi informal dan formal, termasuk bekerja bersama orang tua mereka di rumah dan perusahaan di perkebunan, dan milik keluarga toko dan pabrik-pabrik kecil, terutama mereka yang adalah satelit industri besar. Ada anak yang bekerja di pabrik-pabrik besar, namun jumlah tidak diketahui, terutama karena dokumen untuk memverifikasi usia yang dipalsukan dengan mudah. Beberapa majikan mempekerjakan anak-anak karena mereka lebih mudah daripada orang dewasa untuk mengelola dan kecil kemungkinannya untuk mengatur atau membuat tuntutan pada majikan.Satu studi yang dilakukan oleh Universitas Atma Jaya di Jakarta memperkirakan ada setidaknya 400.000 anak di bawah usia 15 bekerja sebagai pembantu rumah tangga di Jakarta saja.Anak-anak terlibat dalam berbagai kegiatan pekerjaan berbahaya. Selain mereka yang bekerja di jermal (lihat Bagian 6.c.), anak-anak melakukan benda kerja di pabrik-pabrik sepatu kecil (bengkels) di mana mereka terkena pemutih berbahaya dan perekat. Banyak perusahaan mempekerjakan orang dewasa membenarkan praktek anak-anak membantu orang tua mereka di sawah. Media melaporkan penggunaan merkuri dalam penambangan emas Kalimantan Tengah, menggarisbawahi bahaya yang ditimbulkan untuk anak-anak ini.Approximetely 74 persen dari anak-anak berusia di bawah 12. LSM memiliki program berkelanjutan untuk mengajar anak-anak untuk menghindari limbah berbahaya seperti jarum suntik dan limbah yang berbahaya lainnya.Komite bertemu sekali pada bulan September.e.Sebaliknya, dewan upah wilayah kerja di bawah pengawasan Dewan Pengupahan Nasional menetapkan upah minimum untuk wilayah dan kebutuhan dasar angka untuk setiap provinsi - jumlah moneter dianggap cukup untuk memungkinkan seorang pekerja tunggal untuk memenuhi kebutuhan dasar gizi, sandang, dan papan . Namun, upah minimum yang ditetapkan oleh dewan, tidak memberikan standar hidup yang layak bagi pekerja dan keluarga. Pada tanggal 2 November Gubernur Jakarta diberlakukan kenaikan 38 persen dalam upah minimum bulanan sampai $ 55, efektif Januari 2002.Hukum perburuhan dan peraturan menteri memberikan pekerja dengan berbagai manfaat lainnya, seperti jaminan sosial, dan pekerja di fasilitas yang lebih modern sering menerima tunjangan kesehatan, makan gratis, dan transportasi.Undang-undang menetapkan 7 - atau 8-jam hari kerja dan hari kerja 40-jam, dengan satu 30-menit waktu istirahat untuk setiap 4 jam kerja.Tingkat upah lembur harian adalah 1,5 kali tarif per jam normal untuk jam pertama dan 2 kali untuk jam lembur tambahan. Kepatuhan pada undang-undang yang mengatur tunjangan dan standar perburuhan bervariasi antara sektor dan daerah.Di sektor Barat sebagian besar dioperasikan minyak, program keselamatan dan kesehatan berfungsi cukup baik. Dugaan korupsi pada bagian dari pengawas yang umum. Majikan dilarang oleh hukum untuk membalas mereka yang laporan, tetapi hukum tidak ditegakkan secara efektif.f.Undang-undang melarang perdagangan manusia, namun, perdagangan manusia adalah masalah serius.Statistik resmi melaporkan 75.106 pelacur terdaftar pada tahun 1999, naik dari 72.000 pada tahun 1995. Prevalensi pelacur anak tampaknya berbeda menurut wilayah. Menurut studi LSM, sekitar 15 persen pelacur di beberapa bagian Jawa Tengah adalah antara 16 dan 20 tahun. Dalam sebuah seminar yang diselenggarakan di Batam pada bulan Agustus, peneliti melaporkan bahwa 50 persen dari lebih dari 1.800 pekerja seks yang mereka diwawancarai pada tahun 1998 lebih muda dari 18 tahun. Perkiraan lain menunjukkan bahwa pekerja seks sebanyak 6.000 di Batam berada di bawah usia 18. Semakin banyak anak-anak memasuki pelacuran untuk membantu keluarga mereka atau untuk mendukung kebiasaan narkoba.Pelacur anak bisa memperoleh $ 500 sampai $ 1.000 (sekitar Rp 4,7 menjadi 9,4 juta.) Per bulan, 10 sampai 20 kali apa yang seorang pekerja pabrik tidak terampil menghasilkan. Permintaan untuk muda girls meningkat, sebagai klien banyak yang mencari gadis-gadis muda yang dianggap kurang mungkin untuk melakukan HIV / AIDS.Meskipun tidak didokumentasikan secara menyeluruh, perdagangan seks diyakini secara luas telah meningkat tajam sebagai perempuan terluka oleh krisis ekonomi mencari sarana pendukung bagi keluarga mereka.Kirsty Sword-Gusmao, istri kemerdekaan Timor Timur Xanana Gusmao, dilaporkan pers internasional pada bulan November 2000, bahwa 33 hamil Wanita Timor Timur yang telah kembali ke Timor Timur, mengklaim bahwa mereka diculik dan dipaksa menjadi budak seks untuk TNI di Timor Barat.Banyak perkawinan seperti itu tidak dianggap sebagai hukum, dan anak yang dilahirkan dari mereka dianggap lahir di luar nikah. Beberapa gadis-gadis itu masih berusia 14 tahun. Jika pernikahan tersebut gagal, para wanita tidak memiliki jalur hukum. Menurut sebuah sumber, ada sebanyak 10.000 Sino-perempuan Indonesia dari Sinkawang hidup di Taiwan yang status hukum tidak pasti.Salah satu taktik yang umum digunakan adalah untuk menawarkan perempuan muda di daerah pedesaan pekerjaan sebagai pelayan atau pegawai hotel di daerah yang jauh, biasanya di resort pulau.Ada banyak laporan penganiayaan buruh Indonesia, khususnya perempuan, di Arab Saudi.Pemerintah, dalam menanggapi publikasi negatif dan upaya LSM, mengambil langkah untuk memperbaiki kondisi buruh migran perempuan di negeri ini dan untuk meningkatkan perlindungan konsuler bagi mereka bekerja di luar negeri, namun, banyak perempuan tetap rentan. Berbeda dengan pernyataan LSM, konsorsium perekrut tenaga kerja bersikeras bahwa rekening penyalahgunaan parah buruh migran perempuan pengecualian untuk norma.Meskipun ada hukum yang dirancang untuk melindungi anak dari pelecehan seksual, pelacuran, dan inses, pemerintah belum melakukan upaya penegakan khusus di bidang ini. Pejabat pemerintah yang korup, beberapa di antaranya terlibat dalam perdagangan manusia sendiri, pada waktu yang menghambat upaya penegakan yang membahayakan kepentingan keuangan mereka.Kelompok agama Muslim bereaksi terhadap kelambanan pemerintah yang dirasakan terhadap prostitusi dengan mencoba untuk memerangi masalah sendiri. Kelompok Muslim 'penggerebekan dan penghancuran rumah bordil dan tempat-tempat lain yang diduga terlibat dalam prostitusi, termasuk panti pijat, bar karaoke dan klub malam, peningkatan frekuensi dan agresivitas selama tahun berjalan (lihat Bagian 1.c.).Setidaknya selusin LSM yang aktif dalam memerangi perdagangan manusia. Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan memfasilitasi program kesadaran masyarakat di Jakarta untuk mendidik perempuan muda tentang bahaya perdagangan manusia.
Advokasi Anak Indonesia Foundation dan Pekerja pekerjaan City Group Sosial untuk menghilangkan pekerjaan anak di jermal jermal di Sumatera Utara. Mitra Perempuan LSM, mengoperasikan hotline untuk merekam kasus penyalahgunaan dan membantu perempuan korban kekerasan. Masalah-masalah Bahasa Indonesia Yayasan Kesejahteraan Anak anekdot laporan tentang insiden perdagangan manusia. Para pekerja anak payung organisasi, JARAK (Jaringan LSM untuk Program Aksi untuk Hilangkan Pekerja Anak di Indonesia), memiliki 63 anggota organisasi di 15 provinsi dan terlibat dalam upaya penghapusan semua aspek pekerja anak, termasuk perdagangan manusia.
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